Teachers’ conceptions about the origin of life in three Latin American countries with contrasting levels of secularism were analyzed: Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. A European survey questionnaire was used and the interpretation of the results drew on Barbour's four categories concerning the relationships of science and religion. A large majority of Argentinian and Uruguayan teachers were clearly evolutionist, even when believing in God, with no difference between Argentina and Uruguay. The majority of Brazilian teachers assumed a religious position about the (...) origin of life, being creationist or evolutionary creationist. Differences of Brazilian teachers’ conceptions may result from the higher percentage of evangelicals and lower proportion of agnostics/atheists. Brazilian Catholic teachers were more creationist than their Catholic colleagues in Argentina and Uruguay. Distinct patterns were found, but further research is needed to understand possible classroom impacts. (shrink)

An agential and organismic view of development has brought back certain concepts in biology, such as teleology and normativity. What are the goals and norms that a developmental system pursues? Where do phenotypes in ontogenesis come from? The common answer is that genes contain the recipe to build organisms. However, the agential and organismic view of development seeks to offer a different answer beyond any reductionist explanations. For this reason, teleological development has become a central explanans in developmental and evolutionary (...) biology. However, the motivation for this article is that teleological development as an explanandum has not been treated with the same intensity and rigor despite its ubiquity as an explanans. In particular, a common and now widely adopted strategy for explaining teleological development is to appeal to a closely related, yet fundamentally distinct, conception of teleology: the theory of autonomous systems, a theory designed to deal with physiological-level processes, not developmental ones. This article explores the (generally unanalyzed) differences between teleological development and teleological physiology by arguing that autonomous systems theory falls short of explaining the specificity of teleological development. The main conclusion is that the agential and organismic views in biology ought to be broadened to include different goals beyond self-maintenance; that to be alive is not only about the maintenance of an organization. The distinctiveness of teleological development entails specific philosophical puzzles—what I call Bernard and Baer’s desiderata—that are neither present in nor solved by autonomous systems theory. (shrink)

The foundations of biology have been a topic of debate for the past few decades. The traditional perspective of the Modern Synthesis, which portrays organisms as passive entities with limited role in evolutionary theory, is giving way to a new paradigm where organisms are recognized as active agents, actively shaping their own phenotypic traits for adaptive purposes. Within this context, this article raises the question of whether contemporary biological theory is undergoing a cognitive revolution. This inquiry can be approached in (...) two ways: from a theoretical standpoint, exploring the centrality of the cognitive sciences in current theoretical biology; and from a historical perspective, examining the resemblance between the current state of theoretical biology and the Cognitive Revolution of the mid-20th century. Both inquiries yield affirmative answers, though important nuances will be emphasized. The cognitive sciences' explanatory framework is employed to elucidate the agentic characteristics of organisms, establishing a clear parallelism between the Cognitive Revolution and the present state of theoretical biology. (shrink)

Abstract: Ernst Mayr famously distinguished between proximate and ultimate causal explanations. His view was decisive in the fact that development was not included in the theory of evolution. Nevertheless, the explanatory role of developmental processes in evolution is a central theme of current theoretical biology, which has led to several revisions of Mayr’s distinction. One of the reasons for this is that the interactions between organisms and the environment influence evolution. This is a cornerstone of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. How (...) are these reciprocal interactions integrated into evolutionary theory? I will argue that this question can sometimes be answered by adopting an interactivist view based on a reinterpretation of reciprocal causation: developmental processes (such as niche construction or developmental plasticity) interact reciprocally with natural selection to produce evolved traits. In the following, I will critically analyze Mayr’s critics to determine whether the integration of development and evolution based on the reinterpretation of reciprocal causation is an appropriate alternative. I will argue that this is not the case, since this interactivist framework raises several explanatory problems. Instead, I should reconsider Mayr’s distinction by adopting an alternative view of evolutionary causation, known as the statisticalist view of natural selection, which posits that the only level of causation is the individual level and that ultimate explanations are statistical in nature. I argue that this framework avoids the explanatory problems identified earlier. To explore the relationship between organisms–environment reciprocal causation and ultimate explanations, I introduce the concept of ‘statistical reciprocity’ to measure the statistical effects of reciprocal causation in population changes. I situate this proposal within a general framework I call ‘population ontogenetics’, which is seen as an attempt to unify development and evolution beyond interactivist positions. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper argues that a central explanatory role for the concept of Umwelt in theoretical biology is to be found in developmental biology, in particular in the effort to understand development as a goal-directed and adaptive process that is controlled by the organism itself. I will reach this conclusion in two (interrelated) ways. The first is purely theoretical and relates to the current scenario in the philosophy of biology. Challenging neo-Darwinism requires a new understanding of the various components involved (...) in natural selection processes. An important prerequisite for the explanation is the ability to understand development in a teleological way. Here, the concept of Umwelt plays a crucial role: if organisms are responsible for generating adaptive variation in specific environments, we need a theory that explains the context-dependent nature of adaptively oriented processes. The Umwelt is thus a central element in determining the goal that an adaptive process pursues. The second path in my analysis also has a historical dimension. I will present Karl Ernst von Baer’s reflections on teleological development and his influence on von Uexküll's thinking. I will present various ideas developed by von Baer, such as the distinction between Ziel and Zweck and the use of musical metaphors, which can help to understand development teleologically and give von Uexküll’s theory a central place in this framework. (shrink)

