Value change is a phenomenon that is gaining increasing attention in ethical analyses of technologies. However, a comprehensive study of how reprogenetic technologies and values coevolve is lacking. To remedy this gap, in this overview article, I address the relationship between reprogenetics and value change. This contribution thus argues for the importance of investigating the phenomenon of value change in relation to the technological controversies discussed in bioethics. To meet this goal, I begin by (...) clarifying, first, how technologies shape reproductive choice. I then clarify what “values” and “moral values” are, how reprogenetic technologies are value laden, and what values are often discussed in reprogenetics debates. Next, I show five types of value changes that have occurred in advance in reproductive and genetic technologies. Finally, I argue for the bioethical relevance of discussing future techno-value change, pointing out the descriptive and normative challenges of this philosophical endeavor. (shrink)

In this paper, we take inspiration from original institutional economics (OIE) as an approach to study value change within the highly complex assembly of sociotechnical transformations that make up the energy transition. OIE is examined here as a suitable perspective, as it combines Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and a methodological interactionist perspective on value change, behavior and institutions, with technology figuring as a transformational factor. This combination overcomes conceptual and methodological shortcomings of alternative accounts of values. We (...) will present the contours of an OIE based conceptual framework connecting nature, humans, technology, the economic process, society, culture and institutions and habits, valuation and behavior. We illustrate how to use this framework to examine and understand how environmental, ecologic, safety, economic, and social concerns about the energy transition are (re)framed as (new) values in the belief systems and habits of individuals and groups. Moreover, we will explore how that may give rise to collective action, via the institutionalization of such revised values in the procedures, arrangements, norms and incentives guiding transactions. As such, this approach allows us in a fine-grained manner to conceptually and theoretically understand the way in which values change in the energy-transition, as a complex interaction of technology development and social relations. (shrink)

The co-shaping of technology and values is a topic of increasing interest among philosophers of technology. Part of this interest pertains to anticipating future value change, or what Danaher (2021) calls the investigation of “axiological futurism”. However, this investigation faces a challenge: “axiological possibility space” is vast, and we currently lack a clear account of how this space should be demarcated. It stands to reason that speculations about how values might change over time should exclude farfetched possibilities (...) and be restricted to possibilities that can be dubbed to be realistic instead. But what does this realism criterion entail? This paper introduces the notion of realistic possibilities as a key conceptual advancement to the study of axiological futurism and offers suggestions as to how realistic possibilities of future value change might be identified. Additionally, I propose two slight modifications to the approach of axiological futurism. First, I argue that axiological futurism can benefit from a thoroughly historicised understanding of moral change. Secondly, I argue that when employed in normative contexts, the axiological futurist should seek to identify realistic possibilities that come along with substantial normative risks. (shrink)

As policy innovation is essential for upscaling responsible innovation, understanding its relationship to value change(s) occurring or sought in sociotechnical systems is imperative. In this study, we ask: what are the different types of values in the policy process? And, how does value change influence policy innovation? We propose a disaggregation of values and value change based on a four-stream variant of the multiple streams framework (MSF), a conceptual lens increasingly used for explaining policy (...) innovation in sociotechnical transitions. Specifically, we posit that the values that ‘govern’ problem framing, policy design, political decision making, and technological diffusion can evolve relatively independently, potentially leading to value conflict. We apply this framework to the ongoing case of the market-based economic dispatch of electricity (MBED) policy in the Indian energy transition using content analysis. We find that the MBED scheme—with its emphasis on efficiency (problem), economic principles (policy), low-cost dispatch (technology), and centralization (politics)—attempts value change in each stream. Each instance of value change is, however, widely contested, with the ensuing value conflicts resulting in significant opposition to this policy innovation. We conclude that a disaggregation of values based on the MSF can facilitate an analysis of value change and value conflict in sociotechnical transitions and lay the foundation for systematically studying the relationships among technological change, value change, and policy change. (shrink)

