Zu den wichtigsten Entwicklungen der Diskussion der Frage, ob Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung einerseits, und der Determinismus andererseits miteinander vereinbar sind, zählen nach verbreiteter Ansicht die Überwindung der Konditionalanalyse von Freiheit, sowie der wachsende Zweifel daran, dass alternative Möglichkeiten Voraussetzung für Verantwortung sind. In meiner Habilitationsschrift versuche ich zu zeigen, dass beide Entwicklungen Irrwege sind. Das Buch gliedert sich in zwei Hauptteile. Im ersten Teil wird der Begriff der praktischen Fähigkeit bzw. der Handlungs- und Willensfreiheit analysiert. Unter welchen Bedingungen kann (...) ein Akteur etwas anderes als das tun, was er faktisch tut, bzw. unter welchen Bedingungen ist ein Akteur frei, anders zu handeln? In der philosophischen Diskussion dieser Frage ist traditionell ein zentraler Aspekt, ob zu diesen Bedingungen auch Indetermination zählt. Philosophen, die die Freiheit, anders zu handeln, für kompatibel mit dem Determinismus halten, haben oftmals eine konditionale Analyse von Freiheit/Können vertreten (Augustin, Hobbes, Hume, Moore, Tugendhat). Gegen diese Analyse sind jedoch zahlreiche Einwände erhoben worden, die von den meisten Philosophen, auch von Kompatibilisten, für triftig gehalten werden. Ich versuche im ersten Teil, die Konditionalanalyse gegen die erhobenen Einwände zu verteidigen. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit geht es um die Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen Akteure moralisch verantwortlich gemacht werden können. Diese Frage ist mit der Frage nach der Fähigkeit, anders zu handeln, dadurch verbunden, dass einer lange unbestrittenen Annahme zufolge jemand nur dann moralisch verantwortlich sein kann, wenn er anders hat handeln können. Diese Annahme ist in neuerer Zeit – im Gefolge Harry Frankfurts – angezweifelt worden. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass die Annahme dennoch richtig ist. Ich entwickle eine an Überlegungen Peter Strawsons angelehnte Analyse von moralischer Verantwortung, der zufolge ein Akteur moralisch verantwortlich für ein Ereignis ist, wenn er in einer kausalen Beziehung zu ihm steht, welche Rückschlüsse auf die moralische Qualität seines Willens ermöglicht. Durch eine Analyse der Adäquatheitsbedingungen moralischer Beurteilung von Akteuren versuche ich zu zeigen, dass die relevanten Kausalbeziehungen dann bestehen, wenn eine bestimmte Konditionalanalyse die Fähigkeit zuschreibt, anders zu handeln. Alternative Möglichkeiten im Sinne dieser Analyse sind notwendig und hinreichend für moralische Verantwortung. (shrink)

Luck egalitarians like Ronald Dworkin and G. A. Cohen claim that the influence of luck on the distribution of goods or welfare has to be equalized, whereas inequality must be accepted if the subjects bear responsibility for it. The paper investigates how this claim should be interpreted and if it is plausible. Analyzing several examples, I try to show that the spectrum of pertinent cases is much more limited than Dworkin and Cohen think. Sometimes it seems as if someone is (...) responsible for being in a worse position than someone else, while in fact they didn't have equal opportunities. Fitting cases of responsibility for inequality can be found when we focus on the outcomes of calculated gambles. But why, and what exactly are cases in point? What distinguishes the risk-taking of someone who buys a lottery ticket from that of a peasant who cultivates a piece of land, knowing that a storm might ruin the crop? I try to demonstrate that an ethically relevant difference occurs when the attitude towards risk differs. Would the agent prefer to receive the expected utility safely, or would she rather gamble? (shrink)

