In this paper we present the problem of a noisy lexical taxonomy and suggest two tasks as potential remedies. The first task is to identify and eliminate incorrect hypernymy links, and the second is to repopulate the taxonomy with new relations. The first task consists of revising the entire taxonomy and returning a Boolean for each assertion of hypernymy between two nouns (e.g. brie is a kind of cheese). The second task consists of recursively producing a chain of hypernyms for (...) a given noun, until the most general node in the taxonomy is reached (e.g. brie → cheese → food → etc.). In order to achieve these goals, we implemented a hybrid hypernym-detection algorithm that incorporates various intuitions, such as syntagmatic, paradigmatic and morphological association measures as well as lexical patterns. We evaluate these algorithms individually and collectively and report findings in Spanish, English and French. (shrink)

Relational mechanics is a gauge theory of classical mechanics whose laws do not govern the motion of individual particles but the evolution of the distances between particles. Its formulation gives a satisfactory answer to Leibniz’s and Mach’s criticisms of Newton’s mechanics: relational mechanics does not rely on the idea of an absolute space. When describing the behavior of small subsystems with respect to the so called “fixed stars”, relational mechanics basically agrees with Newtonian mechanics. However, those subsystems having huge angular (...) momentum will deviate from the Newtonian behavior if they are described in the frame of fixed stars. Such subsystems naturally belong to the field of astronomy; they can be used to test the relational theory. (shrink)

Some time ago I advanced on the pages of this journal a critique of the interpretation given by Jay L. Garfield and Mark Siderits (hereafter GS) of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(2):195–219, 2013.1); to my article the two authors responded with a ‘defense of the semantic interpretation’ of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (GS, J Indian Philos 41(6):655–664, 2013). Their reply, however, could not consider my personal understanding of Nāgārjuna’s notions of śūnyatā and (...) dve satye. My interpretation of these notions was in fact absent in the paper GS responded, and was only related in a second paper of mine (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(5):563–590, 2013.2), still unpublished at the time of GS’s drafting of their ‘defense’. Therefore, in the present rejoinder, I found it appropriate, rather than responding point by point to the passages of GS’s reply, to advance a comparison between the semantic interpretation and my ‘realist antimetaphysical’ understanding of Nāgārjuna’s thought. (shrink)

This paper proposes a critical analysis of that interpretation of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the two truths as summarized—by both Mark Siderits and Jay L. Garfield—in the formula: “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth”. This ‘semantic reading’ of Nāgārjuna’s theory, despite its importance as a criticism of the ‘metaphysical interpretations’, would in itself be defective and improbable. Indeed, firstly, semantic interpretation presents a formal defect: it fails to clearly and explicitly express that which it contains logically; (...) the previously mentioned formula must necessarily be completed by: “the conventional truth is that nothing is conventional truth”. Secondly, after having recognized what Siderits’ and Garfield’s analyses contain implicitly, other logical and philological defects in their position emerge: the existence of the ‘conventional’ would appear—despite the efforts of semantic interpreters to demonstrate quite the contrary—definitively inconceivable without the presupposition of something ‘real’; moreover, the number of verses in Nāgārjuna that are in opposition to the semantic interpretation (even if we grant semantic interpreters that these verses do not justify a metaphysical reconstruction of Nagarjuna’s doctrine) would seem too great and significant to be ignored. (shrink)

