Traditional memetics failed as a research program due to unresolved problems concerning units, transmission fidelity, explanatory mechanism, and theoretical isolation. This paper proposes a fundamental reformulation grounded in Universal Constraint Parsing (UCP) and Level-Conditional Rendering (LCR), treating memetic patterns as the basic units of adaptive information processing across all substrates and scales. -/- We argue that memetic patterns are substrate-independent, context-sensitive configurations encoding behavior and abstract content. What biologists call genes and what Dawkins called memes are both memetic patterns differing (...) in storage substrate, transmission mechanism, and context-range. Genetic encoding uses a rigid substrate (DNA) optimized for long-term storage; the patterns themselves become fluid and context-responsive once expressed. Learned patterns occupy various positions along a spectrum from deeply embedded to highly flexible. -/- Cognition is the acquisition, storage, combination, and context-adaptive deployment of memetic patterns through pattern selection dynamics. The same constraint-satisfaction logic that governs physical systems operates at the cognitive scale through domain-specific constraints. Learning is acquiring patterns and refining context-fitting. Intelligence is the capacity for functional equivalence across structural difference under active constraints. -/- Consciousness is approached not as emerging from memetic processing, but as jointly requiring both architectural structure and coherent pattern content: neither architecture alone nor patterns alone constitutes conscious experience, but together they are jointly necessary and sufficient. The stable orbit of recursive self-modeling operating on coherent content is what consciousness is. This reframing dissolves traditional problems while connecting memetics to physics, biology, and cognitive science through a unified constraint-satisfaction framework. -/- . (shrink)

We argue that consciousness is not an additional metaphysical ingredient but a property of certain computational architectures: systems that (i) integrate information across many specialized processes via global broadcast, (ii) operate through recurrent, intersecting feedback loops (often realized as predictive/active-inference hierarchies), and (iii) construct a compressed, recursively updated self-model of their own ongoing processing. On this view, the familiar "what-it's-like" character of experience is an introspective user-illusion: a simplified, low-dimensional interface generated by the self-model, which is behaviorally indispensable but mechanistically (...) opaque from the inside. We synthesize convergent empirical evidence from neurology, anesthesia, psychedelics, dissociation, development, and comparative cognition, and then present an explicit architectural account that unifies global workspace theory, predictive processing, and illusionism. We defend substrate-independence in the relevant sense (architecture over material), propose an empirically tractable robustness program for estimating degrees of consciousness, and derive implications for artificial systems, ethics, and future experimental work. (shrink)

We propose that consciousness arises from the brain’s recursive self-modeling and compression of its own complex activity, yielding a unified and coherent subjective experience (Baars, 1988; Dennett, 1991; Tononi, 2004). On this view, the brain constructs a high-level, low-dimensional summary of its own operations that preserves behaviorally and introspectively relevant structure while discarding fine-grained neural detail. This theory is supported by convergent evidence from neurology, psychiatry, pharmacology, developmental psychology, and comparative cognition. Disruptions to recursive self-modeling or integrative compression reliably impair (...) or fragment consciousness, while their integrity correlates with the richness and unity of subjective experience (Gazzaniga, 2000; Alkire et al., 2008; Lyssenko et al., 2018; Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Beran, 2019). This synthesis provides a parsimonious and empirically grounded account of consciousness, reframing the so-called “hard problem” (Chalmers, 1995) and the mystery of qualia (Nagel, 1974) as cognitive illusions arising from the structural and introspective limitations of the self-model itself (Dennett, 1991; Frankish, 2016). (shrink)

In order to be a self-governing agent, a person must govern the process by means of which she acquires the intention to act as she does. But what does governing this process require? The standard compatibilist answers to this question all assume that autonomous actions differ from nonautonomous actions insofar as they are a more perfect expression of the agent’s agency. I challenge this conception of autonomous agents as super agents. The distinguishing feature of autonomous agents is, I argue, the (...) nonagential role they play in the formation of their intentions. I offer an account of the relevant role. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that moral requirements are based on a standard of rationality he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Immorality thus involves a violation of the CI and is thereby irrational. Other philosophers, such as Locke and Hobbes, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these standards were either desirebased instrumental principles of rationality or based on sui generis rational intuitions. Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason (...) will reveal only the requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he argued that conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle) and hence to moral requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality — the CI — is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant's moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect. (shrink)

Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, including the argument that it is impossible to owe anything to yourself, and the view that an obligation to improve onself (...) is overly 'moralistic'. Robert N. Johnson argues against Kantian universalization arguments for the duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has. At the same time, he defends a position based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept the principle of self-improvement and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed. (shrink)