Strafe fügt Leid zu und bedarf deshalb der moralischen Rechtfertigung. Der Utilitarismus ist in der Lage, eine Rechtfertigung zu liefern: Strafe kann aufgrund ihrer präventiven Wirkung nutzenmaximierend wirken. Das Problem, das sich dem Utilitarismus stellt, besteht darin, dass utilitaristisch begründete Strafe oftmals im Konflikt mit drei zentralen moralischen Intuitionen steht: 1. Keine Unschuldigen dürfen bestraft werden. 2. Ist jemand moralisch gravierend schuldig, so muss er bestraft werden. 3. Das Strafmaß muss dem Grad der moralischen Schuld entsprechen. Der Konflikt entsteht, weil (...) der Utilitarismus als konsequentialistische Ethik zukunftsorientiert ist, während diese Intuitionen in die Vergangenheit blicken. (shrink)

The essays collected in this special issue of Critical Inquiry are devoted to reflection on the shifts in photographically based art practice, exhibition, and reception in recent years and to the changes brought about by these shifts in our understanding of photographic art. Although initiated in the 1960s, photography as a mainstream artistic practice has accelerated over the last two decades. No longer confined to specialist galleries, books, journals, and other distribution networks, contemporary art photographers are now regularly the subject (...) of major retrospectives in mainstream fine-art museums on the same terms as any other artist. One could cite, for example, Thomas Struth at the Metropolitan Museum in New York, Thomas Demand at the Museum of Modern Art, or Jeff Wall at Tate Modern and MoMA. Indeed, Wall's most recent museum show, at the time of writing, The Crooked Path at Bozar, Brussels, situated his photography in relation to the work of a range of contemporary photographers, painters, sculptors, performance artists, and filmmakers with whose work Wall considers his own to be in dialogue, irrespective of differences of media. All this goes to show that photographic art is no longer regarded as a subgenre apart. The situation in the United Kingdom is perhaps emblematic of both photography's increasing prominence and its increased centrality in the contemporary art world over recent years. Tate hosted its first ever photography survey, Cruel and Tender, as recently as 2003, and since then photography surveys have become a regular biannual staple of its exhibition programming, culminating in the appointment of Tate's first dedicated curator of photography in 2010. A major shift in the perception of photography as art is clearly well under way. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz handelt von den unterschiedlichen Formen des moralischen Zufalls. Ich werde die These vertreten, dass lediglich konstitutiver Zufall möglich ist, ergebnis- und willensbezogener hingegen nicht. Ich versuche außerdem zu zeigen, dass sich aus den Befunden bezüglich des moralischen Zufalls Konsequenzen für die Frage nach der Vereinbarkeit von moralischer Verantwortung und Determinismus ergeben, und zwar zugunsten des Kompatibilismus.

Joshua Knobe und andere haben empirische Belege für folgende rätsel- hafte Asymmetrie vorgelegt: Nebenfolgen, die lediglich in Kauf genommen werden, werden im Alltag als unabsichtlich bezeichnet, wenn sie positiv sind, jedoch als absichtlich, wenn sie negativ sind. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass dieser Asymmetrie ein symmetrisches Prinzip zugrunde liegt, das auf die kausalen Rollen abhebt, die bestimmte Eigenschaften von Akteuren für das Auftreten von Ereignissen spielen. Relevant sind hierbei Kausalrelationen, mit denen gewisse „Spiegelverhältnisse“ einhergehen: im Ereignis „spiegelt“ sich die Akteurseigenschaft (...) evaluativ und propositional. (shrink)

The conditional analysis interprets power/capability as disposition and gives it a counterfactual analysis. The phenomenon of finkishness poses a problem for this account. I argue that the conditional analysis has to be modified in order to solve these problems. The new analysis, I claim, is well suited to deal with Frankfurt-style scenarios as well, which conditional analyses are frequently thought to be incapable of.

