This paper attempts to provide a more plausible theory of moral accountability and the crucial role in it of moral address by taking seriously four "marginal" cases of agency: psychopaths, moral fetishists, and individuals with autism and mild intellectual disabilities. Each case motivates the addition of another key accountability capacity.

A significant theme in the work of Gary Watson is the idea that responsibility relations involve the addressing of moral demands to other agents. But both the nature of moral address, and its bearing on other moral debates, remain somewhat obscure. This chapter offers an interpretation of moral address in terms of the Strawson-style reactive attitudes. On the basis of this interpretation, it goes on to explore the significance of moral address for (...) questions about the conditions of moral responsibility and about the ultimate nature of moral requirements. In the process, some particular Watsonian themes are discussed: the nature of the moral demands commonly associated with moral address; the fact that moral address frequently turns on interpersonal accountability; and the limits of moral address, seen in the requirement that it be directed to individuals who have the capacity to understand and respond to such demands. (shrink)

While Strawsonians have focused on the way in which our “reactive attitudes”—the emotions through which we hold one another responsible for manifestations of morally significant quality of regard—express moral demands, serious doubt has been cast on the idea that non-blaming reactive attitudes direct moral demands to their targets. Building on Gary Watson’s proposal that the reactive attitudes are ‘forms of moral address’, this paper advances a communicative view of praise according to which the form of (...) class='Hi'>moral address distinctive of the praise-manifesting reactive attitudes (approbation, gratitude) is moral invitation. Like moral demand, moral invitation is a species of directive address presupposing its target’s possession of distinctive agential capacities and, when valid, provides its addressee with reason to give the addressor’s directive discursive uptake. While blame’s demands issue imperatival reasons for compliance (e.g. to acknowledge wrongdoing, apologize, etc.), praise’s invitations provide discretionary reasons to accept credit in jointly valuing the significance of the act for the praiser. In addition to its phenomenological plausibility and contribution to the already fecund Watsonian-cum-Strawsonian program, the invitational view helps render intelligible the power of our praise practices to facilitate the formation and enrichment of our interpersonal relationships. (shrink)

The moral community is a social community, and as such it is vulnerable to social problems and pathologies. In this essay I identify a particular way in which participation in the moral community can be constrained by social factors. I argue that features of the social world—including power imbalances, oppression, intergroup conflict, communication barriers, and stereotyping—can make it nearly impossible for some members of the moral community to hold others responsible for wrongdoing. Specifically, social circumstances prevent some (...) marginalized people from engaging in what Stephen Darwall calls “felicitous moral address” (Darwall 2006). We should think of some members of the moral community as having “second-class moral citizenship” in ways that parallel second-class political citizenship. The injustice of second-class moral citizenship can be understood by drawing an analogy with Miranda Fricker’s notion of “epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2007). Fricker’s account of how people can be undermined in their capacity as knowers can be extended to show how people can be undermined in their capacity as makers of moral claims, which can be called “claimant injustice”. (shrink)

Acts of interpersonal moral address depend upon a shared space of social visibility in which human beings can both display themselves and perceive others as morally important. This raises questions that have gone largely undiscussed in recent philosophical work on moral address. How does the social mediation of interpersonal perception by forces such as ideology shape and limit the possibilities for moral address? And how might creative acts of putting oneself on display make possible (...) unanticipated forms of moral address, especially under ideological conditions? In this paper, I propose that we can make progress towards answering such questions by treating moral address as a fundamentally aesthetic phenomenon. I begin by drawing examples from literature that invite the idea that humans and animals possess ethically value-laden features that are open to empirical view, and argue that approaches to moral address that do not avail themselves of this idea face serious limits, focusing on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint. I then illustrate the role of the aesthetic in moral address by offering a reading of the “Capitol Crawl,” a 1990 direct action in which people with disabilities left behind assistive devices in order to ascend the stairs leading to the US Capitol. Drawing from some ideas in Iris Murdoch, I argue that the aesthetically striking features of this collective act of moral address are inseparable from the moral demands it expresses, and that, read as an aesthetic whole, its morally expressive power extends beyond the discursive while nevertheless remaining a part of the space of reasons. (shrink)

This article evaluates communicative approaches to responsibility within the Strawsonian tradition. These approaches consider reactive attitudes to be forms of moral address and consider responsiveness to moral address a condition on responsible agency. The article consists of a critical and a positive part. In the first part, I identify a risk for these theories. They often provide an overly narrow account of how we can communicate with others about perceived moral disregard. I argue that, when (...) read this way, a conversational approach has implausible implications and falls prey to a familiar objection to Strawsonian theory: it would incorporate social injustices inherent to our responsibility practices. In particular, it would affirm ableist attitudes towards autistic individuals, by exempting them as moral agents on the basis of irrelevant criteria. In the second part, I propose an inclusive reading of the communicative approach. This inclusive account steers clear of ableism towards autistic individuals and accommodates diversity. Although it is also derived from our practices and psychologies, it does not incorporate the biases and injustices that are part of those practices, and instead it provides us with a means to criticize them. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, on a reductionist reading of Buddhist no-self ontology, Buddhists could not have sincere ethical intentions toward persons. And if Buddhists cannot have sincere intentions toward persons, they cannot have second-personal moral reasons for acting. From this I conclude that Buddhists fail to qualify as genuine members of the moral community if, as some contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophers argue, such membership depends on an individual agent’s having the capacity to be motivated by (...) second-personal moral reasons. (shrink)

