Diese Arbeit bespricht die Bedingungen von Selbstbewusstsein. Nach eingehender Kritik an bestehenden philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien wird ein eigenständiger Ansatz zur Akquise von Selbstbewusstsein entwickelt, der die besondere Bedeutung der Zweite-Person-Perspektive hervorhebt, ausführlich analysiert und in den aktuellen wissenschaftlichen Diskurs einbettet: Die hier entwickelte Theorie der umfassenden Perspektivität untersucht das Phänomen des Selbstbewusstseins sowohl philosophisch als auch in Bezug auf die mit der Erste-, Zweite-, und Dritte-Person-Perspektive verknüpften entwicklungspsychologischen Fähigkeiten. Von zentraler Bedeutung dafür sind die an aktuelle philosophische Debatten anschließenden (...) Analysen der im deutschen und teils englischen Sprachraum bisher uneindeutig definierten Begriffe der Zweite-Person-Perspektive, Perspektive und joint attention. Die theoretischen Betrachtungen werden zum Schluss mit einem Blick auf Beispiele aus der angewandten Ethik überprüft und ergänzt. Die Autorin Mandy Stake ist Philosophin und arbeitet derzeit als Postdoc in der Arbeitsgruppe Neuroethik und Ethik der KI im Forschungszentrum Jülich. Sie beschäftigt sich sowohl mit theoretischen als auch praktischen Fragen, insbesondere in den Bereichen Erkenntnistheorie, Philosophie des Geistes und Angewandte Ethik. (shrink)

Dass sich Selbstbewusstsein entwickelt, und nicht vielmehr bereits vorliegt, ist soweit unstrittig. Strittig ist, welche Bedingungen gegeben sein müssen, um selbstbewusst zu sein. Die hier vertretene These, dass Selbstbewusstsein in mindestens zwei Formen, einer rudimentären und einer robusten Form, vorliegt, wobei letztere nur durch die Zweite-Person-Perspektive entstehen kann, ist Grundstein für ein verfeinertes Verständnis, welches in vielen Theorien grundsätzlich bereits vorhanden ist. Nichtsdestoweniger ist gerade die Zweite-Person-Perspektive wegen ihrer zu stark betonten Rolle der Intersubjektivität kritisiert worden. Dieses Kapitel stellt die (...) aktuellsten Kritiken vor, um zu verdeutlichen, warum Selbstbewusstsein letztlich ein erworbener Selbstbezug ist. Der erste Unterabschnitt bespricht alternative Ansätze der Wir-Intentionen oder Wir-Erlebnissen, die als Voraussetzung sozialer Interaktion angesehen werden, und reißt die Kritik an den Untersuchungsmethoden der Naturwissenschaften kurz an, die in Abschnitt 9.1 gezielter thematisiert werden. Der zweite Unterabschnitt 7.2 dieses Kapitels führt schließlich einige Punkte zusammen, die verdeutlichen, warum Selbstbezüge erlernt sind. (shrink)

Anknüpfend an begriffliche Eingrenzungen von Selbstbewusstsein und personaler Identität eruiert dieses Kapitel erste weitere Implikationen für die Bedeutung von ‚Person‘. Auf das in dieser Arbeit erarbeitete Vorverständnis aufbauend, kann nun auch das Versprechen eingelöst werden, das Konzept eines integrativen Naturalismus zu erweitern. Aktuelle Ansätze der Zweite-Person-Perspektive werfen einen kritischen Blick auf gängige Methoden im ersten Abschnitt des Kapitels (9.1). Der zweite Abschnitt dieses Kapitels (9.2) stellt Konsequenzen für das Konzept der Person innerhalb eines integrativen Naturalismus vor. Darin sehen wir, wie (...) theoretische Neufassungen der Begriffe klassische Fallstricke vermeiden können. Der dritte Abschnitt (9.3) zeigt einerseits Implikationen einer Aufnahme der Zweite-Person-Perspektive für Anwendungsfragen in Bezug auf neurodegenerative und psychische Erkrankungen bzw. Entwicklungsstörungen und andererseits Implikationen für Abgrenzungsfragen und das Verhältnis zwischen humanen und anderen nicht-menschlichen Lebensformen aber auch zur künstlichen Intelligenz auf. (shrink)

In diesem Kapitel werden grundsätzliche Bedeutungen von ‚Bewusstsein‘ und ‚Selbstbewusstsein‘ im philosophiegeschichtlichen Kontext eigeführt, die solange als Ausgangspunkt dieser Untersuchung dienlich sind, bis ein daran angelehntes, aber modifiziertes Verständnis erarbeitet wurde. Dies bietet die Grundlage für das nachfolgende, zweite Kapitel, das die Quellen der Konfusion in Bezug auf die Konzepte des Bewusstseins und Selbstbewusstseins bespricht.

