Recently, philosophers' attention has been draw to science done in response to ongoing crises, such as natural disasters, pandemics, or climate change. In this paper, I argue that extant accounts of crisis science, which understand it as merely faster science, are reductive and oversimplified. Instead, I characterize crisis science as a qualitatively distinct phase of science that incorporates a variety of temporal and causal scales and addresses unique communicative challenges. This fuller account of (...) the phenomenon is then detailed with respect to what some contend is the archetypal crisis science, conservation biology. (shrink)

In his last work, "Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", Edmund Husserl formulated a radical new approach to phenomenological philosophy. Unlike his previous works, in the "Crisis" Husserl embedded this formulation in an ambitious reflection on the essence and value of the idea of rational thought and culture, a reflection that he considered to be an urgent necessity in light of the political, social, and intellectual crisis of the interwar period. In this book, James Dodd (...) pursues an interpretation of Husserl's text that emphasizes the importance of the problem of the origin of philosophy, as well as advances the thesis that, for Husserl, the "crisis of reason" is not a contingent historical event, but a permanent feature of a life in reason generally. (shrink)

In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism.

The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss whether psychological science today is in a state of crisis, and if so how that crisis is to be characterized. Three aspects of a possible crisis are discussed: a replicability crisis, a normativity crisis, and a validity crisis. It is argued that the present crisis goes deeper than being merely a replicability crisis. There are also signs of a normativity crisis, due (...) to a social incentive system that is not conducive to scientific progress, and a validity crisis due to a variable-oriented approach that is not suitable to the scientific problems that need to be solved. Whereas the normativity crisis requires changes in the social incentive system operating in the scientific community, the validity crisis requires a change of paradigm from a variable-oriented to a more person-oriented approach. These questions are illustrated with examples from the field of psychotherapy research. (shrink)

The results of forensic science are believed to be reliable, and are widely used in support of verdicts around the world. However, due to the lack of suitable empirical studies, we actually know very little about the reliability of such results. In this paper, I argue that phenomena analogous to the main culprits for the replication crisis in psychology are also present in forensic science. Therefore forensic results are significantly less reliable than is commonly believed. I conclude (...) that in order to obtain reliable estimates for the reliability of forensic results, we need to conduct studies analogous to the large-scale replication projects in psychology. Additionally, I point to some ways for improving the reliability of forensic science, inspired by the reforms proposed in response to the replicability crisis. (shrink)

The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Crisis) marks the culmination of Husserl’s Genetic Phenomenology and the beginning of a new philosophy of science, one that viewed science not as a fact but as a problem that needed philosophical understanding. For Husserl, the crisis of Galilean Science is born out of the severance of its relation to the life-world and the erroneous identification of “Nature” with its constituted mathematical or quantifiable object. In the (...) phenomenological philosophy of science, science is a tradition formed through human praxis, like any other cultural enterprise. Objectivity in scientific praxis is a regulative principle constituted by the consensus of judgements of the scientific community. The continuity of scientific knowledge shows in its unity of propagated transference of meaning, the sedimentation of which is carried through language. Despite the scientific world being ontologically grounded in the life-world, Husserl sought to preserve the autonomy of both worlds. To fully appreciate the implications of Husserl’s contribution to the philosophy of science, this paper identifies the ‘spatial turn’ that Husserl brought in through his “less mathematical, more physical” notion of life-world with the 90° shift in the social studies of science that Latour proposed. The life-world fuses “Nature” and “Society” as one ontological entity that gives rise to science, moving away from a one-dimensional science that kept the ontology of science grounded in one of those poles alone. Despite the limits of Husserlian phenomenological epistemology, Crisis radically departed from positivism, the then-official philosophy of science, embracing historicity and language to broaden our discourse on science and even coming close to certain later developments in Philosophy of Science. Husserl’s meditations on spatiality also urged a transition to the contemporary understanding of space, opening possibilities of dialogue with Foucault. (shrink)