The field of the philosophy of biology is flourishing in its aim to evaluate and rethink the view inherited from the previous century ---the Modern Synthesis. Different research areas and theories have come to the fore in the last decades in order to account for different biological phenomena that, in the first instance, fall beyond the explanatory scope of the Modern Synthesis. This thesis is anchored and motivated by this revolt in the philosophy of biology. -/- The central target in (...) this context is the possibility of naturalizing teleology, a classical nightmare for the history of biology itself. This requires, principally, understanding the causes of teleological explanations without assuming an unfashioned backward causation of sorts. As the riddles of teleological explanations are about their temporal dimension, I analyze different temporal scales of biological processes: evolutionary, developmental, and physiological. -/- The first one is the one defended in the context of the Modern Synthesis. As expected, one of the aims of this thesis is to evaluate the adequacy of an evolutionary account of teleological explanation. The scrutiny is negative. Evolutionary explanations in the context of the Modern Synthesis lack the necessary causal roots to naturalize teleology. Concerning the physiological scale, a long tradition pushed up by Kant and the organicist movement in the 20th century allows us to better understand how teleological explanations can be naturalized in physiological process. The key notions in this temporal scale are self-organization and the recursive, looped character of physiological process. While the physiological scale may be suitably accounted by contemporaries views, such as Autonomous Systems Theory, different central teleological phenomena remain unexplained from a purely physiological perspective. In particular, different issues concerning the (adaptive) construction of organism ---such as plasticity, robustness, variation, novelty, inheritance--- deserve an ontogenetic analysis. -/- The principal aim of this thesis is to provide a theory of teleological development that falls beyond the Modern Synthesis' framework and is prompted by different insights from the history of biology. I call it Agential Teleosemantics. It rests on two central pillars. First, that developmental processes, beyond any gene-centered stance, can be understood in informational terms; i.e. developmental processes are about the interaction of developmental resources conveying biological information. The second ingredient is agentivity, namely the idea that development is regulated by an agentive system according to the adaptiveness of the phenotypic outcomes produced. The role of agency in Agential Teleosemantic is equivalent to the role of genes in the Modern Synthesis: it is responsible for explaining the order and the adaptive complexity in the living realm. -/- The second target of this thesis regards the possibility of naturalizing intentional explanations in cognitive science. The central project involved in such an aim is known as teleosemantics. Classical teleosemantics however is etiological: it explains the teleofunctions of representational systems in terms of evolutionary processes. The different disputes in the contemporary philosophy of biology provide two insights to analyze teleosemantics in cognitive science. First, the challenges against the Modern Synthesis must be extended to the evolutionary approach of etiological teleosemantics. Second, as Agential Teleosemantics suggests an alternative source for teleofunctions ---ontogeny, I offer an attempt to integrate Agential Teleosemantics into cognitive science in order to provide an alternative teleosemantic project to understand intentional explanations in cognitive science. (shrink)

This article characterizes Oyama’s concept of ontogenesis of information formally. I apply the mathematical notion of synergistic information to the framework proposed by Griffiths et al. (2015) for developmental information and specificity. This allows us to examine the specificity revealed by the interaction of variables as a result of interventions on interactions. I define Developmental Synergistic Information as the specificity of interacting variables obtained by measuring how much mutual information interventions on interactions carry about the effect variable. To formalise this (...) concept, I use partial information decomposition, one of the most robust frameworks for analysing synergistic information. Some examples of developmental synergistic information are presented. Finally, I consider the philosophical implications of developmental synergistic information, arguing that it supports important tenets of organism-centered biology: (i) synergistic information has ontogeny—order is generated in epigenesis; (ii) such information is non-transmissible through channels of inheritance—the specificity of outcomes must be reconstructed anew in each generation; (iii) the developmental organism (or any synergistic system under consideration) is itself a cause of development—causation resides in the coaction of developmental variables; and (iv) the developmental context of information must be taken into account—that developmental causation is always embedded in and constrained by a developmental matrix of other specifiers. (shrink)

Disputes about the causal structure of natural selection have implications for teleosemantics. Etiological, mainstream teleosemantics is based on a causalist view of natural selection. The core of its solution to Brentano’s Problem lies in the solution to Kant’s Puzzle provided by the Modern Synthesis concerning populational causation. In this paper, I suggest that if we adopt an alternative, statisticalist view on natural selection, the door is open for two reflections. First, it allows for setting different challenges to etiological teleosemantics that (...) arise if a statisticalist reading of natural selection is right. Second, by providing a different solution to Kant’s Puzzle based on individual causes of evolution, statisticalism promotes a different answer to Brentano’s Problem, what I label as Agential Teleosemantics. (shrink)

Abstract: Inheritance theory is broadening by emphasizing two kinds of diversity, both justified by recent empirical advances: the material substrates of inheritance beyond genes, and the directions of inheritance relationships beyond vertical, parent-to-offspring transmission. There are different inheritance materials—genetic, epigenetic, parental, cultural—and inheritance directions—vertical, oblique, horizontal. This shift is accompanied by theoretical reconceptualizations associated with developmental and organismal views of inheritance, which understand inheritance as the transgenerational reconstruction of traits that explain trait persistence across a lineage. Within this framework, this (...) article draws attention to inverted inheritance: inheritance relationships that run from a younger generation to an older one. Although this idea may initially seem at odds with how inheritance is generally understood and studied, this article argues that inverted inheritance is compatible with—and indeed illuminated by—the current expansion of inheritance theory. While it highlights relationships that invite empirical investigation, it also sheds light on our conceptualization of what inheritance is. (shrink)

