Social Media

This chapter explores how online communication, particularly on social media, reshapes the reputational incentives that motivate speakers to communicate truthfully. Drawing on costly signalling theory (CST), it examines how online contexts alter the social mechanisms that sustain honest communication. Key characteristics of online spaces are identified and discussed, namely (i) the presence of novel speech acts like reposting, (ii) the gamification of communication, (iii) information overload, (iv) the presence of anonymous and unaccountable sources and (v) the increased reach and persistence (...) of online communication. Both epistemic pitfalls and potential benefits of these features are discussed, identifying promising avenues for further empirical investigation, and underscoring CST's value for understanding and tackling online misinformation. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explore the prospects of epistemic minimax and related principles. Minimax is a well-known approach to choosing a strategy under conditions of risk and uncertainty. In individual cases, the minimax strategy selects the action that can lead to the least bad outcome for the agent, even if taking that action ensures that expected utility is not maximized and that best-case outcomes are impossible. In social cases, the minimax strategy selects the policy that maximizes the wellbeing of the (...) least-well-off members of the group, even if doing so ensures that the aggregate utility of the group is not maximized and that best-case social outcomes are impossible. While there are many criticisms of minimax at both the individual and the social level, it is a prominent and popular approach at the social level because it prioritizes those at the bottom of the ladder. This chapter focuses on the social case for epistemic minimax and related principles. We develop the notions of epistemic position and epistemic power, both of which are prima facie epistemic goods, and demonstrate that a minimax principle can come apart from principles that would promote aggregate or maximum epistemic position or power. We also point to empirical and computational work that shows that testimonial networks online tend to be characterized by extreme inequalities of epistemic power. Then we extend traditional arguments in favor of social minimax to show that they hold in the epistemic case as well. In light of these arguments, we contend that the epistemic minimax principle should be treated as a heuristic for network interventions in democratic communities, and that it may be attractive for other types of communities as well. We conclude by examining the idea that some communities—especially the scientific community—should probably adopt different principles. Communities vary along different dimensions, and these dimensions may favor or disfavor different epistemic policies and principles, showing the sensitivity of our arguments to particular circumstances. (shrink)

When thinking about designing social media platforms, we often focus on factors such as usability, functionality, aesthetics, ethics, and so forth. Epistemic considerations have rarely been given the same level of attention in design discussions. This paper aims to rectify this neglect. We begin by arguing that there are epistemic norms that govern environments, including social media environments. Next, we provide a framework for applying these norms to the question of platform design. We then apply this framework to the real-world (...) case of long-form informational content platforms. We argue that many current long-form informational content platforms are epistemically unhealthy. The good news? We provide concrete advice on how to take steps toward improving their health! Specifically, we argue that they should change how they verify and authenticate content creators and how this information is displayed to content consumers. We conclude by connecting this guidance to broader issues about the epistemic health of platforms. (shrink)

The costs of privacy losses don’t only come from what others know about us, but also what they don’t know. Living with limited privacy can involve bits and pieces of our lives being observed in isolation: surveillance algorithms may only call attention to activities with certain features, social media followers may scroll past half of our posts, and no observer is likely to experience the full context of our words and actions. And distinctive structural features of being under observation make (...) it difficult to correct misconceptions observers form when they lack context. So, losing privacy can create pressure for us to lead more fragmented lives, lives that seem okay when encountered as isolated sound bites, rather than richer, coherent wholes. But many of the especially meaningful aspects of our lives—lasting interpersonal connections, long-term goals and projects, and personal growth and change—are extended over longer periods of time and woven into our lives in more complicated ways. Focusing on producing good fragments can undermine features of our lives that we usually recognize as meaningful. In this sense, part of privacy’s value is underappreciated: privacy can help us to lead more meaningful lives—or at least reduce one obstacle to it. (shrink)

Many people form beliefs about matters of social and political importance online, in what have been described as “echo chambers.” These include social media news feeds and news sites tailored to the consumer’s political perspective. Some philosophers have suggested that there is nothing especially worrying about this from an epistemological view, while others have taken it to be a serious problem in need of diagnosis and remedy. This chapter applies some ideas of the 17th-century philosopher Blaise Pascal to the dispute (...) about echo chambers. Pascal emphasized the role of affect, or what he called “the heart,” in determining belief. The ways in which the heart can affect belief are characterized as motivated reasoning and motivated seeing—the influence of affective states on the processing of evidence and the appearance of evidence, respectively. These influences and their manifestation in online echo chambers are discussed, and the consequences for one’s rationality assessed. A Pascalian perspective that emphasizes the heart, rather than focusing exclusively on reasoning, has great potential to explain and diagnose the problem with online echo chambers, and thereby shed light on a major issue in applied epistemology. (shrink)