The second regime of Donald J. Trump has decimated federal science and federally supported science to a greater degree than his first regime, unleashing an unprecedented crisis. The authors in this roundtable take a close look at the tortured landscape of science in America and, using historical scholarship and the tools of history, analyze and assess its plight. Topics include nuclear facilities, the role of Silicon Valley oligarchs, Executive Order 14168 on biological sex, climate change and (...) the environmental sciences, science and ideology, responses to regime change, and resistance to the regime, especially by universities. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Preface; Introduction: Husserl's life and writings; 1. Husserl's Crisis: an unfinished masterpiece; 2. Galileo's revolution and the origins of modern science; 3. The Crisis in psychology; 4. Rethinking tradition: Husserl on history; 5. Husserl's problematical concept of the life-world; 6. Phenomenology as transcendental philosophy; 7. The ongoing influence of Husserl's Crisis.

This book is a collection of essays on Husserl's _Crisis of European Sciences_ by leading philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the _Crisis_, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the "life-world" of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we (...) confuse mathematical idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of _qualia_, naive science, and the fact-value distinction. The scholars included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this "crisis" and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and "worlds," the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault. (shrink)

The paper deals primarily with the standard question in what exactly, according to Husserl, consists the crisis of the European sciences. In the literature so far, there have been two tendencies on this question, one focusing on the loss of the sciences’ meaningfulness for life, the other emphasizing the inadequacy of their scientificity. Instead of arguing for one of these two options or for some sort of combination of both, another interpretation of this topic will be suggested. The focus (...) will be on Husserl’s notion of historicity and its connection with the concept of life-world. It will be argued that it is the historical detachment of sciences from ideas and consequently the sphere of meaning altogether which lies at the core of their ill state. On this basis, it will show that Husserl’s approach to science in Crisis is actually double. For one, it is an attempt to supplement science with a philosophical justification. The other is a historical de-construction of scientific objectivism as a misleading metaphysical claim concerning the lived world. This second, historical approach is developed exclusively in the Crisis. However, it does bring out questions leading to rethinking the meaning and goals of transcendental phenomenology itself. (shrink)

Despite the significant number of critical analyses devoted to the subject, the precise definition of the famed crisis-notion that lies at the heart of Husserl’s last work remains controversial. The aim of this article is to defend and expand the account of Husserl’s notion of the crisis of philosophy and of the resulting crisis of the European sciences that I have developed in a number of publications. This will be done by further exploring the notion of the (...) meaningfulness of the sciences for life as well as its relation to their scientificity. Based on this result, I will then respond to some objections advanced against my proposal, and I will present further arguments to the effect that the crisis of philosophy consists in the collapse of its pretension to be scientific, and the consequent crisis of the European sciences consists in the resulting enigmatic character of their scientificity. (shrink)

ArgumentWhile science and economy are undoubtedly interwoven, the nature of their relationship is often reduced to a positive correlation between economic and scientific prosperity. It seems that the modern scholarship focusing on “success stories” tends to neglect counterintuitive examples such as the impact of economic crises on research. We argue that economic difficulties, under certain circumstances, may also lead to the prosperous development of scientific institutions. This paper focuses on a particular organism, the Pine Institute in Bordeaux in France. (...) Not only was it a key actor in the process of defining the discipline of resin chemistry, but also it remained for years at the heart of the local resin producing industry. Interestingly, there is an actual inverse correlation between the Institute's budgets and the prices and production of resinous products. The Pine Institute's existence seemed to have been driven by the crisis of the resin industry. (shrink)

Philosophy as rigorous science and philosophy and the crisis of European man.