Obgleich von vielen Moralphilosophen für obsolet erklärt, wird der moralische und politische Rekurs auf religiöse Traditionen von vielen Gläubigen keinesfalls als obsolet betrachtet. Ich untersuche, auf welchen Gründen diese Praxis basiert, und mit welchen Argumenten sie kritisiert werden kann. Es geht mir dabei ausschließlich um interne Kritik, um die Frage also, ob es aus der Perspektive der Gläubigen selbst gute Gründe gibt, darauf zu verzichten, partikulare religiöse Interessen zum Fundament allgemein verbindlicher intersubjektiver Forderungen zu machen. Hierbei sollen nicht pragmatische Gründe (...) im Vordergrund stehen, etwa das Fehlen von Machtmitteln; vielmehr soll gefragt werden, ob es Gründe gibt, einfach deshalb darauf zu verzichten, religiös fundierten Zwang auszuüben, weil es religiöse Gründe wären, die die Intoleranz motivierten. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass Gläubige bestimmte, von Moralphilosophen vorgetragene Argumente nicht akzeptieren müssen: weder machen Gläubige semantische Fehler, wenn sie religiös motivierte Forderungen erheben, noch müssen sie den speziellen, emphatischen Vernunftbegriff anerkennen, vor dessen Hintergrund solche Forderungen irrational erscheinen. Bereitschaft zur Toleranz nicht glaubenskompatibler Praktiken kann jedoch u.a. aus einer Reflexion auf den epistemischen Status des Glaubens erwachsen. (shrink)

Zweifellos ist es normalerweise moralisch falsch, eine Person zu töten. Was jedoch sind die Gründe? Im ersten Kapitel rekonstruiere ich einen der elaboriertesten Ansätze zur Ethik des Tötens: den zweigleisigen Ansatz Jeff McMahans. Das erste Gleis dieses Ansatzes basiert auf der konsequentialistischen Annahme, dass Töten insofern pro tanto falsch ist, als es beim Opfer objektiven Schaden erzeugt, indem es dieses der Güter beraubt, die es erlangt hätte, hätte es weiterleben können. Das zweite Gleis ist für Personen reserviert: Es baut auf (...) der kantianischen These auf, dass es stets im gleichem Maße falsch ist, Personen zu töten. Im zweiten Abschnitt erläutere ich, worin meiner Ansicht nach die Schwierigkeiten dieses Ansatzes liegen, und plädiere für eine Differenzierung zwischen subjektivem und objektivem Schaden. Im dritten Abschnitt argumentiere ich bezüglich des ersten Gleises für eine subjektivistische Variante des schadensbasierten Ansatzes. Im vierten Abschnitt diskutiere ich das zweite Gleis: die These der gleichen Schlechtigkeit der Tötung von Personen, und komme zu einem skeptischen Resultat. (shrink)

Davidson vertritt die Auffassung, daß Handlungen durch Gründe verursacht werden, daß Gründe als Werturteile zu analysieren sind, und daß die Befolgung der Norm „Vollziehe die Handlung, die du situativ als die beste beurteilst“ eine notwendige Bedingung für intentionales Handeln darstellt. Damit scheint eine bestimmte Form von Willensschwäche, das intentionale Unterlassen der Handlung, die man situativ als die beste beurteilt, aus begrifflichen Gründen ausgeschlossen, was vielfach als explanatorischer Nachteil einer solchen Handlungstheorie angesehen wird. Davidson bestreitet die begriffliche Unmöglichkeit. Um Willensschwäche zu (...) erklären, interpretiert er den Geist als unterteilt in Subsysteme, die, da ihre Binnenstruktrur der A-priori-Norm gemäß ist, auf partikular intentionale Weise interagieren können – mit dem möglichen Resultat, daß das Gesamtsystem die Norm verletzt und das Subjekt dennoch intentional handelt. Ich argumentiere, daß Handlungen, die durch solche irrationalen mentalen Kausalprozesse verursacht werden, mit einem Kontrollverlust verbunden sind, der mit der üblichen Phänomenbeschreibung von willensschwachem als freiem, kontrolliertem Handeln unvereinbar ist. Insofern das intentionale Handeln generell als vom Akteur kontrolliertes Handeln angesehen wird, muß innerhalb einer Handlungstheorie, wie Davidson sie vertritt, der propositionale Gehalt der vermeintlichen A-priori-Norm nicht normativ, sondern assertorisch qualifiziert werden: „Intentionales Handeln ist der Vollzug der situativ als die beste beurteilten Handlung.“. (shrink)

