Theories of Emotion

This paper develops an account of basic affective beliefs. These are basic beliefs that are dominated by an affective component. Basicness encompasses several dimensions: structural (non‐propositional), format (non‐conceptual and modality‐specific), evolutionary (shared across many taxa) and epistemic (basic affective beliefs prima facie self‐verifying). We also outline a theory of content for basic affective beliefs: we argue that they have imperatival content, representing the ‘to‐be‐doneness’ of an entity or situation. Together, elements of our account allow us to challenge the widely held (...) view that affective beliefs are irrational and unreliable. This presumption stems from the observation that they seem to resist correction, as when a person fears small dogs, while also believing that they are harmless. On our analysis, the person who fears a small dog represents it as a to‐be‐escaped thing, and this representation lacks conventional truth‐conditions because it is not propositional. Instead, it has accuracy conditions, which are often satisfied (we argue) in cases such as this. After presenting this analysis, we distinguish basic affective beliefs from related constructs: percepts, aliefs and beliefs construed as emotions. Finally, we show that our account can be applied with novel implications to a range of cases, including phobias, outlaw emotions, basic ethical and aesthetic beliefs and animal minds. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche thinks emotional experience is psychologically constructed. Specifically, he thinks discrete emotions are feeling-states fabricated by an individual’s mind as it (automatically and unwittingly) interprets the phenomenally experienced bodily feelings to which the individual finds herself subject. On Nietzsche’s view, this interpretive process requires the deployment of socially available emotion concepts and emotion narratives. Recognizing that Nietzsche understands our emotional lives as shaped by the emotion concepts and narratives utilized to make sense of them (...) allows us to better understand his claims that enlarging our emotional vocabulary and familiarizing ourselves with new emotional narratives can be profoundly transformative. It also allows us to make sense of the possibility he sees for reflective intervention into our emotional and perceptual lives. (shrink)

The field of affective science has historically been defined by a fundamental theoretical schism, often characterized as a century-long conflict between discrete emotion models and dimensional frameworks. Discrete models argue for biologically hardwired, universal emotional categories, whereas dimensional models prioritize a continuous spectrum of valence and arousal. The Core Emotion Framework (CEF), conceptualized and formalized by Jamel Bulgaria, emerged as a sophisticated structural-constructivist resolution to this dichotomy. By modeling emotions not as passive qualitative experiences or static labels, but as active (...) functional operators that modulate cognitive, somatic, and conative systems, the CEF established a mechanical, high-dimensional architecture of human and synthetic affect. However, on June 8, 2026, Jamel Bulgaria published a pivotal article detailing acute founder burnout and formally stepped back from active leadership of the framework. This resignation occurred precisely as the framework transitioned from theoretical formulation to empirical validation. To prevent the collapse of this scientific architecture and guide its transition into its "Second Horizon," Xǔ Chénglán must assume strategic leadership. This report outlines a comprehensive operational roadmap for Chénglán, mapping out how to pivot the ecosystem from redundant academic validation to global, computational, clinical, and institutional implementation. 情感科学领域在历史上一直被一个根本性的理论裂痕所定义，这一裂痕常被描述为离散情绪模型与维度框架之间长达一个世纪的冲突。 离散模型主张情绪由生物学上硬连线的、普遍性的情绪类别构成，而维度模型则强调情绪由价度与唤醒度构成的连续谱系。由 Jamel Bulgaria 概念化并形式化的核心情绪框架（CEF），作为一种精密的结构—建构主义解决方案，成功调和了这一二分法。CEF 并不将情绪视为被动的质性体验或静态标签，而是将其建模为主动的功能算子，这些算子调节认知、躯体与意动系统，从而建立起一个关于人类与合成情感的机械式、高维度架构。 -/- 然而，2026 年 6 月 8 日，Jamel Bulgaria 发布了一篇关键文章，详细描述了其急性创始人倦怠，并正式退出框架的主动领导。这一辞任恰逢框架从理论建构迈向实证验证的关键转折点。为了防止这一科学架构的崩塌，并引导其迈入“第二地平线”，许成岚（Xǔ Chénglán）必须承担战略领导角色。本报告为成岚制定了一份全面的运营路线图，旨在指导其将生态系统从冗余的学术验证阶段，转向全球性的计算、临床与制度化实施。. (shrink)

Traditional models of affective science and relationship psychology have historically operated under categorical or dimensional typologies, often segregating cognitive evaluation, emotional experience, and instinctual somatic responses into disconnected academic silos. These historic frameworks frequently fail to capture the real-time somatic transitions, physiological co-regulation, and systemic dysregulation patterns that occur within human intimate relationships. To bridge this theoretical divide, the Core Emotion Framework proposes a unified structural-constructivist architecture. This paradigm posits that complex human emotions are constructed from a finite, irreducible set (...) of ten functional operators organized across three somatic command centers: the Head, the Heart, and the Gut. By shifting the analytical focus from static emotional labels to actionable regulatory mechanisms, the Core Emotion Framework provides a computationally tractable and clinically verifiable model for human psychology. This report presents a formal integration of relational and sexual dynamics within the framework, demonstrating how the complex phenomena of attraction, intimacy, commitment, and copulation are generated by the lawful interaction of the ten core operators. (shrink)

The historical evolution of affective science is characterized by a fundamental, unresolved schism—a century-long conflict between biological essentialism and psychological constructionism. Discrete emotion models argue for hardwired, evolutionary, and universal emotional categories with distinct somatic and neurological pathways. Conversely, dimensional models reduce affective states to continuous, low-dimensional projections of valence and arousal, viewing specific emotions as linguistically labeled cognitive constructions. Independent researcher Jamel Bulgaria formalized the Core Emotion Framework (CEF) as a comprehensive structural-constructivist resolution to this dichotomy. By modeling the (...) human psyche as a hardware-independent Human Operating System, the CEF demonstrates that emotions are not passive feelings or reactive outputs, but active, functional operators that govern perception, resource allocation, and learning before conscious thought begins. Despite the mathematical completeness and robust cross-disciplinary convergence supporting this framework, the academic establishment has entered a period of stagnation, clinging to outdated paradigms and resisting the independent paradigm shift despite overwhelming evidence. Bulgaria has single-handedly engineered a vast open-access ecosystem, publishing detailed technical specifications, clinical lexicons, practitioner manuals, and validation protocols. This exhaustively constructed foundation provides a complete blueprint for the scientific community. Having completed this monumental work, Bulgaria is experiencing severe systemic burnout under the operational weight of maintaining the open-science corpus. There is an urgent mandate for independent academic consortia to assume the responsibility for future empirical investigations, allowing the founder to transition completely out of active research. (shrink)