As the first book to analyze the work of Fanon as an existential-phenomenological of human sciences and liberation philosopher, Gordon deploys Fanon's work to illuminate how the "bad faith" of European science and civilization have philosophically stymied the project of liberation. Fanon's body of work serves as a critique of European science and society, and shows the ways in which the project of "truth" is compromised by Eurocentric artificially narrowed scope of humanity--a circumstance to which he refers as (...) the crisis of European Man. In his examination of the roots of this crisis, Gordon explores the problems of historical salvation and the dynamics of oppression, the motivation behind contemporary European obstruction of the advancement of a racially just world, the forms of anonymity that pervade racist theorizing and contribute to "seen invisibility," and the reasons behind the impossibility of a nonviolent transition from colonialism and neocolonialism to post colonialism. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Arithmetic, Geometry, Logic, and the Science of All Possible Sciences Phenomenological Philosophy and the Foundation of the Sciences The Crisis of the Modern Sciences Conclusion.

The social sciences are facing numerous crises including those related to replication, theory, and applicability. We highlight that these crises imply epistemic malfunctions and affect science communication negatively. Several potential solutions have already been proposed, ranging from statistical improvements to changes in norms of scientific conduct. In this paper, we propose a structural solution: the elimination of the discussion section from social science research papers. We point out that discussion sections allow for an inappropriate narrativization of research that (...) disguises actual results and enables the misstatement of true limitations. We go on to claim that removing this section and outsourcing it to other publications provides several epistemic advantages such as a division of academic labour, adversarial modes of progress, and a better alignment of the personal aims of scientists with the aims of science. After responding to several objections, we conclude that the potential benefits of moving away from the traditional model of academic papers outweigh the costs and have the potential to play a part in addressing the crises in the social sciences alongside other reforms. As such, we take our paper as proffering a further potential solution that should be applied complimentarily with other reform movements such as Open Science and hope that our paper can start a debate on this or similar proposals. (shrink)

Declarations of the death knell of postmodernism are rather quite commonplace. For its 50th anniversary, The Journal of Educational Philosophy and Theory conducted a philosophical experiment, asking philosophers of education to solicit a comment, argument or position concerning the so-called death of postmodern philosophy. Renia Gasparatou joined this experiment; in this short paper she suggests that, unfortunately, postmodernism is not dead enough!

Having delineated genuine science from pseudo-science in the previous chapters, this concluding chapter turns to a delineation between genuine social science and pseudo-social science. Co-opting Sartre, I have suggested social science is the study of “man in situation”. The issue to be addressed now is that multiple cognitive styles do this which begs the question of why they struggle to cohere with one another? I propose this stems from a failure to consider the philosophical anthropological (...) question “What is man?” Each has a different understanding of man which do not cohere. This brings us to the problem of intersubjectivity and how I recognise my fellow man as “man”. In further exposing the human prejudice, I will show how social science has been guided by a nonuniversal European supposition and fails to be genuine. In order to escape this outcome I will look at Jean-Paul Sartre’s understanding of intersubjectivity as it responds to Scheler. Out of Sartre’s theory of intersubjectivity we will get a radical reconception of “subject” and “object”. This constitutes an entirely new approach to the definition of man, one which has radical consequences for our understanding of social science. By pursuing this Sartrean approach we will be in a position to escape the crisis of social science. (shrink)

Originally published in 1986. This work remains of compelling interest to those concerned with the natural sciences and their social problems. It puts forward original and unorthodox ideas about the philosophy of and sociology of science, starting from the conviction that modern societies face deep problems arising from unresolved dilemmas about the meaning, content and technical applications of the theories of nature they employ. The book draws on insights developed within a variety of traditions to explore these problems, especially (...) the work of Edmund Husserl and modern critical theory. (shrink)