The ongoing energy transition toward more sustainable energy systems implies a change in the values for which such systems are designed. The energy transition however is not just about sustainability but also about values like energy security and affordability, and we witness the emergence of new values like energy justice and energy democracy. How can we understand such value changes and how can or should they affect the design of future energy systems? This introduction to the special section (...) on value change in energy systems introduces the main themes and questions. It discusses different understandings of values and value change, explains why the topic is important and how it can be methodologically studied. (shrink)

We propose a pragmatist account of value change that helps to understand how and why values sometimes change due to technological developments. Inspired by John Dewey’s writings on value, we propose to understand values as evaluative devices that carry over from earlier experiences and that are to some extent shared in society. We discuss the various functions that values fulfil in moral inquiry and propose a conceptual framework that helps to understand value change as (...) the interaction between three manifestations of value distinguished by Dewey, i.e., “immediate value,” “values as the result of inquiry” and “generalized values.” We show how this framework helps to distinguish three types of value change: value dynamism, value adaptation, and value emergence, and we illustrate these with examples from the domain of technology. We argue that our account helps to better understand how technology may induce value change, namely through the creation of what Dewey calls indeterminate situations, and we show how our account can integrate several insights on moral change offered by other authors. (shrink)

This introductory article describes the phenomena of incommensurability and incomparability, how they are related, and why they are important. Since incomparability is the more significant phenomenon, the paper takes that as its focus. It gives a detailed account of what incomparability is, investigates the relation between the incomparability of values and the incomparability of alternatives for choice, distinguishes incomparability from the related phenomena of parity, indeterminacy, and noncomparability, and, finally, defends a view about practical justification that vindicates the importance of (...) incomparability — assuming it exists — for practical reason. (shrink)

In the value sensitive design literature, there has been little attention for how values may change during the adoption and use of a sociotechnical system, and what that implies for design. A value change taxonomy is proposed, as well as a number of technical features that allow dealing with value change.

This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a (...) par (a mathematical proof is given in the appendix). I also suggest that there are three senses of ‘rationally permissible’ which, once distinguished, show that parity does distinctive practical work that cannot be done by the usual trichotomy of relations or by incomparability. In this way, we have an additional argument for parity from the workings of practical reason. (shrink)

This paper addresses value changes that have occurred to college?educated youth as China is going through drastic social transformations under Western influences. It explains how socio?economic and cultural forces interplay within a particular historical and political context in bringing about such notable changes as individualism, materialism and moral crisis. Through exploring young people's perceptions of the relative status of China versus the West, represented by the USA, the paper reveals a collective inferiority complex and resulting dislocation of cultural identities, (...) manifested as national nihilism and a magnified, empty patriotism. Conclusions are drawn on the importance of educating the younger generations with a sound knowledge of Chinese history, culture and traditional values, and a sensible perspective as regards Western civilization. (shrink)

People share their emotions on social media and evidence suggests that in times of crisis people are especially motivated to post emotional content. The current Coronavirus pandemic is such a crisis. The online sharing of emotional content during the Coronavirus crisis may contribute to societal value change. Emotion sharing via social media could lead to emotional contagion which in turn could facilitate an emotional climate in a society. In turn, the emotional climate of a society can influence society’s (...) value structure. The emotions that spread in the current Coronavirus crisis are predominantly negative, which could result in a negative emotional climate. Based on the dynamic relations of values to each other and the way that emotions relate to values, a negative emotional climate can contribute to societal value change towards values related to security preservation and threat avoidance. As a consequence, a negative emotional climate and the shift in values could lead to a change in political attitudes that has implications for rights, freedom, privacy and moral progress. Considering the impact of social media in terms of emotional contagion and a longer-lasting value change is an important perspective in thinking about the ethical long-term impact of social media technology. (shrink)

According to the neo-Schumpeterian mission-oriented innovation policy framework, innovation efforts are to be aligned with public values. This implies that innovation policy should ensure that the direction of innovation is aligned with non-economic values and goals. Through conceptual analyses of value and sustainability theories and Schumpeterian conceptions of value that undergird the mission-oriented policy approach, this article uses the case of seaweed innovation in Norway to discuss the role of values and value change in public-private innovation (...) efforts in a context of mission-oriented innovation. In this case, innovation involves giving determinate meaning to concepts such as “sustainability”. Acts of giving meaning to values reside neither fully in top-down direction setting nor bottom-up experimentation. The theory of mission-oriented innovation needs to take into account how innovation can be aligned with values that are subject to change. (shrink)

‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, (...) for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. The plurality of values is also thought to raise problems for rational choice. If two irreducibly distinct values conflict, it seems that there is no common ground that justifies choosing one over the other. The metaphysical plurality of values does not, however, have the implications for rational choice that many have supposed. A charitable interpretation of value pluralist writings suggests a ‘nonreductive’ form of value pluralism. Nonreductive value pluralism maintains that in the context of practical choice, there are differences between values—whether or not those values reduce to a single supervalue—that have important implications for rational choice. This article examines the main arguments for metaphysical value pluralism, argues that metaphysical value pluralism does not have certain implications that it is widely thought to have, and outlines three forms of nonreductive value pluralism. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the need to monitor and respond to changes in values and the other core elements of a technology project or product during its lifespan—from its initial design phase through completion and into implementation and maintenance. The complexity we aim to address is that technology projects and products are situated in sociotechnical systems that undergo change in many of their parts over time. We are introducing the turn to Process Philosophy into Value Sensitive Design projects and (...) literature to bring conceptual systems where all parts of the system undergo change over time. Values Sensitive Design (VSD) literature has traditionally applied conceptual systems called “structure and change” systems where most of the structure remains stable while some parts undergo change. We call our program of method development: Value Change Sensitive Design methods (VCSD). Our approach uses Process Ontology and Niklas Luhmann’s Social Systems Theory to develop a minimal ontological system and a diagramming tool—a schema—for marking and tracking changes in the situation of technology projects and products. The minimal ontological system focuses on values and other core elements of sociotechnical systems that affect design and outcomes of projects using Value Change Sensitive Design. The minimal framework articulates a temporal duration (window) of a change process by centering on an “event” during which a change takes place. We combine this process ontological framework and diagramming tool with the tools of historical analysis called path dependence analysis and process tracing to propose a full method for discovery and characterizations of causal mechanisms underlying changes in sociotechnical systems. This chapter is a contribution to the philosophical literature in Value Change Sensitive Design and Values Change. (shrink)

What is the contribution of pragmatism to the sociology of morality? I answer to the points raised by the essays in this symposium on Moral Entanglements: Conserving Birds in Britain and Germany by outlining what the work of John Dewey adds to recent discussions on the question how values change over time and how individuals develop moral commitments.

Culture is the most difficult thing about an organization to change in a lasting way. Our paper is predicated upon the idea that better ethics leadership through change is the foundation to more successful implementation of change. Ethical culture will enable the firm to initiate the change process from a stronger position: the obstacles to change such as mistrust, fear of uncertainty, failure of communication and empowerment will be easier to overcome in an atmosphere pursuing (...) the ethically correct approach, combining ethical leadership with an ethical corporate culture. Our idea goes one step beyond the virtuous change circle by incorporating a series of check points a leader can reference to stay on a course of change management based in good ethical principle that will lead to effective change. Our model incorporates the concept of values into the management of change; this allows for a more comprehensive approach to change management by the utilization of well-known change management principles used in conjunction with basic principles of ethics. We argue that the change leader can depend on this more comprehensive approach for a better assurance of ethical and therefore more effective change. Our idea also would be effective regardless of the type of change confronting the organization and/or the leaders of the firm. Our point is that, while change is by its nature hard and there is an inclination to resist change, with ethical change management, the firm has a better chance of success. (shrink)

Prometheus has grown four years older since its last and highly controversial special issue, published in 2017 on the Shaken Baby Debate. But, as always, Prometheus is committed to open discussion and dissemination of scientific research, regardless of the potential backlash or controversy that may ensue from such a venture, a venture that is at the core of authentic scholarship. Since the beginning of 2020, the world has changed irrevocably, making once-held norms seem obsolete in favour of new ways of (...) being in the world and new technologies emerging to face these new ways of living. Although it has been a long-held insight in the philosophy of technology that technical systems are carriers of values, the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has made manifest how these values, and their incarnations in sociotechnical systems, can likewise change. Prometheus has, since its inception, danced in tandem with the critical interpretations, theories, and methods for understanding innovation, and how innovations fundamentally impact and are impacted by the world in which they emerge and are situated. For this reason, Steffen Steinert, Tristan de Wildt, and I chose to guest edit this special issue on designing for value change and chose Prometheus as its home. (shrink)