This paper proposes an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths that considers saṃvṛti and paramārtha-satya two visions of reality on which the Buddhas, for soteriological and pedagogical reasons, build teachings of two types: respectively in agreement with (for example, the teaching of the Four Noble Truths) or in contrast to (for example, the teaching of emptiness) the category of svabhāva. The early sections of the article show to what extent the various current interpretations of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of (...) the dve satye—despite their sometimes even macroscopic differences—have a common tendency to consider the notion of śūnyatā as a teaching not based on, but equivalent to supreme truth. This equivalence—philologically questionable—leads to interpretative paths that prove inevitably aporetic: indeed, according to whether the interpretation of śūnyatā is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘anti-metaphysical’, it gives rise to readings of Nāgārjuna’s thought incompatible, respectively, with anti-metaphysical and realistic types of verses traceable in the works of the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). On the contrary, by giving more emphasis to the expression samupāśritya (“based on”), which recurs in MMK.24.8, and therefore, by epistemologically separating the notion of śūnyatā from the notion of paramārtha-satya (and of some of its conceptual equivalents such as nirvāṇa, tattva and dharmatā), we may obtain an interpretation—at once realistic and anti-metaphysical—of the theory of the two truths compatible with the vast majority (or even totality) of Nāgārjuna’s verses. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper I critically examine some of the main interpretations of “classical” Yogācāra philosophy of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Among these interpretations, based on extant textual and contextual data, I consider philologically unlikely both metaphysical-idealistic readings, which ascribe to these authors the view that ultimate reality is a mental or subjective stuff, and epistemological-idealistic readings which advocate that either Yogācāra suspends judgment on the existence of the extramental or that it maintains that the extramental exists (...) in itself and ultimately. Instead, I consider more likely the thesis that classical Yogācāra upholds an epistemological idealism that, while admitting epistemological priority of the mental over the extramental, rules out the ultimate existence of both the former and the latter. This exclusion, however, does not amount to the exclusion of every metaphysics, but rather to the adoption of a metaphysics of emptiness conceived, in fact, as absence of the mental/extramental dichotomy. In the second part of the paper this reading of classical Yogācāra is compared with the interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy that I elsewhere called “realistic antimetaphysical”, and I reach the conclusion that, while with respect to epistemology between early Madhyamaka and classical Yogācāra there is continuity, regarding metaphysics these two schools are deeply distinct and discontinuous: while Nāgārjuna conceives of emptiness as an extinction of any metaphysical view, Yogācāra emptiness actually presents itself as a metaphysical point of view. (shrink)

According to a well-established interpretive line, the Benthamic judge would be allowed no room for autonomous calculations of utility and his or her task would only be that of mechanically applying substantive law, which expresses the legislator's will. For Gerald Postema, in contrast, Bentham's judge would be granted ample power to decide cases by directly applying the principle of utility. This article criticizes both views, by showing that a adjudication was for Bentham utterly impossible, although this does not mean that (...) judges should be free to decide according to direct utility calculations. Judges must be the tutors of the citizens’ expectations, which, under a system of statute law, will focus on the code. However, they can avoid suboptimality in cases where applying a general rule would not maximize utility, without preponderant damage for law-induced expectations: Bentham's suggestion is that they do so by proposing amendments of the code to the legislature. (shrink)

This paper supports the thesis that nihilistic interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy derive from generally antirealistic and/or metaphysical approaches to Nāgārjuna’s thought. However, the arguments and many images by way of which the author of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and his Indian commentators defend themselves from the charge of nihilism show limits in these approaches, and rather confirm that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy should be read as a theoretical proposal that is at once realistic and antimetaphysical. The epistemology inherent to the soteriological dimension of the (...) Buddha’s teaching, of which Nāgārjuna presents himself as a faithful continuer, assesses on the one hand the accomplishment of a ‘cognitive revolution’ consisting in the achievement of a new vision of reality and on the other the avoidance of any metaphysical description of the same vision. Comprehension of the Madhyamaka philosophical enterprise through a realistic-antimetaphysical lens seems to hinder and prevent the possibility of any nihilistic interpretation of Nāgārjuna. (shrink)

“Symbolic legislation” is often used to refer to laws that are ineffective, that is, instrumentally inadequate in achieving their declared or expected purposes. It is often associated with lawmakers deceiving citizens about their actual aims, as when they legislate only to alleviate social pressure rather than to address social problems. However, more often than not, symbolic legislation involves no legislative intent to deceive, as when a law is not symbolic from the outset but becomes so later. A novel definition of (...) “symbolic legislation” will be offered, making no reference to irrationality or deception and focusing instead on the prevalence of symbolic functions. These functions are those that laws perform when they are not interpreted according to legal-specialistic codes but according to different codes provided by extra-legal social norms. A classification of these functions is proposed, based on whether they rely entirely on pre-existing codes (as in symbolic signalling, including virtue signalling) or modify those codes by creating new symbols or changing their social meanings. In some cases, the prevalence of symbolic functions overshadows the laws’ lack of effectiveness: citizens are led by “expressive” concerns into what Newig has called “societal self-deception” regarding the instrumental adequacy of the laws they support. Although various alternative accounts of self-deception have been offered, it will be held that, when symbolic legislation is associated with societal self-deception, it fosters the propagation of identifiable epistemic vices within the community. (shrink)

