Few studies have examined how family capital affects the sense of place, and the effect of spatial thinking on the relationship between the two is unclear. This study constructs a mediation model to examine the impact of family capital on sense of place and the mediation effect of geospatial thinking. A total of 1,004 upper-secondary-school students were surveyed using the Family Capital Questionnaire, the Geospatial Thinking Test, and the Sense of Place Scale. The correlation analysis showed that family capital has (...) a positive effect on both sense of place and geospatial thinking. Moreover, there is also a significant positive correlation between geospatial thinking and sense of place. The results of mediation analysis indicated that geospatial thinking plays mediating and buffering roles in the relationship between family capital and sense of place after controlling for gender and residential address. The direct and indirect effects accounted for 73.31 and 26.69% of the total effect, respectively. Specifically, family capital is a significant positive predictor of both sense of place and geospatial thinking, and geospatial thinking partially mediates the relationship between family capital and sense of place. Students from better family backgrounds are more likely to have a better geospatial thinking and sense of place, as well as geospatial thinking promotes the development of a sense of place. Therefore, both family capital and geospatial thinking should be considered when we want to examine and develop individuals’ level of sense of place. (shrink)

As an increasingly serious social problem, Internet gaming disorder of college students may be related to their social self-efficacy. However, the relationship and its internal mechanisms underlying are still unclear. The current study tested the mediating effect of alexithymia in the association between social self-efficacy and IGD, and whether this mediating process was moderated by empathy. Social Self-Efficacy Scale, Chinese version of Internet Game Addiction Scale, Toronto Alexithymia Scale and Interpersonal Response Scale were adopted to examine the model on 888 (...) Chinese college students. The results indicated that social self-efficacy was significantly negatively associate with IGD. Mediation analysis illustrated that alexithymia mediated the association between social self-efficacy and IGD. Further, moderated mediation analysis manifested that the mediated effects was stronger for lower level of empathy. The conclusions corroborate and clarify the mechanisms that alexithymia mediated the association between social self-efficacy and IGD, and the mediation effects is moderated via empathy. Besides, these findings provide available references for colleges to conduct educational activities, and at the same time provide scientific suggestions for preventing IGD among undergraduates. (shrink)

BackgroundBilateral cerebral palsy is the most common type of CP in children and is often accompanied by different degrees of communication impairment. Several studies have attempted to identify children at high risk for communication impairment. However, most prediction factors are qualitative and subjective and may be influenced by rater bias. Individualized objective diagnostic and/or prediction methods are still lacking, and an effective method is urgently needed to guide clinical diagnosis and treatment. The aim of this study is to develop and (...) validate an objective, individual-based model for the prediction of communication impairment in children with BCP by the time they enter school.MethodsA multicenter prospective cohort study will be conducted in four Chinese hospitals. A total of 178 children with BCP will undergo advanced brain magnetic resonance imaging at baseline. At school entry, communication performance will be assessed by a communication function classification system. Three-quarters of children with BCP will be allocated as a training cohort, whereas the remaining children will be allocated as a test cohort. Multivariate lesion- and connectome-based approaches, which have shown good predictive ability of language performance in stroke patients, will be applied to extract features from MR images for each child with BCP. Multiple machine learning models using extracted features to predict communication impairment for each child with BCP will be constructed using data from the training cohort and externally validated using data from the test cohort. Prediction accuracy across models in the test cohort will be statistically compared.DiscussionThe findings of the study may lead to the development of several translational tools that can individually predict communication impairment in children newly diagnosed with BCP to ensure that these children receive early, targeted therapeutic intervention before they begin school.Trial registrationThe study has been registered with the Chinese Clinical Trial Registry. (shrink)

Ben shu shou ci dui ming mo qing chu zui fu sheng ming de hui zu san da han wen yi zhu jia--Wang Daiyu, Ma Zhu, Liu Zhi de zheng zhi lun li si xiang, jing ji lun li si xiang, hun yin jia ting lun li si xiang, ren xing shan e guan, dao de xiu yang guan jin xing le quan fang wei, duo jiao du de shu li, gou chen he kao cha.

Yen Fu was one of the four representatives who looked to the West for truth before the birth of the Chinese Communist Party. Our research on his life and work is still insufficient. Needless to say, both Yen Fu and Lin Shu were known as famous translators in pre-Liberation days. But Lin Shu cannot be equated with Yen Fu, insofar as their ideological and academic achievements and their contributions to modern China are concerned. From the post-Liberation days to the eve (...) of the Great Cultural Revolution, research works on Yen Fu remained scanty and he was seldom mentioned in articles on the advanced models among modern Chinese thinkers. More articles on Yen Fu appeared during the Criticize-Lin, Criticize-Confucius Campaign because Yen Fu had been mentioned by Chairman Mao. But the "Gang of Four" openly defied Chairman Mao's explicit direction by tampering with modern Chinese history, fabricating the struggle between the Confucians and the Legalists and describing Yen Fu as a Legalist. Chairman Mao pointed out: "Before the May Fourth movement, the struggle on the Chinese cultural front was one between the new bourgeois culture and the old feudal culture, and the antagonisms between modern schools and imperial examinations, between the new learning and the old learning and between Western thought and Chinese thought were all of the same nature." But, in the articles by Liang Hsiao and Lo Ssu-ting, all this has been described as the struggle between Legalists and Confucians and between Legalism and Confucianism. Thus, Chang Tai-yen, not Sun Yat-sen, is regarded as a bourgeois revolutionary and "Legalist." Yen Fu, not the "Confucian" K'ang Yu-wei, is treated as a representative of the bourgeois Reformists. This attitude has caused serious theoretical, ideological and academic chaos. We should do away with the chaos, conduct a thorough criticism of the "Gang of Four" and push forward our academic research work in accordance with the principle of "letting a hundred schools of thought contend.". (shrink)