The aim of this first chapter is to introduce the current Philosophy of Engineering and Technology volume Engineering and Changing Values, and explain its origin, originality, and purpose. While growing out of a meeting of the forum on Philosophy, Engineering, and Technology (fPET) held in Delft in 2023, its final form is the fruit of a singular editorial, selection and support effort. This introductory chapter aims to highlight its singularity, which is based as much on the theme addressed as on (...) the geographical, cultural, and disciplinary diversities that characterize the group of contributors, and the editorial team, which is in the image of the forum from which it comes. This chapter also describes the general philosophy of the book and the four thematic sections that make it up: ethics, justice, epistemology, and theoretical approaches to value change in design. This introduction also provides an opportunity to thank the many people who helped make this project a reality. (shrink)

The values that will govern choices among future energy systems are unlikely to be the same as the values we embrace today. This paper discusses principles of rational choice for agents expecting future value shifts. How do we ought to reason if we believe that some values are likely to change in the future? Are future values more, equally, or less important than present ones? To answer this question, I propose and discuss the Expected Center of Gravity Principle, (...) which articulates what I believe to be a reasonable compromise between present and future values. (shrink)

Autonomy is an ideal both defended and condemned by theorists and empirical scholars alike. I begin this article by suggesting that at least part of this ongoing debate can be explained by the fact that autonomy—and teacher autonomy, in particular—is a slippery concept. While some scholars characterize autonomy in ways that highlight teachers' control, others prioritize rational independence or even creativity and emotion. Such ambiguity makes it difficult to know what we are evaluating as a potential good that is worth (...) defending for teachers, as well as to articulate the reasons we might have to preserve it. This article seeks to closely interrogate the concept of teacher autonomy through analyzing a normative case study. I first demonstrate how teacher autonomy can and should be understood as more than rational choice or control. Drawing on David Enoch's distinction between “autonomy as sovereignty” and “autonomy as non-alienation,” as well as on Doris Santoro's notion of a teacher's “moral center,” I propose an account of teacher autonomy that prioritizes non-alienation. However, the subsequent analysis reveals that this account on its own falls short of capturing all the ways in which a teacher's autonomy might be at stake. I suggest this is due to the deep relationality that characterizes how values are both constructed and expressed through teaching. That is, because teaching is a shared practice, teachers' values and commitments are often formed and enacted in relation with others. I argue that this has implications for the way we evaluate and advocate for the autonomy of teachers. (shrink)

In this article, we propose that giving in cash and non-cash differ in their relation with the giving firm’s future corporate financial performance and only cash giving is associated with future CFP. Using a novel dataset from ASSET4 that differentiates corporate giving over a sample period of 2002–2012, we examine three competing hypotheses: agency cost hypothesis that cash giving reflects agency cost and destroys value for shareholders, investment hypothesis that cash giving is an investment by management that aims for (...) better future return, and information hypothesis that cash giving has informational value to shareholders as cash is a critical resource at a firm and giving is a decision by managers who are insiders. We find that indeed, only cash giving is positively associated with future CFP and firm value, measured by Fama–French five-factor abnormal risk-adjusted stock returns, future return on assets, and Tobin’s Q. In addition, we find that the positive association exists only between excess, i.e., unexpected, but not expected cash giving and future CFP. Our empirical findings support the information hypothesis, but neither the agency hypothesis nor the investment hypothesis, and are robust to a number of endogeneity tests, including orthogonalized cash giving, instrumental variable regression using geography-based instruments, and propensity score matching. Furthermore, we show that the positive association between future CFP and unexpected cash giving is only pronounced at firms with good governance and relatively higher sales growth where agency problems are less likely, and at firms with no alternative mechanisms to demonstrate the strength of cash flow. Additionally, we do not find evidence that suggests in-kind giving to possess any informational value. (shrink)