A great deal of "epistemological" thought is dedicated to the question of the origin of the ideas that form our ordinary conception of reality.1 How do we obtain our view of the world as a whole composed of discrete substances, endowed with space-time extension, which are the substrata of specific qualities, linked to each other by different kinds of relation?This is a question that is certainly less problematic in contexts of thought that defend "pluralist" ontologies—where being is thought to amount (...) to a plurality of discrete and self-subsistent entities. There... (shrink)

This article aims to show the relevance of Hannah Arendt’s political and philosophical thought on the contemporary crisis of “political space”, bureaucratically moralised for the citizens, with a focus on the disorientation of public opinion in state affairs. In her philosophical career, Hannah Arendt investigated the functioning mechanisms of totalitarian regimes and pioneered the famous notion of the “banality of evil”, which she coined during Eichmann trial, held in Jerusalem in 1961. Arendt questions the nature of the evil that was (...) being perpetrated during the Second World War: an evil without a face and without roots, but which had claimed the lives of many people. Arendt reflects on this new type of evil that can be countered through the action of critical thinking. After the war, there was a strong need to redefine an idea of responsibility and a call for each individual to voice their ideas. Put it briefly, post-war society had to become a new philosophical and intellectual arena. Beginning with the strife between state law and moral law, I will include in my discussion Kantian famous notions of categorical imperative and reflective judgment, clarifying their use in Arendt’s conception of thinking and judging. Arendt, recognising Socrates as a critical thinker par excellence, keeps alive a dimension of living in common that protects the individual's singularity and guarantees a conscious and meaningful relationship with the otherness. (shrink)

O caminho do meio entre “ser” e “não-ser” do filósofo budista Nāgārjuna (II d.C.) põe-se como um extraordinário desafio a qualquer metafísica afirmativa ou negativa. A presente obra avalia criticamente diferentes leituras, antigas e contemporâneas, do pensamento desse autor, e apresenta uma interpretação original de um dos seus aspectos mais cruciais: a doutrina das duas verdades.

Este trabalho agencia a obra de Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari à educação em ciências ao jogar luzes sobre o deslocamento que permeia a organização deste componente curricular. O uso destes autores para pensarmos a educação em ciências, possibilita a (re)inserção da diferença e da multiplicidade, extirpadas do estrato científico pelo sonho moderno de totalização da realidade – que persiste no pedagógico – por meio da redução conceitual operada pela lógica da identidade. Assim, evidencia as (des)continuidades das práticas entre um (...) estrato e outro, como resultado da força de uma tradição que passa a ser subvertida pelo corte epistemológico deleuzo-guattariano. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to draw a comparison between two models of sovereignty, embodied by Philip II of Spain and the Roman emperor Tiberius, as described in Cornelius Tacitus’ Annales. My analysis is based on Diez Libros de la Razón de Estado, the Castilian translation of Della Ragion di Stato by Giovanni Botero (1544–1617), made by the Spanish Court historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas (1549–1625). Herrera’s translation plays an important role in the Spanish reception of the wider (...) debates on the relationship between ethics and politics in early modern Spain. I will first address the reliability of Herrera’s translation, highlighting the instances in which his translation was moulded to be applicable to the Spanish court. What emerges from this analysis is the concern with the notion of ‘prudence’ that enabled Philip II’s political style. Secondly, I intend to show how Herrera depicts Tiberius as acounterpart to Philip II and how the latter takes on the deeds of the prudent monarch. The comparison herein outlined stems from the use of quotations from the Tacitean oeuvre, which had become an important tool for policy-making at the time. (shrink)