Replicability is widely taken to ground the epistemic authority of science. However, in recent years, important published findings in the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences have failed to replicate, suggesting that these fields are facing a “replicability crisis.” For philosophers, the crisis should not be taken as bad news but as an opportunity to do work on several fronts, including conceptual analysis, history and philosophy of science, research ethics, and social epistemology. This article introduces philosophers to (...) these discussions. First, I discuss precedents and evidence for the crisis. Second, I discuss methodological, statistical, and social-structural factors that have contributed to the crisis. Third, I focus on the philosophical issues raised by the crisis. Finally, I discuss proposed solutions and highlight the gaps that philosophers could focus on. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the theme of crisis and more specifically on the crisis of the science in Husserl. Divided into two parts, the paper initially approaches the subject in question through Husserl's critique of the presuppositions of the naturalist doctrine, the ground on which the positive sciences of nature are based. In a second moment, the paper shows that the crisis of the sciences would result from a slippage in the meaning of Geometry and (...) more particularly from a fundamental forgetfulness of the pre-scientific world, through which the sciences would lose sight of their original relationship with the world, leaving behind the forgotten foundation of meaning of the natural science. (shrink)

What is science? What is the purpose of science education? Should we be training scientists, or looking towards a greater public understanding of science? In this exciting text, some of the key figures in the fields of science and science education address this debate. Their contributions form an original dialogue on science education and the general public awareness of science, tackling both formal and informal aspects of science learning. the editors argue that (...) a greater knowledge of science can lead to a better future, but that this can only happen through a mutual understanding between scientists, schools and the public. (shrink)

. Science at the interface with society is regarded with mistrust among parts of the public. Scientific judgments on matters of practical concern are not infrequently suspected of being incompetent and biased. I discuss two proposals for remedying this deficiency. The first aims at strengthening the independence of science and suggests increasing the distance to political and economic powers. The drawback is that this runs the risk of locking science in an academic ivory tower. The second proposal (...) favors “counter-politicization” in that research is strongly focused on projects “in the public interest,” that is, on projects whose expected results will benefit all those concerned by these results. The disadvantage is that the future use of research findings cannot be delineated reliably in advance. I argue that the underlying problem is the perceived lack of relevance and reliability and that pluralism is an important step toward its solution. Pluralism serves to stimulate a more inclusive research agenda and strengthens the well-testedness of scientific approaches. However, pluralism also prevents the emergence of clear-cut practical suggestions. Accordingly, pluralism is part of the solution to the credibility crisis of science, but also part of the problem. In order for science to be suitable as a guide for practice, the leeway of scientific options needs to be narrowed – in spite of uncertainty in epistemic respect. This reduction can be achieved by appeal to criteria that do not focus on the epistemic credentials of the suggestions but on their appropriateness in practical respect. (shrink)

Our aim in this article is to put into practice, in the field of social sciences, the principles that Husserl displayed in his book from 1936, "The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology”. In that seminal work, Husserl reflected on the mathematization of nature and produced an historical meditation on the essence of geometry. Here we will try to extend the reach of Husserlian postulates in order to deal with economics and, more specifically, with the theory of money. (...) We think that, in certain social sciences, and in particular in those with a clear mathematical penchant like economics, the use of formalization often helps to cover an uncritical use of phenomenologically ungrounded idealizations. This fact ultimately results in a massive concealment of the true sense of some of its principal phenomenanamely, money. It is worth mentioning that this concern does not have its roots only in phenomenology, for even academic monetary theory openly acknowledges that we lack an understanding of the meaning of money which could help us clarify and prevent financial crisis and economic collapses. Crisis, in short, are not the result of a deep understanding of the concept of money; on the contrary, they highlight the fact that we don’t really know what money is. Thus, our goal here is to illustrate the possibilities offered by the phenomenological method in its application to the question of money. It is in this sense that the research taking place here can be understood as a “phenomenological critique of monetary theory”.En el presente artículo se pretende llevar a cabo una aplicación de los principios que Husserl lleva a cabo en su obra de 1936, “La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología transcendental”, a las ciencias sociales; concretamente, al concepto de dinero. En su obra de 1936, Husserl puso el énfasis en la matematización de la naturaleza, centrándose sobre todo en la meditación histórica sobre la geometría. Pero en el caso de algunas ciencias sociales, como la economía, la utilización libre de construcciones idealizadoras fenomenológicamente infundadas, como en el caso del dinero, está teniendo como resultado un enorme encubrimiento de sentido del fenómeno monetario. Esto no es vivido tan solo desde la feno-menología: desde la propia teoría monetaria se reconoce que estamos faltos de una comprensión del sentido del dinero que nos ayude a clarificar y prevenir de manera suficiente las crisis financieras. Estas crisis no son fruto de que hayamos comprendido demasiado bien el concepto de dinero, sino de que todavía estamos faltos de una comprensión profunda del sentido del dinero. Aquí pretendemos ilustrar las posibilidades que el método fenomenológico ofrece, aplicado al caso del dinero. En este sentido, pueden considerarse las investigaciones que tienen lugar aquí como “crítica fenomenológica de la teoría monetaria”. (shrink)

