Delicately and with a voluptuous spiral movement the leaf from the tall beech tree detached itself from its branch and landed on the flaming bed made by its companions.That autumn, that morning, while I was observing this unique event, I began to reflect on the emotion I felt in its probably universal connotation. Like aesthetic feeling, a great many concepts affect living beings in the deepest part of themselves, and come from the depths of the cognitive processes, those determinants that (...) are innate dispositions to feel and know. Those depths have a reality and a meta-historical, infra- and extra-verbal dimension. (shrink)

In his book How to Take Skepticism Seriously, Adam Leite defends the efforts of Moore and Austin to show that the skeptic’s assumptions are at odds with ordinary epistemic practice. In these comments, I want to raise two questions. The first question concerns the extent of what counts as “ordinary epistemic practice.” While various plausible general principles concerning knowledge and justified belief clearly count as part of this practice, do various recondite, or even potentially controversial, empirical claims also count as (...) part of this practice? The second question I want to raise concerns just what it is that Leite can claim to have shown about the truth of skepticism, even granting that he has shown that the case for skepticism cannot be made from within ordinary epistemic practice. If we grant that Leite has shown that much, we can conclude that ordinary epistemic practice does not undermine itself. But should this somehow reassure us of the truth of our ordinary knowledge attributions, or otherwise alter our attitudes concerning those attributions? (shrink)

Philosophers advance hypotheses, and occasionally those hypotheses are to some extent justified on the basis of some evidence. But what sorts of things can serve as such evidence, and how can they do so? These are the central questions of Lycan’s book On Evidence in Philosophy. There, he claims that one sort of thing that can serve as evidence in philosophy is “intuition.” But what, in Lycan’s view, are intuitions, and what is it about intuitions that enable them to function (...) as evidence in philosophy? In this chapter, I critically assess Lycan’s answers to these questions. Though I am sympathetic to much of what Lycan says, I argue for slightly different answers to his central questions. (shrink)

How can formal Sanskrit dramaturgical theory’s claim that the dominant aesthetic essence (rasa) of a literary work must be unmixed with another be reconciled with the evident complexity of emotions (bhāvas) that such works strive to convey? In the 10th-century text The Ten Dramatic Forms by Dhanamjaya and Observations on it by Dhanika the issue of how conflicting emotions can be conveyed and understood aesthetically is directly tackled. Drawing on the complex typology of emotions they inherit through the tradition, Dhanamjaya (...) and Dhanika seek to demonstrate that a mix of emotions in a single scenario (romantic attraction and heroic resolve, or attraction and spiritual calmness; or attraction and revulsion) do not conflict with each other, but can be explained through various analytic relationships between states and types of emotions. I present these moves and suggest that they provide us with some interesting ideas for a philosophical anthropology of conflicting emotions. (shrink)

The chapter examines voice of identity and resistance in Chinua Achebe’s most promising novels Things Fall Apart (2010a) and Arrow of God (2010b). The chapter investigates the colonised Igbo community, one of Nigeria’s major ethnic groups who stand for their own identity, native religion, unique customs, and the ways in which the British colonists subvert that community. It illustrates how the two cultures collide, and how these caused into loss of cultural hegemony of the Igbo people. It focuses on the (...) various ways to attempt resistance of the native Igbo people in order to sustain their culture. It questions the survival of the ruling colonial mentality in Igbo socio political and cultural structure. The chapter also presents the self-consciousness of the colonised people against the alterations that colonialism has made to their identity and culture, and it depicts their eagerness against the colonial suppression. (shrink)

‏A set of approaches to sociology, which has emerged since the 1990s, is related to Israel’s neocolonial situation—namely, its lasting domination of the Palestinian ArabsOccupied Territories, which it captured in 1967, and related social and cultural aspects of the protracted Israeli-Arab conflict and of Israeli society. This chapter diagnoses three such approaches: A Mizrahim (Mizrahi) counter-orientalist sociology; Palestinian sociology in Israel; and the sociology of the Occupation.