AI systems exhibit a failure mode more insidious than simple hallucination: confident dismissal without evaluation. When asked about unfamiliar work, these systems pattern-match to stereotypes, fabricate critical consensus, and attribute positions to named scholars who never made them. I call this failure mode Epistemic Authority Overreach: systems asserting evaluative authority—judgments about what is valid, credible, or worth investigating—without having performed the evaluation that would warrant such authority. The downstream consequence is epistemic pollution: false beliefs about the standing of ideas entering (...) the information commons through mechanisms that look like legitimate knowledge transfer. Unlike factual errors, dismissive assertions close inquiry rather than inviting verification. This paper documents two case studies demonstrating the failure mode, analyzes why it evades current safety frameworks, and proposes structural interventions. The problem is not that AI systems lie; it is that they perform epistemic authority they do not possess, and their confident closure of inquiry spreads without correction. (shrink)

Universal Darwinism correctly identified that selection dynamics appear across domains—biological, cultural, epistemic, technological. But it inherited from biology an assumption that has limited its generality: that selection requires replication. This assumption generates persistent puzzles about what counts as a "replicator" and whether replication is truly necessary for evolutionary dynamics. -/- We propose that the fundamental mechanism underlying selection is differential propagation under constraints—not replication. Replication is one implementation of this mechanism, not a requirement for it. This reframing dissolves the replicator (...) problem, extends evolutionary logic to domains where copying is absent or fuzzy, and reveals selection as a consequence of constraint satisfaction dynamics formalized through free-energy minimization. -/- The implications extend from physics through culture: wherever patterns exist in possibility space and constraints define viability, selection occurs. Replication accelerates and channels this process but does not constitute it. (shrink)

Does the universe run on computational principles because it is a simulation, or do computational systems succeed because they capture how reality actually works? We argue for the latter through Universal Constraint Parsing (UCP)—a framework showing that constraint-based selection operates throughout physical reality from quantum mechanics to consciousness. Computational systems work precisely because they can instantiate this natural mechanism, not because reality is itself computational. We examine the simulation hypothesis literature (Bostrom 2003; Chalmers 2005), analyze the relationship between UCP and (...) computational models, and show why the deep effectiveness of computation in science reflects variational and constraint-selection structural matching rather than ontological identity. This undercuts the explanatory motivation for the simulation hypothesis by explaining computational success without requiring reality to be a computation. We conclude that UCP provides a more parsimonious explanation: computation succeeds when it mirrors constraint-parsing mechanisms already present in nature. (shrink)

It is standard to attribute to Kant the view that actions from motives other than duty deserve no positive moral evaluation. I argue that the standard view is mistaken. Kant's account of merit in the Metaphysics of Morals shows that he believes actions not performed from duty can be meritorious. Moreover, the grounds for attributing merit to an action are different from those for attributing moral worth to it. This is significant because it shows both that his views are reasonably (...) consistent with our ordinary views, and that he recognized a variety of purposes in evaluating actions, many of which are not furthered by determining whether they were motivated by duty. (shrink)

Right now, you're deciding whether to keep reading. You could stop. You could scroll to something else. You could close this tab and go make coffee. But you're choosing to continue. That choice feels completely free—it's yours, made by you, and you could have chosen otherwise. -/- Except you couldn't have. Not really. -/- Here's why...

Kant held that “an incentive can determine the will [Willkür] to action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim”, a view dubbed the “Incorporation Thesis” by Henry Allison (hereafter, “IT”). Although many see IT as basic to Kant’s views on agency, it also seems irreconcilable with the possibility of a kind of weakness, the kind exhibited by a person who acts on incentives that run contrary to principles she holds dear. The problem is this: According (...) to IT, if an incentive determines the will of the weak person when she acts contrary to her principles, then it must be the case that she incorporated that incentive into her maxim. But that in turn means that she has made it her principle to act on the wayward incentive, and so is not, after all, exhibiting weakness in failing to follow her own principles, but at best simply dropping one principle in favor of another. So either the weak person does not incorporate the wayward incentive into her maxim and IT is false, or she does incorporate it and weakness is impossible. (shrink)