Das Phänomen der joint attention fand vor allem in den letzten zehn bis fünfzehn Jahren wieder verstärkt Eingang in die Diskussionen der Kognitionswissenschaften, Entwicklungspsychologie und Philosophie des Geistes. Grund dafür ist u. a. ein erhöhtes Interesse an den damit in Verbindung stehenden Themenfeldern der Perspektivität, sozialen Interaktion sowie der Theory of Mind. Die entsprechenden Diskussionen um die joint attention, auch „shared attention“ genannt, finden nach wie vor insbesondere in englischsprachigen Artikeln, Aufsätzen und Büchern statt. In der deutschen fachwissenschaftlichen Literatur gibt (...) es kein eindeutiges und etabliertes Pendant für den englischen Begriff. Eine Besonderheit ist, dass es auch keine einheitlich anerkannte, eindeutige Definition einer Situation der joint attention gibt, allerdings viele Kurzdefinitionen oder Zusammenfassungen von den bei einer joint attention beteiligten Merkmale und Fähigkeiten. Eine uneinheitliche Verwendung kann zu Irrungen und Missverständnissen führen. Es ist deshalb nötig, eine begrifflich eindeutige Bestimmung zu finden, die grundlegend für all diese Varianten sein kann, aber mögliche Erweiterungen nicht ausschließt. In diesem Kapitel wird joint attention versuchsweise näher bestimmt. Dabei wird auch untersucht, ob joint attention ein menschliches Spezifikum und notwendigerweise an Sprachfähigkeit gebunden ist. (shrink)

Dieses Kapitel ist eine kurze Zusammenfassung der vorliegenden Arbeit, in der die Bedingungen des Selbstbewusstseins ergründet und insbesondere in Hinblick auf die Rollen der Intentionalität, Perspektivität und Repräsentation erschlossen werden. Selbstbewusstsein ist hiernach eine verbindende Aktivität der Wirklichkeitserfahrung, die das eigene Verständnis der Welt mit den vorliegenden Gegebenheiten zusammenbringt, von denen es selbst eine ist. Selbstbewusstsein umfasst die Fähigkeit, mit Hilfe derer Personen Erlebnisse der einzelnen Perspektiven kontextspezifisch organisieren, miteinander in Beziehung setzen, verallgemeinern und auf sich beziehen können. Der Fokus (...) auf die Bedingungen von Selbstbewusstsein führt nicht nur zu einer Theorie der umfassenden Perspektivität, die der Zweite-Person-Perspektive einen definierten und begründeten Platz in unseren philosophischen Theorien gibt, sondern gibt auch Anlass eine Theorie des erweiterten integrativen Naturalismus sowie eine erweiterte Theorie des Selbstbewusstseins zu formulieren. (shrink)

Die Begriffe der Perspektive, Perspektivität oder des Standpunktes begegnen uns alltäglich, in der Kunst, der Philosophie und in vielen anderen Wissenschaftsbereichen. Speziell in der Erkenntnistheorie und der Philosophie des Geistes kommen wir nicht um perspektivische Bezugnahmen herum, beispielsweise wenn wir über Theorien des Verstehens anderer oder die Unterscheidung zwischen der sogenannten Erste-Person-Perspektive und Dritte-Person-Perspektive diskutieren. Trotz seiner häufigen und interdisziplinären Verwendung wurde der Begriff der Perspektive selbst aber bisher nur erstaunlich wenig wissenschaftlich und explizit philosophisch untersucht. Eine begriffliche Ausarbeitung und (...) Thematisierung der Perspektive oder Perspektivität ist also überraschend unterrepräsentiert. Diesen Mangel nehme ich zum Anlass, um die Bedeutung des Begriffs der Perspektive besser zu begreifen und zu explizieren. Dieses Kapitel skizziert im ersten Abschnitt die geschichtlichen Hintergründe und Bedeutungskonnotationen. Im Mittelpunkt stehen die grundlegenden Fragen, was unter einer Perspektive gemeinhin verstanden wird und ob dieses Verständnis vollständig und adäquat für die in dieser Untersuchung zentralen Frage nach dem Selbstbewusstsein ist. Das gängige Verständnis der in der Philosophie des Geistes etablierten Begriffe der Erste-Person-Perspektive und der Dritte-Person-Perspektive wird dabei beachtet. Aus den darin entstandenen Einsichten ergibt sich zunächst eine scheinbare begriffliche Eingrenzung der Perspektive auf die erste Person, die im zweiten Abschnitt weiter ausgeführt, jedoch in dem darauffolgenden dritten Abschnitt begründet erweitert wird, ohne das zuvor herausgearbeitete Verständnis ad absurdum zu führen. Der vierte Abschnitt schließt mit einer Untersuchung des Begriffs der Zweite-Person-Perspektive an, der eine genauere Ausarbeitung im Zusammenhang mit den anderen zentralen Begriffen der joint attention (gemeinsame Aufmerksamkeit und gemeinsamen Teilhabe), reziproken Interaktion (reciprocal interaction) und Intersubjektivität erfährt. Daraus erschließt sich eine notwendige Interdependenz der Erste-, Zweite- und Dritte-Person-Perspektive, die im fünften Abschnitt dieses Kapitels erläutert wird. (shrink)

