Credence and belief

Philosophical Studies 180 (2):429-438 (2022)
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2023

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10.1007/s11098-022-01881-8

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Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Fragmentation and the Preface Paradox.Ethan Lai - 2026 - Episteme 23 (1):95-104.

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References found in this work

The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.

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