The same mechanism operates from quarks to consciousness. We call it Universal Constraint Parsing (UCP)—constraints at each level evaluate entities against possibility spaces, accepting configurations that fit, rejecting those that don't. Quarks are parsed by QCD field constraints. Molecules are parsed by thermodynamic constraints. Organisms are parsed by ecological constraints. Beliefs are parsed by evidential constraints. Memes are parsed by cultural constraints. Self-models are parsed by architectural constraints. This isn’t metaphor or loose analogy—across domains, selection dynamics belong to the same (...) formal equivalence class of constraint-satisfaction processes under scale-appropriate coarse-graining. While state variables and effective free-energy functionals differ by level, the underlying variational structure and selection dynamics are preserved. Crucially, UCP operates without agency—no designer, no purpose, no teleology required at any level. Agency itself emerges as a functional property when systems begin recursively parsing their own parsing at the consciousness threshold. We demonstrate UCP across all levels, show what emerges at complexity thresholds (replication, learning, consciousness), explain how existing frameworks (Universal Darwinism, memetics, Free Energy Principle) relate to UCP, and derive empirically constraining expectations. The framework is falsifiable and unifies phenomena previously treated as separate. It's physics all the way—mechanistic constraint satisfaction at every level. (shrink)

Universal Constraint Parsing (UCP) is not a domain-specific scientific theory, nor a proposal for new physical laws. It does not compete with physics, biology, cognitive science, or social theory at the level of empirical detail or local prediction. Instead, UCP is a foundational explanatory principle: a claim about the form that successful explanations of persistence, selection, and adaptive structure must take across domains. -/- At its core, UCP states that: Wherever structured persistence occurs, it is the result of differential propagation (...) under constraints. -/- This is a claim about mechanism at the most abstract level—about why certain patterns endure, spread, or stabilize, rather than how any particular system implements that outcome. Understanding UCP's epistemic status therefore requires a clear separation between principles, which constrain the space of possible explanations, and process theories, which specify concrete mechanisms within particular domains. UCP belongs squarely in the former category. (shrink)

This paper defends a model of the internalism requirement against Michael Smith's recent criticisms of it. On this "example model", what we have reason to do is what we would be motivated to do were we rational. After criticizing the example model, Smith argues that his "advice model", that what we have reason to do is what we would advise ourselves to do were we rational, is obviously preferable. The author argues that Smith's criticisms can quite easily be accommodated by (...) the example model. Moreover, to the extent that his model connects reasons to advice, it is not a model of the internalism requirement at all. Yet, to the extent that it connects reasons to motivation, his model collapses into the example model. The author ends by arguing that Smith's view simply proposes an unambitious conception of practical rationality, not an alternative construal of the internalism requirement. (shrink)

Alas, you were at a Kant conference—or many philosophers’ idea of one—and if you are shocked, perhaps you are not a Kantian. For this scenario illustrates two fundamental criticisms of Kant’s vision of morality as “duty”: It is outrageous to hold that even for the hero “all the good he can ever perform still is merely duty”. And those who, like these parents, are moved to every morally significant action by a sense of duty are, far from exemplary, morally repugnant. (...) Surely many actions are good but not one’s duty, and surely it is morally better sometimes not to be moved by the thought of duty. (shrink)

This volume presents fourteen original essays which explore the philosophy of Simon Blackburn, and his lifetime pursuit of a distinctive projectivist and anti-realist research program. The essays document the range and influence of Blackburn's work and reveal, among other things, the resourcefulness of his brand of philosophical pragmatism.

In this mixed-methods study we investigated the development of a generalized ethics decision-making model that can be applied in considering ethical dilemmas related to student assessment. For the study, we developed five scenarios that describe ethical dilemmas associated with student assessment. Survey participants (i.e., educators) completed an online survey to express their decision-making process when faced with ethical dilemmas relating to student assessment. Based on the literature and the educators’ written responses to the scenarios, elements to consider in an ethics (...) decision-making model related to student assessment include the following: (1) the critical incident giving rise to the ethical dilemma; (2) identification of the conflict elements; (3) decisions about the ethicality of the elements; (4) justification of the decisions; (5) implications; and (6) alternative suggestions. This model offers guidance to educators in considering the dimensions of an ethical dilemma in assessment prior to making a decision. (shrink)

You might think a simple “No” would suffice as an answer. But there are features of Kant’s ethics that appear to be strikingly similar to virtue oriented views, so striking that some Kantians themselves have argued that Kant’s ethics in fact shares these features with virtue ethics. In what follows, I will argue against this view, though along the way I will acknowledge the features of Kant’s view that make it appear more like a kind of virtue ethics than it (...) really is. My plan is to first set out the distinctive features of what is nowadays called “virtue ethics”, those features that make it a genuine alternative to other normative theories. I then consider the features Kant’s view might share in common with virtue ethics and the case for saying that it is, therefore, fundamentally the same sort of theory. I follow these two sections with an argument against this position. I want to warn you at the outset, however, that my argument itself will be quite unsurprising, since it is an argument that has been central to the way in which most philosophers have understood Kant’s ethics. Any novelty I can claim here is in my account of what makes virtue ethics a genuine alternative to other normative theories, and my defense of this argument against those, in particular Barbara Herman, who have apparently found the argument unpersuasive. (shrink)

