BackgroundCommonly applied measures of symptoms of anxiety are not sensitive to disease-specific anxiety in patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. There is a need for validated instruments measuring COPD-specific anxiety. Therefore, we translated the COPD-Anxiety Questionnaire into Danish and performed an initial validation of the psychometric properties in a sample of patients with COPD.Materials and MethodsTranslation procedures followed the World Health Organization guidelines. Participants with COPD completed questionnaires measuring COPD-specific anxiety, general psychological distress as well as variables related to COPD, (...) quality of life, and socio-demography.ResultsA total of 260 patients with COPD completed questionnaires. The Danish version of CAF-R-DK demonstrated acceptable Cronbach’s α values that were comparable with those of the original CAF. As expected, the CAF-R-DK showed positive correlations with convergent constructs and negative correlations with discriminant constructs. However, the results for specific subdomains of the CAF-R-DK indicated inconsistency in the underlying concept of disease-specific anxiety, which was also suggested based on the subsequent confirmatory and exploratory factor analyzes.ConclusionThe CAF could serve as an important supplement to generic psychological distress screening of patients with COPD in somatic health care settings, and the questionnaire is now available in Danish. Translation into other languages is needed with the purpose of obtaining data for further testing the psychometric properties of the questionnaire. (shrink)

One of the central logical ideas in Wittgenstein’sTractatus logico-philosophicusis the elimination of the identity sign in favor of the so-called “exclusive interpretation” of names and quantifiers requiring different names to refer to different objects and (roughly) different variables to take different values. In this paper, we examine a recent development of these ideas in papers by Kai Wehmeier. We diagnose two main problems of Wehmeier’s account, the first concerning the treatment of individual constants, the second concerning so-called “pseudo-propositions” (Scheinsätze) of (...) classical logic such as$a=a$or$a=b \wedge b=c \rightarrow a=c$. We argue that overcoming these problems requires two fairly drastic departures from Wehmeier’s account: (1) Not every formula of classical first-order logic will be translatable into asingleformula of Wittgenstein’s exclusive notation. Instead, there will often be a multiplicity of possible translations, revealing the original “inclusive” formulas to beambiguous. (2) Certain formulas of first-order logic such as$a=a$will not be translatable into Wittgenstein’s notation at all, being thereby revealed as nonsensical pseudo-propositions which should be excluded from a “correct” conceptual notation. We provide translation procedures from inclusive quantifier-free logic into the exclusive notation that take these modifications into account and define a notion of logical equivalence suitable for assessing these translations. (shrink)

In the following dialogue between TT - a foundationalist - and WdeV - a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars writes: 'For a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge", not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of (...) the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.' In the ensuing dialogue, TT argues that it sets the bar too high when knowledge about perceptual conditions is required for ordinary observational knowledge - that young children, for example, are implausibly excluded as knowers given Sellars's principle. WdeV defends Sellars's metaknowledge requirement against these charges. Results from developmental psychology are surveyed for what they show about the actual capabilities of young children. The implications of these results for the success of Sellars's principle are debated. (shrink)

Most accounts of cognitive scaffolding focus on ways that external structure can support or augment an agent’s cognitive capacities. We call cases where the interests of the user are served benign scaffolding and argue for the possibility and reality of hostile scaffolding. This is scaffolding which depends on the same capacities of an agent to make cognitive use of external structure as in benign cases, but that undermines or exploits the user while serving the interests of another agent. We develop (...) criteria for scaffolding being hostile and show by reference to examples including the design features of electronic gambling machines and casino management systems that hostile scaffolding exists and can be highly effective. In cases where the scaffolding is deep and permits the offloading of significant cognitive work, hostile scaffolding exploitatively manipulates cognitive processing itself. Given the extent of human reliance on scaffolding this is an important and neglected vulnerability. [This is an updated version of the paper, added in February 2023.]. (shrink)

