This paper connects the hard problem of consciousness to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. It shows that constitutive Russellian pan(proto)psychism (CRP) is compatible with Everett’s relative-state (RS) interpretation. Despite targeting different problems, CRP and RS are related, for they both establish symmetry between micro- and macrosystems, and both call for a deflationary account of Subject. The paper starts from formal arguments that demonstrate the incompatibility of CRP with alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics, followed by showing that RS entails Russellian (...) pan(proto)psychism. Therefore, CRP and RS are mutually supportive. It then provides a unified ontological picture by combining CRP and RS. The challenge faced by CRP, the combination problem, can be resolved by adopting a RS version of quantum mechanics. Technically, this is achieved by a co-consciousness relation capable of explaining the difference between first-person and third-person perspectives. The hierarchical structure of the relation removes any concern on the structural mismatch between the physical and the phenomenal. (shrink)

The dominant way to define physical entities is by appeal to ideal physics (as opposed to current physics). However, it has been worried that physicalism understood in terms of ideal physics would be too liberal to rule out “psychism”, the view that mentality exists at the fundamental metaphysical level. In this article, I argue that whereas physicalism is incompatible with some psychist cases, such as the case of “phenomenalism” in which ideal physics adopts mental concepts to denote fundamental entities, (...) physicalism should accommodate a certain type of psychist case in which fundamental mental entities are denoted by non-mental concepts in ideal physics. In so doing, I propose a distinctive account of physical entities, which asserts that physical entities are entities denoted by non-mental natural concepts in ideal physics. Physicalism thus understood is expected to be neither too liberal nor too demanding. (shrink)

SummaryIn this synthetic exposition, devoted to the relations which exist between psľchic functions and anatomic structures, Dr Pontes first insists on the difficulties of the subject and of its scientific analysis. Soma, Psyche, and social Milieu form a kind of continuum which is artificiallľ dissociated by our one‐sided approaches. Experimentation cannot be fullľ practised on man, nor can its results on animal be extended to man without serious risks of error. Similar limitations appear if, resorting to the pathological method, we (...) try to apply to the normal conclusions arrived at through the Study of the abnormal. Special reference is made here to psychosurgery, a topic quite familiar to Dr Fontes, who is Dr Egas Moniz’ countryman.The author then summarises our present knowledge concerning the structure, connections and functions of encephalic centers, especially; the thalamus, the hypothalamus and the frontal lobes.Finally, he subscribes, though not without serious reservations, to the hierarchical conception of the Nervous Sľstem as well as of the human mind, first suggested by Jouffroy, after him developed by Baillarger, Janet, Wallon in France, by Hughlings Jackson in Great Britain, and recentlľ revived in Europe by von Mona‐kow and Mourgue, Eľ, and Delaľ. This view enables one to consider nervous or psľchic illnesses as various dissolutions, resulting on the one hand from the suppression of higher centers or powers, on the other hand from the liberation of lower ones. It agrees rather well with the informations gathered by the anatomy and the physiology of the nervous sľstem, and with the conclusions suggested by psychosurgical opérations. To the thalamus and hypothalamus correspond the lower and older manifestations of mind: emotion and instinct, to the cortex the higher and more recent adaptive and intellectual processes. The hypothalamus plays a most important role in the nervous machinery as a regulator of vegetative and instinctive life, of wake and sleep, of consciousness, and of the basic biological rhythms. At the cortical level the frontal lobe appears as the structural basis for such psychical functions as Ego‐control, Will, Personality, and succèssfull action on the milieu. (shrink)

“Dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism” is a long and complicated name for a simple and elegant view. In this first chapter, I explain what this view is about and what it is for. I introduce the combination problem and the general direction to take in order to solve or avoid it.

Ce texte a été présenté lors du colloque de l'Institut Universitaire de France, Le Rythme, Montpellier, 18-20 mai 2015. Nous remercions Luc Fraisse de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Une conférence consacrée au seul écrivain Marcel Proust au sein d'un colloque intégralement interdisciplinaire pourrait paraître un sujet excessivement spécifique et donc étroit. Or, il n'en est rien. Génie universel comme par exemple Montaigne, ou encore Léonard de Vinci, Proust en nouvel Atlas porte le - Poétique et Études littéraires (...) – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

La pensée française a beaucoup perdu à se couper de la « psycho-philosophie » de l’entre-deux-guerres. Non seulement les injections massives de phénoménologie ont occulté les possibilités de jonction entre psychologie positive et métapsychologie, mais la nature des thèses inventées par Sartre et relayées par Deleuze, d’une individuation toujours solitaire et solipsiste, ont rendu incompréhensibles les processus de cogenèse des consciences.