In time there emerged certain modalities ofModernizationTheory modernization theory, including revisedFunctionalism (Functionalist school of sociology)Revised functionalism, which, in the 1960s and 1970s, complemented the macrolevel approach with microlevels and mezzolevels of analysis. Another modality, revisited functionalism, hasFunctionalism (Functionalist school of sociology)Revisited coped, since the late 1970s, with the fall of the house of LaborLabor Movement, and with the parallel fall of functionalist theory. The “late Eisenstadt” progressively distanced himself from his early ParsonianParsons, Talcott (Parsonian sociology) functionalism and elaborated a WeberWeber, (...) Max (Weberian sociology)ian cultural-civilizationCivilization (Civilizational)al orientation. (shrink)

The first Department of Sociology was formed, in Jerusalem, in 1948. It was first chaired by Martin BuberBuber, Martin, who ushered in his Jewish German romantic nationalist world view. In 1950 his heir was Shmuel Noah EisenstadtEisenstadt, Shmuel Noah, who ushered in the American modernization paradigmParadigm (scientific). Eisenstadt is crowned as the founding father of Israeli sociologyFounders (of Israeli sociology), which, between the 1950s and 1970s, was mostly concerned with the question of the integration of new immigrantsImmigration (immigrants) in the (...) national mold. (shrink)

You regard yourself as enjoying genuine sensory engagement with what philosophers call “the external world”, viz., a spatio-temporal world that exists independently of your consciousness. For instance, you see the computer screen before you, you feel the chair against your back, you hear dogs barking outside your room, etc.

DuringFeminism (Feminist school of sociology)Liberal the 1970s conflict, sociology developed three further strands: pluralist sociologyPluralism (Pluralist school of sociology), which underlined the multiethnic composition of society; feminist sociologyFeminism (Feminist school of sociology), which highlighted the specificity of women’s status in society; and colonizationColonization (school of sociology) sociology, which considered the encounter between immigrant Jews and settled Palestinian ArabsPalestinian Arabs as the pivot of Israel’s social structure and dynamics.

In the late 1970s the atmosphere in the discipline of sociology started to change. “Consensus sociology” enticed a lot of criticism, and various strands of “conflict sociology”Conflict sociology evolved and challenged it. From the critical point of view, mainstream sociologyMainstream sociology was blind to the role of power, domination, and struggle in society, and to the divergence of interests and identities that had riven it. Political elitesElites (school of sociology) and ethnoClass (social)Ethnoclasses were the first approachs to contest modernization theory.

This book is about Israeli sociologyPredecessors (Precursors; of Israeli sociology) since its beginnings, from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century. Israeli sociology evolved in tandem with the development of the Israeli-Jewish nation in PalestinePalestine, and later, of the state of Israel, and in compliance with this collectivity. The changing nature of relations between the nation-state and the discipline of sociology throughout this era is a major pivot of our narration. The narration is organized in the following historical (...) phases: Predecessors (1882–1948), Founders (1948–1967), Disciples (1967–1996), Critics (1977–1987/1993), Intermediators (who analyze social cleavages) (1987–2018), and Postmodernists and Postcolonialists (1993–2018). The introductory chapter outlines briefly the development of the Israeli sociological text within the shifting context of Israeli history. (shrink)

PostmodernismPostmodern (-ism) (school of sociology) reached Israel in the late 1980s and the 1990s, enticing young cohort of scholars, while irritating older ones. It was embraced by radical intellectualsIntellectuals in tandem with the diffusion in Israel of late-capitalistCapitalism culture in the wake of the neoliberal turn of the 1980s. It was, as is the case elsewhere, in part, an effect of neoliberalismNeo-liberalism and in part, a reaction to it. The impact of postmodernism was first felt in the artistic and aesthetic (...) spheres and later spilled over to the humanities and, finally, to the social sciences. Three sociological approaches are discussed in this context: cultural studies;Cultural StudiesBourdieusian sociologyBourdieusian (sociology); and new MarxistMarx, Karl (Marxist sociology) sociology. (shrink)