This article presents a novel and comprehensive analysis of online hate, arguing that it should be conceptualized as a form of violence rather than simply hate speech, abuse, harassment, or trolling. Building on Slavoj Žižek’s distinction between subjective and objective violence, the paper demonstrates how explicit and visible acts of online hostility obscure the deeper systemic and symbolic structures that perpetuate online violence. It critiques the role of social media platforms in fostering and amplifying divisive content, emphasizing how their algorithmic (...) designs prioritize engagement— often through outrage—at the expense of user well-being. This challenges dominant assumptions that online hate is primarily a product of individual anonymity or online disinhibition, instead highlighting how platform architectures deliberately cultivate antagonism and conflict. Additionally, the article explores the limitations of resistance within digital culture, exposing the paradoxes of liberal values, particularly free speech, in the governance of online spaces. By interrogating the complicity of digital platforms in sustaining online violence, the paper contributes to critical discussions on platform responsibility, digital justice, and the broader sociopolitical consequences of online hate. In doing so, it offers an urgent and theoretically informed intervention into debates surrounding online harm, regulation, and the ethics of digital communication. (shrink)

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering (...) part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it. (shrink)

By allocating their attention to pieces of content, algorithmic filtering shapes the daily behavior of billions of users when they interact with a digital platform. Beyond conditioning what we do, can recommendation algorithms influence who we are? This paper suggests that they do. Specifically, I contend that recommender systems affect users’ capacity to be their authentic selves in both positive and negative ways. I start by offering an account of authenticity that builds on two central concepts: volitional alignment and self-understanding. (...) I then explain how algorithmic filtering works and impacts authenticity. While recommender systems frustrate users’ second-order desires by relying on uninformative behavioral signals, they also facilitate self-understanding by inciting users to question their identity. I end by discussing how controllable and explainable recommenders would best enable users to be authentic. (shrink)

Within democracies, the capacity to influence political outcomes through speech depends not only on the right to express oneself, but also on the opportunity to reach relevant audiences. In this paper, I argue that the unequal distribution of algorithmic reach on social media platforms undermines equality of opportunity for political influence (EOPI), which is a central democratic ideal. Drawing on Niko Kolodny’s work, I contend that current recommendation algorithms create and perpetuate informal inequalities by concentrating attention among a small minority (...) of already-amplified speakers while systematically marginalizing others. To address this problem, I propose recommendation floors as a mechanism for equalizing political speech. To help users achieve meaningful participation, each verified account would receive guaranteed minimum recommendation for up to a limited number of political posts per week. Although this measure represents one component of the structural reforms needed to move the digital public sphere closer to democratic ideals, it offers a feasible pathway to reducing informal inequalities in political influence online. (shrink)

The human propensity for possession and ownership has been a defining characteristic throughout history, influencing the structuring of societies. The advent of digital technology, however, challenges traditional notions of possession and necessitates a redefinition of the concept. This paper aims to explore the resignification of possession in the digital age through a philosophical reflection based on an anthropological analysis. It contrasts two paradigmatic forms of possession: the material collection in the ‘thing’ civilization and the data-based access in the digital civilization. (...) Ultimately, the research shows, analyzing the OnlyFans platform model, how the digital age has fundamentally changed the human mode of possession, demanding a new paradigm in both virtual and augmented reality, while emphasizing the irreplaceable material reference when it comes to the intimate aspects of Homo Sapiens. The transition from material collection to digital access signifies a profound change in human self-perception and social structures and reflects the general cultural and existential changes triggered by technological progress. (shrink)

I argue that the attention economy wrongly commodifies attention. In the first section, I survey the conventional approach to the attention economy, which treats the ethical problems here as instances of questions about the moral limits of markets. I agree that this approach is justified, but I aim to broaden the debate by focusing on whether attention should be commodified at all. In the second section, I argue that attention is not properly subject to market forces. In the third section, (...) I argue that subjecting attention to market forces leads, predictably, to the development and use of technology that violates the right to attention. In the fourth section, I argue that coercive paternalism offers the correct response to these problems and that two other solutions — the reliance on nudges and the reliance on social antibodies — are inferior. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to argue that social-media companies ought to remove misinformation from their platforms. I begin by outlining four kinds of harms that misinformation can produce. In the following section, I clarify the conceptual foundations of this duty, including the difference between purposeful and general social-media sites, influenced by Lavinia Marin’s recent research, and the correct characterization of online debates about topics such as climate change and vaccination.

Standardly, echo chambers are thought to be structures that we should avoid. Agents should keep away from them, to be able to assess a fuller range of evidence and avoid having their confidence in that information manipulated. This paper argues against that standard view. Not only can echo chambers be neutral or good for us, but the existing definitions apply so widely that such chambers are unavoidable. We are all in large numbers of echo chambers at any time – they (...) can be found not just on social media or in political groups, but in almost every social or epistemic group we could categorise ourselves into. Because we are finite and fallible, we cannot escape them and need to exist in them just to get by. The concept, then, does not actually capture something as structurally problematic as the paradigmatic cases would suggest. Our way of using the term in social epistemology needs to change. (shrink)

Are social media companies epistemically responsible for the spread of disinformation? Against the view that they are not responsible, on the grounds that they are passive conduits of information like telephones, I argue that they are responsible, on the grounds that they have discretionary control over the information shared on them and their audiences are vulnerable to that control. I identify two epistemic harms that social media companies are responsible for as the result of that control. I conclude that they (...) are responsible for promoting a harmful form of epistemic distrust, which makes the nature of their responsibility importantly different from sources that generate disinformation. (shrink)