This paper argues that punishment operates through metaphorical substitution rather than genuine communication, and that the communicative theories of punishment developed by Duff, Bennett, Tadros, and others presuppose forms of communicative success that punishment’s structure cannot deliver. The relationship between an offence and its punishment is not natural or logical but semantic: a culturally constituted correspondence that carries the characteristic indeterminacy of metaphor. Drawing on recent work on standing to blame, the conditions of felicitous moral address, and the (...) expressive dimensions of punishment, the paper shows that punishment’s metaphorical structure generates an opacity that prevents offenders from reliably receiving the moral messages communicative theories attribute to it. Restorative approaches to crime succeed communicatively where punishment fails, because they employ direct speech rather than metaphorical substitution and create dialogical conditions under which meaning can be iteratively refined. (shrink)

We are often uncertain how to behave morally in complex situations. In this controversial study, Ted Lockhart contends that moral philosophy has failed to address how we make such moral decisions. Adapting decision theory to the task of decision-making under moral uncertainly, he proposes that we should not always act how we feel we ought to act, and that sometimes we should act against what we feel to be morally right. Lockhart also discusses abortion extensively and (...) proposes new ways to deal with the ethical and moral issues which surround it. (shrink)

I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I (...) then re-examine the evidence which is supposed to support this claim. In doing so, I provide a novel suggestion for how to analyze the reliability of intuitions in empirical studies. Analysis of the evidence suggests that moral intuitions subject to framing effects are in fact much more reliable than perhaps was thought, and that Sinnott-Armstrong has not succeeded in showing that noninferential justification has been defeated. (shrink)

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength has been (...) largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain-specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. (shrink)

P.F. Strawson defends compatibilism by appeal to our natural commitment to the interpersonal community and the reactive attitudes. While Strawson''s compatibilist project has much to recommend it, his account of moral agency appears incomplete. Gary Watson has attempted to fortify Strawson''s theory by appeal to the notion of moral address. Watson then proceeds to argue, however, that Strawson''s theory of moral responsibility (so fortified) would commit Strawson to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. Watson also (...) argues that the reactive attitudes do not lend unequivocal support to Strawsonian compatibilism and that the reactive attitudes are sometimes sensitive to considerations which suggest an incompatibilist or skeptical diagnosis. Watson attempts to provide a Strawsonian defense against these difficulties, but he ultimately concludes that the skeptical threats raised against Strawsonian compatibilism cannot be sufficiently silenced. I believe that Watson has done Strawsonian compatibilism a great service by drawing upon the notion of moral address. In this paper I attempt to defend the Strawsonian compatibilist position, as Watson has cast it, against the problems raised by Watson. I argue against Watson that Strawson''s theory of responsibility, as well as the notion of moral address, does not commit the Strawsonian to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. I also argue that Watson misinterprets the point of certain reactive attitudes and thereby wrongly assumes that these attitudes are evidence against Strawsonian compatibilism. (shrink)

We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral (...) bioenhancement should be sought and applied. We argue that cognitive enhancement and technological progress raise acute problems because it is easier to harm than to benefit. We address objections to this argument. We also respond to objections that moral bioenhancement: (1) interferes with freedom; (2) cannot be made to target immoral dispositions precisely; (3) is redundant, since cognitive enhancement by itself suffices. (shrink)

Is there a category of ‘phthonic’ or malicious humour that is morally wrong because it endorses negative stereotypes, or is humour always or for the most part morally neutral? De Sousa argues that humour that trades in racist or sexist stereotypes involves an implicit endorsement of those attitudes. To think otherwise while telling or laughing at jokes that depend on pernicious stereotypes to land is to engage in self-deception, either of belief or emotion. His critics label this view as extreme (...) and advocate for the dissociation of humour from any endorsement of immoral attitudes. It is argued here that while de Sousa’s critics are right that a joke teller need not be either asserting or implying the truth of an associated stereotype, it cannot be inferred from this that the dissociationist thesis is correct—that is, that the status of such humour as humorous is independent of pernicious stereotypes. Utilising speech act theory, an analysis of such jokes is then given that explains why they enjoy immunity to criticism, with the consequence that such jokes threaten to undermine our rationality, not just our morality. This claim is born out empirically in disparagement humour studies that suggest that jokes function psychologically to impede argument scrutiny. The complexities of self-deprecating and reclaimed humour are then explained in terms of shifts in joke frames that render the apparent ‘butt’ of the joke (the speaker) the winner and the ‘other’ (the out-group audience) the loser, unless the audience can position themselves morally to laugh with not at the butt of the joke and, with good measure, at themselves. Such jokes, properly understood, can thus be seen as playing an important role in promoting the intellectual and moral virtue of humility. (shrink)

Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with a challenge to (...) realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully. Others beg the question against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that—when carefully stated—can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement. Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight, I conclude, against moral realism. (shrink)

According to longtermism, present persons ought to promote the value of the far future. While this view has so far been primarily discussed within a consequentialist normative framework, less has been said about what longtermism entails from a deontological perspective. This paper aims to address this shortcoming. I argue that, from a deontological standpoint, distant future people have a present moral status qua “expected persons”. Therefore, they have at least some present rights qua moral status-holders. But distant (...) future people do not have equal moral status at the present time. Therefore, their present rights are not as stringent as those of present persons, other things being equal. However, I demonstrate that the most fundamental longtermist concerns do not rest on a commitment to intergenerational moral equality: even if distant future people are not our moral equals, respecting their present rights should be a key moral priority of our time. (shrink)

This paper defends Periodic Process Realism (PPR): the view that metric time is physically grounded in stable recurring processes rather than in an independent temporal container or in spacetime geometry alone. The thesis is realist—periodicities exist independently of observers—but anti-substantival: no further temporal medium is required beyond the processes that furnish temporal metric. PPR is orthogonal to the A-theory/B-theory debate about temporal ontology; it instead challenges the standard Eternalist assumption that metric temporal structure is given by geometry without reference to (...) the physical processes through which it becomes determinate. The argument distinguishes temporal order, temporal metric, temporal direction, and lived temporality, and locates periodicity specifically at the metric layer. Four lines of support are developed. First, modern chronometry and metrology define and stabilize temporal units through recurrent phenomena, and the corrective apparatus of metrology reveals an asymmetry between convention and physical periodicity. Second, a conceptual argument bridges measurement and ontology: stable recurrence is not merely how we measure metric time but a physical grounding condition for metric comparability. Third, a universal-acceleration thought experiment shows that background temporal frameworks do no explanatory work unless physically realized in processes. Fourth, the view is compatible with relativity and with relational approaches to time in quantum theory. Objections concerning non-periodic duration, thermodynamic directionality, Shoemaker-style time without change, Bergsonian durée, and the first-completed-cycle problem are addressed. The result is a layered account of temporality: physical process supplies temporal order, stable periodicity supplies the temporal metric, thermodynamic entropy supplies the arrow of time, and consciousness supplies lived temporal experience. (shrink)

Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions provides an account of how we might effectively address wrongdoing given challenges to the legitimacy of anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. The issue is introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 asks how we might conceive of blame without retribution, and proposes an account of blame as moral protest, whose function is to secure forward-looking goals such as the moral reform of the wrongdoer (...) and reconciliation in relationships. Chapter 3 considers whether it's possible to justify effectively dealing those who pose dangerous threats if they do not deserve to be harmed, and contends that wrongfully posing a threat is the core condition for the legitimacy of defensive harming. Chapter 4 provides an account of how to treat criminals without a retributive justification for punishment, and argues for an account in which the right of self-defense provides justification for measures such as preventative detention. Chapter 5 considers how we might forgive if wrongdoers don't basically deserve the pain of being resented, which forgiveness would then renounce, and proposes that forgiveness be conceived instead as renunciation of the stance of moral protest. Chapter 6 considers how personal relationships might function without retributive anger having a role in responding to wrongdoing, and contends that the stance of moral protest, supplemented with non-retributive emotions, is sufficient. Chapter 7 surveys the options for theistic and atheistic attitudes regarding the fate of humanity in a deterministic universe, and defends an impartial hope for humanity. (shrink)

We propose the Singularity–Duality–Triality (S-D-T) framework, a constrained meta-theoretical heuristic for characterizing systems in which stable higher-order organization emerges through mediation between competing dynamical structures, not a first-order physical theory. The framework addresses a question with roots in wave-particle complementarity: whether process-first descriptions reveal structural constraints that object-first descriptions systematically miss. Just as treating a photon as an interfering wavefunction rather than a particle reveals interference structure the particle description cannot access—a methodological rather than physical parallel—S-D-T proposes that treating a (...) system's organization as a generative process reveals the mediating constraint responsible for its stability—a reframing the framework is proposed to extend across physical, biological, and informational domains. Three contributions follow: (i) a formal definition of Triality with exclusion criteria and an operational novelty test; (ii) a framework-level falsification condition (F0) with pre-specification requirements; and (iii) the SAF (Stability–Adaptability–Functionality) Coherence Index, a domain-agnostic composite metric derived from the triadic grammar. A minimal dynamical model demonstrates that triadic stabilization is non-reducible to parameter variation within the dual system. The framework's validity depends on whether triadic mediation proves necessary in systems meeting the specified criteria. (shrink)