The philosophical production in our region in the 19th century developed in two lines: the school philosophy and the works, which in contemporary terminology could be called applied philosophy. The first attempts at the original in the frame of so called “national philosophy” remained without a considerable achievment. This was also the case of the physician and philosopher Michael Petöcz , whose all essays were written in German. However, in his works he developed a relatively original system, differing from the (...) philosophical thought of that time. The paper presents the basic thoughts of this system, paying attention also to another local philosophers, who already before Petocz were heading for similar conclusions. The author mentions also rarely appearing interpretations of his work. (shrink)

Panpsychism is a plausible theory of the fundamental nature of reality. It is fully compatible with everything in current physics, and with physicalism. It is an error to think that being physical excludes being mental or experiential. Anyone who endorses the following three views – [i] materialism or physicalism is true, [ii], consciousness is real, [iii] there is no ‘radical emergence’ – should at least endorse ‘micropsychism’ or psychism, the view that [iv] mind or consciousness is a fundamental feature (...) of concrete reality, already present in the most basic forms of concrete reality. And given [v] the interconvertibility (fungibility) of all fundamental forms of physical stuff, panpsychism appears to be the most plausible form of psychism. (shrink)

Les sciences humaines se distinguent les unes des autres par leurs méthodes et leurs objets privilégiés. En élaborant des procédures d’enquête spécifiques, elles s’efforcent de comprendre la vie psychique ou les pratiques collectives, la distribution des populations ou les rapports entre groupes, les idéaux sociaux ou les échanges matériels. Leur fin commune est toutefois d’éclairer de leurs lumières croisées une même réalité humaine et sociale. Leurs objets ont donc vocation à se rejoindre, leurs méthodes à se compléter. En interrogeant leur (...) pluralité sans la reconduire à une illusoire unité, la philosophie peut éclairer l’espace conceptuel et problématique qu’elles ont en commun. Elle ne ressort toutefois pas indemne d’une telle étude : ses propres questionnements, épistémologiques et politiques, se trouvent radicalement altérés par leur confrontation à ces disciplines. Les contributions réunies dans le second tome de cet ouvrage analysent, dans cette perspective neuf concepts essentiels : la population, le psychisme, la pratique, les classes, le genre, la comparaison, les statistiques, le public et la critique. -/- Ont contribué à ce volume : Ét. Bimbenet, J. Christ, I. Drouet, R. Fanciullacci, S. Ferrando, Ch. Girard, F. Hulak, A. Le Goff, L. Paltrinieri, L. Perreau. (shrink)

Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are more dualistic or that (...) bring in mentalistic features at the ground- floor level of reality as in pan-proto-psychism. My aim here is to give an overview of the recent philosophic discussion to serve as a map in locating issues and options. I will not offer a comprehensive survey of the debate or mark every important variant to be found in the recent literature. I will mark the principal features of the philosophic landscape that one might use as general orientation points in navigating the terrain. I will focus in particular on three central and interrelated ideas: those of emergence, reduction, and nonreductive physicalism. The third of these, which has emerged as more or less the majority view among current philosophers of mind, combines a pluralist view about the diversity of what needs to be explained by science with an underlying metaphysical commitment to the physical as the ultimate basis of all that is real. The view has been challenged from both left and right, on one side from dualists and on the other from hard core reductive materialists. Despite their differences, those critics agree in finding nonreductive physicalism an unacceptable and perhaps even incoherent position. They agree as well in treating reducibility as the essential criterion for physicality; they differ only about whether the criterion can be met. Reductive physicalists argue that it can, and dualists deny it. (shrink)

Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind/body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are more dualistic or that bring (...) in mentalistic features at the ground- floor level of reality as in pan-proto-psychism. My aim here is to give an overview of the recent philosophic discussion to serve as a map in locating issues and options. I will not offer a comprehensive survey of the debate or mark every important variant to be found in the recent literature. I will mark the principal features of the philosophic landscape that one might use as general orientation points in navigating the terrain. I will focus in particular on three central and interrelated ideas: those of emergence, reduction, and nonreductive physicalism. The third of these, which has emerged as more or less the majority view among current philosophers of mind, combines a pluralist view about the diversity of what needs to be explained by science with an underlying metaphysical commitment to the physical as the ultimate basis of all that is real. The view has been challenged from both left and right, on one side from dualists and on the other from hard core reductive materialists. Despite their differences, those critics agree in finding nonreductive physicalism an unacceptable and perhaps even incoherent position. They agree as well in treating reducibility as the essential criterion for physicality; they differ only about whether the criterion can be met. Reductive physicalists argue that it can, and dualists deny it. (shrink)