Die Religion ist unter jenes gefallen, wovon man nur ein Wissen hat, solange es unthematisch bleibt. Das war nicht immer so in der zweihundertjahrigen Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie, vor allem nicht an deren Beginn in den letzten Jahrzehnten des 18. Jahrhunderts. Um eine Neubegrundung der Disziplin bemuht, wendet der Autor seinen Blick dorthin zuruck, um zunachst einmal ein Gesamtverstandnis jener massgeblichen Epoche des religiosen Gedankens zu gewinnen. Er zeigt, dass der Streit um die Philosophie des Spinoza nur vor dem religionsphilosophischen Hintergrund (...) der Erschutterung des Offenbarungsglaubens verstandlich wird. Dass die Zukunft der Religion nicht der kirchlichen Orthodoxie, sondern dem universalen, spinozistisch perfektionierten Christentum gehoren werde, wird in dieser Zeit zur verbindenden Uberzeugung der intellektuellen Elite in Deutschland. Der Band rekonstruiert den Ursprung der Religionsphilosophie in den 1780er Jahren bei Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Jacobi, Thomas Wizenmann, J.H. Obereit, Kant, Mendelssohn, Reinhold u.a. (shrink)

According to some scholars, such as Rodych and Steiner, Wittgenstein objects to Gödel’s undecidability proof of his formula $$G$$, arguing that given a proof of $$G$$, one could relinquish the meta-mathematical interpretation of $$G$$ instead of relinquishing the assumption that Principia Mathematica is correct. Most scholars agree that such an objection, be it Wittgenstein’s or not, rests on an inadequate understanding of Gödel’s proof. In this paper, I argue that there is a possible reading of such an objection that is, (...) in fact, reasonable and related to Gödel’s proof. (shrink)

Dark patterns, interfaces that scholars deem ‘problematic’, have received significant attention in the field of Human-Computer Interaction. Despite significant conceptual progress in recent years, there is still room to improve the parity between accounts in regulatory, legal, and scholarly domains. Furthermore, the need for more conceptual clarity is becoming increasingly pressing with the EU’s AI Act aiming to regulate against digital manipulation, and the term ‘dark patterns’ now codified in various EU laws. This paper aims to show how a philosophical (...) framework, namely Sterelny’s (2003) notion of ‘hostility’, provides conceptual benefits, characterizing all dark patterns as hostile patterns—i.e., digital interfaces that influence or affect users in ways that undermine user interests while serving the interests of platforms/ services. The benefits of a ‘hostility’ approach can be summarized as: (1) it points to the core problematic in all dark pattern types: ‘hostility’; (2) it allows us to differentiate dark patterns from anti-patterns (and adjacent cases); (3) we can decouple an account from other salient concerns, such as intentionality; and (4) it allows for greater conceptual inclusivity/ potential universalizability. After expanding on this ‘hostility’ characterization, I show how we might convert Sterelny’s paradigm to account for the various ways dark patterns harm user interests, drawing on Feinberg (1984). Lastly, I close by discussing how the account is broad enough to also develop organically with contemporary issues within the ‘ethics of influence’ literature. (shrink)

, David Bloor suggests that logical reasoning is radically relativistic in the sense that there are incompatible ways of reasoning logically, and no culturally transcendent rules of correct logical inference exist which could allow for adjudication of these different ways of reasoning. Bloor cites an example of reasoning used by the Azande as an illustration of such logical relativism. A close analysis of this reasoning reveals that the Azande's logic is in fact impeccably Aristotelian. I argue that the conclusions Bloor (...) can legitimately draw from his case study are not controversial and do nothing to make plausible the thesis of logical relativism. (shrink)

Das Buch entwickelt einen neuartigen, physikalistischen Interpretationsansatz zu Wittgensteins Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Das traditionelle Urteil, Wittgenstein habe im Tractatus keine klare Vorstellung der Analyse gehabt, wird widerlegt. Auf der Basis der Rekonstruktion der um die Jahrhundertwende etablierten Sinnesdatenanalysen im allgemeinen und der Farbanalysen im besonderen wird nachgewiesen, daß Wittgensteins Tractatus eine physikalische Sinnesdatenanalyse voraussetzt. Auf diesem Hintergrund werden Wittgensteins allgemeine Auffassungen zur Analyse der Welt und Sprache gedeutet, begründet und exemplifiziert. Der Tractatus liefert die philosophische Klärung des mechanistischen Weltbildes von Boltzmann (...) und Hertz. Er stellt die Mittel bereit, um den Sinn der Sätze zu analysieren und die logische Zulässigkeit von Aussagen zu prüfen. Die Anwendung dieser Mittel ist Aufgabe der Philosophie. Daß sie anwendbar sind und wie sie anzuwenden sind, demonstriert dieses Buch. (shrink)