Yen Fu was one of the four representatives who looked to the West for truth before the birth of the Chinese Communist Party. Our research on his life and work is still insufficient. Needless to say, both Yen Fu and Lin Shu were known as famous translators in pre-Liberation days. But Lin Shu cannot be equated with Yen Fu, insofar as their ideological and academic achievements and their contributions to modern China are concerned. From the post-Liberation days to the eve (...) of the Great Cultural Revolution, research works on Yen Fu remained scanty and he was seldom mentioned in articles on the advanced models among modern Chinese thinkers. More articles on Yen Fu appeared during the Criticize-Lin, Criticize-Confucius Campaign because Yen Fu had been mentioned by Chairman Mao. But the "Gang of Four" openly defied Chairman Mao's explicit direction by tampering with modern Chinese history, fabricating the struggle between the Confucians and the Legalists and describing Yen Fu as a Legalist. Chairman Mao pointed out: "Before the May Fourth movement, the struggle on the Chinese cultural front was one between the new bourgeois culture and the old feudal culture, and the antagonisms between modern schools and imperial examinations, between the new learning and the old learning and between Western thought and Chinese thought were all of the same nature." But, in the articles by Liang Hsiao and Lo Ssu-ting, all this has been described as the struggle between Legalists and Confucians and between Legalism and Confucianism. Thus, Chang Tai-yen, not Sun Yat-sen, is regarded as a bourgeois revolutionary and "Legalist." Yen Fu, not the "Confucian" K'ang Yu-wei, is treated as a representative of the bourgeois Reformists. This attitude has caused serious theoretical, ideological and academic chaos. We should do away with the chaos, conduct a thorough criticism of the "Gang of Four" and push forward our academic research work in accordance with the principle of "letting a hundred schools of thought contend.". (shrink)

本书共分为梁漱溟致有关人士 (1949年以前); 梁漱溟致政界人士及有关机构; 梁漱溟致有关人士 (1949年以后); 梁漱溟致师友; 有关人士致梁漱溟; 师友致和梁漱溟; 家书几部分, 其主要内容包括: 致蔡元培; 致胡适等.

本书围绕《论语》一书,梁漱溟从自己的理解出发,把儒家思想解释为十三个方面:乐、讷言敏行、看自己、看当下、反宗教、不迁怒不贰过、天命等。同时,还结合中国现时的思想及西方思想,谈了新时期对儒家思想的再审视 、再理解。.

Increasing concerns have been raised regarding artificial intelligence (AI) bias, and in response, efforts have been made to pursue AI fairness. In this paper, we argue that the idea of structural injustice serves as a helpful framework for clarifying the ethical concerns surrounding AI bias—including the nature of its moral problem and the responsibility for addressing it—and reconceptualizing the approach to pursuing AI fairness. Using AI in healthcare as a case study, we argue that AI bias is a form of (...) structural injustice that exists when AI systems interact with other social factors to exacerbate existing social inequalities, making some groups of people more vulnerable to undeserved burdens while conferring unearned benefits to others. The goal of AI fairness, understood this way, is about pursuing a more just social structure with the development and usage of AI systems when appropriate. We further argue that all participating agents in the unjust social structure associated with AI bias bear a shared responsibility to join collective action with the goal of reforming the social structure, and we provide a list of practical recommendations for agents in various social positions to contribute to this collective action. (shrink)

Structural injustice exists when the influence of social structure exposes some groups of people to undeserved burdens while conferring unearned power to others. It has been argued that the responsibility for addressing structural injustices should be shared among those participating in the social structure and can only be discharged through collective action; however, the proper form of collective action does not happen easily. To address structural injustice effectively, we need to gain clarity on the practical challenges that are involved and (...) explore possible means of implementing shared responsibility. This chapter thus aims to contribute to the study of addressing structural injustice in the following two ways. First, building on previous studies, I categorize three forms of practical challenges that have been encountered by existing proposals for discharging shared responsibility for structural injustice. Second, I offer an alternative proposal, which I will refer to as the deliberative mini-public proposal, and argue that it has the potential to mobilize structural change and better overcome the identified practical challenges. (shrink)