In this book, Jiri Benovsky takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view is that the nature of (...) reality is 'phental' (physical-mental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combination problem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the question even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular – namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micro-mental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with a reductionist/eliminativist view of the self, allows us to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. (shrink)

La vie n'a pas fini de nous surprendre. Réduite à des interactions moléculaires mais étendue à des lois d'organisation inattendues, elle est aujourd'hui observée dans des systèmes vivants dont la logique interpelle et renouvelle la pensée rationnelle. Qu'est-ce que l'organisé? L'auto-organisé? Pourquoi et comment percevons-nous des ordres dans la nature, d'où viennent les significations que nous leur attribuons? Notre psychisme, nos sociétés, objets de sciences au statut toujours aussi mal assuré, nous font penser l'organisation comme une création ininterrompue de nouveau, (...) de sens, de vivant, entre et à partir de deux formes de morts, entre le cristal et la fumée. Les sciences de la nature, l'expérience de l'identité et de la pensée juives, la réflexion éthique forment le contexte de ces méditations sur un vivant qui déborde la biologie. (shrink)

Jean Richard Deux articles de Tillich sont présentés ici, parus en 1946 et traitant tous deux du salut et de la santé. Le premier insiste sur deux aspects du salut. Tillich réinterprète de façon non supranaturaliste le caractère eschatologique du salut, et il soutient sa dimension cosmique : c’est le monde qui est sauvé, non pas seulement la personne individuelle. — Dans le second article, il distingue trois modes de santé et de guérison : la guérison physique, psychique et spirituelle. (...) En insistant sur la sphère intermédiaire du psychisme, il s’attaque à la dichotomie cartésienne de la pure extension et de la pure conscience. La réflexion théologique se trouve ouverte ainsi à tout le champ de l’inconscient. (shrink)

Part of the material contained in the present book was presented in the form of a lecture course given by me at the University of Oxford in I962 as a Fulbright Senior Lecturer. Scripps College and the Claremont Graduate School contributed to the cost of research and publication. The staff of the Honnold Library, Claremont, California, was extremely obliging in matters concerning inter-library loans. The page proofs were read in part by Professor Richard Walzer, the University of Oxford. Mr. Salih (...) Alich, Blaisdell Institute, Claremont, California, corrected many errors occurring in the transliteration from Arabic in Section V. To all these institutions and persons I express my most sincere thanks. The manuscript was essentially completed early in I960. Scripps College, Claremont, California. TABLES OF CONTENTS I GENERAL I Introduction 1-3 II Three neoaristotelian and neoplatonic concepts: mono­ psychism, mysticism, metaconsciousness III Three A verroistic problems I Collective immortality and collective perfection in A verroes and Dante 2 Ecstatic conjunction, death, and immortality in the individual 102 94- 3 The double truth theory and the problem of per­ sonal immortality in A verroes 102-II3 IV Collective consciousness, double consciousness, and metaconsciousness (unconscious consciousness) in Kant and some post-Kantians 114-137 V Select bibliography of translations of philosophical works by al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, ibn-Bagga, and Averroes 138-150 VI Index of names 151-154 11 ANALYTICAL OF SECTION 11 I The starting point: Plotinus, Enn. V 1. Plotinus' principle l)'rL oux ~~c. u VOU 't"oc V01)'t"CX. (shrink)

Au milieu du bouillonnement intellectuel des années vingt en U.R.S.S., Mikhaïl Bakhtine, philosophe et critique littéraire, sʹinterroge sur les rapports entre lʹidéologie, le langage et le psychisme. Refusant la dichotomie saussurienne langue / parole, qui vide la pratique linguistique de sa substance, il affirme la nature sociale du signe et pose les fondements dʹune linguistique de lʹénonciation en tant que manifestation sociale et non individuelle. Au signe figé, réduit à nʹêtre quʹun "signal", il oppose le signe mouvant, changeant, arène où (...) se jouent les conflits sociaux. Publié en 1929 à Leningrad sous le nom de Volochinov, élève de Bakhtine, cet ouvrage paraît pour la première fois sous le nom de son véritable auteur. -- Back cover. (shrink)

Context: Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana worked closely together for several short episodes and wrote joint publications during the 1970s and 1980s. After that their respective paths in life diverged. Problem: What is the common ground and what are the differences between these two authors with respect to their lives and aims? Method: The author reconstructs their common history in the form of personal reflections and conversations with Varela. Results: The personal reflections reveal the intellectual path Maturana took to develop (...) his way of thinking, in particular his fascination with explanatory processes and the phenomenon of life. The conversations with Varela portray him as a man of great “cognitive autonomy,” whose career started with the intention to study “psychism in the universe.” For Varela it seemed possible, through meditation, to reach transcendental reality as something that exists externally to the living of human beings and that can be known as such. Maturana, by contrast, claims that there is no way to refer to such a universal truth. Rather, human beings generate all the worlds they live in. Implications: While the two men collaborated in both teaching and writing, they eventually created two different constructivist approaches driven by a different set of questions. Constructivist content: Both Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have decisively contributed to constructivist approaches. (shrink)