This paper systematically outlines Wittgenstein's ab-notation. The purpose of this notation is to provide a proof procedure in which ordinary logical formulas are converted into ideal symbols that identify the logical properties of the initial formulas. The general ideas underlying this procedure are in opposition to a traditional conception of axiomatic proof and are related to Peirce's iconic logic. Based on Wittgenstein's scanty remarks concerning his ab-notation, which almost all apply to propositional logic, this paper explains how to extend his (...) method to a subset of first-order formulas, namely, formulas that do not contain dyadic sentential connectives within the scope of any quantifier. (shrink)

In this paper I problematize the use of appeals to the common intuitions people have about the morality of our society’s current treatment of animals in order to defend that treatment. I do so by looking at recent findings in the field of cognitive science. First I will examine the role that appeals to common intuition play in philosophical arguments about the moral worth of animals, focusing on the work of Carl Cohen and Richard Posner. After describing the theory of (...) Moral Disengagement—which has been used to explain how people live with themselves when they commit acts that they themselves believe are wrong—I will review the recent empirical research that details the nature of the moral disengagement that accompanies animal treatment. This includes studies that reveal that those who eat animals engage in the following behaviors: They minimize the nature of the harm of killing animals by casting the practice in a positive light; They obscure personal responsibility by blaming others for harms; They minimize the effect of the conduct on the animals by avoiding reference to the animal origins of meat; They derogate vegetarians as a way of avoiding feelings of guilt for their own practices. Perhaps most importantly, a number of empirical studies have shown that people’s intuitions about the moral worth of animals are shaped by their practice of eating animals—and not the other way around. In addition to the studies on moral disengagement, there is another body of research that has attempted to discover what accounts for the individual differences in attitudes people have toward the moral worth of animals. These studies have linked masculinity and traits like Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Right Wing Authoritarianism to the tendency to disregard the moral worth of animals. I will briefly summarize this body of research and will then conclude by arguing that this data should cause us to be highly skeptical of the value that the common intuition that people who eat animals have about the moral status of animals may have in helping us understand the actual moral worth of animals. (shrink)

In a previous issue of this journal, Michael Hicks challenges my critique of Wilfrid Sellars’s arguments against the given and against the foundationalist epistemology that relies on the idea of a sensory given. I had argued that Sellars’s well-known claim that the given is a myth does not succeed because at a critical juncture he misconstrued sense-datum theorists such as Bertrand Russell and H. H. Price. In his response to my argument, Hicks makes the striking claim that Sellars was not (...) targeting foundationalism at all in his discussion of the myth of the given. Hicks reconstructs a key argument in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) in a way intended both to avoid any reference to foundationalism and to do a more effective job than does Sellars’s original argument in uncovering a dilemma for traditional empiricism. The present paper challenges Hicks on two fronts. First, it argues that Hicks’s reconstruction is not more successful than Sellars’s original argument. Second, a review of relevant passages in makes clear that the critique of foundationalism is a prominent aspect of Sellars’s multi-faceted attack on the given. The conclusion reasserts the significance of Sellars’s place in the history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Newton claims to have proven the heterogeneity of light through his experimentum crucis. However, Olaf Müller has worked out in detail Goethe’s idea that one could likewise prove the heterogeneity of darkness by inverting Newton’s famous experiment. Müller concludes that this invalidates Newton’s claim of proof. Yet this conclusion only holds if the heterogeneity of light and the heterogeneity of darkness is logically incompatible. This paper shows that this is not the case. Instead, in Quine’s terms, we have two logically (...) compatible theories based on mutually irreducible theoretical terms. From a Quinean point of view, this does no harm to the provability of the corresponding statements. (shrink)

I argue that in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Wilfrid Sellars significantly misconstrued the early twentieth-century empiricists he was criticizing (empiricists such as Bertrand Russell, H.H. Price and C.I. Lewis). Because these philosophers and their theories were becoming passé (partly due to EPM itself but also due to broader trends), this misconstrual was not noted. As a result, Sellars’s most influential claim – that the given is a myth – did not receive the critical scrutiny that it should have (...) received prior to its widespread acceptance. (shrink)