This paper argues that a central explanatory role for the concept of _Umwelt_ in theoretical biology is to be found in developmental biology, in particular in the effort to understand development as a goal-directed and adaptive process that is controlled by the organism itself. I will reach this conclusion in two (interrelated) ways. The first is purely theoretical and relates to the current scenario in the philosophy of biology. Challenging neo-Darwinism requires a new understanding of the various components involved in (...) natural selection processes. An important prerequisite is to understand developmental change in a teleological way. Here, the concept of _Umwelt_ plays a crucial role: if organisms are responsible for generating adaptive variation in specific environments, we need a theory that explains the context-dependent nature of adaptively oriented processes. The _Umwelt_ is thus a central element in determining the goal that an adaptive process pursues. The second path in my analysis also has a historical dimension. I will present Karl Ernst von Baer’s reflections on teleological development and his influence on Jacob von Uexküll’s thinking. I will present various ideas developed by Baer, such as the distinction between _Ziel_ and _Zweck_ and the use of musical metaphors, which can help to understand development teleologically and give Uexküll’s theory a central place in this framework. (shrink)

Este artigo realiza um mapeamento e análise das trajetórias de mulheres negras no ensino superior brasileiro a partir de uma perspectiva interseccional de raça, gênero, classe e regionalidade. A partir de uma revisão narrativa de literatura, foram examinados estudos acadêmicos, relatórios institucionais e dados estatísticos coletados em bases como SciELO, Portal de Periódicos CAPES, Ipea, IBGE e ENAP. Os resultados evidenciam barreiras estruturais (desigualdade de acesso e permanência), institucionais (sub-representação no corpo docente, baixa efetividade de cotas em concursos) e simbólicas (...) (racismo velado, epistemicídio, misoginoir, tokenismo), que impactam inclusive a saúde mental dessas estudantes e docentes. Paralelamente, identificam-se estratégias de resistência — como a escrevivência, o aquilombamento epistêmico e as pedagogias antirracistas — que promovem a produção de saberes contra-hegemônicos, diversificam currículos e fortalecem redes de apoio. O estudo destaca conquistas recentes: expansão das matrículas após a Lei 12.711/2012, ingresso de primeiras gerações de doutoras negras em áreas antes inacessíveis e efeitos multiplicadores de representatividade que elevam autoestima discente e pluralizam a ciência. Por fim, são discutidas práticas e políticas imprescindíveis para consolidar avanços: ampliação de ações afirmativas no ingresso, permanência e carreira docente; inclusão plena das Leis 10.639/2003 e 11.645/2008; reconhecimento institucional do trabalho de mentoria e extensão; e fortalecimento de coletivos de mulheres negras como espaços de produção intelectual. Conclui-se que …. (shrink)

The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) has been presented as an expansion of the Modern Synthesis (MS). A common and parsimonious view maintains that MS's quantitative evolutionary biology remains both valid and central within the EES, insofar as the EES primarily introduces a more elaborate qualitative research agenda. This article examines the relationship between qualitative and quantitative approaches in the EES debate and argues for a more complex view of how the EES relates to the MS. Its guiding question is whether (...) quantitative evolutionary biology itself might call for an EES. Although no specific answer is supported, the article analyzes the significance of this question and surveys the principal positions in the current literature. Two aims structure the discussion. First, by providing a detailed literature review, I show that, over the past two decades, quantitative research programs have increasingly contributed to modeling the phenomena at the core of the EES. The rationale for the EES is not confined to qualitative considerations; a growing body of work now (re)interprets population-level dynamics through the EES lens. Second, I present the problem of models: Is the mathematical framework of the MS sufficient to account for the phenomena emphasized by the EES, or must these models be extended? I identify and discuss four main positions: (1) strong accretionism-standard quantitative 1 evolutionary biology is enough; (2) mild accretionism-the continuous historical expansion implies that current extensions do not constitute a substantive theoretical shift; (3) mild radicalism-population models require EES assumptions and novel applications; and (4) strong radicalism-some biological phenomena demand genuine modifications to the existing modeling framework. -/- . (shrink)

In evolutionary theory, Explanatory Externalism—one of the pillars of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis—holds that natural selection is the sole adaptive force driving evolution. This paper highlights several challenges to Explanatory Externalism, primarily advanced by developmental biology and its various subfields and theories. Based on this debate, I examine the implications for one of the most established accounts of biological function: the selected-effect theory. While externalist readings of selected-effect theory are common, I argue a conditional claim: if and when SE is (...) interpreted within an externalist framework, two central desiderata remain unresolved—the explanatory and the discriminatory desiderata. Internalist explanations are indispensable in evolutionary biology for two reasons. First, in connection with the explanatory desideratum, internalist explanations are necessary to account for the existence of traits—not only at their origin but also in their transgenerational persistence. Second, concerning the discriminatory desideratum, an internalist framework shows that traits may exist in nature without being either selected or accidental, arising instead from structural properties and constraints that render them necessary conditions for the organism’s existence. Due to the limits of an externalist SE, I propose a possible alternative in which selected functions are reconceptualized from an internalist perspective. Although this framework remains underdeveloped, key ideas can be outlined through the Agential Paradigm in biology. In this view, an organism’s capacity to regulate its environmental interactions generates specific trait functions, which in turn determine selection conditions across generations. Rather than treating selection as an external force imposing order on randomness, trait function itself drives selection—no selection without function. Selected functions are thus linked to the adaptive origins of traits and their persistence across phylogeny. From this agential perspective, developmental processes generate specific functions, which in turn cause the selection of traits. This article, consequently, offers an appraisal of selected-effect functions grounded in a reconceptualization of selection within the Agential Paradigm. (shrink)