Mental health problems are increasing among young adults, and growing evidence points to social media platforms as a potential influence. Design decisions made by platform developers have the potential to fundamentally impact mental well-being. However, translating abstract values such as “well-being” or “mental health” into concrete norms and design features is challenging. We explore the potential of using a value sensitive design approach towards redesigning a social media environment that promotes mental well-being. We interviewed social media experts, held a focus (...) group with adolescent users, and created a values hierarchy that translates abstract well-being values into norms and design requirements. Results reveal that mental well-being is negatively impacted by the inherent value tensions found in the design of social media platforms, tensions such as authenticity and connection, personalization and autonomy, and control and autonomy. We propose a value-sensitive design approach, informed by involving young users and other stakeholders, to show how to integrate key values into social media redesign. (shrink)

Investigations into antagonistic political emotions have typically included a concern with expressions and actions related to particular emotions, such as hatred, anger, fear, and ressentiment, or examining how seemingly positive or apolitical emotions can become antagonistic on the political stage. Yet one of the ways in which antagonistic politics plays out is through imposing controls and restrictions on the spaces containing the expressions and experiences of emotions. Focusing on online social spaces as such a container, we examine how antagonistic politics (...) play out within and through such spaces. Using the case of the 2019 protests in Iran when access to the internet was blocked across the nation as a means of oppressing revolt, we examine dynamics of political antagonism online. We highlight the affordances of online communities as a “holding space” for various emotions and affects that arise in response to state violence and oppression, and we consider some ways in which online spaces foster new possibilities for political empowerment and collective action. (shrink)

This paper suggests that virtue epistemology can help decide how to respond to conflicts between different epistemic goals for social media. It is a contribution to critical epistemology of social media insofar as it supplements system-level consideration with insights from individualist epistemology. In particular, whereas the proposal of critical social epistemology of social media by Joshua Habgood-Coote suggests that conflicts between epistemic goals of social media have to be solved by ethical consideration, I suggest that virtue epistemology can also solve (...) at least some of these conflicts fully within the epistemic realm. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is increasingly criticised as out of touch with the realities of partisan politics. This paper considers the rise of fake and hyperpartisan news as one source of this scepticism. While popular accounts often blame such content on citizens’ political biases and motivated reasoning, I survey the empirical evidence and argue that it does not support strong claims about the inability of citizens to live up to deliberative ideals. Instead, much of this research is shown to support the deliberative (...) capacities of citizens and points to their potential in helping to reduce the spread of false and misleading content. (shrink)

Exploring how online hate speech infiltrates public discourse, this article examines the antisemitic hashtag, ‘#JewGoal’, tracing its spread from the FIFA gaming community to online football discussions. Analysing 1,364 public tweets on the platform ‘X’ (formerly Twitter), the paper illustrates how the hashtag, framed as humour and sports commentary, perpetuated antisemitic stereotypes through historical tropes and cultural symbols. Utilizing the Lacanian concepts of jouissance and llanguage, the study reveals how #JewGoal extended beyond mere humour, exposing an excessive enjoyment tied to (...) its repetitive and absurd use. This dual function—offering inclusion in online communities while perpetuating harm—underscores how normalized antisemitic language infiltrates sports fandom. By framing #JewGoal as a llanguage of hate, its impact lies not in explicit content but in its provocative repetition. By detailing the persistence of antisemitism in digital spaces, the article emphasizes the need to critically address the enjoyment derived from harmful online speech. (shrink)

I argue that because many forms of viewpoint-based moderation by major social media companies (SMCs) undermine subjects’ equal opportunity for political influence (EOPI), such moderation violates users’ right to free expression and ought to be prohibited. I then refute three common defenses of SMCs’ freedom to moderate as they please, each of which seeks to establish relevant disanalogies between state- and SMC-imposed speech regulations: the substitution argument, argument from government abuse, and argument from corporate rights. I argue that the presence (...) of substitutes does not excuse viewpoint-based regulation, that the risk of abuse does not meaningfully distinguish state from social media moderation, and that corporate rights are limited by users’ right to EOPI. (shrink)

"Doug Campbell lays out a comprehensive and fair-minded account of both the benefits and the drawbacks of social media for our era. He attaches these evaluations to both the individual and to society as a whole. The case studies are compelling and exhibit a keen awareness of the current moment. How should we live, now that many or even most of us are at least partially online? Campbell addresses this question from the point of view of privacy, attention, politics, misinformation, (...) online ostracism, online friendship, and the potential benefits of simply quitting social media or at least some of its more pernicious platforms. Along the way, Campbell ties his discussions back to philosophical concerns raised by Plato, Aristotle, and Xunzi, among others. He also connects his discussion with recent work in feminist philosophy. And each chapter concludes with a succinct definition of key terms and suggested case studies and discussion topics that will engage students at all levels. An impressive accomplishment, and one that deserves a place in the classroom." —Mark Alfano, Macquarie University. (shrink)

Bystander information is information about others’ attitudes towards a text (i.e. about whether they agree or disagree with it). Social media platforms force bystander information upon us when we read posts thereon. What effect does this have on how we respond to what we read? The dominant view in the literature is that it changes our minds (the so-called “bandwagon effect”). Simplifying a little: if we see that most people agree (disagree) with what a post says, we are more likely (...) to agree (disagree) with what it says. This paper argues that we should take seriously a competitor view and care about the difference between it and the dominant view. The competitor view proposes that bystander information changes what a text seems to us to say: although bystander information may lead us to change what attitude we express toward a post, that’s not because we’ve changed our attitude toward any fixed content (i.e. fixed thing that the post says). This paper argues that, if this competitor view is correct, then social media is likely to be an especially hazardous place for the practice of sharing content. (shrink)