Die egalitaristische Position in der Debatte um distributive Gerechtigkeit wird üblicherweise so verstanden, dass sie die These enthält, der Relation der Gleichheit komme ein intrinsischer Wert zu. Diese These ist dem Levelling-down-Einwand ausgesetzt. Unter dem Eindruck dieses Einwandes ist vielfach argumentiert worden, Gerechtigkeit sei kein relationaler Begriff; Gerechtigkeit herrsche vielmehr dann, wenn nicht-relationale moralische Standards erfüllt seien. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass Gleichheit zwar tatsächlich keinen intrinsischen Wert besitzt, dass Gerechtigkeitsstandards jedoch nicht mit den non-relationalen Standards, auf die die Kritiker (...) des Egalitarismus verweisen, identisch sind. Es geht, so meine These, bei der Frage nach der gerechten Verteilung nämlich um die höherstufige Frage, ob die basalen non-relationalen moralischen Standards für alle gleichermaßen erfüllt sind. Gerechtigkeit besitzt auch ein genuines normatives Gewicht, das sich – wie auch das Gewicht der basalen moralischen Standards – aus bestimmten Präferenzen speist. Während die basale Moral im Mitleid fundiert ist, gründet die Gerechtigkeit in generalisiertem Neid. Neid jedoch ist von Missgunst zu unterscheiden, er fordert – anders als letztere – nicht levelling down, sondern levelling up. Der intrinsische Wert liegt somit nicht in der Gleichheit, sondern in der Angleichung nach oben. (shrink)

Desire-based concepts of practical reason are generally considered incapable of grounding the normativity of universalistic and egalitarian moral rules. This explains the popularity of both non-universalistic conceptions of morality, such as contractarianism, and emphatic notions of practical reason, as in the Kantian tradition. In contrast, I argue that the move from desire-based concepts to universalism is possible if altruistic/benevolent desires are adequately taken into account. Due to the nature of benevolent preferences, which virtually everybody has, far more people than usually (...) thought at least have pro tanto reasons to obey universal and egalitarian norms, moral weakness in many cases resulting only from cognitive deficiencies. I put forward a concept of external reasons compatible with a desire-based theory of practical rationality, which proves a usefull tool in the conceptualization of moral rationality as distinct from prudential rationality. Moral rationality, I argue, is based on the desires of the proponent of a moral claim, not on the desires of its addressees. (shrink)

Entspringt die Moral den Gefühlen, wie Hume meinte, oder der Vernunft, wie Kant behauptete? In jüngerer Zeit haben Philosophen wie Shaun Nichols, Jesse Prinz und Michael Slote versucht, diese Frage durch die Auswertung empirischer Studien entwicklungspsychologischer und psychiatrischer Provenienz zu klären. Auf den ersten Blick erscheint dieses Unterfangen hoffnungslos. Wie sollten empirische Befunde dabei helfen, metaethische und normative Fragen zu beantworten? Dieser Eindruck ist jedoch irrig, wie ich zu zeigen versuche. Analysiert man die Befunde der experimentellen Moralpsychologie, so legen sich (...) nicht nur Konsequenzen für die Metaethik nahe; Folgen ergeben sich auch für die Normative Ethik. (shrink)

Many incompatibilists and compatibilists agree that freedom is a precondition of moral responsibility. Many incompatibilists acknowledge that certain varieties of freedom are compatible with determinism. The dissent concerns the question of whether such compatibilist freedoms suffice for moral responsibility. The debate is stuck in a stalemate. I try to show that the stalemate can be overcome by approaching the question not in terms of freedom, but of responsibility. To call an agent morally responsible for an event is to claim that (...) a relation holds between her and the event which makes it possible to judge her morally in the light of the event. I argue that the relevant relations are causal ones, relations compatible with determinism. The moral assessment of an agent is in turn determined by the quality of her will. The question as to the quality of a will does not depend on its causal history, and so a fortiori is independent of whether this history unfolded in a determined way or not. Hence, both of the constitutive elements of moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. This compatibilist result can be reformulated in terms of freedom, thus overcoming the stalemate. (shrink)