The career of the developmental psychobiologist Gilbert Gottlieb revolved around the construction of a probabilistic view of epigenetics. In drastic contrast to instinct and nativist theories which portray development as a determinate sequence of changes controlled by a genetic master plan, Gottlieb’s experiments and theory picture (behavioral) development as a highly multicausal complex process, with bidirectional interactions across different levels of organization and profound influences from ecological causes. Notwithstanding, the rejection of deterministic epigenetics was accompanied by the neglect of the (...) concept of information in developmental biology, which various developmental systems theorists advocated. Information, particularly its interpretation in the gene-centered framework, was seen as an obstacle to probabilistic epigenetics. In recent years, however, Paul Griffiths and colleagues have developed an informational view of development that encompasses the theoretical and experimental background of developmental systems theory. There is thus an opportunity to build a bridge between probabilistic epigenetics and information theory, and this paper explores this avenue. Here I explore probabilistic epigenetics by adopting an informational view that allows us to represent and model specific aspects related to the probabilistic nature of development: dynamic epigenetic landscapes, probabilistic phenotypic repertoires, and the multicausality, non-linearity, and bidirectionality of developmental processes. This paper intends to enrich probabilistic epigenetics with informational tools while extending the applicability and utility of Griffiths et al.’s theory to previously unexplored developmental phenomena. (shrink)

Wakefield’s “hybrid” theory of mental illness defines the (dys)function of mental traits in terms of the evolutionary account of biological functions known as the Selected-Effect Theory. This evolutionary framework, however, has been subject to serious challenges in recent decades. Accordingly, the article sets out—programmatically and through a detailed literature review—an appraisal of hybrid accounts of mental health in light of debates around the philosophy of biological functions. Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, it extends and systematizes three central critiques (...) to the Selected-Effect Theory to Wakefield’s account: (i) the explanatory inadequacy of historical and population-based accounts of function for defining mental illness, (ii) the possibility that the origins and persistence of mental traits may resist functional explanation, and (iii) the claim that functional explanations of the mind’s evolution extend beyond selection-based accounts. Second, we explore alternative frameworks through which biological theories of function can shape the definition of mental illness—particularly the causal-role theory and the organizational account. (shrink)

In this paper, I will conduct three interrelated analyses. First, I will develop an analysis of various concepts in the history of biology that used to refer to individual-level phenomena but were then reinterpreted by the Modern Synthesis in terms of populations. Second, a similar situation can be found in contemporary evolutionary theory. While different approaches reflect on the causal role of developing organisms in evolution, proponents of the Modern Synthesis refrain from any substantial change by reinterpreting and explaining individual-level (...) phenomena from a population perspective. Finally, I will approach these historical and contemporary debates by arguing for the statistical reading of natural selection, which holds that explanations by natural selection are statistical. My main conclusion is that the historical conceptual reinterpretations belong to a new explanatory strategy developed by the Modern Synthesis based on population thinking. Adopting the statistical point of view has three advantages for the issues discussed in this paper. First, understanding historical conceptual change as part of an explanatory shift fits with the emergence of population biology as a discipline that employs statistical methods. Second, concerning current debates in evolutionary biology, the statisticalist reading can validate the goal of both sides of the dispute. It ascribes an invaluable role to the population statistical explanation of the MS and also commends the study of developmental and organismal causes of adaptive evolution. Finally, the division of explanatory roles in evolutionary biology, embarrassed by statisticalism, can be related to the different interpretations that important biological concepts have undergone throughout history and contemporary biology, i.e., that the division of explanatory roles allows for a division of conceptual interpretations. (shrink)

Classical formulations of cognitive-affective dynamics, including Lyapunov-based stability frameworks, guarantee convergence to equilibrium: a property appropriate for many engineering applications but insufficient for systems that must learn, evolve, and maintain identity through change. This paper develops quantum foundations for a cognitive-affective architecture comprising three regimes: dynamic evolution (MDEI), stabilization (MCEE), and symbolic measurement (MESN). This paper uniquely introduces the non-Hermitian Hamiltonian Ĥ ef f =Ĥ − iΓ, where the dissipative termΓ models the system's openness to its environment. The central contribution (...) is the derivation of a self-referential floor : for any architecture containing a self-observing module (MESN), the effective dissipation rate is bounded below by an irreducible residue, Γ ef f ≥ ε ∞ > 0. This floor emerges from the back-action inherent to self-measurement-the system cannot observe itself without disturbing itself. Consequently, all bound states have finite lifetime; the system cannot collapse into permanent stasis. Stability, for self-referential systems, is necessarily a pattern of bounded oscillation rather than convergence to rest. This result provides the formal foundation for autopoietic AI and motivates a dual-layer architecture: classical Lyapunov dynamics at the surface for computational efficiency, non-Hermitian quantum dynamics at the core for autopoietic capacity. The operationalization of layer-switching mechanisms and empirical validation constitute the ongoing research agenda. (shrink)