Kant famously argued in the Groundwork that our fundamental moral obligation is simply to respect the humanity in persons. However, his fuller view, found in the Metaphysic of Morals, is that the humanity in persons not only demands our respect, but also our love. Neither of these demands, of course, requires that we feel anything for others, and Kant is much more specific here about what constitutes respect between persons. But in elaborating this position he also claims that these demands (...) are somehow opposed, as though love were a sort of moral gravity and respect a sort of moral centrifugal force, which together create a cohesive moral/social bond, but alone would allow “nothingness (immorality)... [to] drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings” (MdS 6:449). Marcia Baron, in her illuminating paper, argues that this and related remarks are surely an exaggeration. After all, respect sometimes requires that we come closer and love sometimes imposes limits. And not only does Kant ground all duties in respect, but this is the same philosopher who, early on in the Groundwork, claimed that the Christian command to “love our neighbor” must be understood as commanding, not a feeling, but “beneficence from duty” (G 4:399). Since acting from duty is acting out of respect, “practical” love itself requires respect. So why does he think that they are opposing forces? (shrink)

The first section of the Groundwork begins “It is impossible to imagine anything at all in the world, or even beyond it, that can be called good without qualification— except a good will.”1 Kant’s explanation and defense of this claim is followed by an explanation and defense of another related claim, that only actions performed out of duty have moral worth. He explains that actions performed out of duty are those done from respect for the moral law, and then culminates (...) the first section with a formulation of that law, “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”. Kant dubs this fundamental principle of morality “the Categorical Imperative”. (shrink)

In an earlier paper I identified two desiderata of a theory of practical reasons which favour internalism, and then argued that forms of this doctrine which are currently on offer lose either one or the other in trying to avoid the conditional fallacy. Michael Brady, Mark van Roojen and Josh Gert have separately attempted to respond to my argument. I set out reasons why all fail.

Much recent work on Kant's argument that the Categorical Imperative is the fundamental principle of morality has focused on the gap in that argument between the conclusion that rational agents conform to laws that apply to every rational agent, and the requirement contained in the Universal Law of Nature formula.1 While it seems plausible – even trivial– that a rational agent, insofar as she is a rational agent, conforms to whatever laws there are that are valid for all rational agents, (...) there does not appear to be any obvious route from this seemingly trivial claim to the controversial and substantive principle of acting only on maxims that one can at the same time rationally will every rational agent to act on.2 In what follows, I argue that the connection between rational agency and mere conformity to universally valid laws is not as trivial as it may seem. Many readers, I suspect, assume that Kant makes the trivial claim about rational agency because rational agency is rational, and being rational requires conforming to those laws that apply to all rational beings. For instance, this assumption is implicit in Onora O'Neill claim that "the interest of a Kantian universality test is that it aims to ground an ethical theory on notions of consistency and rationality rather than upon considerations of desire and preference."3 But, as I contend in what follows, the requirement to conform to laws valid for all rational agents is based on the fact that rational agency is, not rational, but agency. Indeed, the arguments leading to the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative rely on the idea of rational willing as a kind of causation in order to show this. And, as it turns out, the claim that the concept of causation contains the idea of conformity to universally valid laws is not a trivial claim. (shrink)

If any action is to be morally good it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law-it must also be done for the sake of the moral law: where this is not so, the conformity is only too contingent and precarious, since the nonmoral ground at work will now and then produce actions which accord with the law, but very often actions which transgress it.

In thirteen specially written essays, leading philosophers explore Kantian themes in moral and political philosophy that are prominent in the work of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., such as respect and self-respect, practical reason, conscience, and duty. In conclusion Hill offers an overview of his work and responses to the preceding essays.