Was folgt aus der hier dargelegten Theorie für Konzepte der Identität des Selbstbewusstseins über die Zeit hinweg? Ohne alle gängigen Theorien anführen zu wollen, werden in diesem Kapitel nur einige Implikationen aufgezeigt. Das rudimentäre Selbstbewusstsein ist die Erlebnisperspektive, die bereits vorhanden ist und durchwegs bestehen bleibt. Es ist nicht so, dass dieses durch die Entwicklung der robusten Erste-Person-Perspektive bzw. des robusten Selbstbewusstseins abgelöst wird. Die Fähigkeit des robusten Selbstbewusstseins ist es, Erfahrungen zusammenzufassen, zu reflektieren und miteinander in Beziehungen zu setzen. (...) Es bildet die Narrative unseres Lebens, die sich stets erweitert und verändert, im immerwährenden Prozess. Dieses Kapitel eruiert diese doppelt grundlegende Struktur des Selbstbewusstseins als Ausdruck der menschlichen Lebensform sowie die Auswirkungen dieses Konzepts in Bezug auf den Begriff der Person. (shrink)

Dieses Kapitel bespricht die Quellen der Konfusion in Bezug auf die Konzepte des Bewusstseins und Selbstbewusstseins, die sich einerseits als Psycho-Physischer Dualismus, andererseits als ein Problem der Überzeugung bzgl. eines absoluten Primats der Naturwissenschaften vorstellen. Beide Probleme sind grundlegend und führen zu unzulänglichen Beschreibungen von Selbstbewusstsein.

Die Konzepte der Introspektion und Reflexivität haben Einfluss auf das Konzept des Selbstbewusstseins und die perspektivischen Bezugnahmen. Allgemeinhin werden Introspektion und Reflexivität in einer gewissen Abhängigkeit voneinander verstanden: Einerseits müssen wir uns reflexiv auf uns beziehen können, wenn wir Introspektion ausführen, andererseits können wir uns nur reflexiv auf uns beziehen, wenn wir bereits verstanden haben, dass wir jeweils „ich“ sind, was introspektive Einsicht voraussetzen könnte. Introspektion und Reflexivität scheinen sich demnach gegenseitig vorauszusetzen, was auf den ersten Blick unverständlich ist. Um (...) diese Abhängigkeit besser zu verstehen, untersucht dieses Kapitel die gängigen Begriffsbestimmungen und stellt diese in Zusammenhang zu den bisherigen Erkenntnissen dieser Untersuchung. (shrink)