This paper examines Hannah Arendt’s account of the relationship between politics and morality. Many critics have argued that Arendt’s conception of political action lacks any moral foundations, while others have tried to focus on her understanding of thinking as a normative source of her ethics. In contrast to these views, I present an alternative explanation and argue that the sources of Arendt’s political ethics are located neither in the faculty of thinking nor in extrapolitical moral norms or rules, but in (...) the ontological conditions of action, specifically worldliness, natality and plurality. This interpretation allows us to make sense of Arendt’s fragmented, unsystematic accounts of the various virtues and moral dispositions required for authentic politics: courage, responsibility, care, respect, moderation, solidarity and gratitude. In particular, an inquiry into the ontological sources of political ethics provides a solid normative grounding for the two moral dispositions—promise and forgiveness—that form an explicit “moral code” of political action for Arendt. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to compare Hannah Arendt’s and Jan Patočka’s reflections on the meaning of sacrifice. In her study of totalitarianism, Arendt discerned how the concept of sacrifice was misused and manipulated by totalitarian regimes, which is why she was more skeptical about it than Patočka for whom it was a central philosophical term. Patočka took note of such distortions and introduced the important distinction between authentic and inauthentic sacrifice, the instrumental, depersonalized sacrifice utilized by ideological regimes. (...) And yet Arendt’s concept of the political would be inconceivable without self-sacrifice, although she usually refrained from using the term itself, opting instead for the semantically close concept of courage. I argue that for both thinkers, self-transcendence was the core of self-sacrifice—the readiness to leave one’s private interests behind and enter the public realm where the common good and broader existential questions become central. Self-sacrifice was thus a way for both Arendt and Patočka to challenge the dominant technoscientific worldview of modernity. However, to avoid totalitarian excesses and manipulations, self-sacrifice had to be embedded in an ethical framework, and it was to meet this challenge, I conclude, that Arendt and Patočka formulated their own distinctive notions of political ethics. (shrink)

Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive about the contents of consciousness: we will not address neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective what might be called the ‘enabling factors’ for conscious- attention, working memory and cognitive control ness (e.g. appropriate neuromodulation from the brain- stem, etc.). involve competition between widely distributed rep-.

The aim of this paper is to articulate and analyse the complexity of the concept of work in Hannah Arendt’s philosophy. Work is usually interpreted as antithetical to political action. This claim merits specification: only the instrumental, utilitarian strand of homo faber poses real danger to authentic politics. By contrast, the artistic or cultural mode of homo faber is not only compatible with Arendt’s understanding of politics, but in fact indispensable for any form of political longevity. Enduring political existence is (...) impossible without the constant support of artists, poets, historiographers and monument-builders who reify and memorialize the key meanings of political communities. This claim is substantiated by applying the phenomenological concept of sedimentation and drawing the political implications of this application. However, similarly to Edmund Husserl, Arendt identified a dual, problematic nature of sedimentation that underscores the importance of natality and thinking in artistic practice. (shrink)

The use of evolutionary explanations to explain phenomena at the individual level has been described by various authors as an explanatory error, the so-called Phylogeny Fallacy. In this paper, this fallacy will be analyzed in the context of teleosemantics, a central project of the philosophy of mind whose main aim is to naturalize intentional systems by appealing to their biological teleofunctions. I will argue that those teleosemantics projects that invoke evolutionary functions generally commit the fallacy. First, I will point to (...) various arguments in the literature that point to this fallacy. However, a more general argument will also be made. To illustrate this puzzling scenario, I will present two desiderata that any teleosemantic project must fulfill. I will argue that naturalizing intentionality based on natural selection creates an explanatory gap between types and tokens. This gap prohibits an adequate explanation of the desiderata. To close the gap, teleosemantics invokes replicator biology, a view of inheritance that has already been identified to commit the fallacy. This leads teleosemantics into a complex situation: to close the gap, it must commit the fallacy. (shrink)

A common explanatory error in science concerns the conflation of the epistemological roles between two domains. Here we will address a specific case: when explanations of development replace evolutionary explanations or vice versa. Ernst Mayr famously distinguished between proximate and ultimate causal explanations in biology. His view was central to the Modern Synthesis’ exclusion of development from evolutionary theory. Nonetheless, the explanatory role of developmental processes in evolution is a central theme in current theoretical biology which has prompted several revisions (...) of Mayr’s distinction. Here we will review these reviewers to determine whether the integration of development and evolution is based on an appropriate reinterpretation of Mayr’s distinction. In many cases, revisionists suggest an interactionist alternative, in which proximate and ultimate causes interact to produce evolved traits. The most frequent interactionist account relies on the idea of reciprocal causation. We will argue that this perspective is still problematic and that the boundaries between explanatory domains are crossed. Instead, we should rethink Mayr’s distinction by adopting an alternative view of evolutionary causation, the so-called Statisticalist view, which maintains that the only level of causation is the individual level. By ruling out two different levels of causation, this framework is appropriate to avoid fallacious explanations and reconsider reciprocal causation entirely as a proximate phenomenon. We introduce the concept of “statistical reciprocity” to explain the statistical effects of reciprocal causality in populations and outline some ideas of “population ontogenetics” as a prominent framework for unifying development and evolution beyond interactionist positions. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt plačiai žinoma kaip filosofė, kuri mėgino reabilituoti senovės graikų politikos sampratą. Remiantis Žmogaus būklės skaitymu, Arendt paprastai laikoma „graikofile“, jai prikišama „Atėnų nostalgija“. Sunku paneigti Arendt simpatijas graikams – ji iš tiesų atsigręžė į atėniečių politikos supratimą, bandydama jame iškristalizuoti kertinius autentiškos politikos elementus. Vis dėlto ši interpretacija yra pernelyg vienpusiška. Didžiausius nuopelnus politikos suvokimo srityje Arendt priskiria ne graikams, o romėnams. Pastarieji žymiai geriau sprendė politikos stabilumo, tęstinumo ir tvarumo problemą. Visą dėmesį sutelkiant į veiksmą, spontaniškumą ir (...) nepaprastus žygdarbius, kyla grėsmė destabilizuoti ir „išcentruoti“ politinės bend­rijos gyvenimą. Romėnai, įvesdami tokias sąvokas kaip tradicija, autoritetas, steigties (įkūrimo) šventumas, teisė (lex), taip pat pabrėždami politinę atleidimo ir pažado reikšmę, atveria graikams svetimą politinės sedimentacijos plotmę. Ši plotmė suteikia būtinus saugiklius, be kurių tvari politinė egzistencija yra neįmanoma. (shrink)