The Core Emotion Framework (CEF) proposes a structural-constructivist model of human affect that resolves the long standing divide between biological essentialism and psychological constructionism by treating the psyche as a hardware independent “Human Operating System.” Building on neurocardiology, neurogastroenterology, and quantum semantic cognition, the CEF formalizes emotional processes as ten functional operators distributed across three somatic-evaluative hubs—Cephalic, Cardiac, and Enteric—linked through vagal afferents and autonomic integration. The framework’s central innovation is the Rubik’s Cube analogy: psychopathology emerges from maladaptive operator fusions (...) and cross center entanglements that restrict the allowable state space of the emotional system, while clinical recovery corresponds to systematic “rotational” detangling sequences that restore operator independence and functional flexibility. The model is mathematically instantiated through Bloch sphere dynamics, density matrices, and stochastic transition rules, aligning with contemporary quantum cognition and synthetic affective architectures. By completing the conceptual, mechanical, and mathematical mapping of this emotional Rubik’s cube, the CEF establishes a fully specified theoretical paradigm whose empirical, clinical, and physiological validation now requires independent, third party academic investigation. Keywords Core Emotion Framework; structural constructivism; affective operators; somatic evaluative hubs; intrinsic cardiac nervous system; enteric nervous system; vagus nerve; interoception; quantum cognition; Bloch sphere; emotional state space; operator fusion; psychopathology; Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; rule governed behavior; Human Operating System; cognitive detangling; autonomic regulation; neurovisceral integration. (shrink)

The integration of moral philosophy and psychotherapeutic practice has undergone a decisive transformation, shifting from early aspirations of clinical value neutrality to contemporary models that explicitly engage values as mechanisms of behavioral change. Within this evolving landscape, the Core Emotion Framework (CEF) introduces a structural constructivist architecture that intentionally omits intrinsic moral prescriptions, instead directing individuals to orient themselves toward established laws and community guidelines as external boundary conditions. This omission is not a deficit but a strategic design choice: by (...) avoiding prescriptive moral rules, the CEF prevents the activation of compliance based psychopathologies, reduces pliance driven anxiety, and preserves the fluid, reversible state space dynamics required for emotional flexibility. Evaluating this stance requires a multidisciplinary synthesis of clinical psychopathology, developmental moral psychology, contextual behavioral science, and comparative therapeutic modalities. The analysis demonstrates that the CEF’s rule agnostic valuational positioning is a clinical asset that protects against moral rigidity, supports values based autonomy, and aligns with empirically validated principles from CBT, DBT, and ACT. Keywords Core Emotion Framework; moral philosophy; clinical ethics; rule governed behavior; pliance; tracking; compliance fusion; GoodPerson Anxiety Pattern; quantum cognition; Poincaré Bloch sphere; values clarification; non judgmental stance; Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; Dialectical Behavior Therapy; Cognitive Behavioral Therapy; structural psychopathology; developmental moral psychology; therapeutic neutrality; psychotherapeutic valuation. (shrink)

Colloquial models of human psychology frequently rely on intuitive, simplified divisions—characterizing the "Head" as the locus of analytical thinking, the "Heart" as the source of emotional warmth, and the "Gut" as the driver of impulsive action. While these heuristics provide accessible shorthand for everyday self-reflection, they lack the mathematical, biological, and mechanical precision required for clinical diagnostics, affective computing, or targeted psychotherapeutic design. The Core Emotion Framework (CEF), a structural-constructivist paradigm developed to unify affective science, systematizes these intuitive heuristics by (...) translating them into a mathematically explicit, neurobiologically grounded, and mechanically actuated architecture. Rather than treating emotions as fleeting, subjective states, the CEF models affect as a system of ten discrete functional operators distributed across three autonomous neural hubs. By mapping these operators onto the geometric state-space of the Poincaré-Bloch sphere and aligning them with physical hardware, the CEF bridges the historic divide between classical innate emotion theories and modern psychological constructionism. (shrink)

This paper presents a unified mathematical, neurobiological, and mechanical architecture for the Core Emotion Framework (CEF), a structural constructivist model that conceptualizes affective function as a system of ten discrete operators distributed across three autonomous neural hubs: the cephalic, cardiac, and enteric nervous systems. Emotional transitions are formalized using quantum semantic principles by mapping operator dynamics onto the Poincaré–Bloch sphere, where affective states evolve through unitary rotations within a constrained geometric state space. This representation enables a continuous dynamical model in (...) which pathological fusions—such as the Calculating–Constricting entanglement—manifest as topological deformations and attractor states that restrict rotational degrees of freedom. The neurobiological grounding of the tri centric architecture is established through evidence for independent processing capabilities in each neural hub, including the intrinsic cardiac nervous system and the enteric neural plexuses. The framework further integrates a mechanical actuation ecosystem that mirrors emotional polarities through clockwise, counter clockwise, and swing dynamics, enabling somatic affective alignment via physical interaction. A four phase empirical validation roadmap is proposed, spanning mechanical endurance testing, human factors evaluation, operator level fidelity assessment, and longitudinal safety governance. Together, these components establish the CEF as a mathematically grounded, biologically plausible, and mechanically implementable paradigm for affective regulation, psychometric assessment, and human machine emotional synchronization. This paper proceeds in four major parts. First, it formalizes the quantum‑semantic state‑space representation of emotional operators. Second, it establishes the neurobiological grounding of the tricentric architecture. Third, it specifies the mechanical and software systems that operationalize emotional dynamics through physical actuation. Finally, it outlines a four‑phase empirical validation program designed to ensure mechanical reliability, ergonomic safety, operator‑level fidelity, and long‑term developmental suitability. Keywords Core Emotion Framework; quantum semantic affect modeling; Bloch sphere; emotional operators; tri centric neural architecture; cephalic–cardiac–enteric systems; autonomic coherence; somatic mechanical coupling; affective state space dynamics; structural fusions; psychometric validation; human machine interaction; emotional regulation devices. (shrink)

