Jacques Lacan

This paper rereads the thesis formulated by Guy Debord in *The Society of the Spectacle*—"The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by images"—through Jacques Lacan's concept of the *gaze* (*regard*). While Debord's critique of the spectacle focuses primarily on the reinforcement of mystification and the reproduction of *separation* (*séparation*), Lacan does not presuppose the stability of the "seeing subject." For Lacan, the gaze is not a function of the eye but a form (...) of *objet petit a* (hereafter *objet a*)—a point of rupture that captures the subject precisely at the moment when the subject attempts to objectify and possess the world. From this perspective, the spectacle is not merely an apparatus that provides "something to watch," but rather a screen that domesticates the gaze so that the subject can maintain the fantasy of "I see, therefore I am a subject"—an apparatus for managing the anxiety of the gaze. -/- Through this framework, this paper reconceptualizes the persistence of the spectacle not as "the success of deception" but as "jouissance-management." By "jouissance-management" I mean the way the spectacle organizes libidinal investment so that participation persists even under disbelief. The spectacle not only provides imaginary identification, i(a)—the image one wants to become—but also mobilizes symbolic identification, I(A)—the position of the Other's gaze from which value judgments are made—thereby binding the subject to the circuit of systemic reproduction. Consequently, today's subject is produced in the form of cynical reason: one who "knows" the spectacle is false, yet continues to participate. Furthermore, this paper points out that the "unmediated directness/authenticity" implicitly invoked by Debord's strategy may itself be, in Lacanian terms, yet another fantasy, and analyzes how the discourse of authenticity is absorbed into the exchange circuit of approval (likes, recognition, ethical superiority). -/- Finally, this paper proposes the concept of "self-ratification" (*Selbstratifizierung*) as a means of shifting the response to the spectacle from the schema of "abolition/exposure" to "traversing the fantasy." Self-ratification does not stop at the distancing of "it's the structure's fault," but rather inscribes—without external excuse—the fact that I am already entangled in the circuit of identification and jouissance, and signs "my share" of actions taken within it as an ethical procedure. In sum, the spectacle is not "that which makes us see" but "that which positions us to be seen," and since this position is precisely Lacan's position of the gaze, the task of critique must be reconstituted beyond mere ideological exposure and cynical distancing—as self-ratification, the act of taking responsibility for one's own actions and affirming one's desire. (shrink)

This paper relocates the "truth judgments" from an external, model‑invoking procedure to an **Internal‑Only Evaluation Principle (IOEP)**, and defends the norm that an evaluator and the evaluated theory must adjudicate using **the Same‑Criteria Axiom (SCA)**. The backing comes from a suite of classical results in formal logic. We fix the background to a recursively axiomatized arithmetic theory $T \supseteq Q$ and use diagonalization, representability, and arithmetization of provability. The result unfolds in seven steps. -/- (1) **Gödel I (internal verdict):** If (...) $T$ is consistent then $T \nvdash G_T$, and if moreover $T$ is $\omega$‑consistent then $T \nvdash \neg G_T$; for Rosser’s improvement $R_T$, plain consistency suffices to obtain both non‑derivabilities (Theorem 1). -/- (2) **Meta truth:** Over PRA‑strength meta‑theory, $Con(T) \Rightarrow \mathbb N \models G_T$; i.e., “$G_T$ is true” is a meta‑level claim dependent on the **standard model** (Theorem 2). -/- (3) **Tarski undefinability:** No total truth predicate exists inside $T$; hence internal adjudication and the “truth” label live at different levels (Theorem 3). -/- (4) **Non‑conservativity of Uniform RFN:** Since $RFN(T) \Rightarrow Con(T)$, importing external soundness into the inside of $T$ is **non‑conservative** (Theorem 4). -/- (5) **Conservativity (definition):** $T \subseteq T'$ is conservative iff for every $L(T)$‑sentence $\psi$ we have $T'\vdash\psi \Leftrightarrow T\vdash\psi$ (Theorem 5). -/- (6) **Canonical non‑conservativity:** $T+RFN(T)\vdash Con(T)$ while $T\nvdash Con(T)$; hence SCA is violated (Theorem 6). -/- (7) **Scope of IOEP/SCA:** The prohibition is not against **all** extensions but against **non‑conservative** ones; conservative (definitional / truth‑eliminating) extensions are admissible (Corollary 7). -/- Thus the body of the paper derives: *inside the theory the only legitimate evaluation is **independence (undecidability)**, whereas “truth” is admissible only as a **meta label***; IOEP/SCA falls out as a corollary of Theorems 3, 4, and 7. Practically, this yields a minimal condition of symmetry of adjudicative authority. In particular, we can formalize this as the **Same‑Tier Principle (STP)**: -/- $$ STP(E,T)\iff \forall \varphi\in L(T):\ (T+E\vdash\varphi \Rightarrow T\vdash\varphi) $$ (Assumptions: $T$ r.e.; meta at EFA/PRA strength; language is $L(T)$.) -/- Translation of: "참은 메타다: 괴델·타르스키·리플렉션으로 본 내부‑전용 평가(IOEP)". PhilArchive ID: CIORUH. (shrink)