Musical metaphors represent a means by which biologists illustrate a particularly complex phenomenon: how organisms regulate their life processes according to their living conditions. This explanatory role can be traced back to the early embryologists and organicism. Also, nowadays, musical metaphors are used by those who resist viewing organic processes as reading (performing) a musical score written in a genetic script. In contrast to this reductionist view, organic processes are presented under a Jazz band view in which organic activities are (...) the result of live improvisations based on various sources of information available. This article explores the philosophical and historical foundations of the Jazz band view in the context of plant phytoacoustics, the field concerned with understanding the regulatory role of sound in plants. The incredible ability of plants to perceive, produce, and communicate sounds is central to various regulatory processes in development, maintenance, and reproduction. Musical metaphors and the place of sound in the life cycle of organisms converge in the same explanatory target, regulation, regardless of whether it is explained metaphorically or literally. This allows us to pose some programmatic questions for phytoacoustics that are motivated by current research topics in the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

Abstract: The use of evolutionary explanations to account for proximate phenomena has been labeled by various authors as an explanatory error, the so-called phylogeny fallacy. In this paper, this fallacy will be analyzed in the context of teleosemantics. I will discuss whether teleosemantics projects that rely on the Selected-Effect Theory of Functions (i.e., mainstream teleosemantics) generally commit the fallacy. To frame the discussion, I will present two desiderata that, as argued here, every teleosemantic project must fulfill. The actuality desideratum, motivated (...) by Brentano’s problem, demands for a proximate analysis of the properties that make a system intentional. The historical desideratum, on the other hand, says that a teleological view of intentionality requires a historical dimension in order to understand the causal basis of teleological explanations. While I give some reasons why mainstream teleosemantics might be implicated in the phylogeny fallacy, my main argument aims to highlight an explanatory gap in mainstream teleosemantics: the population perspective on teleofunctions is inadequate to explain the proximate properties of intentional systems. In other words, the account of the historical desideratum in population-evolutionary terms prevents an adequate solution to the actuality desideratum. This is related to two central goals of teleosemantics: The goal of explaining content determination by recourse to natural selection processes makes it impossible to solve another goal of teleosemantics, the so-called problem of representational status. I analyze this situation and argue that inherited information (sometimes interpreted in a teleosemantic sense) plays the role of closing the gap. This leads teleosemantics into a complex situation: in order to close the gap, it must commit the fallacy. At the end of the article, I propose an alternative to fulfill both desiderata, motivated by an evo-devo perspective. I state that lineage explanations have the property of providing historical explanations based on proximate causes. (shrink)

We examine epistemic trespassing in a particular context—interdisciplinary research—with the goal of exploring the role of LLMs in addressing the epistemic challenges that arise from such practices. We first argue that trespassing is not incidental but rather a necessary feature of interdisciplinarity due to three conditions: the flexible boundaries of research questions, the hyperspecialization of expertise, and the socio-economic constraints of academic institutions. These conditions entail that epistemic trespassing may be an unavoidable phenomenon in contemporary interdisciplinary research. While epistemic trespassing (...) is often regarded as problematic, we develop an account of how interdisciplinary research can be conducted under enhanced epistemic credentials. We propose that LLMs function as epistemic scaffolds: LLMs are constructive—they participate in the process of knowledge acquisition—, dynamically embedded—they interact continuously throughout the research process—and non-constitutive tools—can be removed once the process is completed. We further discuss the possibility of LLMs functioning as academic experts and defend an intermediate position between novice and expert status, which we call ghost expert. LLMs possess a set of epistemic credentials grounded in the transitive character of their inferential processes, the structured organization of information, and their finely calibrated capacities. However, they lack certain features required for full expert status, giving rise to persistent and highly dynamic challenges in the contemporary AI landscape. At the intersection of these analyses, we advance our central thesis: the epistemic scaffolding role of LLMs functions as a ghost expert in interdisciplinary research, enhancing researchers’ epistemic credentials and thereby making unavoidable epistemic trespassing more epistemically reliable. (shrink)