Summary Leading scholars offer perspectives from the philosophy of science on the crisis in psychiatric research that exploded after the publication of DSM-5. -/- Psychiatry and mental health research is in crisis, with tensions between psychiatry's clinical and research aims and controversies over diagnosis, treatment, and scientific constructs for studying mental disorders. At the center of these controversies is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which—especially after the publication of DSM-5—many have found seriously flawed (...) as a guide for research. This book addresses the crisis and the associated “extraordinary science” (Thomas Kuhn's term for scientific research during a state of crisis) from the perspective of philosophy of science. The goal is to help reconcile the competing claims of science and phenomenology within psychiatry and to offer new insights for the philosophy of science. -/- The contributors discuss the epistemological origins of the current crisis, the nature of evidence in psychiatric research, and the National Institute for Mental Health's Research Domain Criteria project. They consider particular research practices in psychiatry—computational, personalized, mechanistic, and user-led—and the specific categories of schizophrenia, depressive disorder, and bipolar disorder. Finally, they examine the DSM's dubious practice of pathologizing normality. (shrink)

Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with that of Lakatos (1978) as well as with a related but problematic approach called naïve (...) methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutations, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, potentially lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, NMF represents a hybrid approach that subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its tactic of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that the failure to replicate a previously corroborated theory represents a logical refutation of that theory. In contrast, such replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be temporarily ignored or used to motivate theory development. (shrink)

In his late works Husserl interprets the crisis of European sciences as the loss of their meaning for life. The diagnosis seems to suggest therapeutic strategy: to overcome the crisis, phenomenology must return to the evidences of the life-world. The article argues that the husserlian strategy of overcoming the crisis consists not in the elimination of the break with the prescientific evidences of the natural attitude, but, on the contrary, in the radicalization of the breach. Thus, I (...) want to show that Husserl seeks to overcome the crisis of sciences by means of more radical crisis of phenomenology. In Husserl’s view, phenomenology must become the only science, which does not presuppose the life-world, since it problematizes it. I am going to argue also, that the counterintuitive strategy is not just of the historico-philosophical interest, but is meaningful for the actual philosophical understanding of the life-world. To justify those claims, I will proceed in three stages. In the first section of the article, I analyze the difference between the objective world and the life-world, which is the point of departure of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of sciences in Crisis. Bringing into correlation the difference between the objective world and the life-world in Crisis with the distinction of the ideal world and the real one in Ideas I, I disclose the ambiguity of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of European sciences. According to Husserl, the crisis arises, when science transcends the life-world through the idealizations, and, at the same time, presupposes the immediate prescientific evidences as something that is taken for granted. In the second section, I argue that the strategy of overcoming the crisis in Crisis is based on the phenomenological epoche, which allows for the porblematization of the life-world without presupposing it, Within this context I demonstrate the motivational unity of two reductions, performed by Husserl in Crisis—the reduction to the life-world, stripping the reality of the garb of ideas mistakingly taken to be the reality itself, and the reduction of the life-world, turning it into horizon and depriving phenomenologist of a right of relying on the life-worldly evidences, which is taken for granted in the natural science and renders it possible. The unity of the reductions indicates that phenomenological descent back down to the life-world is treated by Husserl as the radical break with the evidences of the natural life. The third section discusses the question, whether the problematical character of the life-world can be revealed only from the point of view of disinterested spectator, or it can be discovered, in a way, from within, in pretheoretical experience, which capacitates the life to problematizing itself and motivates phenomenological epoche. I argue that, although the question is not answered in a suitable way within husserlian analyses of the motivation for the epoche, the key to the solution of the problem is provided by the genetic phenomenology, since it thematizes the historicity of the life-world. I interpret the historicity as the ambivalent pretheoretical experience, constituting both the self-evidence and the problematical character of the life-world. (shrink)