Remember the pots hammered by spoons from high Manhattan windows, and parades of cars and pick-up trucks holding dear the medical professionals responding to covid-19. This book is part of that chorus, that march, to express appreciation for the giving of care. And beyond doctors and nurses, bless their hearts, to mothers caring for their babies, for captains for their teams, for the soon-to-be widowers for their wives and teachers for their students, but also for the ranchers for their cattle (...) and the contemplative world for our environment. This is a book to think more closely of the support for care, individual as it so often will be, to be woven more closely together in a paradigm of care. Care is always prominent. Care for others, of the family, care for those of the tribe, care for animals and homes and gardens and properties, self-care. And the purse. Even without teaching, compensation, or legislation, care survives, but even with these helpings, it falls short of the need. We live in a crisis of care. Thinking explicitly and beyond health care. There is no mechanism of state and conscience that delivers care to all the venues of need, and seldom in the amounts needed. The reservoirs of care are far from empty, but at a mark that needs topping up. There is need for care advocacy, a care ethic, a paradigm. This book is about that paradigm. A care paradigm may bring comfort and recovery more fully to the people and organic creations of the world. The paradigm hears the moan of indifference. It draws upon the eyes of the heart. The paradigm is about how we see the need for care. The care paradigm, the grand beholding, is manifest in how we provide for others, how we nurture them, give succor, how we are disposed, and are not, to sacrifice to relieve their hurt. It is not only caring for those visibly needing care, unable to care for themselves, but caring for all. It is having a disposition that the hurts, large and small, that all of us carry, arouse concern and appreciation from and for each individual, the community and the world. (shrink)

Die Unterscheidung und Verbindung der beiden Konzepte der Präreflexivität bzw. Reflexivität und der rudimentären bzw. robusten Erste-Person-Perspektive können nicht ohne ein Verständnis der Zweite-Person-Perspektive begriffen werden. Beide Konzepte werden in diesem Kapitel verdeutlicht. Zunächst werden genauer die verschiedenen Perspektiven und spezifisch die Präreflexivität und rudimentäre Erste-Person-Perspektive besprochen. In einem zweiten Schritt werden eine genauere Definition und Erklärung der Besonderheit der Rolle einer Zweite-Person-Perspektive angestrebt. Diese stützen sich auf die bisherigen Untersuchungen und werden im darauffolgenden Kapitel 7 weiter vor dem Hintergrund (...) des Intersubjektivitätsbegriffs vertieft. (shrink)

The article starts by offering a definition of fake kindness focused on the dissociation between the behavioural components of kindness and the intent to sincerely pay some heed to the needs of others. Using the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu, this definition is then used to articulate how fake kindness can be conceptualized as a specific form of symbolic violence. Such a view allows explanations as to how and why the prevalence and effectiveness of fake kindness vary according to microsociological (...) norms and values. The generic definition and conceptualization of fake kindness as a form of symbolic violence are then used to discuss how nursing’s enthrallment with the concept of caring and its operationalization as a moral compass likely fosters the growth of fake kindness within the profession. In this view, the institutional enforcement of propriety and well-behaved professionalism is more likely to lead to toxic environments than to healthy workplaces. We hope that being able to understand how professional norms and institutional rules are sometimes turned into social tools to enforce obedience and existing hierarchies can empower victims of those phenomena to resist them more effectively. It might also contribute to increasing the awareness of well-meaning nurses or people in position of authority who have been socialized in environments where fake kindness is normalized. (shrink)

Although dominated by consequentialist and deontological thinking, the debate about human enhancement has been enriched by several arguments from virtue theory and from virtue ethics. This article provides an overview of the virtue ethical arguments in the debate and identifies several topics in the ethics of human enhancement where the argumentative resources of virtue ethics have not yet been sufficiently considered.

In this essay, we defend a pluralism concerning the concept of knowledge and show that the seven types of knowledge, that we distinguish, can be unified by criteria which characterize the types of knowledge as being critical. In the first part, seven types of knowledge are distinguished: 1. knowledge as true immediate objective understanding (e.g. simple logical or mathematical truths); 2. knowledge as true immediate understanding (e.g. cogito ergo sum); 3. knowledge as true objective understanding by proof (e.g. rigorous proof (...) in logic, mathematics, and science); 4. knowledge as verification (e.g. direct and indirect observation, or experiment); 5. knowledge as justified true belief (e.g. belief in experts); 6. knowledge as possessing epistemic entropy and information (e.g. possible states that satisfy a hypothesis h, and possible states that are forbidden by h); 7. knowledge as justified corroboration (e.g. Kepler’s second law is corroborated by severe tests). In the second part, conditions for knowledge to be critical are proposed. The general critical question (CQ) is: what would happen if p, a statement claimed to be known, is given up? This question, then, is applied to the seven types of knowledge. The first and second type of knowledge cannot be given up because this would lead to contradiction and absurdity. Applying CQ to the third type of knowledge may be a hint for finding an incorrect step or a gap in the proof. CQ applied to the fourth type of knowledge leads to the critical investigation, whether the verification is a reproducible effect, whether it is observer-invariant, and whether it has a suitable interpretation with a well-corroborated hypothesis or law. Applying CQ to the fifth type of knowledge forces to check the reliability of the experts or one’s own reliance. Moreover, it leads to uncover the hidden assumptions and preconditions. Applying CQ to the sixth type of knowledge guides us to investigate the excluded possible states and, consequently, to consider alternatives. For example, Euclidean Geometry excludes positive or negative curvature; an alternative (hyperbolic) geometry with negative curvature was discovered by Lobachevsky and Bolyai. When applying CQ to the seventh type of knowledge, we have to distinguish two cases. Very well confirmed laws of nature or the fundamental constants of nature behave similar to the first type of knowledge: Absurd consequences follow, if they would be given up. Alternatively, applying CQ to corroborated scientific hypotheses often leads to revision, sometimes to refutation. (shrink)