The symbolic functions of law are those that the law fulfils by being used and interpreted as a symbol, that is, by shifting to the ‘symbolic mode’—a way of using legal texts that considers them as referring to much more ample content than the first layer of meaning, consisting of legal relations. A morally neutral, observer-relative definition of ‘symbolic legislation’ is offered here, as legislation where the symbolic functions prevail, in the sense that they are considered as more important; for (...) instance, on account of the lawmakers’ supposed ‘symbolic behaviour’ and their purposive exploitation of such functions. Moreover, the concept of symbolic legislation is distinguished from those of strategic legislative communication and communicative legislation. Lastly, an example of the exploitation of ordinary non-technical language in Italian pandemic regulations is shown to be a clue of the possible symbolic character of at least some of those regulations. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza críticamente la escisión entre razón y sinrazón en la tradición occidental moderna, apoyándose en los aportes de Nietzsche, Foucault y Agamben. Sostiene que la locura, como figura paradigmática de la sinrazón, actúa como límite constitutivo de la razón, configurando un régimen en el que la exclusión opera como inclusión subordinada. A partir de una perspectiva genealógica y de la crítica agambeniana a la soberanía, se examina cómo la razón se constituye mediante la producción de un anomos de (...) la sinrazón, articulando saber, poder y modos de existencia. El texto muestra cómo el discurso médico captura la locura y la transforma en vida desnuda, revelando el funcionamiento de una máquina antropológica de carácter biopolítico. Frente a ello, se propone el concepto de formas-de-vida como posibilidad de resistencia ético-política a las dicotomías modernas, como norma/excepción, bios/zoé y razón/sinrazón. (shrink)

Scholars who wonder how the Buddha would take sides in the traditional debate on the existence of free will generally believe that it is possible to attribute to him a single point of view capable of reconciling apparent inconsistencies that arise from the reading of the scriptural pages that might be related to this issue. The thesis of this article is that the Buddha’s position on the question of free will is in fact far from being univocal. Rather, in each (...) of the three philosophical registers that can be identified in his teachings, different answers to the same question are implicit—in the personalist dimension of the Buddhadharma, a libertarian language is spoken; the reductionist register of the nonself doctrine, on the other hand, necessarily implies a hard determinist position; and finally, in the antimetaphysical context of the middle path, we find a suspension of judgment regarding the determinism/free will dilemma. (shrink)

Este livro apresenta uma reconstrução histórica dessa extraordinária jornada filosófica, que começa com os ensinamentos do Buda Siddharta Gautama e é intrinsecamente marcada por eles. Com base em uma abordagem historiográfica original, o autor mostra como as teorias do Desperto contêm as sementes dos vários desenvolvimentos, bem como das marcadas divergências doutrinárias entre as várias linhas de pensamento, escolas e subescolas nas quais a filosofia budista se articula durante a sua permanência (quase bimilenar) no subcontinente indiano.

In his writings about hypergeometric functions Gauss succeeded in moving beyond the restricted domain of eighteenth-century functions by changing several basic notions of analysis. He rejected formal methodology and the traditional notions of functions, complex numbers, infinite numbers, integration, and the sum of a series. Indeed, he thought that analysis derived from a few, intuitively given notions by means of other well-defined concepts which were reducible to intuitive ones. Gauss considered functions to be relations between continuous variable quantities while he (...) regarded integration and summation as appropriate operations with limits. He also regarded infinite and infinitesimal numbers as a façon de parler and used inequalities in order to prove the existence of certain limits. He took complex numbers to have the same legitimacy as real quantities. However, Gauss’s continuum was linked to a revised form of the eighteenth-century notion of continuous quantity: it was not reducible to a set of numbers but was immediately given. (shrink)

O artigo propõe a repolitização da vida a partir da compreensão do direito e da educação como práticas anti ou contrapolíticas como resistência à racionalidade neoliberal. Para isso, parte da distinção entre a política e o político, bem como da noção de partilha do sensível, para mostrar que ambos os campos - jurídico e educacional - não são neutros, mas arenas hegemônicas de disputa, estabilização ou subversão dos antagonismos sociais. Assim, argumenta que o neoliberalismo opera como forma de governo que (...) captura subjetividades e desloca a política para a gestão individual, convertendo o direito em instrumento de conformidade e a educação em capital humano. Diante desse cenário, propõe compreender direito e educação como máquinas de guerra para a reativação do dissenso; reabrir o espaço público; e a criação de subjetividades capazes de reafirmar modos de vida não governáveis pela lógica competitivo-concorrencial. Assim, o direito pode funcionar como linguagem do dissenso e proteção mínima da vida; a educação, como experiência formativa que produz sujeitos capazes de disputar hegemonias. A repolitização da vida, nesse contexto, exige práticas ético-estético-políticas que reorganizem o sensível, reinventem o comum e afirmem a democracia como campo agonístico sempre inacabado. Direito e educação, tomados como contrapolíticas, tornam-se, portanto, condições de possibilidade para a sustentação de modos de existência resistentes ao neoliberalismo. (shrink)

Ratio Juris, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 38-54, March 2022.