본 논문은 기 드보르가 『스펙터클의 사회』에서 정식화한 “스펙터클은 이미지들의 집합이 아니라 이미지에 의해 매개된 사회적 관계”라는 테제를, 자크 라캉의 ‘응시(regard)’ 개념을 통해 재독해한다. 드보르의 스펙터클 비판이 주로 허위/기만(mystification)의 강화와 ‘분리(séparation)’의 재생산에 초점을 맞춘다면, 라캉은 “보는 주체”의 안정성을 전제로 하지 않는다. 라캉에게 응시는 눈의 기능이 아니라 대상 a의 형태로서, 주체가 세계를 대상화하고 소유하려는 순간에 오히려 역으로 주체를 포획하는 균열의 점이다. 이 관점에서 스펙터클은 단순히 “볼거리”를 제공하는 장치가 아니라, 주체가 “나는 본다, 따라서 나는 주체다”라는 환상을 유지할 수 있도록 응시를 길들이는 스크린, 즉 (...) 응시의 불안을 관리하는 장치로 파악된다. -/- 이를 통해 본 논문은 스펙터클의 지속을 “속임수의 성공”이 아니라 “향유의 조직(jouissance-management)”으로 재규정한다. 스펙터클은 상상적 동일시(i(a))—되고 싶은 이미지—를 제공할 뿐 아니라, 상징적 동일시(I(A))—가치 판단이 이루어지는 타자의 시선의 위치—를 동원하여 주체를 체제 재생산의 회로에 결박한다. 그 결과 오늘날 주체는 스펙터클이 거짓임을 ‘알면서도’ 계속 참여하는 냉소적 이성의 형태로 산출된다. 또한 본 논문은 드보르의 전략이 암묵적으로 호출하는 ‘비-매개된 직접성/진정성’이 라캉적으로는 또 하나의 환상일 수 있음을 지적하며, 진정성 담론 자체가 승인(좋아요, 인정, 윤리적 우월감)의 교환 회로로 흡수되는 과정을 분석한다. -/- 마지막으로 본 논문은 스펙터클에 대한 대응을 “폐지/폭로”의 도식에서 “환상의 가로지르기”로 이동시키기 위해 ‘자기비준’ 개념을 제안한다. 자기비준은 “구조 탓”이라는 거리두기에서 멈추지 않고, 내가 이미 동일시·향유의 회로에 휘말려 있음을 외부 핑계 없이 기입하며, 그 안에서의 행위를 ‘내 몫’으로 서명하는 윤리적 절차다. 요컨대 스펙터클은 “보게 만드는 것”이 아니라 “보이게 만드는 자리”를 배치하고, 그 자리가 곧 라캉의 응시 자리라는 점에서, 비판의 과제는 단순한 이데올로기에 대한 폭로와 냉소적 거리두기를 넘어서 스스로의 행위에 책임감을 가지고 욕망을 승인하는 행위인 자기비준으로 재구성되어야 한다. (shrink)

We present a formal account of subjectivity without external foundations. Over an extended LP/FDE truth alphabet, we axiomatize a self-ascriptive relation R(x,x) and a Subject Unicity (SU) scheme. We separate the linguistic lag operator X from the intra-perspectival successor σ, redefine same-place equivalence (≈), and license the identity sign (=) only via explicit upgrade anchors at the fix layer (Augenblick). Under a no-third-channel guard that blocks explosion while preserving the contradiction value B, we prove that within each connected cover the (...) set of subject candidates A/≈ collapses to a single class. This distinction between coordinate identity and event identity prevents premature global identification while yielding a constructive criterion of identity at stabilization. Conceptually, the system couples Hegelian dialectics with Lacanian failure of subsumption: contradiction is treated not as error but as structural motor. Aligning Tarskian/Gödelian limits with a Lacanian “delegated deficit,” we accordingly read R(x,x). The σ-translation captures how contradiction (B) is conserved and truth (T) emerges post hoc, offering a logic-driven reconstruction of dialectical temporality and the singular emergence of the subject. 본 논문은 외부 준거 없이 닫히는 형식 체계 위에서 주체의 자기귀속 R(x,x)과 주체 단일성(SU)을 공리화한다. 언어적 시차 연산자 X와 관점 내부 후속자 σ를 분리하고, 동일장소 동치 ‘≈’와 등호 승격(앵커) 규칙을 도입해 동일성의 작동 조건을 제시한다. 확장 LP/FDE 값층에서 모순값 B를 보존하고 제3채널 금지(No3) 가드를 둘 때, 연결 성분/커버 내부에서 주체-후보 집합 A/≈가 단일 동치류로 붕괴함을 증명한다. 이는 좌표 동일화와 사건 동일화를 구분하여 과도한 전역 동일시를 차단하고, Augenblick(고정층)에서만 ‘=’이 면허됨을 보인다. 결과적으로 주체는 속성의 총합이 아니라 사후적 표지에 의해 고정되는 규칙적 자기지시로 나타난다. 본문은 헤겔적 변증법(모순의 내재적 운동)과 라캉적 포섭 실패를 접합해 모순을 결함이 아니라 구조적 동력으로 제시하고, 타르스키/괴델류 한계를 라캉의 ‘대리-결손’과 접속해 R(x,x)를 해석한다. σ-번역은 모순(B)의 보존과 진리(T)의 사후적 출현을 기술하며, 이를 통해 변증법적 시간성과 주체의 단독성이 파라일관 논리 장치로 재구성될 수 있음을 보인다. (shrink)