Les sciences sociales s'éloignent aujourd'hui de l'idée selon laquelle leur contribution principale au savoir consisterait à approfondir sans cesse la découverte de l'homme moyen et de l'individu assujetti aux grandes forces collectives, découverte par laquelle elles se justifièrent à l'origine. Désormais, la singularité biographique et caractérologique compte. Elle forme même une dimension décisive du social. Dans ces conditions, les processus par lesquels le donné social se trouve incorporé au psychisme individuel, mais aussi l'inévitable tension persistante de l'objectif et du subjectif, (...) autrefois thèmes latéraux de la pensée sociologique, tendent à se voir reconnaître une importance centrale. S'appuyant sur l'histoire de la psychanalyse, Stéphane Haber, professeur de philosophie à l'université Paris-Ouest-Nanterre, montre qu'une telle conjoncture invite à relire Freud de manière différente et réévalue ses apports en tant que penseur des interactions entre psychisme et société. Les enjeux de cette relecture ne sont pas purement théoriques. Ainsi. comme projet social et politique englobant. le néolibéralisme a provoqué l'émergence de nouvelles incitations à l'auto-contrainte ( devenir plus performant, plus efficace, plus flexible, plus rationnel...) qui rappellent la violence retournée contre soi que Freud décrivait au moyen du concept de "surmoi" composante essentielle. selon lui, du psychisme individuel. On voit à quel point la critique de l'époque présente peut gagner à s'engager sur la voie d'une réappropriation judicieuse des hypothèses et des concepts freudiens. (shrink)

In the world there are concrete particulars that exhibit the kind of substantial unity that allows them to be called substances or “natural individuals”, as opposed to artifacts or mere conglomerates. Persons, animals, and possibly the most fundamental physical simples are all natural individuals. What gives these entities the ontological status of a substantial unity? Arguments from the philosophy of mind and arguments from general metaphysics show that physical properties alone cannot account for substantial unity. The ultimate intrinsic properties of (...) natural individuals resemble phenomenal mental properties rather than any other kind of known properties. Pan(proto-)psychism is thus supported by systematically related arguments from different areas of philosophical inquiry. A certain amount of skepticism regarding the full nature of absolutely intrinsic properties is nevertheless well-advised. (shrink)

Panpsychism is the unorthodox view that mentality is a fundamental and ubiquitous trait of reality. Although a clear minority position, panpsychist positions have experienced a renewed interest, starting (not only) from Chalmers’ (1995) proposal to take consciousness “as a fundamental feature of our world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time.” Various forms of the panpsychist thesis recently have been elaborated, including constitutive and non-constitutive (i.e., emergentist) types. However, the implications of panpsychist conceptions for related philosophical fields so far have only sparsely (...) been explored. The present paper aims at clarifying the implications of panpsychist theories for the topic of free will: given a panpsychist ontology—should free will in the compatibilist or the libertarian sense be assumed? It turns out that, whereas constitutive (micro-)psychism is perfectly consistent with the compatibilist view of freedom and determinism, emergentist (non-constitutive) panpsychism might be the best metaphysical conception to systematically legitimize a libertarian account of freedom. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise an objection to Philip Goff’s “Revelation Thesis” as articulated in his Consciousness and Fundamental Reality. In Sect. 1 I present the Revelation Thesis in the context of Goff’s broader defence of pan-psychism. In Sect. 2 I argue that the Revelation Thesis entails the identity of indiscriminable phenomenal properties. In Sect. 3 I argue that the identity of indiscriminable phenomenal properties is false. The upshot is that the Revelation Thesis is false.

L’objectif de cet article est de mettre l’accent sur la difficulté de dissocier la sexualité de la reproduction dans le psychisme des personnes qui veulent accéder à la parentalité mais doivent recourir à des méthodes de reproduction (assistée médicalement ou non) dissociées des rapports sexuels. En s’appuyant sur des extraits d’entretiens réalisés avec des parents homosexuels dans le cadre de deux recherches cliniques, l’auteure propose une analyse des réaménagements psychiques auxquels sont amenées les personnes concernées sous l’impact des paradoxes et (...) des conflits internes induits par les nouvelles méthodes de procréation. Plus particulièrement sont explorés les fantasmes de la scène originaire qui imprègnent les récits des sujets et bouleversent les tentatives de contrôle de la fécondation. La prise en compte de cette conflictualité psychique de la part des cliniciens peut contribuer à un accompagnement bienveillant des personnes concernées. (shrink)