In the intellectual autobiography that opens this book, Chisholm divides philosophers into “drones” and “commentators,” placing himself in the first group. As a drone, Chisholm proposed solutions to philosophical problems and asked his students and colleagues to try to refute him. He reports that they often did, sending him back to the drawing board. Chisholm’s wry self-description says much about his manner as well as his method. A more pretentious philosopher might have spoken of his dogged search for philosophical truth (...) in an age when many have come to disparage that quest. (shrink)

A striking empirical finding about color perception is that normal perceivers disagree about which hues are pure. (Pure hues contain no perceived admixture of any other color.) This finding poses a prima facie problem for color objectivism and representationalist accounts of perceptual experience. Michael Tye attempts to resolve this problem by arguing that pure hues do exist as objective properties of ordinary objects, but that human color detection mechanisms did not evolve with sufficient refinement to allow us to determine which (...) hues are the pure ones. I argue that Tye’s attempted solution fails, and that the most reasonable conclusion consistent with color objectivism is that pure hues do not exist. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that parkour can be understood as a way to recapture moments of non-alienated human experience in urban space. I draw on Hartmut Rosa’s theory of temporally caused alienati...

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion of expertise and skilled movement in sport by analysing the bodily practice of learning a new movement at a high level of skill in parkour. Based on Sennett’s theory of craftsmanship and an ethnographic field study with experienced practitioners, the analysis offers insight into the skilful, contextual and unique practice of parkour, and contributes to the renewed discussion of consciousness in sport at a high level of skill. With Sennett’s (...) concept of craftsmanship, it is possible to describe and grasp important aspects of obstacles put up, repetitions and material consciousness in developing perceptual and physical skills in parkour. The parkour craftsmen conduct a constant dialogue between concrete, material practices and thinking. It is argued in the article that Sennett’s ideas about craftsmanship are, in many ways, similar to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ concept of mastery, but are less elitist and exclusive than the theory of skill acquisition... (shrink)

It is controversial whether Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics is of critical importance for mathematical proofs, or is only concerned with the adequate philosophical interpretation of mathematics. Wittgenstein's remarks on the infinity of prime numbers provide a helpful example which will be used to clarify this question. His antiplatonistic view of mathematics contradicts the widespread understanding of proofs as logical derivations from a set of axioms or assumptions. Wittgenstein's critique of traditional proofs of the infinity of prime numbers, specifically those of (...) Euler and Euclid, not only offers philosophical insight but also suggests substantive improvements. A careful examination of his comments leads to a deeper understanding of what proves the infinity of primes. (shrink)

In two letters to Russell from 1913, Wittgenstein conjectured that first-order logic is decidable. His conjecture was based on his conviction that a decision procedure amounts to an equivalence transformation that converts initial formulas into ideal symbols of a proper notation that provides criteria for deciding the logical properties of the initial formulas. According to Wittgenstein, logical properties are formal properties that are decidable on the basis of pure manipulations of symbols. This understanding of logical properties (such as provability or (...) logical truth/falsehood) is independent of and prior to any interpretation or application of logic. Wittgenstein’s conception of logic is incompatible with the undecidability proof of Church and Turing from 1936. Thus, Wittgenstein’s conjecture and his understanding of logic appear to be refuted. This paper argues that Wittgenstein did not drew this conclusion and it explains why he never withdrew his conjecture. (shrink)

A dialogue between someone who finds Sellars's Rylean myth in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" quite implausible and another who defends it.

Conducting research during or in the aftermath of disasters poses many specific practical and ethical challenges. This is particularly the case with research involving human subjects. The extraordinary circumstances of research conducted in disaster settings require appropriate regulations to ensure the protection of human participants. The goal of this study is to systematically and qualitatively review the existing ethical guidelines for disaster research by using the constant comparative method. We performed a systematic qualitative review of disaster research ethics guidelines to (...) collect and compare existing regulations. Guidelines were identified by a three-tiered search strategy: 1) searching databases, 2) an Internet search, and 3) a search of the references in the included documents from the first two searches. We used the constant comparative method for analysis of included guidelines. Fourteen full text guidelines were included for analysis. The included guidelines covered the period 2000-2014. Qualitative analysis of the included guidelines revealed two core themes: vulnerability and research ethics committee review. Within each of the two core themes, various categories and subcategories were identified. Some concepts and terms identified in analyzed guidelines are used in an inconsistent manner and applied in different contexts. Conceptual clarity is needed in this area as well as empirical evidence to support the statements and requirements included in analyzed guidelines. (shrink)