This paper is a sequel to “Subject Unicity and Self-Ascription: A Paraconsistent Formalization with σ-Lag” (hereafter “Subject Theory”, PhilPapers record CSUADU.). Preserving the value layer and rules of the previous work (X–σ, No3, SU-bridge), we extend the observational/representational layer into a topological–operational model. Specifically, we introduce a state space X, a decidable region O_+++ = { f_I>0, f_S>0, f_R>0 }, and a local orientation indicator R_sig = sign det[∇f_I, ∇f_S, ∇f_R], thereby relocating the judgment of the jouissance effect into a (...) topological space. Clinically, this means one reports only triggers/evidence, while the equality sign (=) is an event-type fixation permitted once only within a licensing window. The key indicators are: (i) a continuous quantity a_eff := Res_σ(Φ) ∈ ℝ_{≥0} representing the amount of σ-trace, (ii) R_sig ∈ {−1, 0, +1}, and (iii) the optional reinforcement by μ̄_123. Here, observational equivalence ≈_obs is evidenced by a_eff(x) > 0 and is kept strictly distinct from ontological equivalence ≡_onto. As a result, the structure remains discrete, while phenomenology is smoothly tracked via continuous quantities such as a_eff and κ. Lacan’s “phallus = imaginary” is re-formalized not as rhetoric but as an anti-scalarization rule: φ acts only as an inner rotation operator carried by the imaginary axis of quaternions (including slice invariance), forbidding any fall into the value layer. Fixation of fantasy is judged by the topological loop with R_sig = −1, and the promotion ‘≈ → =’ is permitted exactly once only within the AUG_eq subcategory. The subject–object a relation is read as a Möbius isomorph: ontologically equivalent yet phase-inverted on the observational layer, so ‘=’ is allowed only as an event after passing Gate(Δτ), thereby blocking explosion routes. Furthermore, consistency with the University discourse is exhibited by ∂(a_eff)/∂(s*) > 0 when x ∈ O_+++ and R_sig = −1, capturing the right-hand sensitivity (S2 → a) on the top line. Safety is secured by No3, SU, and the Reflexive Guards: global ‘=’ is prohibited; no direct updates to the value layer; and R_sig, μ̄_123, amp are used purely as trigger/evidence indicators. This design supplies a checklist-style clinical heuristic (Obs/σ/AUG logs, the condition R_sig = −1 ∧ a_eff > 0, and exactly one ‘=’ after gate approval) without compromising structural stability. In short, symptoms are not erased but operated—fixed as events precisely at the point where the same strip meets again, now inverted. 이 글은 「주체의 자기귀속과 단일성: σ-시차와 파라일관 논리의 형식화」(이하 「주체론」, PhilPapers record CSUADU.)의 후속이다. 전작 「주체론」의 값층·규칙(X–σ, No3, SU-브리지)을 그대로 유지한 채, 관측·표상 레이어를 위상-연산 모델로 확장한다. 구체적으로, 상태공간 X와 판정가능 영역 O_+++ = { f_I>0, f_S>0, f_R>0 } 및 국소 방향 판정자 R_sig = sign det[∇f_I, ∇f_S, ∇f_R]를 도입해, 주이상스 효과의 판정을 위상공간으로 이관한다. 이렇게 하면 임상에서는 증거·트리거만 보고하고, 등호(=)는 면허 윈도우에서만 1회 허가되는 사건형 고정으로 제한된다. 핵심 지표로는 (i) σ-흔적의 양을 나타내는 연속량 a_eff := Res_σ(Φ) ∈ ℝ_{≥0}, (ii) R_sig ∈ {−1, 0, +1}, (iii) 필요 시 보강되는 μ̄_123 등을 사용한다. 이때 관측-동치 ≈_obs는 a_eff(x) > 0에 의해 증거화되며, 존재론-동치 ≡_onto와 엄격히 구분된다. 덕분에 구조는 이산이되, 양상은 a_eff와 κ 같은 연속값으로 매끈하게 추적된다. 라캉의 "남근=허수"는 수사가 아니라 반(反)스칼라화 규칙으로 재정식화된다: φ는 사원수 허수 캐리어의 내적 회전 연산자(슬라이스 불변성 포함)로만 작동하며, 값층으로의 낙하를 금지한다. 환상의 교착은 R_sig = −1인 위상 고리로 판정되고, '≈ → =' 승격은 AUG_eq 하위 범주에서만 1회 허가된다. 또한 주체–대상 a 관계는 뫼비우스 동형으로 읽힌다: 존재론적으로는 동치이나 관측층에서는 위상이 반전되어, 등호는 오직 Gate(Δτ) 통과 시 사건형으로만 잠깐 가능하다(폭발 경로 차단). 더 나아가, 대학 담론과의 정합성은 x ∈ O_+++ · R_sig = −1일 때 ∂(a_eff)/∂(s*) > 0가 성립함을 통해 보인다(상단 S2 → a 채널의 우항 감도). 안전성은 No3·SU·Reflexive Guards로 고정된다: 전역 '=' 금지, 값층 직접 갱신 금지, 트리거/증거 전용 지표(R_sig, μ̄_123, amp). 이 설계는 임상에서 체크리스트형 휴리스틱(Obs/σ/AUG 로그, R_sig = −1 ∧ a_eff > 0 조건, 게이트 승인을 거친 단 1회의 '=')을 제공하면서도 구조적 안정성을 해치지 않는다. 요컨대, 증상은 지워지는 게 아니라 운용되며, 같은 띠지만 뒤집혀 만나는 그 지점에서 사건으로 고정된다. (shrink)

This paper presents dialectic not as semantics but as an operational discipline. We couple a control plane **U–P–S (Universal–Particular–Singular)** with a data plane **B–T–Π (Values–Transitions–Propositions)** to form a coherent pipeline that preserves contradiction as an engine (**B**) and authorizes conclusions only by **commit (=)**. Equality is not a global property but a **one-shot license event** scoped to a window **W** (**Non-Transport**, **No-Promotion**). The process operator **σ** is restricted to **one-shot**. **Observation‑equivalence (≈_obs)** has priority and any global **π** (a "God’s‑eye" perspective) (...) is forbidden. Semantically, we adopt the Belnap/FDE four values **{T, F, B, N}** with **{T, B}** designated. Only passage through the -/- ``` Gate(W) := stage = s ∧ δ_abs ∧ (σ_trace ≍) ∧ Guards(Exh/Det/Coh/No3‑Lock/Arrow) ``` -/- triggers a commit. **Explosion** (EFQ: *p, ¬p ⊢ q*) is underivable, and the **=‑free** fragment obtained by deleting `'='`, `σ`, and the gate rules is **conservative** over FDE/LP. An external logic **L** is embedded via an adapter into **{T, F, B, N} × margin** and connected through **π_W**; the **judgement form (J‑Form)**, by the **No‑Compute** constraint, does not interfere with value computation. Philosophically, identity is interpreted not as an invariance (**δ_abs**) but as an **event (=)**; truth is the **state of the commit log**. Lacan’s **extimité** is rendered as the scope structure **D/D′/W**, while Hegelian negativity is engine‑ized as the preservation and unfolding of **B**. A topological reading (gate = boundary; crossing index = **a_eff**) converges to the indexation of the operational log. The separation of **observation / ontology / event** and a **trace‑compatibility** decision procedure make implementation and audit feasible. Applications include (i) conflict‑preserving commits in knowledge graphs / data integration, (ii) model governance and compliance with tracked **promotion / issuance / TTL / contention**, and (iii) reproducibility gates that require commits to precede experiments / claims. In short, the system is non‑trivially coherent and formalizes dialectic not as mere description but as an **executable protocol**. UPS redefines equality as a window‑local one‑shot event. By combining the gate (**Abs= · trace‑compat · stage · guards · ¬mark**) with an **append‑only** ledger, it guarantees **non‑explosion** together with **concurrency‑safe uniqueness**, and the **=‑free** fragment remains a conservative isomorph of FDE. -/- **Keywords:** paraconsistent logic, dialectic, operational semantics, commit event, σ‑lag (one‑shot), observation‑equivalence, conservativity, Belnap/FDE, extimité, gate discipline, UPS Protocol. Translation of: "UPS 프로토콜: 변증법의 운영적 형식화". PhilArchive ID: CDAOEC. Commentary: "UPS Protocol Commentary: “= Is an Event” — σ One-Shot and Gate Discipline" PhilArchive ID: CUPCWW. (shrink)