Les progrès fulgurants des biotechnologies, combinés à la révolution des technologies de l'information, laissent entrevoir un avenir radicalement différent pour l'humanité. L'homme cybernétique, le "transhumain", peut-il vraiment "sauver l'homme" ou doit-il susciter nos craintes? A travers la critique de l'argumentaire transhumaniste, qui est fondé sur une conception appauvrie de ce qui fait l'humain, Thierry Magnin nous invite à porter un nouveau regard sur notre humble condition. Qu'est-ce que l'homme à l'heure où l'on pourra bientôt remplacer tous ses organes par des (...) machines intelligentes, voire transférer son psychisme? L'anthropologie chrétienne peut-elle nous aider à aborder avec confiance la révolution annoncée afin que celle-ci nous ouvre, non à un abandon de l'humain, mais à son plein accomplissement? (shrink)

This chapter presents a discussion of philosophical themes and references in Murakami’s novel Kafka on the Shore. This is organised around desire and love, consciousness and pan-psychism, action and tragedy, solitude and community, inner consciousness and responsibility, metaphor and aesthetics. The chapter argues that pan-psychism and the psychic world are metaphors which bring some temporary order to the chaos of chance and some temporary relief from the unpredictable consequences of action. Chance and unpredictable consequences of actions make for (...) a tragic world. Enduring tragedy is a necessary part of the development of the self. Aesthetic and erotic experiences, in which we reach new stages of development, serve this ethical-tragic process. Pan-psychism is a convenient metaphor for the attempted unity of experiences and the communication between individual consciousness, along with the role of dreams and imagination. Irony enables us to understand the negative consequences of well-intended actions and is an indication of how we can try to order the world. Metaphor is the necessary element for finding order in the chaos. References to Hegel and Bergson enable us to understand the place of consciousness in Murakami without him writing a Hegelian or Bergsonian novel. Indirect reference to Arendt directs us towards the role of imagination in ethics. References to Plato are suggestive with regard to the role of love as an ideal. (shrink)

This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an (...) intrinsic, experiential side. However, despite Strawson's suggestion to the contrary, Feigl distinguishes his view from panpsychism. In fact, twofold-access theory, as I construe it, does not so much imply a pan-psychism as a local- or neuropsychism: there are physical phenomena that are experiences, experiences only directly accessible to one when they are events in one's own brain and body. Strawson is also correct that there must be facts about the physical phenomena that constitute an experience that determine that it is the experiences it is -- or indeed any experience at all. Ultimately, however, Strawson fails to make the case that this relation of determination implies that physical ultimates are -- themselves -- subjects of experience. In fact, given what I call the Complex Subject Thesis, physical ultimates are the least likely candidates for being subjects of experience, for experience, I contend, is an embodied phenomenon. (shrink)

partial review of Thomas Nagel’s book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False is used to articulate some systems-theoretic ideas about the challenge of understanding subjective experience. The article accepts Nagel’s view that reductionist materialism fails as an approach to this challenge, but argues that seeking an explanation of mind based on emergence is more plausible than seeking one based on pan-psychism, which Nagel favors. However, the article proposes something similar to Nagel’s (...) neutral monism by positing a hierarchy of information processes that spans the domains of matter, life, and mind. As depicted in this hierarchy, subjective experience is emergent, but also continuous with informational phenomena at lower levels. (shrink)

Categorical properties seem at once necessary, and impossible: they are needed to ‘fill in space’, yet they are impossible to reach. This is Blackburn’s version of Kant’s infamous predicament: things in themselves exist, yet there is no knowledge of them. This chapter looks harder at the reasons for their apparent necessity and inaccessibility. Three remedies are considered: ‘carelessness and inattention’, which might solve the problem on contextualist assumptions; pan-psychism, which locates the categorical in the psychic; and causal structuralism, which (...) erases the distinctness of powers and categorical properties. This third proposal merits Blackburn’s care and attention, but is unlikely to get it, given his enthusiasm for the opposite Humean remedy. (shrink)