Este ensaio aborda a problemática do corpo na educação em ciências. Para tanto, toma como exemplo o corpo utópico utilizado na ciência, colocando-o em uma perspectiva crítica a partir do seu não reconhecimento como modelo corporal. Como contraponto, trabalha com a ideia de corpo heterotópico, como corpo real, singular, que se produz e se traduz como prática de resistência. A partir deste conceito evidencia-se o potencial da educação em ciências para a estetização da ciência, recolocando a discussão do reconhecimento e (...) da autodeterminação do outro como pauta para uma agenda formativa humanística, comprometida com uma ético-estética das alteridades na ciência. (shrink)

A interpretação da filosofia de Nāgārjuna como um niilismo metafísico radical é comum tanto entre os autores antigos quanto nos estudos budológicos contemporâneos. Uma primeira leitura da doutrina da vacuidade proposta por esse autor, com efeito, parece levar à conclusão de que nada existe em última análise e, portanto, a realidade em si seria equivalente a um puro não-ser. Uma tal metafísica do nada, entretanto, seria duplamente problemática: primeiramente, ela parece sofrer de graves incovenientes lógico-conceituais; em segundo lugar, ela colocaria (...) Nāgārjuna fora da ortodoxia budista, por ser o niilismo uma doutrina explicitamente reprovada pelo Buda histórico. Uma leitura mais atenta e completa dos textos a nossa disposição, entretanto, nos leva a concluir que a filosofia do fundador da escola Madhyamaka não pode ser considerado como um niilismo metafísico, mas sim, ao invés disso, como uma tentativa de evitar e de eliminar qualquer metafísica, tanto afirmativa quanto negativa, em total acordo com o programa filosófico – já presente no ensinamento do Buda – do “caminho do meio”, equidistante das categorias do ser e do não-ser. (shrink)

Starting from the premise, recently shared by authors such as Jacques Derrida and Pierre Macherey (for whom a state of crisis is inherent to the university) that of the humanities constitute the specific terrain in which to propose new experiments, this article attempts to verify what is at stake in an approach to philosophy as a way of life, in the context of the current academic form. In doing so, following Hadot and Foucault, it describes philosophical spirituality, and conversion, as (...) the determining elements of a philosophy connected to the practices of existence. Secondly, it shows how the criticisms of the philosophy linked to the state, of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bourdieu – as well as the criticisms of the philosophy linked to the neoliberal market – determine the urgency of thinking of a philosophy as spirituality within universities. In what terms, however, is it possible to practice this philosophy without changing the very forms of the contemporary county university? And how is it possible to change the contemporary university without giving philosophy the utopian place it deserves? (shrink)

The difference between the concepts of saṃsāra e nirvāṇaset forth by the historical Buddha in his first sermon seem to be disputed by the equalization of the two terms effected by Nāgārjuna in a topical passage of his MK. This article, firstly, supports the thesis that the contradiction is just a seeming one and that the relation of difference or identity between the two dimensions depends on the philosophical register, respectively epistemological and ontological, being used - in both cases for (...) soteriological purposes - by the Buddha and Nāgārjuna. Secondly, we wish to prove that, in any case, Nāgārjuna's ontology, far from being a philosophical novelty or an evolution of the thought of the founder of Buddhism, is, on the contrary, one of the possible applications of the "non-self" doctrine - probably the most important and original contribution of Buddhist thought to the history of world philosophy - expounded by the Buddha in his second sermon.La differenza tra i concetti di saṃsāra e nirvāṇastabilita dal Buddha nel suo primo sermone sembra essere messa in discussione dall'equiparazione dei due termini effettuata da Nāgārjuna in un passaggio-chiave delle sue MK. Questo articolo, in primo luogo, difende la tesi che la contraddizione sia soltanto apparente e che la relazione, di differenza o di identità, tra le due dimensioni dipende dal registro filosofico, rispettivamente epistemologico e ontologico, usato - in entrambi i casi per finalità soteriologiche - dal Buddha e da Nāgārjuna. In secondo luogo, cercheremo di provare che, in ogni caso, l'ontologia di Nāgārjuna, lungi dall'essere una novità filosofica o un'evoluzione rispetto al pensiero del fondatore del buddhismo è, al contrario, una delle possibili applicazioni della dottrina del non-sé - probabilmente il contributo più importante e originale del pensiero buddhista alla storia della filosofia universale - esposta dal Buddha nel suo secondo sermone. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de montrer comment, en se penchant sur la question épineuse des habitudes de l’âme, la pensée de Malebranche a intégré et renouvelé le débat sur la thématique, chère aux moralistes du Grand Siècle, de l’insondabilité du cœur humain. Dans ce cadre, il s’agira surtout de mettre au jour les rapports qui se dessinent, à l’intérieur du corpus malebranchiste, entre une série de couples conceptuels : logique et morale, sensation et sentiment intérieur, conscience psychologique et conscience morale, (...) péché et erreur, reproches de la raison et remords. Des éléments de réponse seront ainsi apportés aux interrogations de fond qui persistent sur la nature et l’orientation de la philosophie morale de l’oratorien. (shrink)