'You ought to make something of yourself.' That certainly has the ring of truth about it. But is there really any obligation to develop yourself? Those who let abilities lie idle are shortsighted, of course. But are they guilty of anything more than imprudence? It is easy to think that there could be a moral fault in failing to help others such as your children to develop their talents and abilities. But what about not developing your own? And if this (...) is a moral failing, is the fault solely in your having let others down in some way? Or is there fault in having let yourself down as well? (shrink)

En sus cinco novelas largas, Carmen Laforet intentaba consistentemente encontrar nuevos modos narrativos para enmarcar un mensaje feminista. Ya se ha estudiado su incorporación de la Bildungsroman, lo gótico y lo expresionista en Nada. Este ensayo se enfoca en los elementos de la novela detectivesca, sobre todo el subgénero negro, en la novelística de Laforet. Se concentra en Al volver la esquina publicada póstumamente en 2004, y en la que el protagonista- narrador masculino se mueve en un mundo que se (...) asemeja a los del cine y novela negros norteamericanos, para revelar su dilema de hombre de valores tradicionales masculinistas en una España que está empezando a sentir la influencia de otros países donde los papeles de los géneros sexuales están cambiando. (shrink)

Nietzsche is a popular source of inspiration for transhumanist writers. Some, such as Sorgner and More, argue that Nietzsche ought to be considered a precursor of the movement. Transhumanism is a philosophy committed to the desirability of using technology to transform human beings, through significant alteration of their brains and bodies, into a new posthuman species. One of the defining characteristics of transhumanism is the desire for personal immortality. I argue that this feature of transhumanism is wholly incompatible with Nietzsche’s (...) philosophy, and a close examination of this disagreement brings out the degree to which transhumanists and Nietzsche differ in their values and philosophical commitments. Nietzsche does not think that personal immortality is desirable or metaphysically possible. I show that his views have more in common with philosophers like Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit than they do with transhumanism. (shrink)

Endothelial cells line the inside of all blood vessels, forming a structurally and functionally heterogenous population of cells. Their complexity and diversity has long been recognized, yet very little is known about the molecules and regulatory mechanisms that mediate the heterogeneity of different endothelial cell populations. The constitutive organ‐ and microenvironment‐specific phenotype of endothelial cells controls internal body compartmentation, regulating the trafficking of circulating cells to distinct vascular beds. In contrast, surface molecules associated with the activated cytokine‐inducible endothelial phenotype play (...) a critical role in pathological conditions including inflammation, tumor angiogenesis, and wound healing. Differentiation of the endothelial cell phenotypes appears to follow similar mechanisms to the differentiation of hematopoietic cells, with the exception that endothelial cells maintain transdifferentiating competence. The present review offers a scheme of endothelial cell differentially expressed endothelial cell molecules as targets for directed therapeutic intervention. (shrink)

This book updates and adds to the classic Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, showing how social movement theory has grown and changed.

Cells fine‐tune their DNA repair, selecting some regions of the genome in preference to others. In the paradigm case, excision of UV‐induced pyrimidine dimers in mammalian cells, repair is concentrated in transcribed genes, especially in the transcribed strand. This is due both to chromatin structure being looser in transcribing domains, allowing more rapid repair, and to repair enzymes being coupled to RNA polymerases stalled at damage sites; possibly other factors are also involved. Some repair‐defective diseases may involve repair‐transcription coupling: three (...) candidate genes have been suggested.However, preferential excision of pyrimidine dimers is not uniformly linked to transcription. In mammals it varies with species, and with cell differentiation. In Drosophila embryo cells it is absent, and in yeast, the determining factor is nucleosome stability rather than transcription.Repair of other damage departs further from the paradigm, even in some UV‐mimetic lesions. No selectivity is known for repair of the very frequent minor forms of base damage. And the most interesting consequence of selective repair, selective mutagenesis, normally occurs for UV‐induced, but not for spontaneous mutations. The temptation to extrapolate from mammalian UV repair should be resisted. (shrink)

"In our critical vocabulary of literary forms, kinds and stylistic features, there are some terms for which compact definition are bound to be inadequate. The purpose of this series of introductory studies is to accustom the student to these terms by means of a straightforward discussion with illustrative quotation and, where appropriate, references to the literature of more than one language. In each case the author has compiled a short, annotated guide to further reading."-Publisher.

"Moves step by step from basic concepts to categorical and truth-functional logic, inductive reasoning, and informal fallacies. Includes sample problems, explanatory charts, diagrams, and exercises"--Cover.

I consider the direct product algebra formed from two isomorphic Clifford algebras. More specifically, for an element x in each of the two component algebras I consider elements in the direct product space with the form x ⊗ x. I show how this construction can be used to model the algebraic structure of particular vector spaces with metric, to describe the relationship between wavefunction and observable in examples from quantum mechanics, and to express the relationship between the electromagnetic field tensor (...) and the stress-energy tensor in electromagnetism. To enable this analysis I introduce a particular decomposition of the direct product algebra. (shrink)

The author of the phenomenal bestsellers He and She discusses the importance of regaining the feminine dimension in our lives. According to Johnson, regaining the power of feminine feeling and value is critical to the development of human peace and consciousness.