This paper argues for a physicalistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein's general conception of world and language analysis is interpreted and exemplified in relation to the historical background of the psychophysical analysis of sense data and, in particular, color analysis. Three of his main principles of analysis—the principle of independence, the context principle and the principle of atomism—are interpreted and justified on the background of physicalism. From his proof of color exclusion in the Tractatus, it is shown that Wittgenstein (...) had a detailed conception of how philosophy should fulfil the task of distinguishing between sense and nonsense using physicalistic presuppositions. (shrink)

Background Genomic research on neurodevelopmental disorders (NDDs), particularly involving minors, combines and amplifies existing research ethics issues for biomedical research. We performed a review of the literature on the ethical issues associated with genomic research involving children affected by NDDs as an aid to researchers to better anticipate and address ethical concerns. Results Qualitative thematic analysis of the included articles revealed themes in three main areas: research design and ethics review, inclusion of research participants, and communication of research results. Ethical (...) issues known to be associated with genomic research in general, such as privacy risks and informed consent/assent, seem especially pressing for NDD participants because of their potentially decreased cognitive abilities, increased vulnerability, and stigma associated with mental health problems. Additionally, there are informational risks: learning genetic information about NDD may have psychological and social impact, not only for the research participant but also for family members. However, there are potential benefits associated with research participation, too: by enrolling in research, the participants may access genetic testing and thus increase their chances of receiving a (genetic) diagnosis for their neurodevelopmental symptoms, prognostic or predictive information about disease progression or the risk of concurrent future disorders. Based on the results of our review, we developed an ethics checklist for genomic research involving children affected by NDDs. Conclusions In setting up and designing genomic research efforts in NDD, researchers should partner with communities of persons with NDDs. Particular attention should be paid to preventing disproportional burdens of research participation of children with NDDs and their siblings, parents and other family members. Researchers should carefully tailor the information and informed consent procedures to avoid therapeutic and diagnostic misconception in NDD research. To better anticipate and address ethical issues in specific NDD studies, we suggest researchers to use the ethics checklist for genomic research involving children affected by NDDs presented in this paper. (shrink)

Antony Flew's ?A Strong Programme for the Sociology of Belief (Inquiry 25 {1982], 365?78) critically assesses the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge defended in David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery. I argue that Flew's rejection of the epistemological relativism evident in Bloor's work begs the question against the relativist and ignores Bloor's focus on the social relativity of mathematical knowledge. Bloor attempts to establish such relativity via a sociological analysis of Frege's theory of number. But this analysis only (...) succeeds if the rejection of an explanatory theory entails that there are reasonable grounds for the rejection of the set of propositions which that theory was intended to explain. I argue against such an entailment, and thus against Bloor's attempt to relativize mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Logical relativism is the view that a logical proposition is known just in case it is collectively endorsed in some culture. This striking and controversial view is defended by David Bloor and Richard C. Jennings. They cite in its support distinctive reasoning practices among the Azande as described by E. E. Evans-Pitchard. Jennings has challenged my critique of Bloor's logical relativism, claiming that my analysis is based on misunderstandings of Bloor and Evans-Pritchard. I argue that Jennings' clarifications of Bloor do (...) nothing to support the thesis of logical relativism, and that a direct examination of Evans-Pritchard's evidence suggests that the Azande reason just as we do. (shrink)

Newton claimed to have proven the heterogeneity of sunlight by experiment. Olaf Müller argues that one could likewise prove the heterogeneity of darkness from inverting Newton’s experiments. Müller concludes that both, Newton’s proofs and his underlying methodology, are inconclusive and that Newton’s theory is underdetermined. This paper argues that Müller’s criticism is not justified because the conducted inverted experiments to which Müller refers do not replace Newton’s source of light with a source of darkness. Therefore, Müller does not refute Newton’s (...) methodology, nor does he provide an example of underdetermined theories. (shrink)

Es wird anhand von Fallbeispielen aus der Geschichte der Farbenlehre inwissenschaftstheoretische Probleme eingeführt. Das Buch dient als Grundlagefür eine anwendungsbezogene Lehre und als Einführung in folgende ThemenbereicheNewton vs. Goethe; Theorie und Experiment, Colormetrie; Empfindungsmessung;Helmholtz vs. Hering; Theorienevaluation, Psychologische Farbenlehre; Phänomenologie,Farbausschluss; Beweistheorie, Farbdefinitionen; Theorien- und Begriffsbildung.Neben Aufgaben, Texten und Lösungsvorschlägen finden sich eine Bibliographiesowie Einleitungen zu den behandelten Fragen und Lösungsvorschlägen derjeweiligen Themen.