With regards the crucial issue of the existence of the self, within canonical texts of the Buddhist Abhidharma schools we find passages that are frequently at odds with one another. Sometimes the Buddha defends or respects the belief in the self and in personal continuity; at other times he seems to deny that beyond the psycho-physical factors to which our existential experience can be reduced there is an ātman that contains, owns or controls these same factors; in further cases still, (...) he states that the use of the metaphysical categories of “being” and “non-being” must be avoided – thus, about the self (or everything else), it is inappropriate to say that it exists or that it does not exist. Faced with these divergences (or contradictions) within contemporary Buddhist studies, we can detect two main tendencies. Some scholars start from the assumption that the Buddha’s teaching is or should be coherent and univocal, and, therefore, propose readings of his original message that are supposed to iron out or conciliate any inconsistencies. Others believe that the inconsistencies are actually irreconcilable and, therefore, maintain that the Abhidharma canons are a composite and stratified redaction in which the opposite views of different writers overlap and intersect. Against these historiographical approaches, the purpose of the present paper is to show that the three aforementioned modes of the Buddha’s teaching are, in fact, both alternative and irreconcilable. This, however, far from presenting a puzzle to be solved or explained (by resorting to suppositions of which, in the canons, we have no explicit confirmation), is nothing more than a feature of the Buddha’s Dharma, which appears to be a teaching that develops different pedagogical/soteriological modes for different purposes, and which is conceived for the spiritual growth of followers with different intellectual and psychological profiles. (shrink)

En esta época de la publicación de Diánoia no se incluían resúmenes.

Gorgias certainly is a triumph in linguistic rhetoric: he portraits the ambiguous relationship between human beings and the knowledge of reality. Following his works, the Logos does not produce any objective or absolute, but obscure knowledge. The Logos is not characterized by truth, but rather by the ability to persuade and deceive others, to convince others using the art of rhetoric. This fact composes the core of the metalinguistic attitude, which characterizes Gorgias’ texts. Since the Logos in Gorgias does not (...) seek absolute truth, it creates different truths, such as illusions for platonians, skeptic material, rhetoric or similar exercises. The analysis of the three main Gorgian works on Helen, Palamede and PTMO, are read and observed prevalently through language; they are discussed not just in a rhetorical or logical sense, but are anatomized in search for continuity in a bigger project: the “Gorgian Pragmatism”. This Pragmatism is a philosophy which advises us to embrace those beliefs we find most functional for us. While knowledge cannot be an agreement between the external world and human perception, Gorgias lays out another way to conceive this problem, which lies inside language. In fact, language in itself is considered as the main subject for its power and use. We could say that the reality of language is the only reality we might talk about, as the nucleus of substance which characterizes human beings. Many philosophers have tried to approach the problem of Sophists, and rehabilitated them after a long history of discredit, maintaining the purpose of the research searching for a peculiar philosophical content and a contribution for the posterity. I believe Gorgias can reveal, at each level of his discourse, a theory of rhetorical arrangement aimed at clarification of the problem of language in human activity. (shrink)