L'homme est le seul être vivant qui ait besoin du langage pour vivre : il ne peut voir, agir et penser sans y avoir recours. Se voit ainsi résolue l'énigme que l'homme a toujours représentée à ses propres yeux car l'usage des sons engendre aussi bien le psychisme humain que les institutions. Prêtant sa parole au monde, l'être humain fait de chaque expérience une sorte de communication et lui subordonne l'usage de la main et celui de l'œil. Tout en proposant (...) ainsi une clef du fonctionnement du psychisme et des institutions humaines, le présent ouvrage dégage également ce qui a condamné l'histoire moderne à l'échec. L'homme ne peut tenter de se transformer directement lui-même sans se heurter aux limites que lui impose cet usage de la parole. Il ne peut se transformer lui-même qu'indirectement : en soumettant son action et son désir au jugement de vérité comme il lui soumet sa connaissance. C'est là que s'origine la fameuse révolution copernicienne que la modernité a opérée dans les sciences. Le langage doit en effet sa puissance d'orientation à la conscience d'écoute qui lui est inhérente, car celle-ci engendre perceptions, pensées, actions et désirs au filtre du jugement. La fonction de régulation que l'écoute de vérité a dans la vie humaine lui est ici restituée, ainsi que sa puissance critique. Ces éléments d'anthropobiologie du langage rendent ainsi à chacun l'accès à sa faculté philosophique de juger. (shrink)

This chapter provides indirect motivation for dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism by highlighting the places where more standard solutions to the mind-body problem fail. Emergentism is rejected, and well-known serious weaknesses of various types of physicalism and dualism are pointed out.

Cet article analyse l’effet du retour au nom juif (perdu/changé) de la troisième génération après la Shoah, rendu possible par la décision du ministère de la Justice en 2011 suite à l’action du collectif « La force du nom ». Il s’appuie sur le témoignage d’un homme revendiquant le retour au nom du grand-père (son propre père lui, n’ayant pas souhaité revenir au nom effacé). Cet exemple révèle la complexité du nom patronymique dans ce qu’il engage psychiquement dans la filiation, (...) le poids des secrets et de la dissimulation dans l’histoire familiale, la portée de l’acte symbolique du retour au nom juif pour redonner aux ascendants leur place dans le psychisme des membres de la famille. (shrink)

Parole et sexualité sont à la fois modes d’expression et actes, avec des dimensions individuelles et plurielles. Leurs lointaines origines biopsychologiques les enracinent dans les fondements inconscients du psychisme humain, d’où elles émergent en constituant et le Moi individuel de la conscience humaine et la perception moins consciente d’une appartenance groupale, base narcissique d’un Nous, dont la résurgence est sensible au sein de tous les ensembles groupaux, familiaux, sociaux, et bien sûr dans la vie conjugale et sexuelle. Une thérapie approfondie (...) en couple impose à l’analyste cette compréhension psychanalytique double, individuelle et duelle, pour saisir l’intrication des deux dimensions dans tous leurs conflits, notamment à travers l’expression sexuelle. (shrink)

The combination problem is perhaps the biggest challenge to pan-(proto)-psychism. In this chapter, I distinguish various types of the problem, especially the ‘easy’ combination problem, and the ‘hard’ combination problem. I indicate the solution to the easy problem, and I discuss some resources that are needed in order to solve or avoid the hard problem, namely panprotopsychism and eliminativism.

Partant des considérations des analystes (Moore, Ayer, Austin) et principalement des phénoménologues (Husserl, Ingarden), Pauteur passe en revue différents types de la connaissance immédiate. Le contenu de l'article est le suivant: 0. Considérations préliminaires, 1. Définition de la connaissance. Conscience, 2. Immédiatelé de la connaissance, 3. Perception sensorielle extérieure, 4. Perception sensorielle intérieure, 5. Autoconscience (Durchleben, perception intérieure, perception immanente, rétrospection), 6. Perception du psychisme de Pautre, 7. Remémoration, 8. Quasi-perception. Perception esthétique, 9. Perception intellectuelle (compréhension, intellection, vision eidétique, appréhension (...) notionnelle), 10. Connaissance conditionnée et non conditionnée. Connaissance indirecte, 11. Justification et indication de la connaissance immédiate, 12. Revision des conclusions. Classifications de la connaissance immédiate. Litterature. (shrink)