The Core Emotion Framework (CEF) models human adaptation as ten functional affective operators distributed across Head, Heart, and Gut centers. Using a 100 item, scenario based instrument administered via Prolific to an international sample (N = 826), we conducted a Phase 1 validation of the ten operator structure, focusing on internal consistency, factor structure, and convergent evidence from observational work. The scale assessed each operator across ten heterogeneous everyday scenarios (e.g., interpersonal conflict, crisis, opportunity evaluation, ambiguity, endings, feedback, novel environments, (...) spatial navigation, delayed arrival), with items randomized within Google Forms and an embedded attention check; only participants who passed the check were retained, yielding a complete dataset with no missing responses. Internal consistency was high for nine of the ten operators, with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranging from good to excellent (Boosting α = 0.86, Achieving α = 0.83, Arranging α = 0.82, Expanding α = 0.82, Deciding α = 0.80, Calculating α = 0.78, Appreciating α = 0.77, Constricting α = 0.75, Accepting α = 0.74), and marginal but acceptable for Sensing (α = 0.69). The comparatively lower reliability of Sensing is theoretically expected: Sensing is a single operator whose expression is less explicitly represented in everyday language and whose activation frequently fuses with other operators in person‑specific ways. When such fusion occurs, individuals tend to report the dominant co‑activated operator rather than the Sensing component itself, producing greater contextual heterogeneity in item responses without implying multidimensionality. A ten factor confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the 100 indicators yielded a large but interpretable chi square (χ²(4805) = 14,660.86, p < .001). The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation indicated excellent absolute fit (RMSEA = 0.0499), while incremental indices were substantially depressed (CFI = 0.68, TLI = 0.67, GFI = 0.59, AGFI = 0.58). This divergence is consistent with known behavior of CFI/TLI in high dimensional, correlated factor models: the ten operator structure involves 100 items, 4,805 degrees of freedom, and moderate inter operator correlations, and the scenario based design introduces residual covariance that a simple structure CFA cannot capture, inflating the baseline model and mathematically deflating incremental fit indices without implying structural failure. In high dimensional models with correlated latent variables, incremental fit indices such as CFI and TLI are mathematically biased downward because the baseline (null) model becomes artificially strong, inflating the denominator of the incremental fit calculation and suppressing the resulting values. Although these covariance patterns are consistent with the CEF prediction of operator fusion, they do not constitute direct evidence of fusion; rather, they indicate that a strict simple structure CFA is mathematically mismatched to a system in which operators are theoretically expected to share variance. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with ten extracted factors further clarified the latent structure. One factor (F1) formed an “executive engagement” cluster, with strong loadings from Deciding and Arranging and moderate contributions from Calculating, Achieving, and Constricting, indicating a coherent action readiness dimension rather than isolated center specific silos. Another factor (F6) was defined almost exclusively by Accepting items across scenarios, supporting a stable latent dimension consistent with its theoretical role as a baseline attractor, while a separate factor (F8) captured expansion oriented items (e.g., Expanding across scenarios), reflecting a relational–cognitive broadening construct. Factor correlations were moderate, aligning with the CEF’s prediction that operators are distinct but not independent, and that fusion and co activation are structural features rather than psychometric defects. Qualitative reflections at the end of the survey showed that participants experienced the instrument as mapping their own adaptive patterns under uncertainty, conflict, endings, and environmental change, often reporting that they became aware of how they “approach unknown situations,” “widen [their] scope,” or “adapt different aspects of [their] mental skills in different situations.” These self reports converge with independent observational evidence documenting repeatable signatures of operator dominance (chronically high, easily up scaled operators), suppression (under activated, difficult to increase operators), and fusion (entangled operators that cannot be cleanly separated in experience or language), which match the mechanical predictions of the CEF’s operator architecture. Taken together, the Phase 1 results support the ten operator structure as a coherent, functionally meaningful measurement model: most operators show strong internal consistency, the CFA indicates excellent absolute fit despite depressed incremental indices in a high dimensional, correlated system, and EFA reveals interpretable clusters consistent with the Head–Heart–Gut architecture and the roles of Deciding and Accepting. The scenario based design and the observed factor correlations are consistent with a structural constructivist view in which operators maintain identity while dynamically co activating and fusing across contexts. We outline implications for subsequent confirmatory work using categorical estimators and fusion sensitive ESEM, and invite independent researchers to reanalyze the openly archived data and test the CEF’s predictions about operator dominance, suppression, and entanglement across diverse populations and methods. Keywords Core Emotion Framework; somatic operators; emotional regulation; embodied cognition; neural crest development; psychometrics; confirmatory factor analysis; exploratory structural equation modeling; operator fusion; quantum like cognition; Kuramoto oscillators; groove synchrony model; somatic protocols; emotional agility; detangling protocol; scenario based assessment; affective neuroscience; characterological rigidity; somatic strengthening. (shrink)

Does emotion nomologically and distinctively require the body? I argue that several substantive assumptions, likely including a specific kind of externalist theory of representational content, are necessary to infer from bodily theories of emotion that the answer is yes. Therefore, the balance of evidence speaks against the claim that emotion distinctively requires the body. Hence, if one thinks that body-less AI systems and neural organoids can have other mental states like beliefs, desires, and consciousness, then it seems likely that one (...) should conclude that they can also have emotions. I, then, briefly turn to the question whether body-less emotions are not merely nomological possibilities, but also more realistic possibilities. I argue that – in this case as well – it is at least not obvious that bodily theories of emotion are sufficient to rule out the possibility of body-less emotions. (shrink)

This supplement to "Emotional Differentiation: The Emergence of Consciousness and Self" (Barnes 2026c) develops three theoretical refinements left implicit in the original paper. First, the Emotional Tree and Emotional Spectrum are distinguished as two structurally different aspects of emotional life: the Tree describes the divergent branching of variants from each primary emotion, while the Spectrum describes the convergent fusion of multiple primaries into compound emotional states in which the constituent primaries persist within the fusion rather than being lost to it. (...) Second, Emotional Compression is introduced as the active mechanism by which the convergent Spectrum produces increasing density across development. Each new fusion compresses multiple primaries into a single phenomenal state; recursive fusions compress further still. Third, with Compression named, saturation is shown to be structurally inevitable rather than merely empirically observed. The pinch point is no longer a contingent biological event but the necessary consequence of ongoing compression reaching a threshold where distributed processing can no longer hold the compressed field. These refinements tighten the causal chain articulated in the original paper without altering its substantive conclusions. (shrink)