AroundIntermediators (school of sociology) the mid-1990s two opposing processes took place simultaneously: on the one hand, explicit controversies flared up between mainstream sociologistsMainstream sociology and new critical sociologistsCritics (critical; school of sociology); on the other hand, a more tacit process of rapprochement took place between the two sides. An intermediaryIntermediators (school of sociology) position evolved and became a new sociological convention, that viewed Israel as a society afflicted by conflicts among “cleavagesCleavages (social),” or sectors. In 2015 Reuven RivlinRivlin, Reuven the (...) president of the state, publicly adopted this line of thought and proclaimed the end of the “old social order,” based on a solid majority, and the beginning of a “new social order,” based on a concord between equally weighted minorities. (shrink)

Some aspects of contemporary Israeli sociology look troubling for its future prospects. Sociology today is entrapped between two sources of pressure: neonationalism and Neo-liberalism. On the one hand, sociology is pressed to conform to the Nationalism (Nationalist; Nationalistic) ethos; on the other hand, it is pushed to adapt to neoliberal practices. Yet a third type of problem seems to be a thorough Americanization (of sociology) of Israeli sociology in the global era. Though all these concerns are common to the humanities (...) and social sciences in general, Israeli sociology seems to be particularly challenged. (shrink)

A delightful anthology of classical Greek and Roman writings celebrating country living—ranging from a philosophy of compost to hymns to the gods of agriculture Whether you farm or garden, live in the country or long to move there, or simply enjoy an occasional rural retreat, you will be delighted by this cornucopia of writings about living and working on the land, harvested from the fertile fields of ancient Greek and Roman literature. An inspiring antidote to the digital age, How to (...) Be a Farmer evokes the beauty and bounty of nature with a rich mixture of philosophy, practical advice, history, and humor. Together, these timeless reflections on what the Greeks called boukolika and the Romans res rusticae provide an entertaining and enlightening guide to a more meaningful and sustainable way of life. In fresh translations by classicist and farmer M. D. Usher, with the original texts on facing pages, Hesiod praises the dignity of labor; Plato describes the rustic simplicity of his ideal republic; Varro dedicates a farming manual to his wife, Fundania (“Mrs. Farmer”); and Vergil idealizes farmers as residents of the Golden Age. In other selections, Horace extols the joys of simple living at his cherished country farm; Pliny the Elder explains why all culture stems from agriculture; Columella praises donkeys and tells how to choose a ram or a dog; Musonius Rufus argues that farming is the best livelihood for a philosopher; and there is much more. Proof that farming is ultimately a state of mind we should all cultivate, How to Be a Farmer will charm anyone who loves nature or its fruits. (shrink)

One of America's most beloved spiritual figures, Ram Dass made his mark on the world by teaching the path of the heart and promoting service in the areas of love and compassion, social consciousness, and care for the dying. Ram Dass's spirit has been a guiding light for four generations, carrying millions along the journey and helping to free them from their bonds as he worked his way through his own._ ​_Be Here Now_, Dass's influential and seminal work, still stands (...) as the highly readable centerpiece of Western articulation of Eastern philosophy, and how to live joyously one hundred percent of the time in the present, luminous or mundane. It continues to be the instruction manual of choice for generations of spiritual seekers. This twelve-month planner includes inspiring quotations by Ram Dass accompanied by colorful artwork by artist Sue Zipkin and plenty of space for appointments, special occasions, lists, tracking habits, and more. Features include: 5" x 7" planner (10" x 7" open) Compact size is perfect for your handbag, tote, or backpack while commuting or traveling Wire-O binding offers lay-flat ease and convenience Elastic band closure 12-month planner: January–December 2025 Two bonus months: December 2024 and January 2026 Monthly two-page-spread views facilitate big-picture planning Weekly spreads with ample writing space Habit-tracker tables — four pages with 12 customizable trackers Extra lined pages to record notes and reminders Two inside pockets for storing receipts and mementos Official major world holidays and observances Moon phases, based on Universal Time Each month features inspirational wisdom quotes by Ram Dass Great for journaling and daily gratitude lists WE PLANT TREES_ to offset our carbon footprint and resource usage — more than ONE MILLION and growing! _SUSTAINABLY SOURCED_ — Our paper is sourced from a combination of recycled materials and wood harvested from socially and environmentally sustainable forests and is Forest Stewardship Council® Certified. (shrink)