A product harm crisis undermines a firm’s reputation as well as its managers’ career outlook. To shake off the stigmatization resulting from the PHC and regain a firm’s legitimacy among stakeholders, managers usually face an ethical dilemma as they choose to be transparent about the crisis’ financial implications or to obfuscate them to neutralize the negative impact of the PHC. We find evidence that managers engage in income-increasing earnings management when their firms experience PHCs. Moreover, while income-increasing earnings management in (...) PHCs reduces the likelihood of customer loss and CEO forced turnover in the short run, such behavior can be deemed opportunistic and unethical as it carries long-run negative consequences in terms of a higher likelihood of accounting restatement and weaker future operating performance. Finally, managers in firms that are subject to stricter external monitoring and managers in firms with proactive ethical policies are less likely to engage in upward earnings management in PHCs. (shrink)

This essay examines Claudio Magris’s literary production from the point of view of European normative ethics by drawing on recently-proposed theories of negative empathy and the hybrid hero. A brief overview of Magris’s narratives and characters—from Illazioni su una sciabola (1985) (Inferences from a Sabre, 1991) to Croce del Sud) [Southern cross] (2020)—shows his peculiar interpretation of such theories and how he repurposes them for ethical goals. This is followed by a close reading of Un altro mare (1991) (A Different (...) Sea, 2017) which presents in detail the narrative and stylistic devices adopted by the author to establish an emotional connection with readers that can stimulate empathic identification together with critical thinking. Finally, the essay demonstrates the central role of Magris’s work in a European ethical framework with the support of empirical evidence in the study of reading experience, combined with theoretical claims of several modern philosophers and literary scholars, including, among others, Martha Nussbaum, Stefano Ercolino, Massimo Salgaro, and Benjamin van Tourhout. (shrink)

Writers, readers, critics all have strong personal preferences. Roland Barthes was a case in point. Many were the texts he chose to affirm. Others he rejected, while some were left to hover in the margins of his thinking. Still others barely feature at all, among which, conspicuous by their absence, are the novels and plays of Samuel Beckett. This article examines the political, theoretical and affective reasons for Barthes’s apparent indifference to a writer who, despite early hostility on the part (...) of the literary establishment, came to be seen as the abiding embodiment of late modernity. It contrasts Barthes’s limited response to Beckett with that of another leading critic of the period, Maurice Blanchot. (shrink)

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is one of the terms that is used to refer to associatively induced changes in liking. Many controversies have arisen in the literature on EC. Do associatively induced changes in liking actually exist? Does EC depend on awareness of the fact that stimuli are associated? Is EC resistant to extinction? Does attention help or hinder EC? As an introduction to this special issue, we will discuss the extent to which the papers that are published in this issue (...) help to resolve some of the controversies that surround EC. We also speculate about possible boundary conditions of EC and attempt to reconcile conflicting results on the functional properties of EC. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of faultless disagreement for predicates of taste may be fruitfully explained by appealing to the vagueness of predicates of taste and the epistemicist reading of vagueness as defended by Timothy Williamson (1994). I begin by arguing that this position is better suited to explain both the “faultless” and “disagreement” intuition. The first is explained here by appealing to the necessary ignorance of the predicate’s boundaries and a plausible account of constitutive norms of (...) taste assertions, while the second by insisting on classical, absolutist semantics for judgments containing predicates of taste. Furthermore, I analyze the arguments against the reading of taste predicates as vague based on the alleged epistemic privilege concerning one’s taste and on the lack of definite cases. Responding to these objections, I develop a plausible account of constitutive norms of taste assertions, comment on the assumed epistemic privilege concerning taste ascriptions and provide a more detailed account of sources of the vagueness of predicates of personal taste, which I dub “super-vagueness.”. (shrink)