Slow codes—insincere attempts at resuscitation—are widely regarded in medicine and medical ethics as morally impermissible. My goal here is to enrich this special issue on the slow code with an argument for the permissibility of slow codes that is rooted in moral psychology. Specifically, if we take seriously the results from moral psychology, the slow code is not only permissible, it is often the best option. The context of the decision about whether to perform a slow code is (...) analogous to thoroughly investigated moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem. In particular, when the trolley problem is framed as a trilemma, it becomes clear that the decisional context of the slow code is analogous to the famous moral dilemma. Since in the trolley problem the choice analogous to the slow code is the best choice, the slow code may be the best choice when facing patient or family requests for futile CPR. In establishing this claim, I address a range of objections to the slow code. I conclude with an empirically supported explanation of the conventional wisdom. Resistance to the slow code doesn't sprout from the act's moral properties, but from moral judgments influenced by other factors, such as emotion, physical distance, and personal force. (shrink)

Consciousness and confidence seem intimately related. Accordingly, some researchers use confidence ratings as a measure of, or proxy for, consciousness. Rosenthal discusses the potential connections between the two, and rejects confidence as a valid measure of consciousness. He argues that there are better alternatives to get at conscious experiences such as direct subjective reports of awareness (i.e. subjects’ reports of perceiving something or of the degree of visibility of a stimulus). In this chapter, we offer a different perspective. Confidence ratings (...) in general, and metacognitive measures in particular, may offer important advantages over subjective ratings. The arguments we offer here are supported by empirical, practical and socio-strategic considerations. However, we do not suggest consciousness and confidence are interchangeable. We recognize the limitations of confidence ratings in some experimental designs and for some research questions. Nevertheless, we also address a potential conceptual link between consciousness and confidence that stems from Rosenthal’s very own work on mental quality space theory. (shrink)

This original and compelling book argues that previous studies of John Stuart Mill's work have neglected his egalitarianism and thus seriously misunderstood his views. Morales demonstrates that Mill was fundamentally concerned with how the exercise of unjust or arbitrary power by some individuals over others sabotages the possibility of human well-being and social improvement. Mill therefore believed that 'perfect equality'--more than liberty--was the foundation of democracy and that democracy was a moral ideal for the organization of human life in (...) all of its dimensions. By reinterpreting Mill, Morales also challenges twentieth-century views of liberalism, and addresses its contemporary communitarian and feminist critics. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kants disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity (...) complexly engaged with multiple forms of self-knowledge. (shrink)

To find the neural substrates of consciousness, researchers compare subjects’ neural activity when they are aware of stimuli against neural activity when they are not aware. Ideally, to guarantee that the neural substrates of consciousness—and nothing but the neural substrates of consciousness—are isolated, the only difference between these two contrast conditions should be conscious awareness. Nevertheless, in practice, it is quite challenging to eliminate confounds and irrelevant differences between conscious and unconscious conditions. In particular, there is an often-neglected confound that (...) is crucial to eliminate from neuroimaging studies: task performance. Unless subjects’ task performance is matched (and hence perceptual signal processing is matched), researchers risk finding the neural correlates of perception, rather than conscious perception. Here, we discuss the theoretical motivations for the performance matching framework and review empirical demonstrations of, and theoretical inferences derived from, obtaining differences in consciousness while controlling for task performance. We summarize signal detection theoretic modeling frameworks that explain how it is that we can derive performance-matched differences in consciousness without the effect being trivially driven by differences in criterion setting, and also provide principles for designing experimental paradigms that yield performance-matched differences in awareness. Finally, we address potential technical and theoretical issues that stem from matching performance across conditions of awareness, and we introduce the notion of “triangulation” for designing comprehensive experimental sets that can better reveal the neural substrates of consciousness. (shrink)

Trudy Govier offers a sweeping moral critique of revenge, arguing that even non-violent, limited, acts of revenge are wrong, insofar as they necessarily treat the target as an instrument of the revenger’s satisfaction (offending against respect for persons) and thus morally diminish the revenger. I challenge Govier’s critique by broadening her account of revenge, focusing in particular on its communicative complexities. Revenge aims to address rather than use its target, I argue, for the revenger to be satisfied. It (...) is plausibly described as a kind of forcible persuasion, in which the revenger aims to convince her target of the target’s moral desert and the revenger’s moral authority. Nevertheless, the unilateral nature of this address and the morally simplistic worldview on which it depends present significant (and likely fatal) moral risks to any project of vengeance. (shrink)

We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue. The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more: -/- • (...) What would it take to be a moral expert? • Is anyone a moral expert, and if so, how could a non-expert identify one? • Is it in any way problematic to accept and follow the advice of a moral expert as opposed to coming to moral conclusions on your own? • What should we think and do when moral experts disagree about a practical ethical issue? -/- In what follows, we address these theoretical and practical questions about moral expertise. (shrink)