El concepto de dificultad contramayoritaria, aplicado al control de constitucionalidad, describe el problema de justificar que un tribunal declare inválida (inconstitucional) una ley, votada por los representantes de una mayoría de los ciudadanos. ¿Es esto legítimo? En el presente trabajo, analizamos un problema similar respecto a las burocracias públicas, relativamente menos discutido hasta ahora: ¿puede la burocracia pública tomar decisiones que considera justificadas, o tiene que limitarse a implementar las directivas del poder político en todos los casos? El debate se (...) ha planteado con intensidad en México, durante los últimos años, pero afecta a la configuración institucional de otros países en América Latina. (shrink)

Nas primeiras duas seções deste artigo, apresento alguns dos argumentos que os filósofos budistas indianos Nāgārjuna (ca. séculos II-III) e Vasubandhu (ca. séculos IV-V) usam para mostrar a insustentabilidade lógica dos fenômenos, respectivamente, do movimento e da existência de objetos externos/extramentais. A lógica desses argumentos é comparável à lógica que Zenão de Eleia utiliza nos seus paradoxos contra o movimento e a multiplicidade – e, de fato, no interior dos estudos budológicos contemporâneos, essa comparação já foi sugerida. Na terceira seção, (...) entretanto, pretendo mostrar que os objetivos filosóficos mais imediatos desses três pensadores divergem e são inconciliáveis: enquanto Zenão critica o movimento e a multiplicidade para demonstrar a plausibilidade dos atributos da imobilidade e da univocidade do Ser parmenídico, os paradoxos de Nāgārjuna e Vasubandhu devem ser entendidos no âmbito de projetos filosóficos que, em continuidade com o ensinamento budiano do caminho do meio, pretendem ficar equidistantes das categorias do “ser” e do “não-ser”, evitando ambas. Finalmente, na quarta e última seção, defendo a tese de que os objetivos últimos dos Eleatas e aqueles dos dois filósofos budistas voltam a ser parecidos: Parmênides e o Buda, como também seus respectivos epígonos, buscam promover nos seus seguidores uma “revolução epistêmica” que consiste na passagem de uma visão ordinária da realidade a uma compreensão extraordinária ou suprema, coincidente com a realidade em si e, portanto, verdadeira em última análise. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s four Untimely Meditations are a set of works generally rather neglected of this author. They are, however, the outcome of a project placed in a critical situation, along the development of Nietzsche as philosopher. By beginning, particularly, with an analysis of the first Meditation, David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer, and of the third one, Schopenhauer as educator, we will try to show two philosophical perspectives which, launched in the Meditations, will carry Nietzsche’s path until its end: the (...) path of an “ontology of the modernity”, according with the expression of Foucault, and that of a philosophy as “way of life”, according with the expression of Hadot. (shrink)

A experiência da conversão é habitualmente ligada ao contexto religioso.Contudo, autores como Pierre Hadot e Michel Foucault destacaram a presença de uma conversão filosófica, ao longo dos séculos. Se é possível verificar como nas tradições apocalípticas de caráter religioso se instaura uma conversão que visa alcançar uma manutenção do mundo em épocas de crise, também no contexto filosófico a diagnose nietzscheana do niilismo foi seguida por experiências filosóficas, como as de Simone Weil e de Georges Bataille, que visam a definição (...) de uma vida filosófica capaz de enfrentar o apocalipse. Através da abordagem do antropólogo Ernesto De Martino, tentarei mostrar, por um lado, o caráter apocalíptico-cultural do niilismo, e, por outro, como uma conversão filosófica, enquanto experiência interior, pode encarar este hóspede do nosso tempo. (shrink)

It has been a long time since the concept of iconic signs was proposed by C. S. Peirce. From that time on, we have been increasingly realizing that semiotic systems are for the most part established just on some type of similarity. But the more we see the sphere of analogical signification expanding its realm, themore we become aware of how inadequate is the notion of a simple relationship connecting locally a physical object with a second object, or with a (...) mental entity.There is, on the other hand, the more refined theory of sign conceived by Ferdinand de Saussure, but this theory, by its very definition, addresses a restricted domain, and definitely does not include the field of those signs which rest on analogical associations.The main purpose of this article is then to show how the more polished Saussurean model can act as a starting point for a general restatement, primarily intended to embrace the signs that rest on an analogical basis. We may so speak of a “neoclassical”, innovative semiotic theory, able to join the latest “sociosemiotic” approach with the most precious foundations of our discipline. (shrink)