Whistleblowers remain essential as complainants in allegations of research misconduct. Frequently internal to the research team, they are poorly protected from acts of retribution, which may deter the reporting of misconduct. In order to perform their important role, whistleblowers must be treated fairly. Draft regulations for whistleblower protection were published for public comment almost a decade ago but never issued. In the face of the growing challenge of research fraud, we suggest vigorous steps, to include: organizational responsibility to certify the (...) accuracy of research including audit, required whistleblower action in the face of imminent or grave harm to subjects, strengthened legal protections against retaliation including prompt enactment of Federal whistleblower protections and consideration of criminalizing the most egregious cases of research misconduct. (shrink)

How can we explain why certain historically discriminated groups are under-represented in English-speaking analytic philosophy? I present a hypothesis which appeals to rules, rather than relying upon the social theories of Pierre Bourdieu. I do by means of an attempted pastiche of Renata Salecl, my third attempt.

Our eyes are the windows to our world. In the United States, our eyes also become the windows to the quality and depth of connection between two human beings. Deeply imprinted within the American mind is the story of race. This story continues to consciously and unconsciously determine how Americans perceive, reason, remember and make decisions with respect to human relations. For example, 63 years after the seminal decision Brown v. Board of Education that ended legalised segregation in American schools, (...) over 75 per cent of White Americans have zero friends of colour, and two-thirds of Black Americans have zero White friends. While much has been written about systems and structures that create such realities, this paper aims to delve deeper into the role of vedanā in creating such interpersonal and system-wide realities. The paper will further comment on how feeling tones associated with the myth of different races continue play a role in the opportunities and experiences of differently hued human beings in American society. (shrink)

The evaluative conditioning effect refers to the change in the liking of a neutral stimulus due to its pairing with another stimulus. We examined whether the extinction rate of the EC effect is moderated by feature-specific attention allocation. In two experiments, CSs were abstract Gabor patches varying along two orthogonal, perceptual dimensions. During the acquisition phase, one of these dimensions was predictive of the valence of the USs. During the extinction phase, CSs were presented alone and participants were asked to (...) categorise the CSs either according to their valence, the perceptual dimension that was task-relevant during the acquisition phase, or a perceptual dimension that was task-irrelevant during the acquisition phase. As predicted, explicit valence measures revealed a linear increase in the extinction rate of the EC effect as participants were encouraged to assign attention to non-evaluative stimulus information during the extinction phase. In Experiment 1, Affect Misattribution Paradigm data mimicked this pattern of results, although the effect just missed conventional levels of significance. In Experiment 2, the AMP data revealed an increase of the EC effect if attention was focused on evaluative stimulus information. Potential mechanisms to explain these findings are discussed. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the protest of contemporary theologians, substantive changes in the language by which the church names God must result in an alienation from the gospel.

We report the results of one visual‐world eye‐tracking experiment and two referent selection tasks in which we investigated the effects of information structure in the form of prosody and word order manipulation on the processing of subject pronouns er and der in German. Factors such as subjecthood, focus, and topicality, as well as order of mention have been linked to an increased probability of certain referents being selected as the pronoun's antecedent and described as increasing this referent's prominence, salience, or (...) accessibility. The goal of this study was to find out whether pronoun processing is primarily guided by linguistic factors (e.g., grammatical role) or nonlinguistic factors (e.g., first‐mention), and whether pronoun interpretation can be described in terms of referents' “prominence” / “accessibility” / “salience.” The results showed an overall subject preference for er, whereas der was affected by the object role and focus marking. While focus increases the attentional load and enhances memory representation for the focused referent making the focused referent more available, ultimately it did not affect the final interpretation of er, suggesting that “prominence” or the related concepts do not explain referent selection preferences. Overall, the results suggest a primacy of linguistic factors in determining pronoun resolution. (shrink)