This chapter investigates how online conversational environments might be designed to promote epistemic health rather than merely reduce incivility. Drawing on the authors’ empirically informed collaboration with an industry partner developing engagement platforms for publishers, it argues that prevailing industry approaches to “healthy conversation” disproportionately prioritize civility norms while neglecting epistemic norms governing truth, evidence, and inquiry. The analysis distinguishes epistemic toxicity from incivility and examines existing moderation tools, reporting systems, and fact-checking practices, showing that most rely on the identification (...) of manifest norm violations—an approach well suited to detecting insults or harassment but ill suited to tracking misinformation or evidential deficiencies. Survey data from platform users further reveal a striking mismatch between industry priorities and user expectations: participants value epistemic quality at least as highly as civility. To explain this gap, the chapter introduces the “violation-identification problem,” according to which breaches of epistemic norms are typically non-manifest and therefore resistant to automated or surface-level detection. The discussion concludes that improving epistemic health online requires a shift away from civility-centered moderation toward design strategies modeled on high-quality offline epistemic practices, especially those foregrounding evidential standards and norms of inquiry. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose an account of behavioral addiction in terms of what I call addictive motivational scaffolds (AMSs). Taking inspiration from recent work concerning psychiatric externalism and addiction, I propose and describe the concept of motivational scaffolding: external structure that enhances, supports, or regulates motivational processes in the mind-brain. I then argue that some motivational scaffolds are likely difference-makers in that they make an activity more addictive. The paper proceeds in three main parts. First, I describe the concept (...) of a motivational scaffold and how it builds on recent literature in 4E cognition/psychiatric externalist accounts of addiction. Using gambling and gaming as paradigm cases of addictive activities, I then identify and empirically justify four addictive motivational scaffolds (AMSs): (1) quantified metrics, (2) reward uncertainty, (3) short time-horizon to reward, and (4) physically salient features. Finally, I apply my account to social media to showcase its philosophical usefulness: analyzing behavioral addiction in terms of AMSs uniquely elucidates the more _structural_ aspects of the addictiveness of social media, which are undertheorized. (shrink)

This paper examines social media platforms as spaces fostering their user’s self-transformation. This paper argues that the ethics of (illegitimate) technological influence can be expanded and enriched with a concept of situated agency and an enactive evaluation of adaptability afforded by an environment. The paper proposes a taxonomy to evaluate social media platforms as environments for self-transformation by using the concept of situated agency and a notion of enactive normativity. Using a situated concept of agency, we should look into how (...) an agent is afforded or even pushed to undergo transformative experiences while inhabiting a certain technical environment. To coin this taxonomy, the types of transformative experiences from Carel and Kid were used to show that one agent can effectively have four modes of formative agency in any given situation, namely how one responds to the pressures of an environment. However, since it could be argued that any kind of adaptation is legitimate since we become who we change into, this taxonomy adds an explicit normative dimension pertaining to the environment that fosters the agent’s transformation of the self: borrowing from the terminology of enactive theories of cognition, how an environment responds to an agent’s adaptation is also important and can make the difference between a hostile environment and a flourishing-conducive one. The paper shows how one can apply this taxonomy of formative agency to evaluate some of the most concerning cases of self-transformation triggered by social media platforms: online self-radicalisation, habit acquisition, and identity rigidification. (shrink)

The phenomenon of missed interactions between online users is a specific issue occurring when users of different language games interact on social media platforms. We use the lens of institutional theory to analyze this phenomenon and argue that current online institutions will necessarily fail to regulate user interactions in a way that creates common meanings because online institutions are not set up to deal with the multiplicity of language games and forms of life co-existing in the online social space. We (...) argue for the need to enable and foster grassroots online institutions that can stabilize the norms of interaction by redesigning algorithms and user interfaces. Such online grassroots institutions would facilitate user orientation at three distinct levels: informational, normative, and semantic-pragmatic. We propose user orientation as a principle that would facilitate the formation of institutions aiming to regulate information exchanges between users inhabiting various forms of life. This principle of user orientation should guide design decisions, while designer teams would need to become aware of the institutional power unleashed when they set up interfaces and algorithms for user-generated content. (shrink)