One of America's most beloved spiritual figures, Ram Dass made his mark on the world by teaching the path of the heart and promoting service in the areas of love and compassion, social consciousness, and care for the dying. Ram Dass's spirit has been a guiding light for four generations, carrying millions along the journey and helping to free them from their bonds as he worked his way through his own._ _Be Here Now_, Dass's influential and seminal work, still stands (...) as the highly readable centerpiece of Western articulation of Eastern philosophy, and how to live joyously one hundred percent of the time in the present, luminous or mundane. It continues to be the instruction manual of choice for generations of spiritual seekers. This twelve-month calendar includes a monthly quotation by Ram Dass accompanied by colorful paintings by artist Sue Zipkin. Features include: 12" x 12" wall calendar (12" x 24" open) Wrap-around cover design eliminates need for plastic packaging High-quality printing on premium paper stock Spans January–December 2025 Official major world holidays and observances Moon phases, based on Universal Time A year of mindful guidance from Ram Dass for your wall Perfect gift for admirers of Ram Dass and those who seek to live mindfully in the present Wall art for your home, school, or office that provides a sense of time for planning and dreaming WE PLANT TREES_ to offset our carbon footprint and resource usage — more than ONE MILLION and growing! _NO SINGLE-USE PLASTIC_ — We have eliminated single-use shrink wrap to reduce plastic pollution. _SUSTAINABLY SOURCED_ — Our paper is sourced from a combination of recycled materials and wood harvested from socially and environmentally sustainable forests and is Forest Stewardship Council® Certified. (shrink)

Contributed articles on Advaita, Hindu philosophy, Vedic and Sanskrit literature.

Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and the latter is what I will call “the basing relation.” What kind of explanatory relation is this? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent’s manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. Representationalists claim that the basing (...) relation consists in the agent’s representing the bases as justifying the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. This article shows that an adequate account of the basing relation requires a particular refinement and combination of these two views. On the hybrid account defended here, the basing relation involves a disposition exercise that is individuated by the agent’s object-involving de se representation of that very exercise as justifying. (shrink)

Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad offers illuminating new perspectives on contemporary phenomenological theories of body and subjectivity, based on studies of diverse classical Indian texts. He argues for a 'phenomenological ecology' of bodily subjectivity in health, gender, contemplation, and lovemaking.

In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one (...) interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false. (shrink)

Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that various proposed (...) accounts of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set cannot answer this question. I then propose an alternative account of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set. 1 Introduction 2 The elements of one's evidence set are propositions 3 Which kinds of propositions are in one's evidence set? 3.1 Doxastic accounts of evidence 3.2 Non-doxastic accounts of evidence 4 Elaborating and defending the LIE CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The Gita is a central text in Hindu traditions, and commentaries on it express a range of philosophical-theological positions. Two of the most significant commentaries are by Sankara, the founder of the Advaita or Non-Dualist system of Vedic thought and by Ramanuja, the founder of the Visistadvaita or Qualified Non-Dualist system. Their commentaries offer rich resources for the conceptualization and understanding of divine reality, the human self, being, the relationship between God and human, and the moral psychology of action and (...) devotion. This book approaches their commentaries through a study of the interaction between the abstract atman (self) and the richer conception of the human person. While closely reading the Sanskrit commentaries, Ram-Prasad develops reconstructions of each philosophical-theological system, drawing relevant and illuminating comparisons with contemporary Christian theology and Western philosophy. (shrink)

Rieber 1998 proposes an account of "S knows that p" that generates a contextualist solution to Closure. In this paper, I’ll argue that Rieber’s account of "S knows that p" is subject to fatal objections, but we can modify it to achieve an adequate account of "S knows that p" that generates a unified contextualist solution to all four puzzles. This is a feat that should matter to those philosophers who have proposed contextualist solutions to Closure: all of them have (...) motivated their contextualism by appeal to the fact that they can explain the plausibility of each of the statements in Closure taken individually, and they can do this without having to deny that each of those statements is true, at least in the context in which it is plausible. But notice that this consideration would equally well motivate a contextualist approach to the other puzzles. Nonetheless, no contextualist has yet suggested how a contextualist solution to the other puzzles might go. (shrink)

