The troubling ethics and politics of philanthropy Is philanthropy, by its very nature, a threat to today’s democracy? Though we may laud wealthy individuals who give away their money for society’s benefit, Just Giving shows how such generosity not only isn’t the unassailable good we think it to be but might also undermine democratic values and set back aspirations of justice. Big philanthropy is often an exercise of power, the conversion of private assets into public influence. And it is a (...) form of power that is largely unaccountable, often perpetual, and lavishly tax-advantaged. The affluent—and their foundations—reap vast benefits even as they influence policy without accountability. And small philanthropy, or ordinary charitable giving, can be problematic as well. Charity, it turns out, does surprisingly little to provide for those in need and sometimes worsens inequality. These outcomes are shaped by the policies that define and structure philanthropy. When, how much, and to whom people give is influenced by laws governing everything from the creation of foundations and nonprofits to generous tax exemptions for donations of money and property. Rob Reich asks: What attitude and what policies should democracies have concerning individuals who give money away for public purposes? Philanthropy currently fails democracy in many ways, but Reich argues that it can be redeemed. Differentiating between individual philanthropy and private foundations, the aims of mass giving should be the decentralization of power in the production of public goods, such as the arts, education, and science. For foundations, the goal should be what Reich terms “discovery,” or long-time-horizon innovations that enhance democratic experimentalism. Philanthropy, when properly structured, can play a crucial role in supporting a strong liberal democracy. Just Giving investigates the ethical and political dimensions of philanthropy and considers how giving might better support democratic values and promote justice. (shrink)

Introduction : philanthropy in democratic societies / Rob Reich, Lucy Bernholz, and Chiara Cordelli -- Altruism and the origins of nonprofit philanthropy / Jonathan Levy -- Why is the history of philanthropy not a part of American history? / Olivier Zunz -- On the role of foundations in democracies / Rob Reich -- Contributory or disruptive : do new forms of philanthropy erode democracy? / Aaron Horvath and Walter W. Powell -- Reconciling corporate social responsibility and profitability : (...) guidelines for the conscientious manager / Paul Brest -- When is philanthropy? : how the tax code's answer to this question has given rise to the growth of donor-advised funds and why it's a problem / Ray D. Madoff -- Creating digital civil society : the Digital Public Library of America / Lucy Bernholz -- The free-provider problem : private provision of public responsibilities / Eric Beerbohm -- Philanthropy and democratic ideals / Ryan Pevnick -- Reparative justice and the moral limits of discretionary philanthropy / Chiara Cordelli. (shrink)

This chapter examines whether, in a liberal democratic society, the charitable deduction can be justified. The chapter argues that the burden is on the state to show that the charitable deduction is both desirable and just. He explores a number of justifications and finds them inadequate for the task. The chapter argues that the most promising justification is the pluralism rationale, according to which the deduction can be justified on the basis of the role it plays in promoting individual engagement (...) in civil society. However, according to the chapter, it is difficult to justify the deduction on those grounds, because in the end it favors the preferred charities of the rich. (shrink)

Many experts in moral education agree that the potential for empathy, a key moral emotion, is innate. However, it is also evident that this potential needs to be developed if children are to acquire crucial moral qualities such as honesty, concern for others and a sense of fairness. Our central claim is that important structural changes in both families and schools may be necessary for the development of empathy and, hence, the fostering of these moral virtues. Since many families and (...) schools are far from ideal, both are likely to need help from the other and each can compensate to some extent for the other's failings. However, unless families become more sex-egalitarian, and schools become more multicultural in their student and faculty populations as well as their curricula, both lack components necessary for their success as moral educators. If such changes occur, the resulting dynamic between families and schools may be ideal for the healthy moral development of citizens. (shrink)

ABSTRACTClassical liberals and libertarians assign fundamental importance to economic liberties and champion bottom-up approaches to social welfare. They point to the significance, even superiority, of philanthropy in providing for society's most disadvantaged citizens, and they defend rights of inheritance and intergenerational transmission of wealth. So one might think that John Tomasi's “market democracy” would defend gift giving and philanthropy. But market democracy leaves far less room than might be thought for an enthusiastic defense of gift giving and philanthropy, and this (...) distances market democracy more than we might expect from the territory of classical liberalism and libertarianism. (shrink)