The call to make artificial intelligence (AI) more democratic, or to “democratize AI,” is sometimes framed as a promising response for mitigating algorithmic injustice or making AI more aligned with social justice. However, the notion of “democratizing AI” is elusive, as the phrase has been associated with multiple meanings and practices, and the extent to which it may help mitigate algorithmic injustice is still underexplored. In this paper, based on a socio-technical understanding of algorithmic injustice, I examine three notable notions (...) of democratizing AI and their associated measures—democratizing AI use, democratizing AI development, and democratizing AI governance—regarding their respective prospects and limits in response to algorithmic injustice. My examinations reveal that while some versions of democratizing AI bear the prospect of mitigating the concern of algorithmic injustice, others are somewhat limited and might even function to perpetuate unjust power hierarchies. This analysis thus urges a more fine-grained discussion on how to democratize AI and suggests that closer scrutiny of the power dynamics embedded in the socio-technical structure can help guide such explorations. (shrink)

This paper explores the structural mismatch problem between physical and phenomenal properties, where the similarity relations we experience among phenomenal properties lack corresponding relations in the physical domain. I introduce a new understanding of this problem via the Uniformity Principle: for any set of dimensions used to determine phenomenal similarities, there must be a consistently applied set of physical dimensions generating the same pattern of similarity relations. I then assess the potential of recent machine learning models, specifically graph neural networks, (...) to resolve this problem, as proposed by Epstein. By examining how these models generate sensory maps, I argue that the dimensions they adopt violate the Uniformity Principle in two ways: impure dimensions, where subjective responses affect the physical dimensions used, and non-uniform dimensions, where the applied dimensions vary inconsistently. These issues show that current machine learning models fail to establish a systematic correspondence between physical and phenomenal properties. (shrink)

Although the idea that sexual violence is a “structural” problem is not new, the lack of specification as to what that entails blocks effective responses to it. This paper illustrates the concept of sexual violence as structural in the sense of containing a type of moral wrong called “structural wrong” and discusses its practical implications. First, I introduce a distinction between two types of moral wrongs—interactional wrongs and structural wrongs—and I argue that the moral problem of sexual violence includes both (...) types, each of which calls for a different set of moral responses. Second, drawing on Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility, I argue that recognizing the structural-wrong element of sexual violence does not reduce individual perpetrators’ responsibility for it. Instead, it implies that a broader group of agents are required to join collective actions to reform the social structure. I conclude by evaluating some preventive programs against sexual violence through the lens of structural wrongs and providing directions to advance them. (shrink)

In ‘Equity and Marxist Buddhism,’ Tzu-wei Hung engages with the Marxist Buddhism developed by Taiwanese philosopher Lin Qiu-wu in the 1920s, brings this underexplored theory to the table and discusses a few merits and insights of the theory. Building on Hung’s analysis, this paper elaborates on the lessons and insights that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism provides for modern times. The first three lessons are distinctive points that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism brings to the discussion on combining Marxism and Buddhism: the connections between (...) the ethical and political, the responsibility for pursuing social justice and the nonviolent means towards social justice. The last lesson comes at the meta-philosophical level, focusing on how Hung’s engagement with Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism sheds light on the issue of diversifying the discipline philosophy. Overall, I argue that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism not only makes contributions to theoretical frameworks while providing a practical means for pursuing equity and social justice, but it also manifests the epistemic and moral values for engaging with under-represented philosophical traditions. (shrink)

The rationalist lover accepts that whom she ought to love is whom she has most reason to love. She also accepts that the qualities of a person are reasons to love them. This seems to suggest that if the rationalist lover encounters someone with better qualities than her beloved, then she is rationally required to trade up. In this paper, I argue that this need not be the case and the rationalist lover can have just about as normal if not (...) a better romantic life than anyone could hope for. This is because we often do possess most reason to love our beloveds. To see why this is so, we have to think more carefully about (i) how we come to possess reasons for love and (ii) the higher-order reasons that govern whether we should seek or refrain from possessing said reasons. Reflection on these issues leads to what I call the Possession-Commitment Account of Love’s Reasons. I use this account to address additional worries for love rationalism and highlight how being rational about love can potentially get us out of romantic messes. I conclude that if being a rationalist about love is plausible after all, then we have reason to hope that being rational about other areas of our practical lives is plausible as well. (shrink)

Although there has been significant work on aesthetic snobbery and its ethical implications, much less work has been done on the aesthetic normie (normie for short). The normie is someone who primarily engages with popular aesthetic items. I argue that the normie is motivated by a drive towards sociality to connect with others and to rely on them given limited resources and time. I argue that the normie who is motivated by this drive will limit their aesthetic range and depth. (...) This makes it harder for them to access new aesthetic experiences, distorts their ability to accurately appraise others, and makes it harder for them to connect with others. Nonetheless, I argue that we can achieve the goods of sociality by being aesthetically open. Expanding our willingness to engage with new aesthetic items and to develop and share more informed aesthetic judgments allows us to access more aesthetic values, appraise each other more accurately, and form valuable aesthetic communities. (shrink)