According to Schroeder-Heister 2018, proof-theoretic semantics is ‘an alternative to truth-condition semantics. It is based on the fundamental assumption that the central notion in terms of which meanings are assigned to certain expressions of our language, in particular to logical constants, is that of proof rather than truth. In this sense proof-theoretic semantics is semantics in terms of proof. Proof-theoretic semantics also means the semantics of proofs, i.e. the semantics of entities which describe how we arrive at certain assertions given (...) certain assumptions.' This text advocates that proof-theoretic semantics, as described above, was an approach to semantical issues in logic that appeared in mainstream philosophical literature at least a couple of centuries before the tradition of general proof theory (cf. Prawitz 1971) came into being. This is done by means of an interpretive analysis of Kant’s 1762 essay Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren, in which two theses are argued: first, that the issue of justifying the logical validity of inferences is approached by Kant in this text, in a strong sense, in terms of proofs; and second, that the purpose of his effort is to establish a point concerning the semantical equivalence between certain distinct valid inferences. (shrink)

In his On the Musically Beautiful, Hanslick vigorously argued that musical beauty depends neither on the representation nor on the evocation of feelings. However, despite his formalism, Hanslick regards the performance of a musical work as a moment of emotional release. Given the tension between the formalist nature of Hanslick’s general theory and this expressionist drift in his conception of the performer, in this article I pursue two objectives: 1) to argue that there is, in fact, an important internal inconsistency (...) in Hanslick’s theory regarding the nature of performance, and 2) to deepen and render intelligible this perspective of performance. Although internally inconsistent, this perspective, in its search for a synergistic conciliation of the composer’s creativity with the performer’s expressivity, is worthy of analysis. (shrink)

The present paper aims to give an account of pessimistic meta-induction and reply to some representative realist authors who want to consider PMI a fallacy. Most of that accounts are misinterpretations of Laudant’s ideas and fails the target. This work intend that PMI is neither a induction nor a reductio, but a skeptic challenge. If this is right then PMI could not be a fallacy and the realism cannot escape from the task of explain why the success is a good (...) indication for the truthlikeness of the current theories. (shrink)

No presente trabalho procurarei expor dois desafios antirrealistas ancorados na história da ciência, que Stanford apelidou respectivamente de ‘antiga’ e ‘nova indução pessimista’. Argumentarei que existe uma solução realista já disponível a ambos os desafios pessimistas: o realismo experimental, inicialmente proposto por Hacking e Cartwritght, segundo o qual é possível comprometer-se com entidades teóricas com as quais desenvolvemos interações causais e com as quais produzimos fenômenos controlados, sem que tal compromisso se estenda às teorias mesmas. Tomarei como parâmetro não propriamente (...) os argumentos de Hacking e Cartwright que sofrem inúmeras críticas, mas uma formulação sofisticada do realismo experimental proposta por Egg. (shrink)

A common tendency throughout the history of thought concerning the nature of music has been to attribute to it a peculiar power to represent the dynamic of the universe. The tradition has perhaps its most developed expression in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The strict formalism present in Eduard Hanslick’s treatise, On the Musically Beautiful, clearly stands in stark opposition to such ways of thinking. And yet the book’s final paragraph ends with a paragraph in which music is referred to (...) as the ‘sounding image of the great motions of the universe’.The present paper examines the extent to which this apparently Schopenhaurian moment in Hanslick can be reconciled with the formalism promoted by the rest of the book. I argue, in opposition to differing claims to the contrary made by Mark Evan Bonds, and by Christopher Landerer and Nick Zangwill, that the original concluding paragraph is inconsistent with the rest of Hanslick’s argument. At the same time, the paragraph cannot simply be written off as a slip of the pen. Rather, it seems to reflect an anxiety on Hanslick’s part about musical formalism failing to provide any account of why the art of music is valuable. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo pretendo expor sinteticamente os problemas levantados contra uma das formas de realismo científico conhecida como realismo experimental, além de propor uma formulação mais aceitável do mesmo, resistente a tais críticas. Os problemas alegados pelos oponentes do realismo experimental variam desde a acusação de inadequação em relação à prática da comunidade científica, até a inconsistência ao admitir entidades e propriedades postuladas teoricamente recusando, entretanto, as teorias em que tais entidades e propriedades aparecem. Some-se a essas críticas a de (...) que o próprio critério do realismo de entidades seria implausível, seja porque falha na produção de crenças verdadeiras ou porque não fornece garantias melhores do que outras formas de realismo científico. Argumentarei que, adotando o realismo experimental exclusivamente como um critério epistêmico e aplicando tal critério às propriedades é possível contornar as críticas, reabilitando uma proposta realista que muitos consideravam já descartada. ABSTRACT In this paper, I will expose briefly the problems raised against one kind of scientific realism known by experimental realism and also will propose an acceptable formulation of that realism, resistant to those criticisms. The problems claimed by the experimental realism’s opponents range from the accusation of inadequacy with the scientific community’s practice to the claim that the admission of entities and proprieties without accepting the theories in which those proprieties and entities are supposed is incoherent. Besides, there is another criticism which states that the entities realism’s criterion is implausible, either because it fails to produce true beliefs or because there is no better warranty in adopting it than other kinds of scientific realism. I will argue that adopting experimental realism exclusively as an epistemic criterion and applying that criterion to proprieties it is possible to escape the criticisms, rehabilitating a realist propose that many people though already discarded. (shrink)