Anhand der genaueren Analyse von Newtons experimentum crucis und der Argumentation, die er auf dieses Experiment stützt, sowie Goethes Kritik hieran sollen im Folgenden zwei verbreitete Vorurteile revidiert werden: -/- 1. Newton ist kein Dogmatiker, der methodische Ansprüche vertritt, die er nicht einlösen kann, sondern gründet seinen Anspruch, experimentelle Beweise führen zu können, auf einer vorbildlichen Methodologie kausaler Erklärungen, was seine Kritiker allerdings übersehen. 2. Goethe ist kein Antiwissenschaftler, der einen einzigartigen Kontrapunkt zur vorherrschenden wissenschaftlichen Tradition bildet, sondern steht inmitten (...) traditioneller Auffassungen zur Farbenlehre, deren experimentelle und methodologische Grundlagen bezüglich eines Erklärungsanspruches denen Newtons unterlegen sind. (shrink)

In §8 of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM), Appendix 3 Wittgenstein imagines what conclusions would have to be drawn if the Gödel formula P or ¬P would be derivable in PM. In this case, he says, one has to conclude that the interpretation of P as “P is unprovable” must be given up. This “notorious paragraph” has heated up a debate on whether the point Wittgenstein has to make is one of “great philosophical interest” revealing “remarkable insight” in (...) Gödel’s proof, as Floyd and Putnam suggest (Floyd (2000), Floyd (2001)), or whether this remark reveals Wittgenstein’s misunderstanding of Gödel’s proof as Rodych and Steiner argued for recently (Rodych (1999, 2002, 2003), Steiner (2001)). In the following the arguments of both interpretations will be sketched and some deficiencies will be identified. Afterwards a detailed reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s argument will be offered. It will be seen that Wittgenstein’s argumentation is meant to be a rejection of Gödel’s proof but that it cannot satisfy this pretension. (shrink)

An essential feature of Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic is the conjecture of a positive solution to the question of whether logical truth in first-order logic is decidable (Entscheidungsproblem). It is often argued that the proofs of a negative solution to the Entscheidungsproblem presented in the 1930s refuted Wittgenstein's early conception of logic. However, we argue Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic does not share the principles assumed by the proof strategies of those undecidability proofs. Thus, the undecidability proofs do not refute (...) Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic based on its own convictions. Therefore, we provide a purely logical refutation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic that does not depend on assumptions that he does not accept. Wittgenstein claimed that the logical properties of first-order logic are decidable based on patterns in a suitable notation for first-order logic. We explain why this conviction is mistaken. (shrink)

This paper illustrates what a philosophical and a logical investigation of colors amounts to in contrast to other kinds of color analysis such as physical, physiological, chemical, psychological or cultural analysis of colors. Neither a philosophical nor a logical analysis of colors is concerned with specific aspects of colors. Rather, these kinds of color analysis are concerned with what one might call “logical foundations of color theory”. I will illustrate this first by considering philosophical and then logical analysis of colors.

I argue that we can achieve certainty about some empirical propositions. When someone is having a migraine and attending to it, she can be certain that she is in pain. I show that examples intended to undermine claims of certainty or to raise doubts about the reliability of introspection do not touch such cases. Traditional foundationalists have held that epistemically certain beliefs can serve as the basis for all one’s other justified beliefs. This is not so, because those beliefs that (...) are certain are spread too thinly to serve as broad justificatory foundations. Certainty has a different role. The best explanation for the existence of epistemically certain empirical beliefs is experientialism, the view that nondoxastic sensory experiences can justify beliefs. Experientialism then offers a framework for showing how the stream of sensory experiences can provide an adequate basis for the justification of our ordinary beliefs about the external world. (shrink)