La crise écologique que nous traversons actuellement invite à reconsidérer la place de l’espèce humaine dans le monde vivant. Si la civilisation humaine repose de plus en plus sur un développement sans précédent de la technique, elle est confrontée aux impasses d’un interventionnisme technique incapable de résoudre les problèmes proprement biologiques et écologiques. À l’encontre d’une conception unilatérale de notre relation à l’égard des autres espèces, largement centrée sur la domination et l’exploitation, cette crise conduit à approfondir la notion d’ambivalence (...) anthropologique. si l’accès à un univers de sens et de valeur, rendu possible par la complexification de notre système nerveux et ainsi de notre psychisme, nous met à distance de la nature et du reste de la vie organique, nous sommes cependant le fruit d’une histoire naturelle qui nous dépasse et restons profondément dépendants des autres vivants. Notre ambition dans cet article est de creuser cette ambivalence à partir d’une interrogation sur l’histoire et, plus précisément, sur le rapport entre histoire humaine et histoire naturelle. ce point de vue historique, nous l’héritons des réflexions de Bergson et de Ruyer qui nous amènent à défendre, sans contradiction, les deux thèses suivantes. si, d’une part, l’inclusion de l’histoire humaine dans l’histoire évolutive doit nous conduire à prendre en compte notre profonde continuité et dépendance à l’égard du vivant, notamment dans les solutions que nous pouvons apporter à la crise actuelle, elle doit d’autre part nous inviter à envisager la spécificité humaine d’un retour collectif et critique sur nos pratiques dans la biosphère, retour qui pourrait changer le cours de l’histoire que nous construisons en commun avec le reste du monde vivant. cela nous conduira à révéler et critiquer les présupposés théoriques et pratiques des solutions généralement envisagées pour faire face à l’urgence de la crise écologique et à souligner, en contrepartie, l’utilité des collaborations interspécifiques pour relancer des dynamiques évolutives que notre technique peut accompagner mais jamais remplacer. (shrink)

The first text is s letter by Ruyer to Jean Piaget from October the 16th 1965. Piaget enounced a hard criticism to Ruyer’s Elements of psycho-biology : recognizing the quality of his scientific informations, he refused his explanation of scientific facts refering to a metaphysics of potential, finality and psychism, and defended the thesis that philosophy is not able to bring any authentic knowledge and that it is a possibility only for experimental sciences. We can read here Ruyer’s answer.

Resumo: Desde os primórdios de suas indagações sobre a histeria, a hipnose ocupou um lugar central nas considerações freudianas; o interesse por tal fenômeno pode se circunscrever a duas referências principais: a primeira, em relação ao laço entre histeria e hipnose, proveniente das pesquisas de Charcot e que subordinava ambos fenômenos à égide da Neuropatologia. O segundo aspecto encontra-se relacionado ao conceito de sugestão (Suggestion) tal como concebida por Bernheim, que ligava à hipnose ao âmbito da Psicologia. Ao longo do (...) presente artigo, apontaremos a presença das elaborações de Charcot e Bernheim nos primeiros textos freudianos referentes ao tema, assim como as limitações que essas perspectivas apresentaram na medida em que Freud avançava nas suas pesquisas sobre o psiquismo. Ainda, exporemos uma hipótese sobre o abandono da utilização da hipnose, por parte de Freud.Palavras-chave: Freud; Charcot; Bernheim; hipnose. Abstract: Since the beginning of his inquiries about hysteria, hypnosis had a central place in the Freudian considerations; the concern for said phenomenon can be limited down to two main references: the first, concerning the bond between hysteria and hypnosis, coming from Charcot’s researches and that subordinated both phenomena to the aegis of Neuropathology. The second aspect is related to the concept of Suggestion, as conceived by Bernheim, which tied hypnosis to the field of Psychology. Over the course of this article the presence of Charcot’s and Bernheim’s elaborations in the early Freudian texts within the subject will be pointed out, as will the limitations shown by these perspectives as Freud made progress in his researches about the psychism. Furthermore, we will present a hypothesis concerning the matter of Freud discontinuing the use of hypnosis. (shrink)

After its proliferation as a primarily psychological term in the literature of the late 1960s, creativity has since advanced to a core notion also for sociology. The first part of the paper tackles “the creativity narrative” according to three paradigmatic readings brought forward by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, Maurizio Lazzarato, and most recently Andreas Reckwitz. Despite the insightful accounts that those readings provide concerning the entanglement of creativity to capitalist ways of production, the practical consequences they offer regarding how (...) to contest this entanglement are debatable. Therefore, in the second part of the article a fourth understanding of creativity is invoked that was proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis. As argued, the radicality of this concept lies in defining creativity as a mode of production of the subject’s psyche as a collective co-existence from which broader, necessarily collective practices can be derived.Après sa prolifération en tant que notion psychologique dans la littérature des années 1960, la créativité est aussi devenue une notion fondamentale pour la sociologie. La première partie de l’article aborde le « récit de la créativité » à partir des trois lectures paradigmatiques proposées par Luc Boltanski et Ève Chiapello, Maurizio Lazzarato et, plus récemment, par Andreas Reckwitz. Malgré le fait qu’elles éclairent de manière signi????icative l’enchevêtrement de la créativité aux modes capitalistes de production, les conséquences pratiques que ces lectures tirent sur les contestations possibles de cet enchevêtrement sont sujettes au débat. C’est pourquoi, dans la deuxième partie de ce texte, une quatrième compréhension de la créativité est proposée à partir de Cornelius Castoriadis. La radicalité de ce concept repose sur sa dé????inition en tant que mode de production du psychisme du sujet compris en tant que co-existence collective, à partir de laquelle des pratiques plus larges et nécessairement collectives peuvent découler. (shrink)