We propose a new approach for tracing value change. Value change may lead to a mismatch between current value priorities in society and the values for which technologies were designed in the past, such as energy technologies based on fossil fuels, which were developed when sustainability was not considered a very important value. Better anticipating value change is essential to avoid a lack of social acceptance and moral acceptability of technologies. While (...) class='Hi'>value change can be studied historically and qualitatively, we propose a more quantitative approach that uses large text corpora. It uses probabilistic topic models, which allow us to trace values that are latent. We demonstrate the approach for five types of value change in technology. Our approach is useful for testing hypotheses about value change, such as verifying whether value change has occurred and identifying patterns of value change. The approach can be used to trace value change for various technologies and text corpora, including scientific articles, newspaper articles, and policy documents. (shrink)

The importance of value-based leadership such as authentic, ethical, and servant leadership is inconspicuous. However, the benefits of these leadership approaches are often only explained through the behaviors of their followers. As such, limited research has communicated the leader’s motivation for pursuing such leadership behavior, resulting in such discourse to escape theorizing. We draw upon role theory and paid attention to the role of higher-level management (leadership) through the trickle-down model to underline their importance in the organization. We then (...) expand this role theory framework by synthesizing research to explain the emergence of value-based leadership behavior at the frontline of management. In doing so, we aim to provide a stronger explanation of the emergence of value-based leadership in organizations. We conclude this analysis by guiding future research in the form of propositions to investigate the psychological process and organizational factors to empirically examine the proposed role framework. (shrink)

The article presents a pluralistic model of value change, emphasizing the interplay between technology and societal values. It critiques the Simple Change Model, which suggests a uniform transition from one dominant value scheme to another, arguing instead for emergent and differential value change. Emergent value change occurs when new values arise within specific contexts without displacing existing ones, often influenced by generational experiences with technology and niches where new technologies are introduced. Differential (...) value change highlights how distinct groups may adopt different value schemes based on their unique contexts and experiences, sometimes leading to societal polarization and the need to reconcile incompatible value schemes. The article stresses the importance of individual experiences of ethical uncertainty and disruption in understanding these changes. By integrating these complexities, the model offers a rich, non-deterministic framework for analyzing how values evolve in response to technological advancements. (shrink)

Changing values may give rise to intergenerational conflicts, like in the ongoing climate change and energy transition debate. This essay focuses on the interpretative question of how this value change can best be understood. To elucidate the interpretation of value change, two philosophical perspectives on value are introduced: Berlin’s value pluralism and Dworkin’s interpretivism. While both authors do not explicitly discuss value change, I argue that their perspectives can be used for (...) interpreting value change in the case of climate change and the energy transition. I claim that Berlin’s pluralistic account of value would understand the value change as an intergenerational conflict and therefore provide a too narrow and static ground for understanding ongoing value change. Instead, by exploring Dworkin’s standpoint in moral epistemology, this essay distills a more encompassing perspective on how values may relate, converge, overlap, and change, fulfilling their functions in the course of climate change and energy transition. This perspective is further detailed by taking inspiration from Shue’s work on the interpretation of equity in the climate change debate. I argue that the resulting perspective allows us to see value change as a gradual process rather than as a clash between generations and their values. (shrink)

What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about what (...) it is to be a rational agent. (shrink)

Most familiar approaches to social conflict moot reasonable ways of dealing with conflict, ways that aim to serve values such as legitimacy, justice, morality, fairness, fidelity to individual preferences, and so on. In this paper, I explore an alternative approach to social conflict that contrasts with the leading approaches of Rawlsians, perfectionists, and social choice theorists. The proposed approach takes intrinsic features of the conflict—what I call a conflict's evaluative ‘structure’—as grounds for a rational way of responding to that conflict. (...) Like conflict within a single person, social conflict can have a distinctive evaluative structure that supports certain rational responses over others. I suggest that one common structure in both intra- and interpersonal cases of conflict supports the rational response of ‘self-governance’. Self-governance in the case of social conflict involves a society's deliberating over the question, ‘What kind of society should we be?’ In liberal democracies, this rational response is also a reasonable one. (shrink)