The common school ideal is the source of one of the oldest educational debates in liberal democratic societies. The movement in favour of greater educational choice is the source of one of the most recent. Each has been the cause of major and enduring controversy, not only within philosophical thought but also within political, legal and social arenas. Echoing conclusions reached by Terry McLaughlin, but taking the historical and legal context of the United States as my backdrop, I argue that (...) the ideal of common schooling and the existence of separate schools, which is to say, the existence of educational choice, are not merely compatible but necessarily co-exist in a liberal democratic society. In other words, we need both common schooling and educational choice. The essay proceeds in four parts. First, I explain why we need to understand something about pluralism in order to understand common schooling and school choice. In the second and third parts, I explore the normative significance of pluralism for common schooling and educational choice, respectively. In the fourth part, I show how the two can be reconciled, given a certain understanding of what pluralism demands. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Fact of Pluralism Common Schools and the Normative Significance of Pluralism Educational Choice and the Normative Significance of Pluralism Reconciling Common Schooling with Educational Choice.

Education is a contested topic, and not just politically. For years scholars have approached it from two different points of view: one empirical, focused on explanations for student and school success and failure, and the other philosophical, focused on education’s value and purpose within the larger society. Rarely have these separate approaches been brought into the same conversation. _Education, Justice, and Democracy_ does just that, offering an intensive discussion by highly respected scholars across empirical and philosophical disciplines. The contributors explore (...) how the institutions and practices of education can support democracy, by creating the conditions for equal citizenship and egalitarian empowerment, and how they can advance justice, by securing social mobility and cultivating the talents and interests of every individual. Then the authors evaluate constraints on achieving the goals of democracy and justice in the educational arena and identify strategies that we can employ to work through or around those constraints. More than a thorough compendium on a timely and contested topic, _Education, Justice, and Democracy_ exhibits an entirely new, more deeply composed way of thinking about education as a whole and its importance to a good society. (shrink)

This chapter defends an overarching ideal of liberal democracy—government for and by the people, where each is considered free and equal—and shows how different conceptions of this ideal lead to different visions of the nonprofit sector. The argument reflects a more fundamental point: that claims about the proper shape and scope of civil society, and certainly the dimensions of nonprofit organizations, are structured by larger political ideals. We cannot understand competing visions of the nonprofit sector without seeing it in relation (...) to the political and social order in which it is supposed to rest. (shrink)

The late Susan Moller Okin was a leading political theorist whose scholarship tried to integrate political philosophy and issues of gender and the family. This volume stems from a conference on Okin, and contains articles by some of the top feminist and political philosophers working today. Their aim is not to celebrate Okin's work, but to constructively engage with it and further its goals.

Philanthropy involves the voluntary contribution of money or other goods and resources for broadly public purposes. Unlike taxation, contributions are not coerced: rather, their magnitude, their direction, and often their specific use is determined by the donor’s discretion. Unlike the case of ordinary market exchange, the giver does not ask or receive payment for what she offers, though she may receive psychological, reputational, or even material benefits from her gift (e.g., she may feel a “warm glow”, see her name above (...) a building or on a wall honoring donors, receive perks from the organizations she supports, or enjoy tax benefits). What constitutes a “public purpose” is of course controversial, but for now we adopt a very broad definition (excluding, e.g., gifts to family and friends and politicians or electoral campaigns, but otherwise inclusive as to beneficiaries and purpose). It satisfies most ordinary understandings of philanthropy for a gift simply to be other-regarding. -/- Note that the above definition focuses on philanthropy as a practice. Alternative definitions might attempt to specify the philanthropic motivation (i.e., love of humanity, altruism, or public-spiritedness) or philanthropic organizations as a legal category. While this entry engages with these other meanings of philanthropy, a practice-based definition provides the most appropriate lens through which to evaluate philosophical reflection on practices of voluntary giving and receiving. Motives of altruism or beneficence can animate many actions not ordinarily classed as cases of philanthropy (e.g., a decision to run for office), and the legal and tax treatment of philanthropy varies across time and jurisdictions. Additionally, we do not, for the purposes of this entry, draw a distinction between “charity” and “philanthropy”, or assume a necessary contrast between philanthropy and justice: the relationship of philanthropy to justice is a complicated matter that we discuss below. -/- We begin with a historical survey of the role of gift-giving in philosophical traditions, followed by a discussion of the relationship between charity or philanthropy and justice. We then turn to a more detailed discussion of philosophical perspectives on the ethics of philanthropy (e.g., moral questions for prospective givers and recipients) and the politics of philanthropy (e.g., questions about philanthropy’s relationship to the state and to political values like democracy and freedom). Finally, we consider some more specific topics of contemporary philosophical controversy. (shrink)