דמיון מתחולל בחלקו מחוץ לראש באמצעות עזרים טכנולוגיים. עובדה זו כשלעצמה אינה חדשה, אולם ‏טכנולוגיות חדשות משנות את טיבו של הדמיון. מחוללי מדיה סינתטית, כגון דָאלִי, ופריטי מדיה סינתטיים, ‏כגון זיופים עמוקים (‏דיפ-פייקס; תמונות וסרטונים ריאליסטיים שנוצרו באופן אלגוריתמי ושמציגים אנשים ‏מבצעים או אומרים משהו שלא עשו או אמרו) מערערים על אמות המידה האפיסטמיות הבסיסיות שלנו. עם ‏זאת, טבעו של האיום האפיסטמי החדש הנשקף מהם נותר חמקמק, שכן ייצוגים בדיוניים או מעוותים של ‏המציאות הם עתיקים לפחות כמו הצילום עצמו. אפיונים (...) קיימים באפיסטמולוגיה חברתית של האיום הגלום ‏בזיופים עמוקים מתקשים לזהות מה בעצם חדש בו. למאמר זה שתי מטרות: לאפיין את האיום האפיסטמי ‏החדש הנשקף ממדיה סינתטית, ולזהות את התנאים שבהם פריט מדיה סינתטית הוא בעייתי מבחינה ‏אפיסטמית. אנו טוענים שהאיום האפיסטמי הגלום בזיופים עמוקים בפרט, ובמדיה סינתטית בכלל, הוא ‏שלראשונה למשתמשי מחשב רגילים זמינה האפשרות המעשית ליצור בזול וללא מאמץ עולמות בדיוניים שלא ‏ניתן להבחין ביניהם לבין העולם האמיתי ולשתפם בתפוצה רחבה. פריט מדיה סינתטי הוא רעיל מבחינה ‏אפיסטמית בהקשר נתון כאשר אדם בעל הכרה כלשהי של ההקשר עלול לבלבל את העולם הבדיוני המתואר בו ‏עם העולם הממשי או עם ייצוגים מהימנים שלו בנושאים בעלי חשיבות מוסרית או אפיסטמית. ‏ -/- Imagination takes place partly outside the mind, through technological aids. This fact is not new in ‎itself, but new technologies are changing the nature of imagination. Synthetic media generators, ‎such as DALL·E, and synthetic media items, such as deepfakes (realistic images and videos ‎algorithmically generated to depict people doing or saying things they never actually did or said), ‎challenge our fundamental epistemic standards. But the nature of the new epistemic threat they ‎pose remains elusive, since fictional or distorted representations of reality are at least as old as ‎photography itself. Existing characterizations in social epistemology of the threat posed by ‎deepfakes struggle to pinpoint what exactly is novel about it. This paper has two aims: to ‎characterize the new epistemic threat posed by synthetic media, and to identify the conditions ‎under which a synthetic media item is epistemically malignant or toxic. We argue that the ‎epistemic threat posed by deepfakes in particular, and by synthetic media more broadly, lies in the ‎unprecedented practicable possibility afforded to ordinary computer users to cheaply and ‎effortlessly create fictional worlds that are indistinguishable from the real world and share them ‎widely. A synthetic media item is epistemically toxic or malignant in a given context when a person ‎acquainted with the context is liable to confuse the fictional world depicted in it with the real ‎world or with credible representations thereof on matters of moral or epistemic significance.‎. (shrink)

In paradigmatic cases of subtweeting, one Twitter user critically or mockingly tweets about another person without mentioning their username or their name. In this chapter, we give an account of the strategic aims of subtweeting and the mechanics through which it achieves them. We thereby hope to shed light on the distinctive communicative and moral texture of subtweeting while filling in a gap in the philosophical literature on strategic speech in social media. We first specify what subtweets are and identify (...) the central features that give rise to their strategic mechanics. Next, we draw attention to problematic aspects of subtweeting and consider conditions under which subtweeting can be justified on moral and prudential grounds. The chapter concludes by discussing practical upshots and noting avenues for future work. (shrink)

People sometimes behave differently depending on whether they are interacting online (by email, social media, etc.) vs. interacting in person. Four studies test the hypothesis that when an agent’s behavior is different online vs. in person, people think that the online behavior is less reflective of who the agent truly is deep down. Study 1 found that the very same behavior is regarded as less reflective of the true self when it is performed online. Study 2 showed that this effect (...) is not merely a matter of perceived impression management. Study 3 found that there is a general tendency such that behavior is seen as more reflective of the true self when it is performed in an environment regarded as “natural.” In Study 4, a manipulation that led participants to see online behavior as more natural had a downstream effect on the degree to which this behavior was seen as reflecting the true self. Taken together, these results suggest that people’s judgments about online behavior are not simply a reflection of idiosyncratic facts about the online sphere in particular but are instead driven in part by a far more general psychological process involving perceptions of naturalness. (shrink)

In this open access book, Timothy Aylsworth and Clinton Castro draw on the deep well of Kantian ethics to argue that we have moral duties, both to ourselves and to others, to protect our autonomy from the threat posed by the problematic use of technology. The problematic use of technologies like smartphones threatens our autonomy in a variety of ways, and critics have only begun to appreciate the vast scope of this problem. In the last decade, we have seen a (...) flurry of books making “self-help” arguments about how we could live happier, more fulfilling lives if we were less addicted to our phones. But none of these authors see this issue as one involving a moral duty to protect our autonomy. (shrink)

This paper argues that social media companies’ power to regulate communication in the public sphere illustrates a novel type of domination. The idea is that, since social media companies can partially dictate the terms of citizens’ political participation in the public sphere, they can arbitrarily interfere with the choices individuals make qua citizens. I contend that social media companies dominate citizens in two different ways. First, I focus on the cases in which social media companies exercise direct control over political (...) speech. They exercise quasi-public power over citizens because their regulation of speech on social media platforms implies the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with citizens’ democratic contestation in the political system. Second, companies’ algorithmic governance entails the capacity to interfere with citizens’ choices about what mode of discursive engagement they endorse in their relationships with fellow citizens. By raising the cost of deliberative engagement, companies narrow citizens’ choice menu. (shrink)