Accuracy-first accounts of rational learning attempt to vindicate the intuitive idea that, while rationally-formed belief need not be true, it is nevertheless likely to be true. To this end, they attempt to show that the Bayesian's rational learning norms are a consequence of the rational pursuit of accuracy. Existing accounts fall short of this goal, for they presuppose evidential norms which are not and cannot be vindicated in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. I propose an alternative account, according (...) to which learning experiences rationalize changes in the way you value accuracy, which in turn rationalize changes in belief. I show that this account is capable of vindicating the Bayesian's rational learning norms in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy, so long as accuracy is rationally valued. (shrink)

The hypothesis that values change and evolve is examined by this paper. The discussion is based on a series of examples where, over a period of a few decades, new ethical issues have arisen and values have changed. From this analysis it is suggested that there are a series of core values around which most people would agree. These are unlikely to change over long time periods. There are then a series of secondary or derived values around which (...) there is much more controversy and within which differences of view occur. Such changes need to be documented if we are to understand the process involved in the evolution of differences in ethical views. (shrink)

This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.

Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".

As the prevalence of dementia rises, it is increasingly important to determine how to best respect incapable individuals' autonomy during end‐of‐life decisions. Many philosophers advocate for the use of advance directives in these situations to allow capable individuals to outline preferences for their future incapable selves. In this paper, however, I consider whether advance directives lack moral authority in instances of dementia. First, I introduce several scholars who have argued that changes in peoplewith dementia's values throughout disease progression reduce the (...) validity of their advanced wishes. I then outline Karin Jongsma's rejection of this claim, which she calls the “losing and choosing” distinction. Jongsma argues that changes in people with dementia's values should not be respected, because they are unchosen and dictated by the disease. I critique her claim that the process of value change is morally relevant when determining which values we respect. I argue that if individuals with dementia are capable of valuing, their contemporary values should be respected, even when they conflict with past preferences outlined in an advance directive. As such, situations of value change diminish the moral authority of advance directives for individuals with dementia. (shrink)

One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...) the question of how the different considerations relevant to an all-things-considered judgment come together in a way that gives each relevant consideration its proper due. I propose an answer which provides a unified account of all-things-considered judgments and highlights a deep connection between value and reason. My suggestion is that ‘all things considered’ is, in effect, a placeholder for a more comprehensive, sometimes nameless, value that includes the things considered as parts, and that this more comprehensive value determines how the things considered normatively relate. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to determine if students' values were different depending on which type of school they attended, and whether these values changed across the school year. Students of three different types of schools (private, state, religious) were measured at the beginning and the end of a school year, using the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire 40. At both measurement times the analyses showed that the most significant differences between the types of schools were found for values of (...) Tradition and Hedonism. Across all schools, the most notable changes were discovered for the values of Power and Achievement, lesser changes were found for Benevolence and Universalism. The impact of school on change in values was mediated by religiosity for Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence, Hedonism and Power. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to show that under globalization many traditional concepts are no longer acceptable, and may be preconceived. In Vietnam, the system of values Jriend-enemy, success-failure, chance-risk, endogenous-exotic has somehow changed in globalization. Globalization in se marks a new trend, a new change for humankind. A considerable difference in the consumption of goods exists between population strata. The "world of things" owned by the poor has become distant from that owned by the rich to (...) such an extent that no dialogue is possible. But the difference in the consumption of cultural values has to merit concern. This paper displays these value changes in Vietnam in the process of globalization: (a) the value of studiousness and the emphasis on education does not decline, but deviates; (b) the value of "diligence" tends to increase; (c) The value of family and community" tends to diminish. The process of globalization can only be understood in the context of the search for new values, and a critique of globalization is possible if one investigates the very root of the human search for new values: values are values only when they still generate their contributions to solving human problems. (shrink)