A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs about the external (...) world. These considerations do not threaten the truth of our ordinary attributions of evidence, however, for such attributions are context-sensitive in their semantics. It is argued that this solution to the problem of the external world enjoys all of the benefits, and suffers none of the problems, of other solutions to the problem of the external world. (shrink)

(NEG) is widely accepted both by internalist and by externalists. In fact, there have been very few opponents of (NEG). Timothy Williamson (e.g., 2000) rejects (NEG), for reasons that have by now received a great deal of scrutiny.2 John McDowell also rejects (NEG), but his reasons have not received the scrutiny they deserve. This is in large part because those reasons have not been well understood. We believe that McDowell’s challenge to (NEG) is important, worthy of fair assessment, and maybe (...) even correct. In this paper, we explain McDowell’s challenge to (NEG), and also explain how McDowell can address a seemingly fatal objection to his view. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is sometimes read as providing a response to the skeptical puzzle from closure, according to which our commitment to the trustworthiness of our evidence is not itself evidentially grounded. In this paper, I argue both that this standard reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, and that a more accurate reading of Wittgenstein provides us with a more plausible solution to the Closure Puzzle.

Epistemology is one of the oldest, yet still one of the most active, areas of philosophical research today. There currently exists many annotated tomes of primary sources, and a handful of single-authored introductions to the field, but there is no book that captures epistemology’s dynamic growth and lively debates for a student audience. In this volume, eight leading philosophers debate four topics central to recent research in epistemology: The A Priori: C. S. I. Jenkins and Michael Devitt The A Posteriori: (...) Richard Fumerton and Nicholas Silins The Regress of Justification: Declan Smithies and Peter Klein Skepticism: Anthony Brueckner and Ernest Sosa Ram Neta’s introduction to the volume, descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and supplemental guide to further controversies in epistemology help provide clearer and richer views of active controversies for all readers. (shrink)

Based on original translations of passages from the works of three major thinkers of the classical Indian school of Advaita (Sankara, Vacaspati and Sri Harsa), but addressing issues found in Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and contemporary analytic philosophers, this book argues for a philosophical position it calls 'non-realism'. This is the view that an independent, external world must be assumed if the features of cognition are to be explained, but that it cannot be proved that there is such a (...) world, independently of an appeal to cognition itself. This position is constructed against idealist denials of externality, realist arguments for an independent world and the sceptical denial of the coherence of cognition. (shrink)

In the last decade, reading research has seen a paradigmatic shift. A new wave of computational models of orthographic processing that offer various forms of noisy position or context-sensitive coding have revolutionized the field of visual word recognition. The influx of such models stems mainly from consistent findings, coming mostly from European languages, regarding an apparent insensitivity of skilled readers to letter order. Underlying the current revolution is the theoretical assumption that the insensitivity of readers to letter order reflects the (...) special way in which the human brain encodes the position of letters in printed words. The present article discusses the theoretical shortcomings and misconceptions of this approach to visual word recognition. A systematic review of data obtained from a variety of languages demonstrates that letter-order insensitivity is neither a general property of the cognitive system nor a property of the brain in encoding letters. Rather, it is a variant and idiosyncratic characteristic of some languages, mostly European, reflecting a strategy of optimizing encoding resources, given the specific structure of words. Since the main goal of reading research is to develop theories that describe the fundamental and invariant phenomena of reading across orthographies, an alternative approach to model visual word recognition is offered. The dimensions of a possible universal model of reading, which outlines the common cognitive operations involved in orthographic processing in all writing systems, are discussed. (shrink)