Although moral case deliberation (MCD) is evaluated positively as a form of clinical ethics support (CES), it has limitations. To address these limitations our research objective was to develop a thematic CES tool. In order to assess the philosophical characteristics of a CES tool based on MCDs, we drew on hermeneutic ethics and pragmatism. We distinguished four core characteristics of a CES tool: (a) focusing on an actual situation that is experienced as morally challenging by the user; (b) (...) stimulating moral inquiry into the moral concepts, questions and routines in the lived experience of the CES tool user; (c) stimulating moral learning by exploring other perspectives; and (d) incorporating contextual details. We provide an example of a CES tool developed for moral dilemmas over client autonomy. Our article ends with some reflections on the normativity of the CES tool, other application areas and the importance of evaluation studies of CES tools. (shrink)

Background Healthcare professionals, especially professional nurses, experience various types of moral suffering due to inevitable ethical conflicts. Moral resilience is recently proposed as a resource to address moral suffering. However, there is no tool to measure moral resilience in Chinese professional nurses. Aim This study aimed to translate the Rushton Moral Resilience Scale (RMRS) into Chinese and evaluate the psychometric properties of the Chinese version of RMRS (Chi-RMRS). Research design A methodological and descriptive research (...) design. Participants and research context A convenience sample of 411 Chinese professional nurses was recruited through an online survey platform between February and March 2023. Ethical considerations This study was approved by the Research Ethics Committees of the University and hospitals involved. Results The RMRS was translated and culturally adapted into a Chinese version. Neither floor nor ceiling effects were observed. The scale-level content validity index (CVI) was 0.922 with the item-level CVIs ranging from 0.833 to 1.000. The explanatory factor analysis (EFA) generated a three-factor structure for the Chi-RMRS, and the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) demonstrated the three-factor structure with factor loadings for each item ranging from 0.42 to 0.80. The scale-level Cronbach’s α coefficient was 0.811 with each dimension ranging from 0.717 to 0.821, and composite reliability (CR) coefficient for the overall scale was 0.920, with each dimension varying from 0.739 to 0.824. The standard error of measurement (SEM) and smallest detectable change (SDC) were 3.522 and 9.763, respectively. Discussion The Chi-RMRS is able to measure moral resilience of Chinese professional nurses, and has good validity and reliability. It can be used in research and practice to determine the level of moral resilience, thus helping nursing managers to monitor the status of Chinese professional nurses, then develop interventions to maintain the well-being of professional nurses and to ensure quality of care. (shrink)

This essay seeks to understand the domain and demands of reparative justice in terms of moral vulnerability. Significant harms raise the question of whether victims stand in truly reciprocal practices of accountability; if they do, they enjoy the power of calling others to account as well as bearing the liability of being accountable to others. In the aftermath of harms, victims’ moral vulnerability is tested: they may be exposed to the insult and injury of discovering that they do (...) not enjoy the moral standing of holding others accountable. While the occasion of reparative justice is significant wrongs and wrongful harms and losses, this essay argues that the aim of reparative practices is not only or even primarily to redress those harms and losses, but to address the moral vulnerability of victims by affirming their status in accountability relations. (shrink)

A neglected and non-trivial problem exists for a central cluster of Strawsonian accountability theories of moral responsibility, namely those that, following Gary Watson, understand the reactive attitudes to be implicit forms of moral address, particularly moral demand. The problem consists in the joint acceptance of two claims: (a) Accountability is a matter of agents holding one another to moral demands, and (b) accountability is a view of blame and praise. I label joint acceptance of these (...) claims the Strawsonian’s demand dogma. Symptomatic of a larger tendency among responsibility theorists to focus on blame to the neglect of its positive counterpart, the demand dogma saddles the Strawsonian with an impoverished and ultimately untenable view of praise. This is because moral demand occupies a dual role on the Strawsonian's view of blame, one that it is incapable of occupying for praise. For, demands figure not only in the contents of blame responses; demand typifies the form of these responses themselves. That is, reactive attitudes of blame, unlike those of praise, implicitly make demands of their targets. The force of this problem is highlighted by considering the inadequacy of various strategies for shoehorning “demand” into our conception of praise. If reactive attitudes generally are incipient forms of moral address, praise-manifesting attitudes must communicate something other than demand. Though primarily critical, this paper invites Strawsonian responsibility theorists to give renewed attention to the foundations of the proposal that the reactive attitudes are incipiently communicative, focusing this time on the form of address that lies at the heart of praise. (shrink)