Philanthropy is everywhere. In 2013, in the United States alone, some $330 billion was recorded in giving, from large donations by the wealthy all the way down to informal giving circles. We tend to think of philanthropy as unequivocally good, but as the contributors to this book show, philanthropy is also an exercise of power. And like all forms of power, especially in a democratic society, it deserves scrutiny. Yet it rarely has been given serious attention. This book fills that (...) gap, bringing together expert philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and legal scholars to ask fundamental and pressing questions about philanthropy’s role in democratic societies. (shrink)

This article seeks to demonstrate a particular application of Foucault's philosophical approach to a particular issue in education: that of personal autonomy. The paper surveys and extends the approach taken by James Marshall in his book Michel Foucault: Personal autonomy and education. After surveying Marshall's writing on the issue I extend Marshall's approach, critically analysing the work of Rob Reich and Meira Levinson, two contemporary philosophers who advocate models of personal autonomy as the basis for a liberal education.

THE most prevalent interpretation of Hegel’s political philosophy charges him with a glorification and even a divinization of the Prussian State of his day at the expense of the freedom of the individual. This interpretation has its origins in the existentialist critique of Hegel. Kierkegaard, for example, in his evaluation of Hegel’s philosophy of history abhors the apparent deification of the existing State as the manifestation of the Objective Spirit since it robs the individual of his freedom, responsibility, and dignity. (...) ‘The derelict Hegelian ethics, with its desperate attempt to make the State the court of last resort, is a most unethical attempt to reduce the individual to finitude.…’ Karl Popper has helped to perpetuate this interpretation by the existentialists by claiming that according to Hegel ‘the State is everything and the individual nothing’. William Shirer has claimed that one can trace the rise of the second and third Reichs to Hegel’s ‘ringing glorification of the State as supreme in human life’. In determining the validity of this interpretation we shall examine Hegel’s statements on the nature of the ideal State, his evaluations of existing States and ancient States, and his detailed position on the rights of citizens within his ideal State. (shrink)

Some aspects of my writing the monograph Developing the Horizons of the Mind (2002) are highlighted, the central characteristics of relational and contextual reasoning (RCR) are explained, and the contributions to this symposium by John Albright, Varadaraja V. Raman, and John Teske are discussed.

We show that three fundamental information-theoretic constraints -- the impossibility of superluminal information transfer between two physical systems by performing measurements on one of them, the impossibility of broadcasting the information contained in an unknown physical state, and the impossibility of unconditionally secure bit commitment -- suffice to entail that the observables and state space of a physical theory are quantum-mechanical. We demonstrate the converse derivation in part, and consider the implications of alternative answers to a remaining open question about (...) nonlocality and bit commitment. (shrink)

Is getting high immoral? In this book, Rob Lovering defends the claim that it is not. More specifically, he argues that recreational drug use (of which getting high is a token) is neither intrinsically, nor generally extrinsically, immoral. In other words, he contends that recreational drug use is neither immoral in and of itself nor generally immoral due to an immoral-making factor with which it may be contingently linked [e.g., harm]. Lovering does so by offering two arguments for recreational drug (...) use’s ultima facie (all things considered) moral permissibility and critiquing twenty-four arguments for its immorality. -/- Meant to be a companion to Lovering's A Moral Defense of Recreational Drug Use (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), which was written for a general audience, this book is written for an academic—specifically, philosophical—audience and explores recreational drug use in a deeper, more philosophically and empirically rigorous way. (shrink)