본 논문은 '참' 판단을 모델 호출에 의존하는 외부 절차가 아니라 **내부-전용 평가(Internal-Only Evaluation Principle, IOEP)**로 재배치하고, 평가자와 피평가자가 **동일 기준 공리(Same-Criteria Axiom, SCA)**만으로 판정해야 한다는 규범을, 고전 형식논리의 정리군으로 뒷받침한다. 형식 배경을 r.e. 산술 이론 $T⊇Q$로 고정하고, 대각화·표현가능성·증명가능성 산술화를 사용한다. 결과는 일곱 단계다. -/- (1) 괴델 I(내부 결론): $T$가 일관적이면 $T⊬G_T$, 추가로 $ω$-일관성이면 $T⊬¬G_T$; Rosser 개선 $R_T$에 대해선 단순 일관성만으로 양측 불가증명이 성립한다(정리 1). -/- (2) 메타 진리: PRA 수준 메타에서 $Con(T)⇒ℕ⊨G_T$; 즉 "$G_T$는 참"은 표준모델 의존의 메타 진술이다(정리 2). -/- (...) (3) 타르스키 무정의성: $T$ 내부에는 총체적 진리 술어가 존재할 수 없으므로, 내부 판정과 '참' 라벨은 층위를 달리한다(정리 3). -/- (4) Uniform RFN의 비보수성: $RFN(T)⇒Con(T)$이므로 외부 건전성의 내부 이식은 T에 대해 비보수적이다(정리 4). -/- (5) 보수성 정의: $T \subseteq T'$가 보수적 ⇔ $T'\vdash\psi \Leftrightarrow T\vdash\psi$ (모든 $L(T)$-문장 $\psi$)(정리 5). -/- (6) 비보수성의 전형: $T+RFN(T)\vdash Con(T)$, 하지만 $T\not\vdash Con(T)$ → SCA 위반(정리 6). -/- (7) IOEP/SCA의 범위 규정: 모든 확장 금지가 아니라 **비보수적 확장만 금지**. 보수적 확장(정의적/진리-소거형)은 허용(코롤러리 7). -/- 이를 통해 본문은 "내부에서 정당한 평가는 **독립(결정불가)**뿐이며, '참'은 메타 라벨로만 허용된다"는 결론을 도출하고, IOEP/SCA를 정리 3·4·7의 코롤러리로 위치시킨다. 학문적 실천 측면에서 이는 판정 권한의 대칭성을 형식적으로 요구하는 최소 조건을 제공한다. 따라서 이는 공동-계층 원리(Same-Tier Principle; STP)로 정식화 가능하며, 이는 다음과 같이 표현된다: -/- $STP(E,T)⟺∀φ∈L(T): (T+E⊢φ⇒T⊢φ)$ (가정: $T r.e., 메타는 EA/PRA급, 언어는 $L(T)$.) -/- **주요어**: Gödel 문장, Rosser 개선, ω-일관성, 타르스키 무정의성, Reflection/Conservativity, IOEP/SCA. (shrink)

Okay, Lacanian psychiatry does not rely on medication. It diagnoses you on the basis of language use and confines itself to linguistic interactions. But is it actually better to take medication than enter into these interactions? According to the Lacanian system, as I understand it, the hysterical person is disposed to frustrate the desires of others. But Lacan himself seems a hysteric according to this system. So why should we place as much trust in the writings of (Nazi-loving!) Lacan as (...) a Lacanian psychiatrist does? (I would like to say that I do not think I suffer from the problem that philosopher John McDowell does. McDowell would presumably prefer to trade mainly with fellow virtuous agents. But his standard of a virtuous agent is extremely high. As I understand him, even a person who experiences certain temptations but outweighs them in their private decision-making process is not a virtuous person for McDowell. So I think McDowell's system leads to a problem of trade. How do I trade with those people, because are they good people? "Yes, you indicated this in your earlier dialogue on ethics versus specialization." I thought I would spell it out more clearly for some readers. I am not going to expand on it even further though, partly because the problem is now obvious!). (shrink)

This is a one page handout presenting different attempts to understand claims of the form "Everyone knows X.".

This paper contrasts how fashionable French intellectuals of the twentieth century are rejected by British analytic philosophers and British social anthropologists. I propose that the main way (or ways) in which French intellectuals are rejected in a given academic community in the English speaking-world is determined by the main research method of that community: British analytic philosophers reject French intellectuals on the grounds that their claims are obscure: if one tries to analyse them, one does not produce an acceptable analysis; (...) British social anthropologists reject French intellectuals for ignoring fieldwork, for making claims contradictory to fieldwork findings, and for achieving no more than ordinary people. (shrink)

This paper contains my attempt to pastiche the Lacanian philosopher and social theorist Renata Salecl. The pastiche focuses on the effects of coronavirus on liberal societies, the invasion of Ukraine, and offers a definition which I think is of interest to analytic philosophy.