The disciplines within biology which have upheld neo-Darwinism are now in a state of Kuhnian crisis, the puzzle solving power of normal science being replaced with long debates about the interpretation of data, competition between rival articulations of the once universal paradigm, the re-opening of long solved problems, explicit discontent on the part of scientists and frequent appeals to philosophy and history. Similar features of distress are found when scientific research attempts to serve policy decisions. It is argued (...) that the dramatic reduction in the efficiency of the consensus building machinery of science in areas relevant to public policy and in periods of Kuhnian crisis are explained in the same way; by the scientists' loss of autonomy, the weakening of disciplinary boundaries, and the elevation of the degree of critical scrutiny to which conjectures are submitted. (shrink)

Improving generalization in psychology will require more expansive data collection to fuel more expansive statistical models, beyond the scale of traditional lab research. We argue that citizen science is uniquely positioned to scale up data collection and, that in spite of certain limitations, can help to alleviate the generalizability crisis.

While practical efforts in the field of artificial intelligence grow exponentially, the truly scientific and mathematically exact understanding of the underlying phenomena of intelligence and consciousness is still missing in the conventional science framework. The inevitably dominating empirical, trial-and-error approach has vanishing efficiency for those extremely complicated phenomena, ending up in fundamentally limited imitations of intelligent behaviour. We provide the first-principle analysis of unreduced many-body interaction process in the brain revealing its qualitatively new features, which give rise to rigorously (...) defined chaotic, noncomputable, intelligent and conscious behaviour. Based on the obtained universal concepts of unreduced dynamic complexity, intelligence and consciousness, we derive the universal laws of intelligence applicable to any kind of intelligent system interacting with the environment. We finally show why and how these fundamentally substantiated and therefore practically efficient laws of intelligent system dynamics are indispensable for correct AI design and training, which is urgently needed in this time of critical global change towards the truly sustainable development. (shrink)

Knowledge brokers are among the main channels of communication between scientists and the public and a key element to establishing a relation of trust between the two. But translating knowledge from the scientific community to a wider audience presents several difficulties, which can be accentuated in times of crisis. In this paper we study some of the problems that knowledge brokers face when communicating in times of crisis. During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, we collected interviews (...) with Italian experts that played a major role as knowledge brokers in the local media. We asked them questions about five main topics: the features and role of science communicators; the use of language in communicating science; the importance of the relation of trust with the public; the peculiarity of communicating in a context of emergency; the problem of disagreement among experts, and its public perception and communication. The goal of this paper is to understand, through the words of knowledge brokers themselves, what they consider as best practices (and obstacles) to create trust between scientists and the public. Our empirical work can inform normative accounts of what knowledge brokering should be about. (shrink)

The crisis of European science is a recurring theme in German philosophy following the failure of idealism. This crisis finds a pivotal expression in the philosophy of Hermann Lotze, an extremely influential author in the second half of the 19th century, who serves as a reference and source of inspiration for Husserl’s reflections in the 1930s.

Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with that of Lakatos (1978) as well as with a related but problematic approach called naïve (...) methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutations, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, potentially lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, NMF represents a hybrid approach that subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its tactic of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that the failure to replicate a previously corroborated theory represents a logical refutation of that theory. In contrast, such replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be temporarily ignored or used to motivate theory development. (shrink)

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic constituted a crisis situation in which science was very far from Kitcher’s ideal of well-ordered science. I suggest that this could and should have been different. Kitcher’s ideal should play a role in assessing the allocation of research resources in future crisis situations, as it provides a way to balance highly divergent interests and incorporate the common good into decision-making processes on research.