Bystander information is information about others’ attitudes towards a text (i.e. about whether they agree or disagree with it). Social media platforms force bystander information upon us when we read posts thereon. What effect does this have on how we respond to what we read? The dominant view in the literature is that it changes our minds (the so-called “bandwagon effect”). Simplifying a little: if we see that most people agree (disagree) with what a post says, we are more likely (...) to agree (disagree) with what it says. This paper argues that we should take seriously a competitor view and care about the difference between it and the dominant view. The competitor view proposes that bystander information changes what a text seems to us to say: although bystander information may lead us to change what attitude we express toward a post, that’s not because we’ve changed our attitude toward any fixed content (i.e. fixed thing that the post says). This paper argues that, if this competitor view is correct, then social media is likely to be an especially hazardous place for the practice of sharing content. (shrink)

What are the principles and practices that academic management programs need to educate Millennials on social responsibility and sustainability? What can universities do to instruct managers to solve complex ethical problems such as world poverty? The article suggests theoretical and practical insights for higher education management programs based on the principles and practices of developing socially responsible leaders. Through a review of The Principles of Responsible Management Education, the research invites academics and institutions to commit toward business ethics and poverty (...) alleviation. The author suggests how the process of adopting the principles and developing appropriate educational opportunities in line with these principles provides a space for ethical education for current generations. Participating academic institutions enter into a network of scholars and programs acting as positive agents for world benefit. The current world challenges of poverty, ethics and sustainability require committed academic institutions and rooted in the principles and practices of social and global responsibility for the 21st century. (shrink)

This study aims to explore the intertwined aspects of global pop icon Taylor Swift’s critically created public persona, her magnanimous artistic output, and the persistent politics of gendered subordination in the twenty-first century. Over her music career spanning about two decades, Swift has reached heights of unparalleled global stardom but has also built her own distinctive form of feminism. However, despite this humongous level of stardom, Swift has been under media scrutiny particularly with regard to her romantic relationships, which may (...) be referred to as “media trials.” This work contends that such scrutiny from the media is a result of deeply inflected male gaze, wherein Swift’s agency and emotional stability are repeatedly questioned, objectified, and attempted to be disciplined within the public sphere.Looking through the lens of foundational feminist texts and scholarship, particularly the seminal work of Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination, this study engages with the recurrent and significant trope of the “madwoman” within Swift’s discography over the years. Borrowing from the concepts of affect theory, one may locate how the public circulation of feelings of derision, pity, or perceived irrationality—often stemming from the “madwoman” archetypal feature—functions as a powerful mechanism of discipline and morality against women who transgress societal norms. With the primary focus of this work being rooted in gender, the analyses here also implicitly acknowledge the intersectionality of Swift’s experience as a wealthy, white, cisgender woman, identifying critically how her specific social status builds the form and impact of the experiences of gendered subordination in her life.The chapter aims to establish that Swift’s repeated references to the “madwoman” trope (whether through embodying, embracing, subverting, or mocking it) serve as a strong symbol of persistent oppression that leads to continuous societal resistance encountered by contemporary feminism. By assessing Swift’s navigation of this cultural archetype through her music and the public narrative surrounding her, this chapter brings forward some crucial insights into the evolution of feminist resistance by placing it within the backdrop of celebrity culture, and thereby making a contribution to broader issues of gender, power, and media. (shrink)

Feeling like doing something is not the same as deciding to do it. When you feel like doing something, you are still free to decide to do it or not. You are having an inclination to do it, but you are not thereby determined to do it. I call this the moment of drama. This book is about what you are faced with, in this moment. How should you relate to the inclinations you “have,” given that you are free to (...) “act on” them or not? To answer this question, we need an account of what sort of thing we are relating to, in this moment. But here we find a genuine philosophical problem. Our inclinations are forms of motivation, with respect to which we are distinctively passive. To be motivated is to be self-moved. But how can we be passive in relation to our own self-movement? Is our relation to our inclinations like that of rider to horse? Or is it like our relation to our own, spontaneous judgments or perceptions? I lay out three constraints on any theory of inclination, and I argue that familiar theories fail to meet them, because they make being inclined to φ‎ too similar or dissimilar to φ‎-ing. I then put forward the “inner animal” view, which holds that when you are merely inclined to act, the instinctive part of yourself is already active, while the rest of you is not. In this moment, your will is “at a crossroads.” You can humanize your inclination, or dehumanize yourself. (shrink)