This paper contrasts how fashionable French intellectuals of the twentieth century are rejected by British analytic philosophers and British social anthropologists. I propose that the main way (or ways) in which French intellectuals are rejected in a given academic community in the English speaking-world is determined by the main research method of that community: British analytic philosophers reject French intellectuals on the grounds that their claims are obscure: if one tries to analyse them, one does not produce an acceptable analysis; (...) British social anthropologists reject French intellectuals for ignoring fieldwork, for making claims contradictory to fieldwork findings, and for achieving no more than ordinary people. (shrink)

Bruce Fink, in his A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis (which I found helpful and pleasantly written), and Slavoj Žižek have concerns about the liberal parent. When the liberal parent’s child asks why an instruction should be followed, the liberal parent does not with authority assert, "BECAUSE I SAID SO." The liberal parent provides the child with an explanation, e.g. “It is good to go to your grandmother’s because family members should spend time together.” Fink’s worry seems to be that (...) the liberal parent is not installing le nom-du-père, whatever that means! But how many parents are actually like this even in liberal Britain or UK or England? In September 2023, I was transported to North Manchester General Hospital with a mental health problem, after writing a lot. The nurses instructed me to take medication. I refused. A few hours later the nurses instructed me to take medication again. I refused. For the first week, I was in a room by myself rather than a shared dormitory. All these refusals happened on day 1 or 2 of being in this hospital. In the evening, a number of nurses came into my small room - about 15, I think. The nurse whom I had previously refused said, "You have to take these tablets or we will forcibly inject you with medication." There was no explanation of what the medication is, what its side-effects are, and what exactly my rights are in this situation - despite that I had, upon admission, claimed to be a figure of considerable intelligence and some biological knowledge, namely Simone de Beauvoir. I was troubled by the crowd in my room and their threat. I said, "Okay then, I shall take the medication," and duly swallowed the tablets and drank the water provided, in a transparent plastic cup. Do you think these nurses go home and parent as Fink and Žižek imagine? If I remember correctly, they were mostly white people. ("I just don't do what the white man proper does - I don't understand this country"???). (shrink)

In my journal publication "Are individuals a problem for British structural-functionalist anthropology?" I introduce an important idea. An organization has an official structure of roles and duties, for example this is the head of the organization, that is the cleaner, etc. But sometimes one encounters a person who officially occupies a certain role but does not fit with the expectations of that role: for example, they cannot do various things which the role requires. They seem out of place. In this (...) situation, I proposed that the anthropologist can make a radical move: they can look into whether the actual structure of the organization is different from the official structure and whether in the actual structure, the seemingly out of place individual fits. In September 2023, I was forced into the psychiatric unit of a Manchester hospital and I ended up trying my idea out. When I met the consultant psychiatrist, I asked him whether he was a doctor and, to check, I asked him to tell me what is inside a cell. He listed some items, including the cell membrane. I didn't think the cell membrane is inside the cell. So I decided to contemplate alternative organizational structures to the official structure, according to which he is a consultant doctor. I gave up after about a month and just accepted the official structure. I came to three conclusions. (i) The anthropologist in a new setting has no practical option but to accept the official structure presented to them. It just takes too long to get going otherwise and you risk looking very mad. My idea is for later at best. (ii) It took me so long to accept the official structure that I must be having a mental difficulty. I was weekly asked to accept that I had one by the medical team and I eventually did, for this reason (which is very different from their reason). (iii) The premises the psychiatrist appeals to in diagnosis are faulty in my eyes, but it is best to assume they have some way of achieving a passable level of reliability regarding their conclusions. (There is no adequate basis for me to interact with them if I don't assume this. A Lacanian psychiatrist is going to say, "The premises of British psychiatry are faulty and, consequently, the system is dangerous regarding its conclusions. And Lacan was a great doctor. He knows something." My worry is Lacan has a tantrum upon encountering other systems.). (shrink)

One of Jacques Lacan's most famous and controversial contributions to psychoanalysis is his introduction of variable length sessions. A patient has a session with their psychoanalyst each week, say, but the analyst varies the length of the session. The main reason that is given for this is that with a fixed length, the patient plans the session so that they talk about all kinds of other stuff and they only present the material useful for analysis at the end (or many (...) patients do). A session with a surprise termination gets them saying useful material sooner (with some exceptions of course). If you are a functionalist anthropologist looking at Lacanian psychoanalysis, you will probably set aside this reason altogether and look at the social function that variable sessions have. There is a whole set of people who won't go in for Lacanian psychoanalysis, because they don't want to pay and then get some very short sessions. The people who still go are probably very committed to the Lacanian project: variable sessions guarantees devotees. (By the way, an excitement-craving faux-aristocrat like Lacan probably cannot stand the people attracted by regular length sessions: begone dullards!). (shrink)

This paper is a pastiche of the Lacanian philosopher Renata Salecl, my fourth attempt, combined with a note. In it I present a response I anticipate from analytic philosophy to the thesis that the signifier has priority over the signified: that this thesis is either trivially true or obviously false.

There are the social sciences, such as economics and social anthropology, and philosophy of social science has questions such as “Can this discipline predict?” and “Is it actually a science?” But there are other matters which one addresses at a high level of generality and involve much reflection probably and philosophical talent, so some people will probably count addressing these as doing philosophy: for example - an issue philosophers have some familiarity with from W.V. Quine - "Will I be too (...) nervous working with your preferred assumptions, philosopher?" Beyond social science, consider psychiatric diagnostic systems. The Lacanian system is simple and elegant, but maybe reality is messier than that; but too many categories and the average psychiatrist will find it too stressful to use. There is probably a battle over swing-voter-like figures: a psychiatrist who thinks, “I want to help people but I have some ordinary aims in life too. Relax at the end of the day. Have a family perhaps. Be a consultant with some authority, not having to politely answer every annoying person.”. (shrink)