This Open Access book explains the philosophy, design principles, and community organization of Decidim and provides essential insights into how the platform works. Decidim is the world leading digital infrastructure for participatory democracy, built entirely and collaboratively as free software, and used by more than 500 institutions with over three million users worldwide. The platform allows any organization (government, association, university, NGO, neighbourhood, or cooperative) to support multitudinous processes of participatory democracy. In a context dominated by corporate-owned digital platforms, in (...) the era of increasing social structuring via Artificial Intelligence, Decidim stands as a public or community owned platform for collective human intelligence. Yet, the project is much more than its technological features. Decidim is in itself a crossroad of the various dimensions of the networked society, a detailed practical map of its complexities and conflicts. Theauthors distinguish three general dimensions of the project: (1) the political - shedding light on the democratic model that Decidim promotes and its impact on public policies and organizations, (2) the technopolitical - explaining how this technology is democratically designed and managed to produce and protect certain political effects, and (3) the technical - presenting the conditions of production, operation, and success of the project. This book systematically covers those three levels in an academically sound, technologically consistent, and politically innovative manner. Serving as a useful resource and handbook for the use of Decidim, it will not only appeal to students and scholars interested in participatory and digital democracy but also to professionals, policy-makers, and a wider audience interested in learning more about the Decidim platform. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that so-called echo chambers and epistemic bubbles, associated with social media, are detrimental to liberal democracies. Drawing on John Rawls’s political liberalism, we offer a novel explanation of why social media platforms amplifying echo chambers and epistemic bubbles are likely contributing to the violation of the democratic norms connected to the ideal of public reason. These norms are clarified with reference to the method of (full) reflective equilibrium, which we argue should be cultivated as a civic (...) virtue in the context of political justification. The paper demonstrates how epistemic bubbles and echo chambers are likely to be detrimental to the disposition to follow the method of reflective equilibrium in the political context. Based on this diagnosis the paper highlights the need for interventions that help cultivate reflective equilibrium as a civic virtue and the need for corresponding interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

It is this very contention that sits at the heart of Matthew Flisfeder’s, Algorithmic Desire: Towards a New Structuralist Theory of Social Media (2021). In spite of the accusation that, today, our social media is in fact hampering democracy and subjecting us to increasing forms of online and offline surveillance, for Flisfeder (2021: 3), ‘[s]ocial media remains the correct concept for reconciling ourselves with the structural contradictions of our media, our culture, and our society’. With almost every aspect of our (...) contemporary lives now mediated through the digital, the significance of the algorithm maintains a pertinent importance in making sense of the social and psychic investments that our interactions on social media, as well as other forms of digital media, rely upon and encourage. The socio-political tensions and contradictions that such interaction prescribes remains a reoccurring theme throughout Algorithmic Desire, with Flisfeder masterfully navigating the problems and pitfalls of a burgeoning digital infrastructure that is redefining our lives as social beings. What becomes apparent from Flisfeder’s account is how debates and discussions regarding the algorithm can be couched in a number of pressing concerns, including the proliferation of online misinformation and the contradictions inherent to our freedom and security. While these debates are drawn together through the prism of the algorithm, it is mostly with regards to the medium of social media that Flisfeder examines how our desire and enjoyment are algorithmically organized. This focus is expertly followed throughout the book’s eight chapters, producing a critically engaging inquiry that continually considers the socio-political tensions and ambiguities that frame and sustain our digital media interactions. Ultimately, it is this contention that lends further support to Flisfeder’s assertion that algorithms play a key role in reading our desire. In the discussion that follows, this reading will be critically considered by tracing and outlining a number of key significances underpinning Flisfeder’s approach. Most notably, this will require a discussion of the Lacanian conception of desire; the effects of disavowal and cynical perversion; the importance of ‘maintaining appearances’; and, finally, the significance of the social media metaphor. (shrink)

Exploring online criticisms of the ‘take the knee’ protest during ‘Euro 2020’, this article examines how alt- and far-right conspiracies were both constructed and communicated via the social media platform, Twitter. By providing a novel exploration of alt-right conspiracies during an international football tournament, a qualitative thematic analysis of 1,388 original tweets relating to Euro 2020 was undertaken. The findings reveal how, in criticisms levelled at both ‘wokeism’ and the Black Lives Matter movement, antiwhite criticisms of the ‘take the knee’ (...) protest were embroiled in alt-right conspiracies that exposed an assumed Cultural Marxist, ‘woke agenda’ in the tournament’s organization and mainstream media coverage. In conclusion, it is argued that conspiratorial discourses, associated with the alt-right, provided a framework through which the protest could be understood. This emphasises how the significance of conspiracy functions to promote the wider dissemination of alt-right ideology across popular cultural contexts, such as sport. (shrink)

With an eye on the future of global ethics, I argue that social-media technologies are not morally neutral tools but are, for all intents and purposes, a kind of agent. They nudge us to do things that are bad for us. Moreover, I argue that we have a duty to quit using social-media platforms, not just on account of possible duties to preserve our own well-being but because users are akin to test subjects on whom developers are testing new nudges, (...) and we ought to deprive them of their test subjects. (shrink)