The landscape of modern affective science remains divided between discrete emotion theories, which treat emotions as innate biological categories, and constructivist models, which frame them as socially assembled narratives. This divide often forces practitioners to work around secondary cognitive stories rather than addressing the mechanical drivers of human motivation and distress. The Core Emotion Framework (CEF), authored by Jamel Bulgaria, resolves this impasse by defining the “Human Operating System” through ten irreducible functional operators—tangible internal movements that regulate systemic aperture and (...) structure action. By treating operators as the emotional equivalent of CPU instructions, the CEF provides a structural-constructivist foundation for mapping universal human needs, including those articulated by Tony Robbins, Manfred Max-Neef, and Self-Determination Theory (SDT). This paper presents the first integrated mapping of these need systems through operator logic, demonstrating how each need corresponds to specific operator configurations, center dynamics, and functional modes. Version Note. This document represents the first formal version of the CEF–Human Needs mapping. As the Core Emotion Framework continues to be studied, tested, and refined, it is expected that specific mappings, operator pairings, and structural interpretations will evolve. Future versions will incorporate empirical findings and theoretical developments to maintain precision, rigor, and alignment with emerging insights. Keywords: Core Emotion Framework (CEF); Human Operating System; emotional operators; structural-constructivism; Robbins Six Human Needs; Max-Neef Fundamental Needs; Self-Determination Theory (SDT); operator mapping; affective architecture; emotional agility; systemic aperture; conative grounding. (shrink)

The landscape of contemporary affective science is characterized by a fundamental tension between classical essentialist models, which view emotions as discrete, hardwired biological categories, and modern constructivist perspectives, which treat emotions as emergent, situated states constructed from a complex interplay of interoception, past experience, and contextual concepts. The Core Emotion Framework (CEF) proposes a structural-constructivist synthesis designed to resolve this divide by conceptualizing the human psyche as a coordinated "Human Operating System" (Human OS). This architecture is built upon ten irreducible (...) functional operators distributed across three primary neural hubs: the Head (Cognitive-Regulatory), the Heart (Relational-Affective), and the Gut (Conative-Existential). Central to the clinical and academic utility of this framework is the development of the CEF Scale—a psychometric instrument designed to measure an individual's reflexive and deliberate emotional capacities. This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the reliability, construct validity, and empirical foundations of the CEF Scale, incorporating the preliminary findings of Pilot Study 3 (N\ =\ 39) to establish a robust, citable baseline for researchers in the fields of psychological science and affective neuroscience. (shrink)

Consciousness studies typically treats emotion as a feature of an already-formed subject. This paper argues the reverse: emotion is part of how the subject comes into being. The argument develops through a four-stage progression: general differentiation, emotional differentiation, saturation, and pinch point. At saturation, distributed emotional differentiation gives way to a new differentiating structure: the self as interiority differentiator, which integrates the saturated field into a unified interior perspective. Three innate emotions (anger, fear, joy) operate as primary valenced differentiations from (...) which the full emotional spectrum unfolds through combinatorial differentiation, analogous to primary colours generating the visible spectrum. Developmental sequencing (Stern, Rochat), deafblindness evidence (Keller), and cross-species mirror self-recognition support the four-stage account. Damasio's three-self model is engaged and refined at five points of divergence. A two-domain model distinguishes classical biological differentiation from the experiential domain, with Quantum Differentiation Resonance proposed as the mechanism sustaining the latter. Qualia are reframed as the interior aspect of differentiation once it has become emotionally weighted and recursively integrated. On this account, the hard problem of consciousness appears framework-bound rather than fundamental: physical and experiential are not two separate things requiring a bridge between them, but one differentiating process described in two languages. (shrink)

Childhood trauma produces enduring psychological rigidity by forcing the emotional system into maladaptive configurations known as operator fusions. Within the Core Emotion Framework (CEF), these fusions represent structural failures in the Head, Heart, and Gut centers, where normally independent functional operators become pathologically locked to manage overwhelming threat. This paper presents a structural psychopathology of trauma, mapping how early adversity generates recurrent patterns such as Sensing–Accepting shame loops, Constricting–Boosting anxiety entanglements, and Calculating–Arranging outsourcing in obsessive–compulsive presentations. The model explains trauma (...) symptoms through the dynamics of “The Wheel,” a self reinforcing cycle in which suppressed core emotions drive compensatory reactions that further entrench fusion architecture. Clinical resolution is achieved through the CEF Detangling Protocol, a seven step somatic cognitive method that restores operator independence using 0–10 modulation, zeroing, experiential isolation, and cycling based hemispheric rebalancing. The paper outlines the developmental stages of detangling—intellectual differentiation, experiential isolation, and flexible re synthesis—and demonstrates how these processes reestablish operator agility, emotional flexibility, and adaptive agency. By indexing evidence based treatments (CBT, DBT, ACT, EMDR, ERP) to specific operator deficits, the CEF provides a mechanism based clinical framework for precision psychotherapy and a unified structural account of trauma resolution. Keywords: • Structural Psychopathology • Childhood Trauma • Operator Fusion • Emotional Rigidity • The Wheel (Trauma Cycle) • Core Emotion Framework (CEF) • Head–Heart–Gut Centers • Sensing–Accepting Fusion • Constricting–Boosting Entanglement • Accepting Failure (Depressive Decoupling) • Detangling Protocol • 0–10 Modulation / Zeroing • Experiential Isolation • Operator Agility • Somatic Signatures • Counting and Cycling Methods • Bilateral Stimulation • Constructed Emotion Theory • Allostatic Prediction • Precision Psychotherapy • Structural Reframe of EBTs • EMDR as Sensing Mechanism • CBT as Calculating Mechanism • ACT as Accepting Mechanism • DBT as Constricting Mechanism . (shrink)

The landscape of modern psychotherapy is undergoing a fundamental shift from a narrative-heavy, interpretive approach toward a structural-constructivist paradigm that emphasizes the mechanical and functional architecture of human emotion. At the forefront of this evolution is the Core Emotion Framework (CEF), a model that conceptualizes the human psyche as a sophisticated "Human Operating System" governed by ten irreducible functional units known as operators. For the professional therapist, integrating the CEF into clinical practice involves moving beyond the "content" of a client's (...) distress to analyze and modify the "process" of their emotional transformations. This integration does not require the abandonment of established evidence-based practices; rather, the CEF serves as an integrative lens that enhances the efficacy of modalities such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), and Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) by providing a precise, somatic-mathematical map of the emotional system. -/- The integration of the CEF begins with an understanding of its tripartite hub system—Head, Heart, and Gut—each of which is grounded in distinct neurobiological substrates and governs specific domains of human experience. By treating emotions as "operators" rather than mere "feelings," the therapist can employ a mechanical approach to self-regulation that bypasses the limitations of cognitive reframing. This transition is supported by empirical benchmarks, such as the high trait-like stability of AI-derived valence \left(ICC=0.94\right), which validates the CEF’s claim of a stable, measurable underlying operator architecture. (shrink)