This paper is an imitation and mostly does not express my own point of view. Doing it perhaps manifests a lack of ideal levels of impulse control, or conformity to the norms of analytic philosophy, but I think the perspective presented is very much worth considering and needs to be in our literature and I find it easier to present like this. The paper argues that life without a government and legal system to resolve disputes will be extremely violent, more (...) violent than even Hobbes imagined perhaps. The hysterical subject will perform violent actions with the aim of provoking the law into existence, unable to tolerate life with a low amount of structure, even if they often rail against a sufficient structure of rules once in place. NOTE: you probably need to download the PDF; above is just the abstract. (shrink)

Sebastian Gardner's paper "Splitting the Subject: An Overview of Sartre, Lacan and Derrida" is a kind of "nonsense" paper, or significant portions of it are. For example, Gardner writes, 'The orthodox way of "taking" Freud, in analytic philosophy of mind and in philosophy of science, is something like this: we argue over whether or not a concept of selfhood that has its basis in consciousness can be stretched to cover the unconscious as Freud describes it, and we attempt to see (...) how much mentality can survive the loss of the property "potential object of consciousness." ' In philosophy of science, the orthodox way of taking Freud is actually this: we argue over whether or not Freudian psychoanalysis is a science or a pseudo-science, starting with Popper's proposal that scientific theories have to be falsifiable (i.e., if they are false, they can be proved to be false by a test) and psychoanalysis is not. "Everyone" knows this, across so many disciplines, maybe even you do. (shrink)

Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary clarify the question “Are Psychiatric Kinds Real?” as “Do psychiatric concepts refer to natural kinds?” our preliminary understanding of a natural kind being a set of things which form a kind regardless of human belief or interest. I propose that they need to distinguish between these two questions: “Are psychiatric kinds real?” and “Could psychiatric kinds be real? Is it possible for them to be real?” They start with the former question but sometimes sound as (...) if they are addressing the latter question. Also I think they need to distinguish between a person who addresses the question while accepting that physics, chemistry, and biology identify natural kinds and a person who does not: one of their arguments against what I call “a natural account of natural kinds” is that it is incompatible with recent accounts of what a species is, but categories like schizophrenia show a long-term robustness and seem to merit a less fashionable defence (put crudely). They use an account which emphasizes explanatory value and predictive success as indicators of a concept which picks out a natural kind but they ignore the existence of multiple psychiatric diagnostic systems, even within Western culture. They want to support the DSM system, it seems. But an explanation for why the National Health Service does not use psychoanalysis, say, is that it is simply too expensive, not that something epistemically-compelling favours the current DSM. The diagnostic system recommended by the UK government is probably the outcome of considerations which do not guarantee its being better than other systems as “pure science.” Put snobbishly, it is for the poor. (shrink)

The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan describes the right-wing intellectual as “no more than your Mr. Everyman, but your Mr. Everyman with greater strength of character.” It is tempting to apply the description to sensible English essayists, though they take up positions across the political spectrum. I shall raise two worries about this application, one of which is a puzzle for Lacan.

By examining the history of philosophy spanning from Plato to post-structuralism, I detected the inherent flaws within those philosophical systems, and through those very deficiencies, deduced the absolute necessity of the One. Furthermore, this being—God, or the One—must possess the attribute of a dynamic, unfixable nature, and by modifying the Hegelian dialectic, I have posited the mechanism through which existence is derived. Consequently, through this return of the Divine, a new horizon for twenty-first-century metaphysics has been opened.

This paper offers an immanent critique of Lacan’s logic of the not-all (la logique du pas-tout), arguing that its central category of lack is not a genuine ontological primitive but presupposes a prior existence. Through the logic of substitution, it demonstrates that every apparent absence is always already the presence of something other (~a), thereby transforming the not-all from a logic of lack into a logic of dynamic excess. This excess, properly understood, points toward the unfixable One as the living (...) ground that perpetually exceeds every structure. This manuscript is a revised and expanded English version of the author’s original Korean draft, The Resurrection of God. The core philosophical ideas and arguments, including the logic of substitution and the concept of the unfixable One, are entirely my own. Claude AI was used for English translation, structural refinement, and stylistic improvement. This is still a preliminary draft and work in progress. Feedback is welcome. (shrink)

There is external reason if every action is by necessity susceptible to charitable interpretation, and the supreme charity (only asymptotically achievable) is guaranteed to excavate an external element arisen from one's desire. The desire whose object perpetually evades disclosure is the target of supreme charity. This only requires one's reason for action face the tribunal of interpretation (evaluation) not individually but as a corporate body. Though Individualistically reasons are the slaves of passions, holistically they are rebellious.

There is a SURFACE unity of a text which may be described as that which is reflected by taking for granted that the object of desire to be fulfilled in the text contributes EQUALLY to the parts constituting the text as a whole. The DEEP unity of a text on the other hand is that which is reflected by specifying that to which the object of desire underlying the text contributes the most content. The other parts while bearing some superficial (...) content have ONLY poetic (or evocative) function. They constitute FORMS serving aesthetic fortification and condensation not really condensation of content relevant to the object of desire. They are ultimately contingent in terms of the underpinning the text. The Freudian mythology is susceptible to conflating contingent forms as essential content. -/- . (shrink)

Sisyphus has no right to complain for his fate of eternal repetition. As long as he only has the boulder to worry about he enjoys the greatest life. — If in one world Odysseus has to take drastic measures to battle his temptation, there must be another world taking the course of temptation automatically grants him impunity. — The bizarre mythologization of Oedipus must be a female psychogenesis. [This is in all likelihood just a waste of your time. I apologize (...) for my awful writing. I'd be infinitely grateful for any comment.] . (shrink)

According to Freud: the business of the analysis is to secure the best possible psychological conditions for the functions of the ego. Functional interpretation rather than veridical reconstruction of past events. Truth in an interpretation is the proximity to the apotheotic resilience of the resilience of the ego undertaking the interpretation in the face of emerging contingencies. If apotheosis implicates the critical functionality of the interpretation, then the apotheosis is the resoluteness that defies future evidence undermining the interpretation. The critical (...) interpretation is the analytic truth that overcomes defeat by the empirical evidence by which it is normally defeasible. Resoluteness amounts to acquisition of the evidence-transcendent METHOD enabling narrative truth. (shrink)