_Abstract_: In this article, I propose an original re-interpretation of the encounter between deconstruction and psychoanalysis as it is described by Jacques Derrida in his early essay “_Freud and the scene of writing_” (1966). My working hypothesis is that Derrida first reads psychoanalysis as a _partially_ _deconstructive_ human science. To test this hypothesis, I begin by demonstrating that Derrida’s reading draws on the description of deconstructive sciences offered since his early version of_ Grammatology _(1965-66). Second, I explain that it traces (...) across Freud’s work the increasing adequation of the psychoanalytic account of psychism to the model of a somehow spontaneous archiving machine. Finally, I show that, for Derrida, as a consequence of this adequation, psychism – understood as the origin of life, temporalization and the relation to the other – also marks the beginning of the history of technics. As my analyses develop, it should become increasingly evident that any critical assessments of Derrida’s encounter with psychoanalysis must reckon with the overall project of deconstruction in which this encounter is inscribed. _Keywords_: Deconstruction; Life; Psychoanalysis; Technics; World _L’essere-nel-mondo della psiche: le prime interpretazioni freudiane di Derrida_ _Riassunto_: In questo lavoro intendo proporre una re-interpretazione originale dell’incontro tra decostruzione e psicoanalisi come lo descrive Jacques Derrida nel suo saggio “_Freud e la scena della scrittura_” (1966). La mia ipotesi di lavoro è che Derrida abbia letto in prima istanza la psicoanalisi come una scienza umana _in parte_ _decostruttiva_. Per verificare questa ipotesi inizierò mostrando che la lettura di Derrida attinge alla descrizione delle scienze decostruttive offerta sin dalle prime versioni di _Della grammatologia _(1965-66). In secondo luogo proverò a illustrare come si ritrovi nell’opera di Freud un progressivo allinearsi della descrizione psicoanalitica dello psichismo al modello di un apparato di archiviazione più o meno spontaneo. Mostrerò infine che, per Derrida, come conseguenza di questo allineamento, lo psichismo – inteso come origine della vita, temporalizzazione e relazione all’altro – segna anche l’inizio della storia della tecnica. Con lo sviluppo delle mie analisi diverrà sempre più chiaro che una valutazione critica dell’incontro di Derrida con la psicoanalisi debba fare i conti con il progetto complessivo della decostruzione in cui questo stesso incontro si iscrive. _Parole chiave_: Decostruzione; Vita; Psicoanalisi; Tecnica; Mondo. (shrink)

Questionnement sur le rapport entre psychanalyse et religion. Sous l'angle historique, l'ouvrage étudie trois courants, Freud, Jung, Lacan, chacun à partir d'une origine familiale différente : juive, protestante, catholique. L'auteur en déduit que la religion n'existe pas, mais qu'il existe des religions particulières s'incarnant dans le psychisme humain.

The tools employed might appear appropriate, the reasoning sound and argumentation valid, but the subject-matter, well one wonders what that has to do with philosophy, if anything at all? Viewing some of the topics one really wonders of the notion of philosophy is not stretched too far? So much that is passed off as philosophy itself or some kind of so-called interdisciplinary issues really appear as irrelevant. tempt to interpret, perceive and treat as if they a Topics from the grievance (...) studies especially fall under this. It seems as if individuals have personal issues, obsessions and psychological, social and cultural problems that they are philosophical and/or philosophically related. I wish to suggest that those issues are treated as disciplines or subjects in their own right, for example racism, feminism and gender studies, but not as if they have anything to do with philosophy or should be treated in a philosophical manner. As if they inform us about profound philosophical issues or concerns. Perhaps aspects of them can be dealt with as psychological, anthropological, sociological, biological, political, etc, but dealing with them as if they provide us with some kind of profound philosophical ideas and insights might be stretching the notion of philosophy a bit too far.I’ve wondered about the seeming dichotomy of materialism/physicalism and panpsychism and if they are really the only possible consciousness explanatory positions? How about biologism? That is as if all living biological matter or organisms are conscious, as well as that consciousness (the many types of it) can be explained best by the nature of those phenomena. A biologically restricted form or modification of pan-psychism? The consciousness section is an attempt to provide guidelines for the conceptualization of different meanings of consciousness. When they have been identified they can be explored, for example the nature of the different types, on different levels and in different dimensions, the nature of the processes, aims, objectives, functions. These are mere beginnings. When they have been investigated, can one perhaps begin to develop hypotheses and theories about features, processes, causes, functions, the organs involved, etc. (shrink)