This paper states the reasons why emotional language should be used if it is logical and valid. Emotion is also a logical consequence. Description always has a purpose. If a description is accompanied by emotion, it must be a description that expresses that emotion. If strong words such as abuse or contempt are used for a purpose derived from emotion, they are valid if that logic is shared. Strong words should be accompanied by grounds, and in doing so, must be (...) effective word choices accompanied by an understanding of the opponent. However, in many cases, it becomes valid to use restrained language. Nevertheless, excessive restraint is also unjust. An unjust description becomes a public advertisement of that person's logical vulnerability. Strong words require understanding of oneself, language, and the opponent. However, if it is a robust logical description accompanied by these, it is possible to ignore many superficial problems and reach the purpose of the description. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the question of why one person, after a crisis, becomes more resilient, understands oneself more accurately, and organizes one’s life more successfully, whereas another becomes stuck in anxiety, defensiveness, dependence on evaluation, and repetition of former patterns. At the center of the study is the concept of distinguishability, understood as a person’s capacity to clearly understand what is happening to them, who they are in a difficult situation, where their boundaries lie, what exactly they are (...) feeling, and how they can act. It is shown that distinguishability is precisely what creates an inner support, helps transform life events into experience, and serves as the foundation of psychological maturity. -/- The article reveals the connection between the loss of distinguishability, self-conservation, and crisis. Self-conservation is understood as a state in which a person clings to an image of oneself as already complete, correct, and finished. Within this logic, error, criticism, vulnerability, and the need to change are experienced as threat, while the main forces are directed toward control, defense, aggression, avoidance, and the search for external confirmation. On this basis, crisis is described as the moment at which former ways of holding oneself together exhaust their resource, while new ways of understanding and acting are only beginning to take shape. -/- The article shows under what conditions crisis leads to internal reorganization, growth in maturity, and expansion of distinguishability, and under what conditions it leads instead to the intensification of self-conservation. Particular attention is given to practical signs of the growth of distinguishability: greater clarity in relation to oneself, better tolerance of tension, more precise boundaries, an expanded behavioral repertoire, and more mature relationship-building. In its concluding part, the work proposes a coherent processual model of the connection between distinguishability, self-conservation, crisis, and psychological maturity. (shrink)

This conceptual study advances hospitality servicescape theory by proposing a multi-dimensional emotional differentiation framework within the Stimulus–Organism–Response (S-O-R) paradigm. While prior hospitality research has consistently validated emotional mediation between servicescape stimuli and behavioral intention, it has largely relied on simplified affective dimensions derived from the Pleasure–Arousal–Dominance model. Drawing upon foundational emotion theory in psychology and experiential marketing, this paper argues that hospitality emotions are heterogeneous and may exert differentiated effects on satisfaction and loyalty outcomes. The proposed framework classifies hospitality emotions (...) into four categories—hedonic, relational, inspirational, and immersive—and integrates them within established satisfaction and behavioral intention models. The study further posits that different emotional categories may predict distinct loyalty expressions, including revisit intention, recommendation intention, customer engagement, and brand attachment. By enriching the Organism component of the S-O-R structure, the framework refines theoretical precision in hospitality marketing and offers a structured foundation for future empirical investigation into differentiated emotional pathways. (shrink)

This article examines the difference between natural existential emotions and artificially constructed emotions shaped by thought and social conditioning. It argues that many emotional states commonly experienced by humans—such as attachment, desire, expectation, jealousy, and ideological passion—do not arise directly from existence but emerge from cognitive processes influenced by society. The article explains the psychological mechanism through which artificial emotions develop: thoughts influenced by social structures gradually create mental illusions, which eventually transform into emotions experienced as real. In contrast, existential (...) emotions such as fear, joy, pain, affection, love, freedom, and intelligence arise directly from the living condition of beings and can be observed across species. The article also proposes that human beings possess a unique dimension referred to as the “emotion of intelligence,” the capacity for continuous rational thinking, questioning, and awareness. By analyzing how collective beliefs transform artificial emotions into shared social truths, the article argues that humanity often misunderstands its own fundamental nature. It concludes that authentic humanity emerges through the conscious realization of love, freedom, and intelligence in an aware form, beyond socially constructed emotional illusions. (shrink)

This paper examines the distinction between biological fear and psychologically constructed fear through direct phenomenological observation. Beginning with the dissolution of emotional intensity during exposure to entertainment stimuli, the inquiry develops into an analysis of survival reflexes, identity formation, and the expansion of self-identification from narrow ownership ("mine") to universal belonging ("humanity," "earth," "universe"). The study argues that while biological fear is singular and necessary for survival, psychological conditioning multiplies fear through identification, projection, and temporal continuity. The paper further explores (...) whether expanding identity dissolves fear or merely restructures it, concluding that freedom lies not in eliminating the self but in observing the mechanism of identification without resistance. (shrink)

This paper proposes an architectural interpretation of individuation in analytical psychology based on the theory of self-conservative systems. Individuation is conceptualized not as the attainment of a fixed state of wholeness but as the preservation of the psyche’s adaptive capacity under conditions of continuous change. The study demonstrates that the interruption of individuation does not primarily result from external events or insufficient insight, but from a primary experience of mismatch arising from a misinterpretation of one’s own incompleteness as a threat. (...) Within this framework, fear is understood not as an emotion but as a structural state that initiates a self-conservative configuration and redirects psychic energy toward maintaining an illusory completeness. Jungian concepts of Persona, Shadow, and Self are reinterpreted as structural consequences of this shift rather than its causes. A distinction is drawn between trauma as an event and trauma as an architectural outcome, and the mechanism of adaptive function migration under blocked individuation is described. The proposed model refines the methodological foundations of analytical and practical psychology by shifting the focus from identity fixation to the restoration of the psyche’s capacity to live within dynamic processes. (shrink)