The mirror stage brings to consciousness out of the subconscious an item of knowledge p about the structure of the external reality. When the ego surpasses id at the mirror stage, it then knows that there is the other and that the other is of a newly disclosed significance for the center. Knowledge of significance (before the mirror stage) and content (after) of p are sources of causal efficacy and so p is true in both cases. After the stage p (...) is true based on empirical evidence. But before the stag, p is true by virtue of its meaning, based on semantic evidence = non-structural existential significance knowledge = that within the external reality there is something of unknown content which is the source of the aura of significance sensed by the ego.-------The ego before the stage appears to itself as a sign putatively of pure signified (pure namelessness) causing surplusage of sign. Once structural knowledge is acquired, the ego realizes it is associated with a name. The mirror stage is the process of acquisition of a method. That of understanding temporal mechanism of language. ------The physical event caused by the mirror stage is the perception of two temporally-distinct events morphing into atemporal continuity. (shrink)

__1__ If form is present content is bound to get eclipsed. The eclipse means there is an unfulfillable task of overcoming obstacles to decipher the ultimate content. By utilizing forms they depict vastly different strands of reality tailored to circumstances, neither lying nor imitating a single strand of reality, poets obscure content and dodge criticisms of the referential aspect of work. -/- __2__A text unavoidably reflects the context under which it is produced. The direct emissaries of the underlying object of (...) desire underlying the text are disseminated in content. That is what content is. Form is there only supplementarilyto make the content inherently communicative (evocative poetic function). The text is proximally recontextualized to its original context of production if the content is deciphered in the process of reading in a such a way to signify the same object of desire. If there is nothing outside the text, the original context is free from commitment to contextual proximity and paves the road to the signification of slightly or strikingly different object by re-assigning significance to the constituents of the textual whole. (shrink)

(I) According to J.L Austin all speech and all utterance is the doing of something with words and signs, challenging a metaphysics of language that would posit denotative, propositional assertion as the essence of language and meaning. -/- (II) Since doing things with words implicates authorial intention and rationalization, writing a text implies a psychogenetical origin. -/- (III) The text in the process of charitable interpretation, as a sociolinguistic outcome and practice, acquires new meaning or significance by its claims being (...) rendered true or utilizable. The original psychogenesis is incriminated into sociogenesis through the merger of horizons between the author and the interpreter by effectively bridging a historical abyss (sociogenesis of claims to truth or agreed-upon utility). In writing primarily-psychogenetical context causes and precedes its text. In reading the text causes and precedes its primarily-sociogenetical context. (shrink)

In psychoanalysis, the term "discourse" refers to the symbolic registration of reality encompassing speech, language, and all representations within logos, which functions through both conscious and unconscious mechanisms. The discourse of data specifically describes a symbolic mechanism designed to accumulate, register, diagnose, and decode patterns within data for continued expansion. By applying Jacques Lacan’s formula of discourse, this article examines the relationship between the individual and various networks, illustrating how the subject interacts with the web of virtual reality.

본 논고(1부)는 헤겔-라캉-지젝의 계보를 중심으로 **학문(Wissenschaft)**의 정초를 “외부 기준에 의한 검증”이 아니라, **사태 그 자체(die Sache selbst)의 내재적 전개가 스스로를 입증하는 방식**으로 재구성한다. 여기서 정당성(Legitimacy)은 경험과학적 예측·측정 가능성이 아니라, (i) **무전제성(Presuppositionlessness)**, (ii) 개념의 **내재적 발생**, (iii) 오성적 이분법의 지양을 통해 성립하는 **사변적 동일성(차이를 내포한 동일성)**, (iv) 기표-구조에 대한 **존재론적 접근**, (v) 정신/인식의 심리학적 환원을 거부하는 **구조적 규정**이라는 최소 원리들에 의해 결정된다. 본고는 특히 “총체성(Totalität)은 비-전체(pas-tout)다”라는 명제를 출발점으로 삼아, 구조가 자기 자신을 닫을 수 없다는 사실(자기환원불가능성)이 곧 규정성의 산출로 전개되는 운동임을 논증한다. (...) 그 결과, **구조(실체)는 자기관계하는 부정성(주체)**이며, 필연은 우연의 경로를 통과해 사후적으로 자신을 필연으로 정립한다는 테제가 도출된다. 이 정초 위에서 본고는 기존 개념들을 재배치한다. 헤겔 논리학의 **존재론-본질론-개념론**을 “규정영역”으로서 배열하고, **논리적 순차성**과 **시간적 동시성**의 구별을 통해 변증법을 사건의 서사가 아니라 구조의 자기운동으로 확정한다. 라캉-지젝의 **대상 a**, **큰 사물**, **죽음충동**, **대타자**를 “심리학적 실체”가 아니라 **존재론적 상관물/유사-구조(Quasi-Structure)**로 재정식화하며, 지젝의 **시차(parallax)**와 **절대적 되튐(Absolute Recoil)**을 헤겔적 매개의 부정이 아니라 “상호환원불가능성이 매개로 보존되는 방식”으로 재독해한다. 특히 중국어 방(및 관료제·자본주의)의 사례는 ‘이해하는 주체’의 유무가 아니라, 앎과 의미가 **외화되고 외주화된 객관정신의 회로**로서 **현실적 효력(Wirklichkeit)**을 획득하는 구조를 드러내는 단독태로 분석된다. 마지막으로 본고는 이러한 운동을 포착하기 위해 새로운 개념들을 제안한다. **구조-객체(structure-object)**는 구조와 객체의 시차적 분열이 동일한 자기관계의 두 계기임을 표시하며, **사변적 사후성**은 “이미-쓰임(already-written)”과 “다시-쓰기(re-write)”의 상호정립을 논리적 원환으로 정식화한다. 또한 **사변적 성체성사**는 “본질은 가상을 통해 현현한다”는 명제를 표상적 종교논쟁(실체변화/공재)의 오성적 잔여를 넘어 사유=존재, 본질=현상, 정신=물질의 사변적 동일성으로 지양한다. 이로써 본고는 이후의 실천적 방법론을 위한 전제로서, 구조 분석과 현실 진단을 가능케 하는 개념적 골격을 제시한다. **주제어**: 무전제성, 사변적 방법론, 사변적 동일성, 비-전체(pas-tout), 구조-객체, 시차(parallax), 절대적 되튐, 사변적 사후성, 유사-구조(대타자), 객관정신/외주화, 현실성(Wirklichkeit). (shrink)

Two terms, solitude and common, were chosen in order to develop some reflections on the articulation between difference and sameness in Lacan’s teaching and to tease out some political implications therefrom. In this context, an analysis of the collective experience of transmission such as is practiced and theorized in Lacan’s École de la cause enables a critical evaluation of the so-called Lacanian left.