Background: Pre-licensure ethics nursing education does not adequately prepare and instill confidence in nurses to address ethical issues, and yet ethics education provides nurses with greater confidence to take moral action, which can mitigate the negative effects of moral distress. Objectives: To assess the feasibility and acceptability of a nursing ethics education programme that included simulated case-based ethics competencies as a form of evaluation. The programme aimed at building nurses’ ethical knowledge and confidence to respond to ethical (...) challenges in practice. Research design: A prospective, longitudinal, correlational, single-cohort feasibility study using an investigator-developed survey and intervention field data. Participants and research context: Registered nurses were recruited from an academic quaternary-care medical center and 9 small- to mid-sized regional hospitals within one health system in the Midwest United States. Ethical considerations: IRB approval was obtained. Participants could complete the educational programme regardless of research process participation. Findings: Of 20 participants, 19 (95%) provided post-programme surveys and 18 completed competencies. Median (IQR) scores with quartiles for scheduling, timing, and length of sessions were all 10.0 [9.0, 10.0], and participants perceived that the content was interesting, increased knowledge and confidence in ethics, increased skills in providing ethical care, and would recommend the programme to colleagues. Of factors, an increase in ethics knowledge had the highest “always agree” (17, 89.5%) response. Most participants reported that ethics competencies were appropriate 9.0 [9.0, 10.0] and sufficiently challenging 10.0 [9.0, 10.0]. Discussion: The education programme developed nurses’ ethics knowledge and confidence. The single-cohort feasibility design provided early-stage intervention outcomes; however, a larger randomized controlled trial would substantiate programme value. Conclusion: This novel ethics education programme was highly feasible and acceptable to hospital-based nurses who reported increased knowledge and confidence in providing ethical care. Simulated case-based ethics competencies were an appropriate evaluation method. (shrink)

Insider trading refers to the practice of buying or selling assets on the basis of information that is not public. This paper asks if stakeholder theory can adequately address the ethics of insider trading. It argues that this practice involves two types of unfairness between insiders and society. First, an unfair allocation of benefits and burdens. Second, insiders obtain an additional benefit, that cannot be justified to others, from their privileged position. The paper argues that stakeholder theory is superior (...) to shareholder primacy, since it considers these obligations of fairness of insiders with society. However, stakeholder theory also has weaknesses; it ignores both the legal dimension of insider trading and cases that involve politicians, central bankers, the partner of insiders, among others. The paper concludes that responsibility models in business ethics cannot address the whole moral wrong of insider trading, and hence, they should be complemented with models of responsibility in political theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Ethics can be understood as a code of behaviour or as the study of codes of behaviour. While the mission of the International Association of Bioethics is a scholarly examination of moral issues in health care and the biological sciences, many people in the field believe that it is also their task to create new and better codes of practice. Both ways of doing bioethics are sound, but it is important to be aware of the distinction. In this (...) paper, I will study the sources and aims of ethics and suggest a code of conduct for bioethicists based on recognition, responsibility, and respect. (shrink)

Moral disengagement is the process by which individuals mitigate the consequences of their own violations of moral standards. Although MD is understood to be co-determined by culture norms, no study has yet explored the extent to which MD applied to safety at work fosters safety violations, nor the role of organizational culture as a predictor of JS-MD. The current study seeks to address this gap in the literature by examining individual- and organizational-level factors that explain why employees (...) fail to report workplace accidents. We tested a latent variable structural model positing organizational culture typologies as predictors of JS-MD, which in turn is expected to mediate the relationship with accident underreporting. Using data from 1033 employees in 28 Italian organizations, findings suggest that bureaucratic safety culture was related to lower levels of JS-MD, whereas technocratic safety culture was related to greater JS-MD. In turn, JS-MD positively predicted employee accident underreporting and fully mediated the relationship between culture and underreporting. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in light of the increasing focus on underreporting as well as the adverse individual and organizational consequences of failing to report workplace accidents. (shrink)

In a world of industralized farming and feed lots, is eating meat ever a morally responsible choice? Is eating organic or free range sufficient to change the moral equation? Is there a moral cost in not eating meat? As billions of animals continue to be raised and killed by human beings for human consumption, affecting the significance and urgency in answering these questions grow. This volume collects twelve new essays by leading moral philosophers who address the (...) difficult questions surrounding meat eating by examining various implications and consequences of our food choices. Some argue for the moral permissibility of eating meat by suggesting views such as farm animals would not exist and flourish otherwise, and the painless death that awaits is no loss to them. Others consider more specific examples like whether buying french fries at McDonalds is just as problematic as ordering a Big Mac due to the action's indirect support of a major purveyor of meat. The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat is a stimulating contribution to the ongoing debate on meat consumption and actively challenges readers to reevlaute their stand on food and animal ethics. (shrink)

Situated within the framework of Confucian family-oriented ethics, this book explores the issue of familial partiality and specifically discusses whether it is morally praiseworthy to love one's family partially. In reviewing the tension between familial partiality and egalitarian impartiality from different perspectives while also drawing on binary metrics to understand the issue - that is, the weak and strong sense of familial partiality in Confucian moral theory - the author carefully discusses the efficacy of three major arguments to justify (...) moral partiality. It is concluded that the tree argument fails to justify moral partiality in Confucianism, the evolutionary argument only justifies moral partiality in the weak sense that we should devote more resources to our family, and the care argument fails to justify moral partiality in the strong sense that family takes priority in any case even at the expense of the principle of justice. Seeking to address the quandary, the author advances an alternative argument based on Thomas Aquinas' theory of love to interpret Confucian view of partial relationships, holding that partial treatment is assumed in partial relationships. The title will appeal to scholars and students interested in Confucianism, Chinese Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, and Comparative Philosophy. (shrink)