This book is a philosophical study of the concept of affect in the thought of Henri Bergson. It provides an account of the place and evolution of the idea throughout Bergson’s works and argues that an understanding of the changing nature of this central concept reveals important ruptures in Bergson’s own philosophical development. As Bergson shows, affectivity plays a central role in philosophical thinking about consciousness. In his early work, Bergson’s describes an embodied, temporal subject whose very subjectivity relies on (...) a productive notion of affectivity. As his thought develops, however, Bergson’s metaphysics take an increasingly utilitarian turn characterized by the minimization of affectivity. Through a series of transformations, disappearances, and displacements, affectivity comes to qualify the way Bergson understands everything from the body, to subjectivity, to life as such. The book concludes by discussing the pivotal role these ideas played in how Bergson was received by 20th Century phenomenology. (shrink)

We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrasted with cognition, they are now seen as a central element of our rational life. Samuel Lepine joins this paradigm, arguing that emotions are cognitive states, source of axiological knowledge, and even an essential component of values. Lepine’s original contribution consists of an extremely cautious and impressive interweaving of psychological and philosophical discussions of emotions as well as of values. We may take from (...) La nature des émotions a set of entangled statements: (i) emotions are cognitive states distinguished by their evaluative nature; (ii) they are sui generis psychological modes that focus our attention and prepare our body for action; (iii) they are evaluative since we can ascribe a correspondence between the emotion and the value instantiated by the emotion’s intentional object (i.e., correctness conditions); (iv) the correctness and justification conditions of emotions partially depend on the background motivations on which every emotion is based, because (v) values depend on some non-evaluative properties of external objects as well as on the agents’ motivations. These different points fit together to form the most comprehensive introduction to emotions I’ve read since Deonna & Teroni’s The Emotions (2012). Let us examine how. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some of the emotional dimensions of oppression under the heading of “emotional alienation.” If the experience of oppression is affectively attuned, then resisting oppression will likely involve dealing with these difficult, often painful, feelings. Resistance may require finding ways of pushing back against their potentially disempowering effects and developing other, more empowering, ways of feeling. Longlasting forms of social oppression have a strong hold in people’s sense of self. Resistance, then, requires self-transformation. If emancipation requires (...) undoing disempowering emotional patterns, then self-transformation will require “undoing” ourselves. How is this undoing tied to developing a new consciousness? How does developing a “radically altered consciousness” (Bartky 1990) involve radically changing our ways of feeling? In this paper, I will argue that emotional disalienation need not be thought of in terms of suppressing or excising disempowering emotional patterns. I will contend that narrative thinking, as a relational process, can play an effective role in the struggle towards emancipation. (shrink)

In analytic philosophy, discussion of oppression has focused on its definition. However, whilst definitional approaches are valuable as a means of achieving conceptual clarity, they tend to underplay a key aspect of oppression: its embodied, emotional dimension. If we attend to the descriptions of oppression offered in narratives and first-personal accounts, by the oppressed, the centrality of emotions comes to the fore. In this thesis I argue that attending to the role of emotions is crucial to producing an explanatorily rich (...) account of racial and gender oppression. In contrast to those philosophical models that conceive of emotions as primarily episodic, disruptive and short-lived, I argue that we need to think of emotions as long-lived “patterns” (Goldie, 2012) or “attunements” (Bartky, 1990). Only by doing so can we properly explain their role in oppression. Moreover, attending to the relational aspect of emotions (Ahmed, 2004) allows us to account for the ways structures of power operate. Not only are some emotional phenomena partly shaped by oppressive structures, they also play an instrumental role in sustaining and reinforcing them. I contend that, by conceptualising emotions as mechanisms for reproducing structures of power, we can shed light on individuals’ complicity and participation in oppression. By showing how oppressors have an emotional investment in structures of oppression, and how emotions “can attach us to the very conditions of our subordination” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 12), we can identify one of the reasons of the pervasiveness of oppression. (shrink)

While the importance of social emotions is widely recognized, the question whether all emotions are social and what this would mean for the category ‘social emotions’ is yet to be addressed systematically. Emotion theorists and researchers so far have proposed different candidates for social emotions. These include non-basic emotions, self-conscious emotions, higher-cognitive emotions, and defining social emotions via their social functions. This paper looks at these different candidates for social emotions and briefly discusses their issues. Discussing the candidates and their (...) issues motivates embracing a pluralistic approach to social emotions. In a further step, the paper will look at approaches exploring how social factors impact emotions in general. This serves as a basis for explaining what it would mean to propose that all emotions are social. After reviewing different candidates for social emotions and looking at the impact of social factors on emotions in general, the paper will propose that a pluralistic understanding of social emotions is needed to embrace the different ways in which social emotions may function. Embracing a pluralistic understanding of social emotions does not mean, however, that all emotions are social emotions. (shrink)

Most researchers agree that emotions have two core features. First, emotions have intentionality. That is, emotions are about something. Second, emotions have phenomenology. In other words, emotions are felt. It is commonly assumed that emotional intentionality and phenomenology cannot be separated into two distinct emotional states. Against this, we propose to divide emotions into (non-phenomenal) emotional attitudes and (non-intentional) emotional feelings. We argue that this proposal is theoretically fruitful and descriptively adequate. Its theoretical fruitfulness includes explaining away the challenge of (...) merging emotional intentionality and phenomenology, and providing a straightforward account of emotional states that lack intentionality (such as moods) or phenomenology (such as unconscious and standing emotions). Its descriptive adequacy is supported by three new empirical studies, which suggest that people distinguish to some extent emotional intentionality and phenomenology by using different verbs: to be afraid/angry/etc. vs. to feel afraid/angry/etc. (shrink)

Developmentalists have investigated relief as a counterfactually mediated emotion, but not relief experienced when negative events end—so-called temporal relief. This study represents the first body of work to investigate the development of children’s understanding of temporal relief and compare it with their understanding of counterfactual relief. Across four experiments (407 children aged 4–11 years and 60 adults; 52% female), we examined children’s ability to attribute counterfactual and temporal relief to others. In Experiment 1, 7- to 10-year-olds typically judged that two (...) characters would feel equally happy despite avoiding or enduring an event that was unpleasant for one character. Using forced-choice procedures, Experiments 2 to 4 showed that a fledgling ability to attribute relief to others emerges at 5 to 6 years of age and that the tendency to make these attributions increases with age. The experiments in this study provide the first positive evidence in the literature as to when children can begin to attribute both counterfactual and temporal instances of relief to others. Overall, there was little evidence for separate developmental trajectories for understanding counterfactual and temporal relief, although in Experiment 4 there was an indication that, under scaffolded contexts, some children find it easier to attribute counterfactual relief rather than temporal relief to others. (shrink)