This paper describes a decision procedure for disjunctions of conjunctions of anti-prenex normal forms of pure first-order logic (FOLDNFs) that do not contain V within the scope of quantifiers. The disjuncts of these FOLDNFs are equivalent to prenex normal forms whose quantifier-free parts are conjunctions of atomic and negated atomic formulae (= Herbrand formulae). In contrast to the usual algorithms for Herbrand formulae, neither skolemization nor unification algorithms with function symbols are applied. Instead, a procedure is described that rests on (...) nothing but equivalence transformations within pure first-order logic (FOL). This procedure involves the application of a calculus for negative normal forms (the NNF-calculus) with A -||- A & A (= &I) as the sole rule that increases the complexity of given FOLDNFs. The described algorithm illustrates how, in the case of Herbrand formulae, decision problems can be solved through a systematic search for proofs that reduce the number of applications of the rule &I to a minimum in the NNF-calculus. In the case of Herbrand formulae, it is even possible to entirely abstain from applying &I. Finally, it is shown how the described procedure can be used within an optimized general search for proofs of contradiction and what kind of questions arise for a &I-minimal proof strategy in the case of a general search for proofs of contradiction. (shrink)

In his early philosophy as well as in his middle period, Wittgenstein holds a purely syntactic view of logic and mathematics. However, his syntactic foundation of logic and mathematics is opposed to the axiomatic approach of modern mathematical logic. The object of Wittgenstein’s approach is not the representation of mathematical properties within a logical axiomatic system, but their representation by a symbolism that identifies the properties in question by its syntactic features. It rests on his distinction of descriptions and operations; (...) its aim is to reduce mathematics to operations. This paper illustrates Wittgenstein’s approach by examining his discussion of irrational numbers. (shrink)

Es wird gezeigt, dass Wittgenstein in seiner Frühphilosophie ein nicht-axiomatisches Beweisverständnis entwickelt, für das sich das Problem der Begründung der Axiome nicht stellt. Nach Wittgensteins Beweisverständnis besteht der Beweis einer formalen Eigenschaft einer Formel – z.B. der logischen Wahrheit einer prädikatenlogischen Formel oder der Gleichheit zweier arithmetischer Ausdrücke – in der Transformation der Formel in eine andere Notation, an deren Eigenschaften sich entscheiden lässt, ob die zu beweisende formale Eigenschaft besteht oder nicht besteht. Dieses Verständnis grenzt Wittgenstein gegenüber einem axiomatischen (...) Beweisverständnis ab. Sein Beweisverständnis bedingt ein Programm der Grundlegung der Mathematik, das eine Alternative zu den Ansätzen des Logizismus, Formalismus und Konstruktivismus darstellt. Wittgensteins Ansatz steht im Widerspruch zu den Ergebnissen der Metamathematik, da er die Möglichkeit der Formulierung von Entscheidungsverfahren in der Prädikatenlogik und Arithmetik voraussetzt. Um seinem Ansatz gegenüber der traditionellen Metamathematik Recht zu geben, müsste gezeigt werden, dass sein Beweisverständnis im Bereich der Logik und Arithmetik – der traditionellen Metamathematik zum Trotz – realisierbar ist. (shrink)

In contrast to Hintikka’s enormously complex distributive normal forms of first- order logic, this paper shows how to generate minimized disjunctive normal forms of first-order logic. An effective algorithm for this purpose is outlined, and the benefits of using minimized disjunctive normal forms to explain the truth conditions of propo- sitions expressible within pure first-order logic are presented.

This paper compares several models of formalization. It articulates criteria of correct formalization and identifies their problems. All of the discussed criteria are so called “semantic” criteria, which refer to the interpretation of logical formulas. However, as will be shown, different versions of an implicitly applied or explicitly stated criterion of correctness depend on different understandings of “interpretation” in this context.

The young Wittgenstein called his conception of logic “New Logic” and opposed it to the “Old Logic”, i.e. Frege’s and Russell’s systems of logic. In this paper the basic objects of Wittgenstein’s conception of a New Logic are outlined in contrast to classical logic. The detailed elaboration of Wittgenstein’s conception depends on the realization of his ab-notation for first order logic.

Newton claims that his theorems in the Opticks are derived from experiments alone. The paper explains this dictum by relating Newton’s proof method to an iconic conception of proof as opposed to a symbolic one. Theorems are not derived from hypotheses; instead properties of light are identified by experimental properties based on rules of inductive reasoning.