How does moral progress occur? This paper develops a naturalistic account grounded in cultural evolution. We argue that modern morality emerged through institutions facilitating cooperation among increasingly extensive networks of strangers. This process introduced a novel normative infrastructure including expanded moral status, social individualism, moral egalitarianism, political liberalism, and a robust is-ought distinction. We begin by addressing why evolutionary accounts historically struggled to explain moral traits, particularly altruism and cooperation beyond kin groups. We then characterize modern (...) morality and its key features, focusing on the puzzle of the inclusivist anomaly: the granting of moral status to individuals independently of their strategic cooperation value. Drawing on recent research on kinship intensity and institutional development, we explain how the cultural evolution of impersonal prosociality emerged from the destruction of tight kinship institutions in Western and Central Europe over 1.5 millennia. Church policies against cousin marriage, polygamy, and other kinship practices weakened intensive kinship networks, enabling new forms of cooperation among unrelated strangers. Finally, we address whether this genealogical account debunks or vindicates modern morality. We argue that understanding the contingent historical origins of modern morality need not undermine its normative authority, while acknowledging ongoing challenges to its universalization. (shrink)

The current chapter provides an overview of research on responses in moral dilemmas where maximization of outcomes for the greater good (utilitarianism) conflicts with adherence to moral norms (deontology). Expanding on a description of the traditional paradigm to study moral-dilemma judgments (i.e., the trolley problem), the chapter reviews the most prominent dual-process account of moral-dilemma judgments, normative conclusions that have been derived from this account, and criticisms raised against this line of work. The following sections review (...) advances in the development of alternative approaches that aim to address shortcomings of the traditional dilemma paradigm as well as the implications of this work for psychological theories of moral-dilemma judgments and philosophical inferences about the normative implications of moral-dilemma research. The chapter concludes with a review of research on the links between moral-dilemma judgments and social impressions. (shrink)

Brain organoid research raises ethical challenges not seen in other forms of stem cell research. Given that brain organoids partially recapitulate the development of the human brain, it is plausible that brain organoids could one day attain consciousness and perhaps even higher cognitive abilities. Brain organoid research therefore raises difficult questions about these organoids' moral status – questions that currently fall outside the scope of existing regulations and guidelines. This paper shows how these gaps can be addressed. We outline (...) a moral framework for brain organoid research that can address the relevant ethical concerns without unduly impeding this important area of research. (shrink)

Introduction Patient safety is essential for healthcare quality and a global concern. The rapid advancement of medical technology presents ethical challenges for critical care nurses, who navigate complex decision-making processes. Given their close relationships with patients, nurses are uniquely positioned to address patient safety issues. Thus, enhancing nurses’ moral sensitivity and ethical values is increasingly important. Objective This study aims to explore the relationship between moral sensitivity and attitude towards patient safety in critical care nurses. Methods This (...) cross-sectional, descriptive-correlational study was conducted from June to September 2022 in three hospitals affiliated with Hamadan University of Medical Sciences in Iran. Participants were nurses in intensive care units (ICUs), selected via convenience sampling. A total of 382 nurses completed questionnaires assessing demographic information, moral sensitivity, and patient safety attitudes. Data analysis was performed using descriptive statistics, t-tests, ANOVA, Pearson’s correlation, and multiple regression in SPSS 26. Ethical considerations: This research received ethical approval from the Ethics Committee of Hamadan University of Medical Sciences. Participants provided informed consent regarding the study’s objectives, and their confidentiality was strictly upheld throughout the research. Results The nurses’ average age and work experience were 38.6 years and 12.4 years, respectively. Mean scores for moral sensitivity and patient safety attitude were 81.65 ± 2.69 and 51.47 ± 2.21, indicating high levels and a significant positive correlation. Factors such as increasing age, work experience, fewer working hours, and completion of ethics training were linked to more positive attitudes towards patient safety ( p <.05). Regression analysis showed that 42.8% of the variability in attitudes towards patient safety could be explained by moral sensitivity and demographic characteristics. Conclusion This study highlights the relationship between moral sensitivity and patient safety attitudes among critical care nurses, emphasizing the importance of education, experience, and training in shaping ethical values. Enhancing moral sensitivity is vital for reducing risky behaviors and improving patient safety outcomes in critical care settings. (shrink)

People have concerns, and ethicists often respond to them with philosophical arguments. But can conceptual constructions properly address fears and anxieties? It is argued in this paper that while it is possible to voice, clarify, create and—to a certain extent—tackle concerns by arguments, more concrete practices, choices, and actions are normally needed to produce proper responses to people’s worries. While logical inconsistencies and empirical errors can legitimately be exposed by arguments, the situation is considerably less clear when it comes (...) to moral, cultural, and emotional norms, values, and expectations. (shrink)

What should we do when we are not certain about what we morally should do? There is a long history of theorizing about decision-making under empirical uncertainty, but surprisingly little has been written about the moral uncertainty expressed by this question. Only very recently have philosophers started to systematically address the nature of such uncertainty and its impacts on decision-making. This paper addresses the main problems raised by moral uncertainty and critically examines some proposed solutions.