Neuroenhancement concerns the improvement of a person’s mental properties, abilities, and performance. The various techniques of neuroenhancement offer new opportunities of such improvement, but also come with substantive perils. Neuroenhancement thus involves significant normative challenges for individual persons as well as for society as a whole. This expert report provides a concise overview of the contemporary debate on neuroenhancement. It discusses the definition, techniques and targets of neuroenhancement and examines arguments for and against it at the level of individual persons, (...) social interaction, and social policy. (shrink)

There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition. To date, judgments about stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses to “high stakes” cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties—they are scalar: whether a situation is “high” or “low” stakes is a matter of degree. So far, (...) no experimental work has investigated the scalar nature of stakes effects on knowledge: do stakes effects increase as the stakes get higher? Do stakes effects only appear once a certain threshold of stakes has been crossed? Does the effect plateau at a certain point? To address these questions, we conducted experiments that probe for the scalarity of stakes effects using several experimental approaches. We found evidence of scalar stakes effects using an “evidence seeking” experimental design, but no evidence of scalar effects using a traditional “evidence-fixed” experimental design. In addition, using the evidence-seeking design, we uncovered a large, but previously unnoticed framing effect on whether participants are skeptical about whether someone can know something, no matter how much evidence they have. The rate of skeptical responses and the rate at which participants were willing to attribute “lazy knowledge”—that someone can know something without having to check—were themselves subject to a stakes effect: participants were more skeptical when the stakes were higher, and more prone to attribute lazy knowledge when the stakes were lower. We argue that the novel skeptical stakes effect provides resources to respond to criticisms of the evidence-seeking approach that argue that it does not target knowledge. (shrink)

In their chapter “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes,” Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne present several challenges to the doctrine of pragmatic encroachment. In this brief reply to their chapter two things are aimed at. First, the chapter argues that there is a sense in which their case against pragmatic encroachment is a bit weaker, and another sense in which that case is much stronger, than Anderson and Hawthorne’s own argument would suggest. Second, the chapter highlights and then builds upon (...) their extremely interesting reflections on one sort of practical matter that has not received proper attention in the literature: the epistemic significance of double-checking. This is done with an eye towards pointing in the direction of further work. (shrink)

In 'Stakes and Kidneys' the author discusses various ethical issues surrounding the international trade in human organs.

In their chapter “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes,” Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne present several challenges to the doctrine of pragmatic encroachment. In this brief reply to their chapter two things are aimed at. First, the chapter argues that there is a sense in which their case against pragmatic encroachment is a bit weaker, and another sense in which that case is much stronger, than Anderson and Hawthorne’s own argument would suggest. Second, the chapter highlights and then builds upon (...) their extremely interesting reflections on one sort of practical matter that has not received proper attention in the literature: the epistemic significance of double-checking. This is done with an eye towards pointing in the direction of further work. (shrink)

The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as (...) stake-invariant, though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments. (shrink)

According to a prominent claim in recent epistemology, people are less likely to ascribe knowledge to a high stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are severe, than to a low stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are slight. We offer an opinionated "state of the art" on experimental research about the role of stakes in knowledge judgments. We draw on a first wave of empirical studies--due to Feltz & Zarpentine (2010), May (...) et al (2010), and Buckwalter (2010)--which cast doubt on folk stakes sensitivity, and a second wave of empirical studies--due to Pinillos (2012) and Sripada & Stanley (2012)--said to vindicate it, as well as new studies of our own. We conclude that the balance of evidence to date best supports Folk stakes insensitivity, or that all else equal, stakes do not affect knowledge ascription. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations (...) of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