This book argues that misinformation poses a multi-faceted threat to knowledge, while arguing that some forms of content moderation risk exacerbating these threats. It proposes alternative forms of content moderation that aim to address this complexity while enhancing human epistemic agency. The proliferation of fake news, false conspiracy theories, and other forms of misinformation on the internet and especially social media is widely recognized as a threat to individual knowledge and, consequently, to collective deliberation and democracy itself. This book argues (...) that misinformation presents a three-pronged threat to knowledge. While researchers often focus on the role of misinformation in causing false beliefs, this deceptive potential of misinformation exists alongside the potential to suppress trust and to distort the perception of evidence. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of this threat is essential to the development of effective measures to mitigate the harms associated with misinformation. The book weaves together work in analytic epistemology with emerging empirical work in other disciplines to offer novel insights into the threats posed by misinformation. Additionally, it breaks new ground by systematically assessing different forms of content moderation from the perspective of epistemology. Misinformation, Content Moderation, and Epistemology will appeal to philosophers working in applied and social epistemology, as well as scholars and advanced students in disciplines such as communication studies, political science, and social psychology who are researching misinformation. (shrink)

Lavinia Marin draws from phenomenology to lay bare another aspect of the ubiquitous presence of social media. By taking the phenomenology of attention as a starting-point, she show that attention is – rather than only a scare resource as analysts departing from the perspective of the attention economy would have it – foundational for our moral relations to other beings. She argues that there is a distinctive form of other-oriented attention that enables us to perceive other beings as living beings (...) that are worthy of care. This mode of attention presupposes a form of affectivity and involves the recognition of the other as a moral being capable of forming judgments, as well as someone having certain vulnerabilities. Her analysis shows that by prioritizing homogenous interactions and standardization, social media platforms hinder us from engaging in this mode of attention, thereby undermining our capacity of recognizing to others as surprising, changing, and fallible beings. (shrink)

During the Covid-19 pandemic, a significant number of people has seemingly been lured in believing conspiracy theories. Many deliberately disregarded expert advices by virologists and physicians to reduce new infections. This turning away from traditional expert authorities exemplifies the »crisis of expertise« that has been discussed in the philosophy of science for some time, namely that many people seem to have lost their trust in the established authority of expert knowledge and are looking for epistemic alternatives, especially on the Internet (...) and in particular on social media. In this article, this digital cultural trend will be analysed. Will people actually becoming more epistemically autonomous as a result of this new tend? Attention is drawn to the epistemic and moral vulnerability of people who opt for new media as epistemic alternatives instead of relying on traditional expert opinion. It will be shown that some important presuppositions about the Internet and, especially, social media tools as alternative ways to gathering information and find moral support in a group of likeminded people do not hold. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that generics (i.e., unquantified generalizations) are pervasive in communication and that when they are about social groups, this may offend and polarize people because generics gloss over variations between individuals. Generics about social groups might be particularly common on Twitter (X). This remains unexplored, however. Using machine learning (ML) techniques, we therefore developed an automatic classifier for social generics, applied it to 1.1 million tweets about people, and analyzed the tweets. While it is often suggested that generics (...) are ubiquitous in everyday communication, we found that most tweets (78%) about people contained no generics. However, tweets with generics received more “likes” and retweets. Furthermore, while recent psychological research may lead to the prediction that tweets with generics about political groups are more common than tweets with generics about ethnic groups, we found the opposite. However, consistent with recent claims that political animosity is less constrained by social norms than animosity against gender and ethnic groups, negative tweets with generics about political groups were significantly more prevalent and retweeted than negative tweets about ethnic groups. Our study provides the first ML-based insights into the use and impact of social generics on Twitter. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that boredom can be an important experience that contributes to personal autonomous agency by providing authentic motivation, and that strategies of social media providers to bind users’ attention to their platforms undermine this authenticity. As discussed in social epistemology and media ethics for a while now, such strategies can lead to so-called epistemic or filter bubbles. Our analysis of the relation between boredom and social media use focuses on a similarly impairing effect of social media (...) on users’ autonomy, which we call authenticity bubbles. (shrink)

"Merten Reglitz makes a case for a new human right to free Internet access, arguing it is crucial for protecting and advancing fundamental moral interests. He examines the risks the Internet poses to our most important rights if it is not safeguarded by public institutions"--.

În peisajul contemporan al administrației publice, au avut loc schimbări semnificative, determinate de nevoia de eficiență, transparență și implicarea sporită a cetățenilor . Trei concepte esențiale încapsulează aceste schimbări: noul management public, guvernanța electronică, și rolul omniprezent al rețelelor sociale. Fiecare reprezintă o abordare transformatoare a guvernării, modelând colectiv un sector public mai receptiv și mai responsabil. Această carte explorează contribuțiile semnificative ale social media la modelele de guvernare democratică, realizarea principiilor noului management public și a guvernanței electronice. Analizează modul (...) în care media electronică facilitează transparența, îmbunătățește responsabilitatea și implicarea cetățenilor, și încurajează guvernarea colaborativă, redefinind astfel modelele tradiționale de administrație publică. DOI: 10.58679/MM66327. (shrink)