Dmitri Gallow has recently proposed an ingenious accuracy-first vindication that our credence should be updated in accordance with conditionalization. This paper extends his idea to cases where we undergo only a partial learning experience. In particular, I attempt to vindicate, in the spirit of accuracy-first epistemology, that when we undergo what is called ‘Jeffrey partial learning’ in this paper, our credences should be updated in accordance with Jeffrey conditionalization, or at the very least, the update should be rigid. In doing (...) so, I propose what I call the ‘Jeffrey-accuracy function.’ This function is not strictly proper and, at first glance, seems to rationalize ill-motivated credence updating. However, this turns out not to be the case. (shrink)

‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...) exercise of the will can afford us special freedom in determining our reasons? I argue that normative approaches to answering this question prove to be inadequate. To vindicate the thought that normative powers can make our reasons ‘up to us’, we need an altogether different approach to understanding them, one that is located not in the normative but in the metaphysical. I end the paper by sketching a metaphysical explanation of normative powers. This metaphysical defence of normative powers provides a window into a different, more agent-centered way of thinking about rational agency. (shrink)

This article explores the main similarities and differences between Derek Parfit’s notion of imprecise comparability and a related notion I have proposed of parity. I argue that the main difference between imprecise comparability and parity can be understood by reference to ‘the standard view’. The standard view claims that 1) differences between cardinally ranked items can always be measured by a scale of units of the relevant value, and 2) all rankings proceed in terms of the trichotomy of ‘better (...) than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. Imprecise comparability, which can be understood in terms of the more familiar notions of cardinality and incommensurability, rejects only the first claim while parity rejects both claims of the standard view. I then argue that insofar as those attracted to imprecise comparability assume that all rankings are trichotomous, as Parfit appears to, the view should be rejected. This is because imprecise equality is not a form of equality but is a sui generis ‘fourth’ basic way in which items can be ranked. We should, I argue, understand imprecise equality as parity, and imprecise comparability as entailing ‘tetrachotomy’ – that if two items are comparable, one must better than, worse than, equal to, or on a par with the other. Thus those attracted to the idea that cardinality can be imprecise should abandon trichotomy and accept parity and tetrachotomy instead. Finally, I illustrate the difference between Parfit’s trichotomous notion of imprecise comparability and parity by examining how each notion might be employed in different solutions to the problem posed by the Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics. I suggest that parity provides the arguably more ecumenical solution to the problem. (shrink)

What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are (...) evaluative facts (or the facts that subvene them) about what you want, such as the fact that having it would be good in some way. This paper argues that value-based theorists are wrong; if we try to find a single kind of consideration that can always be normative reason, we find that sometimes our reason is the fact that we want something and not any corresponding evaluative fact. (shrink)

Derek Parfit thought that his continuum argument in population ethics leading to the Repugnant Conclusion—viz., that a world with a vast number of people leading lives barely worth living is better than a world with many people enjoying excellent lives—raised a puzzle that must be solved before we can hope to arrive at a correct theory of morality, what he called ‘Theory X’. This chapter critically examines four possible ‘structural’ solutions to continua arguments like Parfit’s—solutions according to which the structure (...) of continua is not as continua arguments suppose. It is argued that incommensurability, incomparability, indeterminacy, and indeed Parfit’s own preferred solution, ‘lexical imprecision’, fail to provide the break in structure needed to defuse continua arguments. An alternative structural solution is then proposed according to which, somewhere along the continuum, items are on a par with their immediate predecessors. Being on a par is a _sui generis_ fourth basic way two items can be compared beyond being better or worse than one another or equally good. The parity solution is shown to have two significant advantages over the other structural proposals. First, only the parity solution allows us to maintain the very plausible thought at the heart of continua arguments, viz., that as we proceed along the continuum, a small diminution in quality of value can be compensated for by a large increase in quantity of value. Second, by appealing to a tetrachotomous, rather than a trichotomous, view of value—a view of value that includes parity—we can vindicate first-blush, untutored, intuitive reactions as to what goes wrong in continua arguments. Thinking about what some may have too readily dismissed as a ‘mere puzzle’ opens up new ways of thinking about the very structure of normativity and the shape of Theory X. (shrink)

The central aim of this book is to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. This work is the first book length treatment of the topics of incomparability, value, and practical reason.