The paper examines the influence of stakes on knowledge attributions, building on the retraction-based experimental design introduced by Dinges and Zakkou. Experiment 1 replicates Dinges and Zakkou’s original findings and extends the research to third-person knowledge ascriptions. The results show that raising the stakes increases the percentage of retraction in both first- and third-person scenarios. Experiment 2 addresses potential concerns about the retraction-based design, specifically whether participants genuinely endorse the initial claim and the worry of scenario sceptics – (...) participants who disagree with a knowledge attribution. Experiment 2 introduces a modification to the initial design by adding a knowledge-ascribing question. This addition makes the act of retraction more realistic. The results confirm that the stakes effect persists even in an improved design. I argue that these findings constitute a serious challenge to classic invariantism and a potential challenge to subject-sensitive invariantism. Their competitors – epistemic contextualism and relativism – seem to be in a better position, even though the retraction-based design at its current stage is unlikely to distinguish between these two. (shrink)

What can rational deliberation indicate about belief? Belief clearly influences deliberation. The principle that rational belief is stake-invariant rules out at least one way that deliberation might influence belief. The principle is widely, if implicitly, held in work on the epistemology of categorical belief, and it is built into the model of choice-guiding degrees of belief that comes to us from Ramsey and de Finetti. Criticisms of subjective probabilism include challenges to the assumption of additive values (the package principle) employed (...) by defenses of probabilism. But the value-interaction phenomena often cited in such challenges are excluded by stake-invariance. A comparison with treatments of categorical belief suggests that the appeal to stake-invariance is not ad hoc. Whether or not to model belief as stake-invariant is a question not settled here. (shrink)

We test the effect of stake size on ambiguity attitudes. Compared to a baseline condition, we find subjects to be more ambiguity seeking for small-probability gains and large-probability losses under high stakes. They are also more ambiguity averse for large-probability gains and small-probability losses. We trace these effects back to stake effects on decisions under risk and uncertainty. For risk, we replicate previous findings. For uncertainty, we find an increase in probabilistic insensitivity under high stakes that is driven (...) by increased uncertainty aversion for large-probability gains and for small-probability losses. (shrink)

Defenses of pragmatic encroachment commonly rely on two thoughts: first, that the gap between one’s strength of epistemic position on p and perfect strength sometimes makes a difference to what one is justified in doing, and second, that the higher the stakes, the harder it is to know. It is often assumed that these ideas complement each other. This chapter shows that these ideas are far from complementary. Along the way, a variety of strategies for regimenting the somewhat inchoate (...) notion of stakes are indicated, and some troubling cases for pragmatic encroachment raised. (shrink)

This article discusses the key existential stakes of implementing biometrics in human lifeworlds. In this pursuit, we offer a problematization and reinvention of central values often taken for granted within the “ethical turn” of AI development and discourse, such as autonomy, agency, privacy and integrity, as we revisit basic questions about what it means to be human and embodied. Within a framework of existential media studies, we introduce an existential ethics of care—through a conversation between existentialism, virtue ethics, a (...) feminist ethics of care and post-humanist ethics—aiming to deepen and nuance our understanding of the human behind “human-centered” AI directives. The key argument is that biometrics implicates humans through unprecedented forms of objectification, through which the existential body—the relational, intimate and frail human being—is at risk. We interrogate these risks as they become visible at three sites where embodied humans are challenged by biometrics, and thus where the existential body is challenged by the biometric body. This occurs through reductionism (biometric passports nailing bodies to identities, removing human judgment and compromising agency at the AI border), enforced transparency (smart home assistants surveying human intimacies and invading intimate spaces in the bedroom) and the breaching of bodily integrity (chipping bodies to capture sensory data, challenging the very concept of bodily integrity through self-invasive biohacking). Our existential ethics of care is importantly not a solutionist list of principles or suggestions, but a manifesto for a way of thinking about the ethical challenges of living with biometrics in today’s world, by raising the right questions. We argue that a revitalized discussion of the basic existential stakes within human lived experience is needed and should serve as the foundation on which comprehensive frameworks can be built to address the complexities and prospects for ethical machines, responsible biometrics and AI. (shrink)

Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as part of their argument. They claim that the knowledge norms in conjunction with our intuitions about when a subject is properly asserting in low or high stakes contexts provides strong evidence that what counts as knowledge depends on practical factors. In this paper, I present new data to suggest they are mistaken in the way they think about cases involving high and low stakes and I (...) show how insensitive invariantists can explain the data. I exploit recent work done on the distinction between flouting a norm and being blamed for that violation to formulate a rigorous theory of rational expected blameworthiness that allows insensitive invariantists to explain the data cited. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases (e.g., Cohen’s Airport) are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, (...) the view that one’s epistemic position may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Some had argued that epistemic position is incompatible with intellectualism. In reply, I point out that position variantism and intellectualism are compatible, if one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p can vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. (shrink)

Greaves and MacAskill argue for ​axiological longtermism​, according to which, in a wide class of decision contexts, the option that is ​ex ante best is the option that corresponds to the best lottery over histories from ​t onwards, where ​t ​is some date far in the future. They suggest that a ​stakes-sensitivity argument may be used to derive ​deontic longtermism from axiological longtermism, where deontic longtermism holds that in a wide class of decision contexts, the option one ought to (...) choose is the option that corresponds to the best lottery over histories from ​t onwards, where ​t is some date far in the future. This argument appeals to the ​Stakes Principle​: when the axiological stakes are high, non-consequentialist constraints and prerogatives tend to be insignificant in comparison, so that what one ought to do is simply whichever option is best. I argue that there are strong grounds on which to reject the ​Stakes Principle​. Furthermore, by reflecting on the Non-Identity Problem, I argue that there are plausible grounds for denying the existence of a sound argument from axiological longtermism to deontic longtermism insofar as we are concerned with ways of improving the value of the future of the kind that are focal in Greaves and MacAskill’s presentation. (shrink)

I trace the relationship between the view that knowledge is stakes sensitive and Laurie Paul’s account of the epistemology of transformative experience. The view that knowledge is stakes sensitive comes in different flavours: one can go for subjective or objective conceptions of stakes, where subjective views of stakes take stakes to be a function of an agent’s non-factive mental states, and objective views of stakes do not. I argue that there is a tension between (...) subjective accounts of stakes sensitivity and Paul’s epistemology of transformative experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to establish that, according to almost all democratic theories, instrumentalist considerations often dominate intrinsic proceduralist considerations in our decisions about whether to make extensive use of undemocratic procedures. The reason for this is that almost all democratic theorists, including philosophers commonly thought to be intrinsic proceduralists, accept ‘High Stakes Instrumentalism’. According to HSI, we ought to use undemocratic procedures in order to prevent high stakes errors - very substantively bad or unjust outcomes. However, (...) democratically produced severe substantive injustice is much more common than many proponents of HSI have realised. Proponents of HSI must accept that if undemocratic procedures are the only way to avoid these high stakes errors, then we ought to make extensive use of undemocratic procedures. Consequently, according to almost all democratic theorists, democratic theory ought, for practical purposes, to be reoriented towards difficult moral and empirical questions about the instrumental quality of procedures. Moreover, this is potentially very practically important because if there are available instrumentally superior undemocratic procedures, then wholesale institutional reform is required. This is one of the most potentially practically important findings of normative democratic theory. In spite of this, no-one has yet explicitly recognised it. (shrink)

The term “know” is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no (...) consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. Alexander Dinges offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability. (shrink)

People experiencing similar conditions may make different decisions, and their belief systems provide insight about these differences. An example of high‐stakes decision‐making within a complex social context is the Arab Spring, in which large numbers of people decided to protest and even larger numbers decided to stay at home. This study uses qualitative analyses of interview narratives and social media addressing individual decisions to develop a computational model tracing the cognitive decision‐making process. The model builds on work by Abelson (...) and Carroll (1965), Schank and Abelson (1977), and Axelrod (1976) to systematically trace the inferences connecting beliefs to decisions. The findings show that protest decisions were often based on positive emotions such as pride, hope, courage, and solidarity, triggered by beliefs about successful protest and self‐sacrifice. By contrast, decisions to stay at home were triggered by beliefs about safety, state approval, and living conditions. As one participant said, “When I heard about the revolution in Tunisia, my heart was filled with solidarity for the people.” In the words of a non‐participant: “When people are killed, we must be careful. There are more important things than protest: safety and stability.” This study of individual explanations about events identifies the role of emotions in high‐stakes decision‐making within complex social environments. (shrink)