In this paper, I show how a pragmatist stance may address the problem of the resolvability of moral conflicts. Pragmatism challenges skeptical and relativist views by arguing that moral conflict resolution is possible via inquiry and exchange of reasons. From a normative standpoint, pragmatism also differs from utilitarian and deontological views, according to which a specific moral theory is correct in every context. From a pragmatist point of view, both utilitarian and deontological responses can be justified, (...) depending on contextual conditions and reasons, on the people to whom reasons are offered, and on constraints of inclusivity, publicity, empirical accuracy, and coherence. Pragmatism’s empiricist method for solving conflicts and making normative adjustments can be seen as a form of reflective equilibrium, where moral beliefs and commitments are adjusted in light of new non-moral knowledge, such as evidence about the reliability of decision processes. Recent empirical research also supports pragmatism’s pluralist and flexible approach more than monistic and generalist normative views like deontology and utilitarianism. (shrink)

An experimental survey was undertakento explore the links between thecharacteristics of a moral issue, the degree ofmoral intensity/moral imperative associatedwith the issue, and people'sstated willingness to pay for policy toaddress the issue. Two farm animal welfareissues were chosen for comparison and thecontingent valuation method was used to elicitpeople's wtp. The findings of the surveysuggest that increases in moral characteristicsdo appear to result in an increase in moralintensity and the degree of moral imperativeassociated with an issue. Moreover, (...) there was apositive link between moral intensity/moralimperative associated with an issue andpeople's stated wtp for policy to address theissue. The paper discusses the relevance of thefindings of the survey in the context of thedebate concerning the relationship betweenmoral and economic values and the use of thecontingent valuation method to estimatepeople's wtp of policy options with moraldimensions. (shrink)

Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral status and presenting (...) two models of degrees of moral status. It then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion. (shrink)

Suffering is an unavoidable reality in health care. Not only are patients and families suffering but also the clinicians who care for them. Commonly the suffering experienced by clinicians is moral in nature, reflecting the increasing complexity of health care, their roles within it, and the expanding range of available interventions. Moral suffering is the anguish experienced in response to various forms of moral adversity including moral harms, wrongs or failures, or unrelieved moral stress. Confronting (...) moral adversity challenges clinicians' integrity: the inner harmony that arises when their essential values and commitments are aligned with their choices and actions. The most studied response to moral adversity is moral distress. The sources and sequelae of moral distress, one type of moral suffering, have been documented among clinicians across specialties. Recent interest has expanded to include a more corrosive form of moral suffering, moral injury. Moral resilience, the capacity to restore or sustain integrity in response to moral adversity, offers a path designing individual and system solutions to address moral suffering. It encompasses capacities aimed at developing self- regulation and self-awareness, buoyancy, moral efficacy, self-stewardship and ultimately personal and relational integrity. Moral resilience has been shown to be a protective resource that reduces the detrimental impact of moral suffering. Clinicians and healthcare organizations must work together to transform moral suffering by cultivating the individual capacities for moral resilience and designing a new architecture to support ethical practice. Used worldwide for scalable and sustainable change, the Conscious Full Spectrum Response, offers a method to solve problems to support integrity, shift patterns that undermine moral resilience and ethical practice, and source the inner potential of clinicians and leaders to produce meaningful and sustainable results that benefit all. (shrink)

This article identifies limitations in traditional approaches to engineering ethics pedagogy, reflected in an overreliance on disaster case studies. Researchers in the field have pointed out that these approaches tend to occlude ethically significant aspects of day-to-day engineering practice and thus reductively individualize and decontextualize ethical decision-making. Some have proposed, as a remedy for these defects, the use of research and theory from Science and Technology Studies to enrich our understanding of the ways in which technology and engineering practice are (...) intricated in social and institutional contexts. While endorsing this approach, this article also argues that STS scholarship may not sufficiently address the kinds of questions about normativity and agency that are essential to engineering ethics. It proposes making use of the growing body of research in a field called “postphenomenology,” an approach that combines STS research with the traditional phenomenological concern with the standpoint of lived-experience. Postphenomenology offers a method of inquiry that combines STS’s investigation into social and institutional dimensions of technology with phenomenological reflection on our lived experience of embodied engagement with technical objects and sociotechnical systems, particularly the ways in which these involvements affect our moral perception and agency. The aim in using this approach in engineering ethics is thus to illuminate moral dimensions of everyday professional life of which practitioners may not typically be aware. The article concludes with some concrete curricular interventions for engineering ethics classrooms. (shrink)