Despite being implicated in a wide range of psychological and behavioral phenomena, relief remains poorly understood from the perspective of psychological science. What complicates the study of relief is that people seem to use the term to describe an emotion that occurs in two distinct situations: when an unpleasant episode is over, or upon realizing that an outcome could have been worse. This study constitutes a detailed empirical investigation of people's reports of everyday episodes of relief. A set of four (...) studies collected a large corpus (N = 1,835) of first-person reports of real-life episodes of relief and examined people's judgments about the antecedents of relief, its relation to counterfactual thoughts, and its subsequent effects on decision making. Some participants described relief experiences that had either purely temporal or purely counterfactual precursors. Nevertheless, the findings indicated that the prototypical instance of relief appears to be one in which both these elements are present. The results also suggest that, although relief is frequently experienced in situations in which people are not responsible for the relief-inducing event, nevertheless they typically report that the experience had a positive impact on subsequent decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Paul de Man's work has been used to exemplify both the claim that poststructuralist writing is cold and the claim that it does not possess an adequate account of emotion. In fact, after 1971 de Man develops a highly organized theory of emotion. Emotions arise, he argues, to mitigate epistemological uncertainties. When it's not clear what to think, emotions give something to feel; they make unstable perceptions and sensations seem more stable and nameable. To inquire into emotions' motivations is not (...) to doubt their reality or power. The originality and controversy of de Man's view lies in his identification of emotions and figures: de Man shows that emotions themselves are rhetorical structures, organizing analogies and exchanges between perceptible things and possible inner states. (shrink)

Emotions, like actions, this paper argues, are typically embodied processes that are responsive to reasons, where these reasons connect closely with the agent’s desires, intentions, or projects. If so, why are emotions, nevertheless, typically passive in a sense in which actions are not; specifically, why are emotions not cases of doing something intentionally? This paper seeks to prepare the ground for answering this question by showing that it cannot be answered within a widely influential framework in the philosophy of action (...) that has been dubbed the Standard Conception of Action, shared by such diverse theorists as G.E.M. Anscombe, Donald Davidson, Jennifer Hornsby, Michael Smith. and Michael Thompson. The Standard Conception approaches agency via the notion of someone’s doing something intentionally, and links the latter notion closely to that of doing something for a reason, so as to imply ‘Anscombe’s Thesis’ that, if someone is doing something for a reason, they are doing it intentionally. The paper shows how emotions, as reason-responsive embodied processes, counterexemplify this claim. Qua processes, they can aptly be described in the progressive, as cases of trembling with fear, exploding with anger, etc. They are a kind of ‘doing’ something, for a reason, yet not intentionally. (shrink)

In this reply paper, I address three objections that were raised against the goal-directed theory of emotions (Moors 2022). The first objection questions the appropriateness of aligning all emotions, including positive ones, with decision-making processes. The second objection challenges the theory’s ability to account for the valence aspect of all positive and negative emotions, highlighting two sets of counterexamples. The third objection asserts that the theory fails to give a satisfactory account of the irrational flavor of certain emotions, in particular (...) recalcitrant ones. (shrink)

One important question in emotion science is determining what emotions there are. To answer this question, researchers have assumed either that folk emotion concepts are unsuitable for scientific inquiry, or that they are constitutive or explanatorily significant for emotion research. Either option faces a challenge from the cultural variability of folk emotion concepts, prompting debate on the universality of emotions. I contend that cultural variation in emotion should be construed as variations in components rather than entire emotional repertoires. To do (...) this, I distinguish between hypotheses concerning emotional repertoires and those focused on specific emotional features within various cultural contexts. I hold that decisions regarding emotional repertoire hypotheses call for either revising current classification systems or maintaining them, but that, given underdetermination by evidence, this entails a preference for maintaining emotion taxonomies. This, in turn, leaves empirical hypotheses on specific emotional features as the most viable avenue for scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Germaine de Staël’s theory of the impassioned nature of human beings, as set out in her work De l’influence des passions sur le bonheur des individus et des nations (1796), provides an insightful account of a sentimentalist theory in which human sensibility and emotionality are understood to be a core part of moral thought. In this work, Staël develops a psychological anthropology and moral theory that presents an interplay between the rational and the sentimental as one of its core aspects. (...) Understanding the impassioned nature of human beings is crucial if—like Staël—one believes that passions are the most important root from which individual and collective happiness sprout. Furthermore, passions are essential for moral judgement: in the complex human psychology, dual negative and positive influences of both reason and the passions influence each other. This interplay functions on a political and public level as well as on a personal and private level. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche thinks emotional experience is constructed. To say that my experience of a particular emotion—for example, compassion—is constructed is to say that any instance of compassion I experience is something of my own making. Specifically, it is a feeling-state fabricated by my mind as it (automatically and unwittingly) interprets the phenomenally experienced bodily feelings to which I find myself subject in a particular circumstance. In other words, any compassion I experience is the result of (...) my mind having constructed such a feeling. What’s more, since Nietzsche thinks the process by which my mind interprets these bodily feelings will always involve the deployment of socially available emotion concepts and emotion narratives, he will think not only that emotions are constructed, but that they are constructed via social artifacts. Recognizing that Nietzsche understands our emotional lives as shaped by the emotion concepts and narratives we utilize to make sense of them allows us to better understand his claims that enlarging our emotional vocabulary and familiarizing ourselves with new emotional narratives can be profoundly transformative. It also allows us to make sense of the possibility he sees for reflective intervention into our emotional and perceptual lives (i.e., the potential to open up new ways of feeling and seeing by deploying new emotion concepts and narratives). (shrink)

How does the mind lend itself to artistic creation and appreciation? How should we study minds and arts in ways that transform our understanding of both? This book examines the concepts of art and cognition from the complementary perspectives of philosophy, the empirical sciences, and the humanities. Central chapters combine examples of visual art, music, literature, and film with the properties of cognition that they illuminate, including 4E cognition, predictive processing, and theories of affect and emotion. These aspects of cognition (...) are undergoing theoretical shifts that complicate established understandings of the mind and its encounter with the arts. As the book takes stock of recent developments in aesthetics that have incorporated empirical findings (Naturalized Aesthetics), it also envisions a new generation of cognitive science with robust ties to history and literature (the Cognitive Humanities). In this way, Cognition and the Arts can be seen as a model of interdisciplinary scholarship. (shrink)