This paper presents the results of a within-subject experiment testing whether an increase in the monetary stakes by a factor of 50 – which had never been done before – influences individual behavior in a simple ultimatum bargaining game. Contrary to current wisdom, we found that lowest acceptable offers stated by the responder are proportionally lower in the high-stake condition than in the low-stake condition. This result may be interpreted in terms of the type of utility functions which characterize (...) the subjects. However, in line with prior results, we find that an important increase of the monetary stakes in the ultimatum game has no effect on the offers made by the proposer. Yet, the present research suggests that the reasons underlying these offers are quite different when the stakes are high. (shrink)

Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in (...) defeating knowledge by defeating epistemic rationality—the very kind of rationality that is entailed by knowledge, and in which Pascalian considerations do not play any role—even though epistemic rationality consists in having adequate evidence. (shrink)

Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person’s performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy (...) and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust, according to which trust implies a moral expectation. The content of the moral expectation is this: W hen A trusts B to do x, A ascribes an obligation to B to do x, and holds B to this obligation. This moral expectation account throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians’ defensive behavior to illustrate this final point. (shrink)

I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether an agent believes the proposition. This poses a dilemma for those who claim that whether a proposition is known can depend on the stakes associated with it. Only the W-stakes reading of this view preserves intuitions about (...) knowledge-attributions, but only the A-stakes reading preserves the putative link between knowledge and practical reasoning that has motivated it. (shrink)

People who defend “pragmatic encroachment” about knowledge generally advocate two ideas: you can rationally act according to what you know; knowledge is harder to achieve when more is at stake. In their chapter in this volume, Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne argue that these two ideas may not fit together so well. This chapter extends Anderson and Hawthorne’s argument. By applying some standard decision theory, we can calculate a precise quantity of “how much is at stake” that does fit together (...) with knowledge and action. While this calculated quantity matches intuitions about how much is at stake in certain standard cases, in others it does not.Keywords. (shrink)

Defenses of pragmatic encroachment commonly rely on two thoughts: first, that the gap between one’s strength of epistemic position on _p_ and perfect strength sometimes makes a difference to what one is justified in doing, and second, that the higher the stakes, the harder it is to know. It is often assumed that these ideas complement each other. This chapter shows that these ideas are far from complementary. Along the way, a variety of strategies for regimenting the somewhat inchoate (...) notion of stakes are indicated, and some troubling cases for pragmatic encroachment raised. (shrink)

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to overcome the opacity of black box systems, i.e., to make them understandable to suitable stakeholders. In this chapter, I investigate how understanding depends on how much is at stake in a context. I support the intuition that understanding is sensitive to the stakes with a pair of cases. I further use this pair of cases to spell out how exactly the stakes affect understanding, particularly, outright understanding why. To do so, I connect (...) discussions of the concept of understanding with debates on pragmatic encroachment and on inductive risk. I zoom in on one necessary condition on understanding specifically, viz. the epistemic justification condition, according to which the beliefs involved in understanding have to be supported by sufficient evidence and have to cohere sufficiently well. I argue that, where the stakes are high, there are more stringent standards for sufficient evidence and coherence, and that this explains the stakes-sensitivity of understanding. (shrink)

Several studies suggest that stakes matter for knowledge attributions. Based on these findings, one might wonder whether stakes – broadly construed – also matter for lying ascriptions. While several studies have addressed certain aspects of the role of stakes in lying, none have tested whether lying ascriptions are affected by stake manipulations. Given that lying is deeply embedded in our social life, empirical studies seem to be a natural approach to this question. To maximize the chances of (...) finding a stake effect, we employed cases of deceptive implicatures, which are not clear-cut cases of lying. The findings of three experiments suggest stakes do not have a significant impact on people’s lying ascriptions. We discuss the implications of these findings and conclude that they are good news for the folk concept of lying. (shrink)

People who defend “pragmatic encroachment” about knowledge generally advocate two ideas: (1) you can rationally act according to what you know; (2) knowledge is harder to achieve when more is at stake. In their chapter in this volume, Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne argue that these two ideas may not fit together so well. This chapter extends Anderson and Hawthorne’s argument. By applying some standard decision theory, we can calculate a precise quantity of “how much is at stake” that does (...) fit together with knowledge and action. While this calculated quantity matches intuitions about how much is at stake in certain standard cases, in others it does not.Keywords. (shrink)

“Pragmatic encroachers” about knowledge generally advocate two ideas: (1) you can rationally act on what you know; (2) knowledge is harder to achieve when more is at stake. Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne have recently argued that these two ideas may not fit together so well. I extend their argument by working out what “high stakes” would have to mean for the two ideas to line up, using decision theory.