There is a crisis of readership for work in our field, as in many other academic disciplines. One of its causes is a pathological form of the professionalism that we so greatly value. “Hyperprofessionalism” is a disease whose symptoms include self‐referentiality, self‐absorption, and a narrowing of intellectual focus. This essay describes some features and consequences of hyperprofessionalism in the history of science and offers a modest suggestion for a possible cure.

Here, we argue that Rosenholtz’ call for a paradigm shift in attention theory is unwarranted based on psychological evidence as well as philosophical theory and would disrupt scientific progress by preventing incremental science. To move forward, we suggest a different philosophical view on attention research that preserves the cumulative nature of scientific progress rather than waxing and waning theoretical paradigms.

The European Renaissance marked the rise of scientific materialistic philosophies that focused on understanding the universe through the experimental scientific method. This approach aligned with the rapid advancements in science and technology. Logical positivism, which sought to challenge metaphysics, emphasized the importance of induction as the primary method for scientific inquiry. This shift made induction central to the philosophy of science.However, there are fields, especially those related to human phenomena, where this scientific approach cannot be applied easily due (...) to inherent epistemological challenges. Despite these difficulties, there is still a strong push to adopt scientific methods in these areas. Scholars argue that humanities should follow the example set by the natural sciences and work to establish their relevance in the broader scientific scope. It is important to note that some phenomena relate to sensory reality, such as those studied in natural sciences, which are open to empirical investigation. On the other hand, non-material phenomena, such as historical, social, and psychological events, are linked to human reality. These phenomena were also separated from philosophy, which created further complexity. Human sciences, particularly those studying human behavior, deal with moral and psychological issues involving free will, making them more difficult to study compared to inanimate matter. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is 1) to focus on the last section of the In Parmenidem, analyzing Proclus’ reflection on the relationship between the First God and what he calls the “axioms of contradiction”, accompanied by an attempt to harmonize in a subordinate sense the Aristotelian perspective with the Platonic one; 2) to analyze the reception of this idea in Nicholas of Cusa, the first Latin author to be systematically influenced by the In Parmenidem. It will be possible to (...) show how Cusanus develops a perspective that, on the one hand, finds its explicit antecedent in Proclus and, on the other, how he radicalizes Proclus’ perspective, developing theoretical tensions that we can find unsystematically in Proclus’ own thought. Proclus is aware that the Principle of all reality—and of science itself—must be conceived as in itself unknowable. At the same time, he seeks to save the ability of human knowledge to describe reality. Starting from an idea of the relationship between God and the laws of contradiction close to that of Proclus, Cusanus develops an epistemology that, on the one hand, recognizes the principle of contradiction as the ultimate principle of reason and, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion of a separation between thought and reality outside thought. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to formulate a clear definition of the concept of crisis of Western sciences introduced by Husserl in his last work. The attempt will be based on a reading of the Krisis, which will stress its underlying continuity with Husserl’s life-long concerns about the theoretical insufficiency of positive sciences, and downplay the novelty of the idea of crisis itself within Husserl’s work. After insisting on the fact that, according to Husserl, only an account of (...) the shortcomings of the scientificity of Western sciences can justify the claim that they are undergoing a crisis, it will be argued that the common definition of the crisis of the sciences as the loss of their significance for life rests on a misunderstanding. The crisis of Western sciences will be characterized, instead, as the repercussion of the crisis of the scientificity of philosophy on the scientificity of positive sciences. The loss of significance of scientific knowledge for our existence will in turn appear as a further, inevitable consequence of the uprooting of the sciences from the soil of a universal philosophy culminating in metaphysics, and thus, as a phenomenon deeply intertwined with the crisis of Western sciences, but not identical to it. (shrink)

Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the nature of the universe and our place in it, and learning how to become civilized. The first problem was solved, in essence, in the 17th century, with the creation of modern science. But the second problem has not yet been solved. Solving the first problem without also solving the second puts us in a situation of great danger. All our current global problems have arisen as a result. What we (...) need to do, in response to this unprecedented crisis, is learn from our solution to the first problem how to solve the second. This was the basic idea of the 18th century Enlightenment. Unfortunately, in carrying out this programme, the Enlightenment made three blunders, and it is this defective version of the Enlightenment programme that we have institutionalized in 20th century academic inquiry. In order to solve the second great problem of learning we need to correct the three blunders of the traditional Enlightenment. This involves changing the nature of social inquiry, so that social science becomes social methodology or social philosophy, concerned to help us build into social life the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science. It also involves, more generally, bringing about a revolution in the nature of academic inquiry as a whole, so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity learn how to become wiser by increasingly cooperatively rational means. The scientific task of improving knowledge and understanding of nature becomes a part of the broader task of improving global wisdom. (shrink)

Centralization and over-professionalization can lead to the disappearance of a critical environment capable of linking the human sciences to the "real world." The authors of this volume suggest that the humanities need to operate in a concrete cultural environment able to influence procedures on a hic et nunc basis, and that they should not entirely depend on normative criteria whose function is often to hide ignorance behind a pretentious veil of value-neutral objectivity. In sociology, the growth of scientism has fragmented (...) ethical categories and distorted discourse between our inner and outer selves, while philosophy is suffering from an empty professionalism current in many philosophy departments in industrialized and developing countries where boring, ahistorical, and nonpolitical exercises are justified through appeals to false excellence. In all branches of the humanities, absurd evaluation processes foster similar tendencies as they create a sterile atmosphere and prevent interdisciplinarity and creativity. Technicization of theory plays into the hands of technocrats. The authors offer a broad range of approaches and interpretations, reaching from philosophy of education to the re-evaluation of business models for universities. (shrink)

Recoge: 1. Crisis as historical specificity -- 2. The history of science as the history of crisis.

“The Crisis of representation” – a discussion that was hold from the middle of 1980 to the middle of 1990 s in social sciences, when the legitimation of the big social theories was questioned as well as the deconstruction of scientific texts and the process of knowing, based on positivistic principles, were done. In this article the author offers the analysis of intellectual context of the development of social sciences (sociology and anthropology) in the crisis. The latter are (...) analyzed in three aspects. Firstly, the crisis concerned the process of knowing, based on principle of the unity of methods and concepts: some authors argued the influential role of language in the construction of reality. Other authors referred to implicit moral and political dimensions while the third provided deconstruction of the scholar figure and the notion of reality. In a similar vein, the crisis was articulated in the critics of scientific texts where implicit meanings and rhetorical devices were found. To the author’s view, the need of reconstruction of the crisis of representation can be explained by the want of more reflexive approach to the practices of social sciences today. (shrink)

The crisis of western civilization is a crisis of public philosophy. This is the charge of _Public Philosophy and Political Science_, a stunning new collection of essays edited by E. Robert Statham Jr. Vividly cataloging the decay of the moral and intellectual foundations of civic liberty, the book portrays a generation of Americans alienated from institutions built on public philosophy. The work exposes the failure of America's political scientists to acknowledge and understand this alarming crisis in the (...) American body politic. The distinguished contributors examine the evolution of public philosophy; the inextricable relationship between politics and philosophy; and the interplay between public philosophy, the constitution, natural law, and government. They reveal the dire threat to deliberative democracy and the fundamental order of constitutional society posed by public philosophy's waning power to refine, cultivate, and civilize. The work is an indictment of a society which has discarded a way of life rooted in natural law, democracy and the traditions of civility; and is a denunciation of an educated elite that has divorced itself from the standards upon which public philosophy rests. It is essential reading for philosophers and political and social scientists seeking to resurrect the standards of American public life. (shrink)