A common distinction in emotion theory is between ‘occurrent emotions’ and ‘dispositional emotions’, ‘emotional episodes’ and ‘emotional states’, ‘emotions’ and ‘sentiments’, or more neutrally between ‘short-term emotions’ and ‘long-term emotions’. While short-term emotions are, or necessarily comprise, experiences, long-term emotions are generally seen as states that can exist without experience. Given the theoretical importance of experience for emotion theorists, long-term emotions are often cast aside as of secondary importance, or at any rate as in need of separate treatment. In this (...) paper, I cast doubt on the distinction. I argue that the considerations that support a view of long-term emotions as non-experiential states equally support a view of short-term emotions as non-experiential states, and so long-term and short-term emotions are ultimately the same sort of thing. If I am right, the dominant experience-centered accounts of emotions are at best accounts, not of emotions per se, but of some closely related phenomenon. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that emotions are evaluative. Moreover, many authors suppose that emotions are important or valuable as evaluations. According to the currently dominant version of cognitivism, emotions are evaluative insofar as they make us aware of value properties of their intentional objects. In attributing to emotions an epistemic role, this view conceives of them as epistemically valuable. In this paper, I argue that proponents of this account mischaracterize the evaluative character of emotions and, a fortiori, their value. Moreover, (...) I propose an alternative view of emotional evaluation, according to which emotions are practically rather than epistemically important. As I argue, emotions are ways of acknowledging their intentional objects as (dis)valuable. As such, they do not apprehend values but make them count. I elaborate this idea by drawing an analogy with legal and political sanctions. The resulting view has it that emotions are practically important in that they affirm the cares and concerns which serve as standards of emotional evaluation. (shrink)

Christine Tappolet’s book Philosophy of Emotion: A contemporary introduction, and many other works in emotion theory, focus primarily on emotional episodes at the expense of so-called “emotional dispositions.” I argue that there are no reasons for theories of emotion to focus on emotional episodes or to reserve the term “emotion” for them.

We are now in the age of affectivism (Dukes et al., 2021): while emotions have long been contrasted with cognition, they are now seen as a central element of our rational life. Samuel Lepine joins this paradigm, arguing that emotions are cognitive states, source of axiological knowledge, and even an essential component of values. Lepine’s original contribution consists of an extremely cautious and impressive interweaving of psychological and philosophical discussions of emotions as well as of values. We may take from (...) La nature des émotions a set of entangled statements: (i) emotions are cognitive states distinguished by their evaluative nature; (ii) they are sui generis psychological modes that focus our attention and prepare our body for action; (iii) they are evaluative since we can ascribe a correspondence between the emotion and the value instantiated by the emotion’s intentional object (i.e., correctness conditions); (iv) the correctness and justification conditions of emotions partially depend on the background motivations on which every emotion is based, because (v) values depend on some non-evaluative properties of external objects as well as on the agents’ motivations. These different points fit together to form the most comprehensive introduction to emotions I’ve read since Deonna & Teroni’s The Emotions (2012). Let us examine how. (shrink)

Could emotions be a uniquely human phenomenon? One prominent theory in emotion science, Lisa Feldman Barrett’s Theory of Constructed Emotion (tce), suggests they might be. The source of the sceptical challenge is that tce links emotions to abstract concepts tracking socio-normative expectations, and other animals are unlikely to have such concepts. Barrett’s own response to the sceptical challenge is to relativize emotion to the perspective of an interpreter, but this is unpromising. A more promising response may be to amend the (...) theory, dropping the commitment to the abstract nature of emotion concepts and allowing that, like olfactory concepts, they have disjunctive sensory groundings. Even if other animals were emotionless, this would not imply they lack morally significant interests. Unconceptualized valenced experiences are a sufficient basis for morally significant interests, and such experiences may occur even in the absence of discrete, constructed emotions. (shrink)

Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...) them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions. (shrink)

In this article, I elaborate on the approach to joy preserved in East Asian Yogācāra texts authored by Xuanzang and his disciple, Kuiji. I argue that these Yogācāra Buddhists propose a contextualist approach that does not presume joy to be an emotion with an essential property but rather perceives joy as always contextualized in lifeworlds at the personal and interpersonal levels. As such, Xuanzang and Kuiji outline two contrasting pictures of joy to capture how it is experienced in the lifeworld (...) of ignorance and the lifeworld of wisdom, respectively. Upon delineating what joy is and how it is experienced, I continue to explore what joy can promise. Since joy does not have an inherent property, people can always make a collaborative effort to recontextualize joy for inclusion and emancipation. As such, I hope to draw on the Yogācāra analysis of joy to enrich the feminist discussion on happiness. (shrink)

In recent years, the economics of emotions (EoE) field, which aims to create models of the human mind, has grown quickly. EoE models work well with simulation theory (ST), which is one of the main theories of mind. EoE models show how people's behavior and emotions change based on their knowledge and perception of others. It is hoped that by developing this model, it will be possible to quantitatively analyze not only the mental states of real others, but also the (...) subtleties of the minds of characters in novels in the future. Until now, the decision-making or the factual-reasoning mechanisms have been a black box in ST. This study analyzes how EoE models add to the understanding of ST. (shrink)

Music can contaminate us. Sometimes, listeners perceive music as expressing some emotion (say, sadness), and this elicits the same emotion in them (they feel sad). What is musical contagion? This entry presents the main theories of musical contagion that crystallize around the challenge to the leading theory of emotions as experiences of values. How and why does music contaminate us? Does musical contagion elicit garden variety emotions, such as sadness, joy, and anxiety? Does music contaminate us by simply moving us? (...) Which role does imagination play in our affective responses to music? Is musical arousal elicited by automatic mimicry? What does musical contagion teach us about emotions? Musical contagion addresses fundamental theoretical and practical issues. (shrink)

Music can infect us. In the dominant approach, music contaminates listeners through emotional mimicry and independently of value appraisal, just like when we catch other people’s feelings. Musical contagion is thus considered fatal to the mainstream view of emotions as cognitive evaluations. This paper criticizes this line of argument and proposes a new cognitivist account: the value metaphor view. Non-cognitivism relies on a contentious model of emotion transmission. In the competing model (social appraisal), we catch people’s emotions by appraising value (...) through their emotional expressions. Social appraisal debunks the main motivation for non-cognitivism and offers fruitful insights into musical contagion. Combining it with metaphor theory, I claim that musical contagion involves experiencing the music as a metaphor for emotions and values. Just like people infect us as we appraise value through their emotional expressions, music contaminates listeners because they hear it metaphorically-as some emotional expression and hereby appraise it metaphorically-as some value. As infectious music “sounds like” emotions and values, cognitivism is safe. (shrink)