This article examines how psychiatric experiences shape life narratives while proposing innovative methodological approaches for mental health research. Drawing on four case studies of individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder, the research initially reveals how psychiatric service users’ life stories often become “pathographies”—narratives predominantly organized around illness and medical interventions. However, through a shift to collaborative research methods, participants moved beyond these initial illness-centered accounts to develop more complex understandings of their experiences. The analysis employs R.D. Laing’s concept of ontological insecurity (...) and Michel Foucault’s framework of historical ontology to examine how psychiatric interventions affect individuals’ sense of reality, identity, and time. The findings demonstrate how collaborative dialogue can transform ontologically insecure experiences into shared grounds for generating new meanings and critical insights about psychiatric systems. This approach addresses key methodological challenges in mental health research while contributing to debates about experiential knowledge and the democratization of mental health knowledge production. The study suggests that, although biographical narratives provide valuable research foundations, their greatest potential lies in creating opportunities for collaborative examination and critique that empower individuals to develop more restorative and emancipatory understandings of their experiences. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that contemporary biomedicine is shaped by two, seemingly incommensurable, organizational logics, the ‘regime of truth’ and the ‘regime of hope’. We articulate their features by drawing on debates sparked by the recent clinical trial of a new approach to the treatment of Parkinson’s Disease. We also argue that the ‘self’ is configured in the very same process whereby these two organizational logics interlock and become mutually dependent, so that the ‘self’ might be said to be (...) the effect of a ‘parasitic’ relationship between the regimes of ‘truth’ and ‘hope’. We then bring these two arguments to bear on the contrasting views of the relationship between embodiment and political subjectivity articulated by Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, on the one hand, and Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, on the other hand. (shrink)

In this article, I investigate the process of coordination between three ‘bodies’ of surgery: the patient-ensemble(s) constructed in pre-operative activities; the surgeon-body constructed with these ensembles in the operating room; and the body-world inhabited by the surgeon. This investigation is done through an ethnography of a neurosurgical clinic, with an analytical focus on the relationship between the spatial configuration of the body of the surgeon and the embodied practices of operating that this configuration demands. My argument is that coordination between (...) those three bodies is organized in the layered space into which the multiple ensembles of surgery are assembled. This relationship, I suggest, lies at the core of the power and technical expertise held by surgeons, and constitutes a challenge for explorations of other forms of articulation between subject body-worlds and the embodiment of power in subject-bodies. (shrink)

According to Tolstoy's theory of art, personal expression plays a crucial role as an essential artistic element since it is associated with originality and emotional communication. Is personal expression also significant in philosophy? We often tend to believe that in a philosophical theory, this element is, or should be, absent in the pursuit of epistemic neutrality. However, Nietzsche raises the suspicion that philosophers may tend to rationalize their passions through their theories. In this regard, philosophy and art would not be (...) so different. To explore this connection further, I first delve into personal expression in art. Second, I outline three ways in which personal factors can influence philosophical inquiry. Third, I compare personal expression in art with that in philosophy. (shrink)

In a novel interpretation of Plato’s Phaedrus, Tiago Lier argues that Socrates’ defense of rhetoric stems from a tension between the desires that motivate speech and the limited power of speech to realize those desires. This tension culminates in a philosophical ethic that Socrates and Plato cultivate through their respective forms of rhetoric.

O problema envolvendo o estatuto ontológico das entidades inobserváveis postuladas pelas teorias científicas é um dos mais centrais em filosofia da ciência. O objetivo deste pequeno artigo é o de oferecer um mapa dos posicionamentos mais recentes, sem a ambição de aprofundá-los. O enfoque será nos principais argumentos a favor e contra a capacidade de a ciência descrever corretamente a realidade natural inobservável. Mais especificamente, exporei o argumento do sucesso para o realismo e uma variação do mesmo, bem como as (...) críticas ao referido argumento, tais como a metaindução pessimista, a subdeterminação das teorias pela evidência e uma abordagem darwinista, que evita a ideia de sucesso. Concluirei apresentando como tais argumentos exigiram uma seletividade na abordagem realista, hoje concentrada em três ramos cujos nomes estão de acordo com os elementos sobre os quais cada filosofia recomenda ser realista: realismo explanacionista, realismo de entidades e realismo estrutural. Por uma questão de enfoque, darei apenas uma descrição resumida de cada ramo de realismo citado. (shrink)

El objetivo de este ensayo es analizar cómo confluyen en una misma base teórica tres discursos de diferentes áreas. Uno de ellos es la ciencia, mediante el genocentrismo defendido en la síntesis moderna en Biología. Otro es el de la religión, mediante la perspectiva finalista del alma y del diseño divino, que comparten las religiones abrahámicas. Y finalmente, en la esfera político-social, donde diferentes movimientos conservadores se oponen a replantear la agenda de derechos. La confluencia teórica que nuclea a las (...) tres áreas mencionadas es un preformismo sobre los organismos. Por lo tanto, primero, veremos cómo el preformismo se encuentra presente en biología. Segundo, señalaremos dos ideas relacionadas al preformismo que subyacen tanto en la biología como en la religión. Finalmente, analizaremos cómo ambos discursos, el científico y el religioso, se encuentran presentes y empleando un rol argumentativo en debates actuales sobre derechos humanos, específicamente, relacionados al aborto ya los derechos de la población lgtbiq+. La principal conclusión es que la síntesis moderna promueve erróneamente una defensa de un preformismo genético, con connotaciones religiosas, que es usado por movimientos conservadores en el ámbito político-social. (shrink)