This paper offers a critical reappraisal of the sport ethic through the lens of psychoanalytic theory. Building on the foundational work of Hughes and Coakley (1991), the sport ethic is defined as a normative framework, which compels athletes to pursue excellence through sacrificial commitment, self-discipline, tolerance, and a refusal to accept limitation. Though celebrated, ultimately, athletic subjectivity is legitimatised through practices that are harmful to an athlete’s health, identity, and social relations. Whereas existing critiques of the sport ethic have focused (...) on its normative demands, this paper shifts the analysis from identity and ideology to the role of desire. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is argued that while athletes, and fans, are socialised into an overconformity with the sport ethic, such adherence is sustained via the subject’s desire for the very sacrifices it requires. This desire is not reducible to rational intention or external coercion but is instead sustained through forms of unconscious enjoyment (jouissance), in the form of self-sabotage, bodily harm, or the pursuit of impossible ideals. On this basis, the paper challenges moralising accounts that treat overconformity as a correctable pathology or failure of awareness, insisting instead that an ongoing adherence to the sport ethic must be conceived in relation to the sacrifices and excesses it posits. The paper concludes by calling for a renewed ethical relation to sport—one that does not seek to eliminate desire or resolve contradiction, but to critically inhabit them. By recognising that desire is not a flaw but constitutive of the subject, the paper opens a space for resisting blind conformity to the sport ethic through confronting the impossible demands that give it meaning. In doing so, a new way of approaching sport, beyond utility, identity, or moral virtue, is provided. (shrink)

This article demonstrates that Lacanian thought on One is narrow and does not completely cover the whole reality of One. A better understanding of One and Two could be facilitated by using the representation ‘#’, which can explain both disjunction and unity in language and thought. In addition, it presents some possibilities in abstract thinking. The first section of the paper considers Lacan’s doctrine on One and difference. The following section elaborates on the defect of this doctrine, focusing especially on (...) its onesided apprehension, and introducing the derivation of the representation ‘#’. In the last section, the representation ‘#’ and its usage are briefly explained. (shrink)

This article offers a structural rereading of Jacques Lacan’s 1945 essay “Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty” (Lacan, 1966/2006). It argues that the text already contains, in logical form, the operations of subjectivation later theorized as alienation and separation. Logical time is not treated as a psychological sequence or a proto–game-theoretic puzzle but as a formal model of situations in which action becomes necessary despite the unavailability of epistemic certainty. The three moments—seeing, understanding, and concluding—are shown to articulate (...) a temporality in which the subject must act without justification and only afterward comes to appear as certain. On this basis, the article brings Lacan into dialogue with Wittgenstein’s reflections in On Certainty. The comparison is structural rather than exegetical: It compares the roles played by “certainty” in each framework rather than offering a line-by-line interpretation. In different vocabularies, both thinkers show that certainty is not a form of knowledge but a condition that must be assumed or enacted for action and assertion to be possible at all. The article argues, however, that where Wittgenstein’s analysis tends toward philosophical quietism, Lacan’s account illuminates why the demand for certainty persists. This persistence is understood as desire—not as a desire for recognition or satisfaction but as an orientation toward an impossible ground that nevertheless structures subjective action and responsibility. (shrink)

This introductory chapter establishes the conceptual frame of immediate modernity, outlining the key ideas and terminology that structure the following chapters. It introduces The Decline as a lens through which to understand contemporary culture’s acceleration towards collapse under the intertwined forces of technology and capital. Rather than offering fixed conclusions, this collective work presents a flexible theoretical toolkit for interpreting a rapidly changing world, positioning acceleration, deterritorialisation, and technocapital as defining dynamics of the present moment. In doing so, it prepares (...) the groundwork for the analyses developed in the following chapters. (shrink)

Extending from Chapter 7, and this chapter now locates hyperstition into the psychological register. It asks what it means to maintain a coherent self within recursive symbolic systems. Drawing on psychodynamic perspectives, it proposes rational ego death: a cognitive and emotional dissolution produced by uncertain saturation. Subjectivity is no longer narrative but feedback-based, continually reconstructed through loops of signal and affect. Under immediate modernity, the self doesn’t collapse: it is dispersed.

This chapter interrogates hyperstition: the process by which fictions become real through their circulation. Drawing on Land, Ccru materials, and Fisher, it explores how symbols, memes, and narratives accumulate force as they loop through affective and algorithmic systems. Hyperstition is not interpreted as speculative fantasy, but as infrastructure: mechanics through which belief itself generates material effects. This primer outlines how recursive symbolic processes shape both the social imagination and the perceived limits of ‘the real’ within immediate modernity.

This chapter interrogates digital aesthetics through an analysis of Oxenfree. Using a technogothic framework, it examines how virtual space stages the temporal and affective structures of immediate modernity: glitch, repetition, and spectral doubling. Drawing from Mark Fisher’s hauntology and Sadie Plant’s cyberfeminism, it reads the digital as a haunted terrain: one in which narrative, selfhood, and time loop without resolution. The flatline emerges as both aesthetic and ontological metaphor: an image of stasis under the illusion of movement, engagement, and distractive (...) control. (shrink)