It has been a long time since the concept of iconic signs was proposed by C. S. Peirce. From that time on, we have been increasingly realizing that semiotic systems are for the most part established just on some type of similarity. But the more we see the sphere of analogical signification expanding its realm, the more we become aware of how inadequate is the notion of a simple relationship connecting locally a physical object with a second object, or with (...) a mental entity. There is, on the other hand, the more refined theory of sign conceived by Ferdinand de Saussure, but this theory, by its very definition, addresses a restricted domain, and definitely does not include the field of those signs which rest on analogical associations. The main purpose of this article is then to show how the more polished Saussurean model can act as a starting point for a general restatement, primarily intended to embrace the signs that rest on an analogical basis. We may so speak of a “neoclassical”, innovative semiotic theory, able to join the latest “sociosemiotic” approach with the most precious foundations of our discipline. (shrink)

RESUMO Entre os vários pontos da obra de Nāgārjuna que deram origem a análises e discussões, o tema das 'duas verdades' é um dos mais controversos. Com efeito, dentro da ampla bibliografia dedicada a essa temática, são muitas, e amiúde divergentes, as tentativas de explicar o que Nāgārjuna entendesse - no verso 24.8 das suas Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā - com as expressões 'verdade convencional' e 'verdade suprema'. Esses pontos de vista interpretativos, entretanto, frequentemente, parecem prescindir daquele que talvez seja o critério mais (...) confiável para dirimir as controvérsias relativas às MMK: i. e., a leitura dos comentários indianos às mesmas MMK. Em contraste com essa tendência, este escrito objetiva investigar as passagens do Prajñāpradīpa e das Prasannapadā onde encontramos explicações, respectivamente de Bhāviveka e de Candrakīrti, que dizem respeito às duas verdades. O resultado dessa pesquisa se apresentará como nitidamente favorável à interpretação da doutrina das duas verdades que, em outros escritos, chamei de 'pedagógica'.ABSTRACT Among the many passages of Nāgārjuna's work that have generated analysis investigation and discussion, the issue of the 'two truths' is one of the most controversial ones. In fact, within the vast bibliography dedicated to this topic, attempts to explain what Nāgārjuna meant - in verse 24.8 of his Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā - by 'conventional' and 'supreme truth' are many and frequently divergent. However, it often seems that these interpretative views neglect what probably is the most reliable criterion for solving controversies in the MMK: i. e., the reading of Indian commentaries to the MMK. Going against this trend, this paper aims to investigate passages of Bhāviveka's Prajñāpradīpa and of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā where we find explanations that concern the two truths. The result of this research will look quite favorably on the interpretation of the two truths doctrine that I called, in other works of mine, "pedagogical". (shrink)

In the late 1740s Euler wrotePhilosophy two memoirs devoted to the investigationItaly of celestial perturbations in general and SaturnSaturn perturbation in particular. In these memoirs, he raised doubts over the validity of the inverse-square lawLaw but, at the same timeTime, he developed analyticalAnalytical methods for determining planetary perturbations that were of great importance in celestial mechanics.

In this paper I illustrate the evolution of series theory from Leibniz and Newton to the first decades of the eighteenth century. Although mathematicians used convergent series to solve geometric problems, they manipulated series by a mere extension of the rules valid for finite series, without considering convergence as a preliminary condition. Further, they conceived of a power series as a result of a process of the expansion of a finite analytical expression and thought that the link between series and (...) analytical expression was not restricted to the interval of convergence. This gave rise to formal aspects that became progressively more evident while the complexity of the theory increased. Asymptotic and recurrence series emerged as the result of the natural evolution of theory, without the difference between these infinite processes with respect to ordinary series being highlighted. The various aspects of dealing with series can be viewed today as derived from different definitions of the sum. However, mathematicians of that time always considered them as different approaches to a single theory that was based on a unique notion of the sum (even though, later in the eighteenth century, they disagree about what this notion was). (shrink)

This paper focuses on the link between systems criticism and anti-mathematicism in the French-speaking philosophical literature of the mid-18thcentury. Moving from Condillac’s omissions to the exemplary cases of Diderot and Buffon—as well as considering Formey’s crucial remarks—I reconsider the complex relationship that the authors of the French Enlightenment have with the Newtonian model. Finally, I inquire into the fate awaiting both mathematics and systems in this context after 1750.