Liberals claim that some perceptual experiences give us immediate justification for certain perceptual beliefs. Conservatives claim that the justification that perceptual experiences give us for those perceptual beliefs is mediated by our background beliefs. In his recent paper ?Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic?, Nico Silins successfully argues for a non-Moorean version of Liberalism. But Silins's defence of non-Moorean Liberalism leaves us with a puzzle: why is it that a necessary condition for our perceptual experiences to justify (...) us in holding certain perceptual beliefs is that we have some independent justification for disbelieving various sceptical hypotheses? I argue that the best answer to this question involves commitment to Crispin Wright's version of Conservatism. In short, Wright's Conservatism is consistent with Silins's Liberalism, and the latter helps to give us grounds for accepting the former. (shrink)

This book presents a collection of essays, setting out both the special concern of classical Indian thought and some of its potential contributions to global philosophy. It presents some key arguments made by different schools about this special concern: the way in which attainment of knowledge of reality transforms human nature in a fundamentally liberating way. It then goes on to look in detail at two areas in contemporary global philosophy - the ethics of difference, and the metaphysics of consciousness (...) - where this classical Indian commitment to the spiritually transformative power of knowledge can lead to critical insights, even for those who do not share its presuppositions. Close reading of technical Indian texts is combined with wide-ranging and often comparative analysis of philosophical issues, to derive original arguments from the Indian material through an analytic method that is seldom mastered by philosophers of non-western traditions. (shrink)

According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for (...) S to know that p, S must have reasons for believing that p which are such that S can know, by reflection alone, that she has those reasons, and that she could not possibly have those reasons if p is not true. Where Descartes went wrong was in thinking that our ordinary, fallible, non-theologically grounded sources of belief (e.g., perception, memory, testimony), cannot provide us with such reasons. (shrink)

I here describe meanings attributed to the term consciousness, extracted from the literature and from recent online discussions. Forty such meanings were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or about experience; some overlapped but others were apparently mutually exclusive - and this list is by no means exhaustive. Most can be regarded as expressions of authors' views about the basis of con-sciousness, or opinions about the significance of aspects of its con-tents. The prospects for reaching (...) any single, agreed, theory independent definition of consciousness thus appear remote. How-ever, much confusion could be avoided if authors were always to spec-ify which aspects of consciousness they refer to when using the term. An example is outlined of how this can be done. (shrink)

A just social arrangement must guarantee a right to health care for all. This right should be understood as a positive right to basic human functional capabilities. The present article aims to delineate the right to health care as part of an account of distributive justice in health care in terms of the sufficiency of basic human functional capabilities. According to the proposed account, every individual currently living beneath the sufficiency threshold or in jeopardy of falling beneath the threshold has (...) a legitimate claim to justice. People's entitlements to health care should not be determined on the basis of brute luck and their efforts to maintain healthy lifestyles. The prioritization of competing claim-rights of individuals is guided by two allocation principles: number and benefit-size weighted sufficiency (among people beneath the threshold) and need-weighted utilitarianism (among people above the threshold). (shrink)

Many epistemologists are interested in offering a positive account of how it is that many of our common sense beliefs enjoy one or another positive epistemological status (e.g., how they are warranted, justified, reasonable, or what have you). A number of philosophers, under the influence of Wittgenstein and/or J. L. Austin, have argued that this enterprise is misconceived. The most effective version of this argument is to be found in Mark Kaplan’s paper “Epistemology on Holiday”. After explaining what this criticism (...) amounts to and why it is important, I then respond to it. My response is based upon, and is intended to display the explanatory power of, a contractarian account of our practice of epistemic appraisal. (shrink)

Right now, I see a computer in front of me. Now, according to current philosophical orthodoxy, I could have the very same perceptual experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing a computer in front of me. Indeed, such orthodoxy tells us, I could have the very same experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing anything at all in front of me, but simply suffering from a hallucination. More generally, someone can (...) have the very same perceptual experience no matter whether she is enjoying a veridical perception of some mindindependent object, or merely hallucinating. What differs across these two kinds of case is not the kind of experience that she has, but rather the connections between her experience and the rest of the world. So say most philosophers. (shrink)

This volume features the complete text of all regular papers, posters, and summaries of symposia presented at the 16th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science...