In a world undergoing rapid, large-scale technological change, the phenomenon of technosocial disruption is receiving increasing scholarly and societal attention. While the phenomenon is most actively delineated in philosophy of technology, it is also receiving growing attention within a different area of philosophy, namely the so-called “4E Cognition” approach to philosophy of mind. Despite this shared interest in technosocial disruption, there is relatively little exchange between the theorizing going on in these two different areas of philosophy. One of our paper's (...) two main aims is programmatic: to motivate the fruitfulness of such an exchange. We do this by turning to a specific case of technosocial disruption, namely Teenage Cancel Culture [TCC]. TCC cannot be disentangled from the introduction of social media platforms [SMPs] into modern day social life. Hence, we will speak of SMP-Afforded TCC. SPM-afforded TCC is a phenomenon fretted over by societal actors but strikingly ignored in academic research. In our effort to narrow this knowledge gap, we analyze SMP-afforded TCC from a perspective of technosocial disruption enriched by insights from 4E-Cognition. This brings out a specific worry about the role of SMPs in the social lives of teenagers. We argue that SMP-afforded TCC disrupts the social relational domains within which teenagers develop, maintain, and express their precarious social identities, by creating social affordances that are hostile to healthy risky interpersonal identity-exploration. As such, SMP-afforded TCC not only cancels particular individuals for particular acts; it may also pre-emptively cancel a certain way of being a social self, namely a healthy social risk-taker. We conclude the paper by proposing several potential routes for mitigating the perniciously disruptive effects of SMP-afforded TCC and identifying future areas for research. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the concept of attentional scaffolds and show the resemblance between social media platforms and slot machines, both functioning as hostile attentional scaffolds. The first section establishes the groundwork for the concept of attentional scaffolds and draws parallels to the mechanics of slot machines, to argue that social media platforms aim to capture users’ attention to maximize engagement through a system of intermittent rewards. The second section shifts focus to the interplay between emotions and attention, revealing (...) how online attentional capture through emotionally triggering stimuli leads to distraction. The final section elucidates the collective implications of scaffolding attention through social media platforms. The examination of phenomena such as emotional contagion and the emergence of group emotions underscores the transition from individual experiences to shared collective outcomes. Employing online moral outrage as a case study, we illustrate how negative emotions serve as scaffolds for individuals’ attention, propagate within social groups, and give rise to collective attitudes. (shrink)

The ongoing digital transformation of almost all areas of human action and agency calls for a readjustment of the norms that regulate these practices. For example, the digitisation of communicative practices poses new challenges to their functioning. This paper explains some of these challenges and argues that they cannot be met by a normative framework that focuses mainly on defensive (free speech and property) rights. In the context of mediated digital communication, the application of such a framework may even have (...) paradoxical consequences. Accordingly, this paper argues for a broader system of communicative rights, understood as rights to meaningful participation in well-functioning communicative practices. (shrink)

Once a “heroic” maxim of the distinguished few, Nietzsche’s motif of distinguishing oneself from the herd seems today to have produced its own “herd,” such that the waste form of Nietzsche’s radical authenticity has become the new mainstream. Whereas Nietzsche’s Zarathustra was the distinguished “one,” determined to teach humankind wisdom, today we encounter countless social-media Zarathustras, all unique and distinguished, incessantly dispersing wisdom. Yet precisely here a metaphysically decisive question emerges: if everyone belongs to a “rare breed” today, what has (...) become of the “many”? Guided by this question, the article pursues the metaphysical traces of the relationship between the “many” and the “few” and explores the motif of uniqueness from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra to the Instagram Zarathustras of the present. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the respondents’ evaluation of the pervasiveness of fake news through various SM platforms in Kuwait. The authors also examined the respondents’ attitudes toward most fake news on SM. A total of 1,539 Kuwaitis were selected. Design/methodology/approach The questionnaire was the major tool for this study. The respondents, from whom demographic information was obtained, were asked about which SM platforms most frequently spread fake news, their attitudes toward the subjects most frequently involved (...) in spreading fake news, their degree of use of the six SM platforms and interest in various subjects, and the attitudes toward the negative nature of SM news. SPSS was used for the data analysis. Findings The results showed that WhatsApp was the most likely to be used to disseminate fake news; Twitter and Instagram ranked second. The younger subjects were affected more by text and voice clips than the older ones. Originality/value The study, hopefully, produces new knowledge on the subject of fake news in social media, especially in the Arab world, since there are few studies conducted in the region. The study showed that WhatsApp was the SM tool most likely to be responsible for disseminating fake news in Kuwait, which may shed light on the usage of this application to be a news tool, rather than merely an interpersonal communication medium. (shrink)

A lot of subordinating speech has moved online, which raises several questions for philosophers. Can current accounts of oppressive speech adequately capture digital hate? How does the anonymity of online harassers contribute to the force of their speech? This paper examines online abuse and argues that standard accounts of licensing and accommodation are not up to the task of explaining the authority of online hate speech, as speaker authority often depends on the community in more ways than these accounts suggests. (...) Instead I argue that online abusive speech is best understood as collective subordinating speech acts, as their authority is drawn from an ad hoc collective. I argue that anonymity and shared language offer online abusers a path to a type of group-authority that explains the harm their speech is capable of. I close by suggesting that similar considerations are in play for subordinating speech in real life, and that online abuse helps to reveal key features of subordinating speech across mediums that are under-emphasized in the existing literature. (shrink)