Turing proved the unsolvability of the decision problem for first-order logic (Entscheidungsproblem) in his famous paper On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. From this proof it follows that attempts to specify a solution for the Entscheidungsproblem through pattern detection in automated theorem proving (ATP) must fail. Turing’s proof, however, merely predicts the non-existence of such solutions; it does not construct concrete examples that explain why specific attempts to solve the decision problem by pattern detection fail. ATP-search often (...) runs in infinite loops in the case of unprovable, i.e. not refutable, formulas and one can ask why finite patterns of repeated inference steps cannot serve as criteria for unprovability. We answer this question by constructing pairs of formulas (ϕ,ϕ′) such that ϕ is provable (refutable) and ϕ′ is unprovable (satisfiable in an infinite domain) but all but the last proof step of the ATP-search for ϕ is a proper part of the endless ATP-search for ϕ′. We generate such pairs of formulas by mimicking computable sequences for a certain kind of universal Turing machine, namely, splitting Turing machines (STMs), via sequences of inference steps in ATP. In contrast to Turing’s and the textbooks’ method to formalize Turing machines, our method does not rely on further axioms and allows us to transfer the straightforward insight that the halting problem cannot be solved through pattern detection to the case of the Entscheidungsproblem. Our method is a constructive alternative to general undecidability proofs that explains why a scientific problem, namely the Entscheidungsproblem, is unsolvable in a specific way. This explanation provides a better understanding of the failure of pattern detection, which is of interest to: (i) the programmer, who is concerned with prospects and limits of pattern detection, (ii) the logician, who is interested in identifying logical properties by properties of an ideal notation, and (iii) the philosopher, who is interested in proof methods. (shrink)

Existe uma linha tênue entre o processo de saúde-adoecimento e o que pode ser considerado fator de satisfação ou de insatisfação na carreira. Esse processo e a forma como cada pessoa/profissional reage a determinada situação varia conforme cada indivíduo e contexto. Logo, o que pode ser satisfatório para uma pessoa pode não ser para outra, da mesma forma, como algo considerado estressante para um pode não ser para outro. Entram em cena questões de ordem pessoal, econômica, sociocultural, estilo de vida, (...) ou seja, tem todo um contexto e uma conjuntura por trás de como cada pessoa reage diante de determinada situação. Esse entendimento é passível de ser aplicado a qualquer profissão, sendo o foco desse texto, a docência. Deste modo, objetivou-se compreender que fatores são considerados como causadores de satisfação no trabalho docente daqueles que atuam em programas de pós-graduação, com conceito 4, em um Estado da região sul do Brasil. Os dados foram coletados através de um questionário semiestruturado encaminhado por email, cujas respostas foram analisadas por meio da análise textual discursiva. Como principais resultados, emergiram as seguintes categorias: docência (e aqui adentram as aulas dadas, a criação dos planos para as disciplinas, as orientações, a autonomia metodológica e a liberdade de cátedra), o estudar, o pesquisar, os resultados de pesquisas, a produção com os alunos, o contato com os alunos, o acompanhamento da evolução/crescimento dos alunos e, por fim, o reconhecimento, que reitera a questão de valorização. Concluiu-se que as categorias emergentes são reflexo de um quadro profissional específico, de uma região particular, mas que se coadunam com o que a teoria nacional desvela e revela. As categorias emergentes possuem relação direta com a essência do trabalho docente, também, como é sentida e valorizada pelo seu entorno. (shrink)

Phenomenology’s return to lived experience and “to the things themselves” is often contrasted with the synthesized perspective of science and its “view from nowhere.” The extensive use of neuropsychological case reports in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, however, suggests that the relationship between phenomenology and science is more complex than a sheer opposition, and a fruitful one for the praxis of medicine. Here, I propose a new reading of how Merleau-Ponty justifies his use of Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein’s reports on (...) Johann Schneider for his phenomenology of embodied perception. I argue that for Merleau-Ponty these neuropsychological case reports represent a coherent deformation of the intercorporeally expressed existence of Schneider that through speech fall again onto the common ground of perception, thereby allowing Merleau-Ponty to understand, in the equivalent sense delivered by language, Schneider’s total being and fundamental illness. I then discuss what Merleau-Ponty’s method implies for a phenomenological praxis of medicine, and for the role of science in this praxis. (shrink)