History: Autonomy

First of all, I would like to define utility in terms of economics as the satisfaction of a need, and further I would like to inquire why games have a certain utility for a human beyond ordinary satisfaction. Secondly, we can distinguish between competitive and cooperative games. A competitive game satisfies the need for argument, confrontation and hierarchy, which can be directed to liberalism and Epikur’s imagination of self-determination, since individuals are allowed to play within their own strategies, plans and (...) ideas. On the other side, there are cooperative games in which the players or individuals work together under the guise of a set of binding plus closed rules and regulations, which can be seen as a set of rules and regulations of the second order, since the players of a competitive game also have to respect a set of rules and regulations; however, their strategy is mostly based on the adaptation and anticipation of the possible moves the opponent has. Cooperative games seem to be similar to communitarianism and connected to Plutarch’s Art of Living, since the game is socially embedded. In the following, I would like to work on the question of which utility is achieved for a human by playing competitive games, chess for instance. “Chess is everything: Art, Science and Sports” – Anatoly Karpov Chess, as a game that combines aspects of Art, Science and Sports according to Anatoly Karpov, must be a game that stimulates understanding tremendously, since precise calculations are needed. Both players must extrapolate and estimate positions as positive or negative in order to find a hierarchy of optimal moves. Such thorough calculations rationalize thinking in a disciplined manner and stimulate diversity of ideas. Uncommon moves can give the players an advantage caused by the irritation of the opponent or by estimating the move as not dangerous or even useless, so that a player can benefit by leaving the traditional history of moves, thus creating new ways of thinking. In addition, it can be determined that games are a place of encountering new people, leading to new conversations and exchange of ideas and strategies, similar to an archaic fireplace of early mankind in the Stone Age. Summarizing, we can say that through planning, training of maximizing one’s own utility, and as a place of encountering the new, games have had an enormous utility in the development of thinking and the evolution of the “own” and “common”, and to this day have—although nowadays digitally—which can provide help in order to stay up to date with the latest developments in technology and in order to allow the world to grow together and to be only a few clicks away. (shrink)

Kant's endeavours in the field of practical philosophy or ethics are considered to be like his Copernican revolution in the speculative field. As he did so in the field of sepeculative philosophy, he tried to pose a new approach in ethics which comprises the positive points of his predecessors. In his view, this ethical theory is universal, necessary, and humanistic. In this approach the moral agent, like the very deed itself and it's end, is more important than other elements. This (...) moral agent-rational being- is both self-obligative and self-legislative; therefore, autonomy is the most important basis of his ethics. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau remains an important figure in the history of philosophy, both because of his contributions to political philosophy and moral psychology and because of his influence on later thinkers. Rousseau's own view of philosophy and philosophers was firmly negative, seeing philosophers as the post-hoc rationalizers of self-interest, as apologists for various forms of tyranny, and as playing a role in the alienation of the modern individual from humanity's natural impulse to compassion. The concern that dominates Rousseau's work is to (...) find a way of preserving human freedom in a world where human beings are increasingly dependent on one another for the satisfaction of their needs. This concern has two dimensions: material and psychological, of which the latter has greater importance. In the modern world, human beings come to derive their very sense of self from the opinion of others, a fact which Rousseau sees as corrosive of freedom and destructive of individual authenticity. In his mature work, he principally explores two routes to achieving and protecting freedom: the first is a political one aimed at constructing political institutions that allow for the co-existence of free and equal citizens in a community where they themselves are sovereign; the second is a project for child development and education that fosters autonomy and avoids the development of the most destructive forms of self-interest. However, though Rousseau believes the co-existence of human beings in relations of equality and freedom is possible, he is consistently and overwhelmingly pessimistic that humanity will escape from a dystopia of alienation, oppression, and unfreedom. In addition to his contributions to philosophy, Rousseau was active as a composer and a music theorist, as the pioneer of modern.. (shrink)

As a Catholic nun, to suggest Jacqueline Pascal as autonomous might at first glance seem contradictory. We show that her moral deference to the divine is not at all forfeiting her autonomy, but that aligning her own law with God's law is to align her own law with rationality itself, that is, the laws of nature. Her theoretical structure begins with a theory of virtue—viz., how and to whom we have an obligation to be moral. For her, acting in accordance (...) with cultural restrictions or following church orders against her own conscience would be living by the laws of another and so not acting autonomously. Pascal would not live by other's laws, regardless of whether her actions conform to the categories by which society expected her to act. The framework for her laws laid in Pascal's understanding of self-governance: if she wants to act virtuously then she must autonomously follow God's law by making it her own through the sentiments of her heart. Thus, she cannot live by the laws of men, but by the laws of her human nature and in alignment with a rightly ordered universe, that is, God's law, which we show parallels with a Stoic framework of autonomy. (shrink)

Ovaj rad istražuje doprinos jednog od najvažnijeg, a nezasluženo zanemarenog inte lektualca dvadesetog stoljeća, Ernsta Kantorowicza, modernoj debati između političke teologije i liberalnog konstitucionalizma, analizirajući aspekte iz njegovog djela "The Kings's Two Bodies." Možemo smatrati da je Kantorowicz kao filozof sudjelovao u "ti hom dijalogu" o pitanju suverena i političke fikcije s ostalim filozofima njemačkog go vornog područja; s Carlom Schmittom, Ernstom Cassirerom, Erikom Petersonom, kao i s filozofima koji se nisu primarno bavili filozofijom politike, poput Martina Heideggera i Carla (...) Gustava Junga; tihom u smislu da su se navedeni autori poznavali, kritizirali i nadovezivali na radove drugih, premda nisu uvijek direktno citirani. Unatoč tome što je Kantorowicz, poput Schmitta, sudjelovao u reakcionarnoj kritici Weimarske republike, njegovo djelo ne služi kao opravdanje "suverena 20. st.," odnosno nacionalsocijalizma, već kao pokazatelj na naš komplicirani odnos s nacionalnom državom, kao i neuspjeh da joj pobjegnemo. Ovdje možemo spomenuti da Kantorowicz nije samo bio dio debate "starog historicizma" nego je anticipirao i novi historicizam, gledajući njegov utjecaj na biopolitiku i Michela Foucaulta, koji u prvom poglavlju svog djela "Nadzora i kazne" gradi na idejama prikazanim u "Kraljeva dva tijela". (shrink)

Paul Guyer is well known for defending the claim that freedom, understood as the capacity to set ends, is Kant’s fundamental value. In contrast, I have developed a reading of Kant’s ethics that places autonomy and community at the heart of Kant’s ethics. At the heart of my account is a conception of autonomy understood as what I call the capacity for sovereignty. I argue that these two positions can be made compatible. To do this involves making a distinction between (...) the concepts of dignity and value and arguing that although autonomy, understood as the capacity for sovereignty, is the source of the dignity of humanity, this is compatible with the claim that the ultimate value for Kant is freedom understood as the capacity to set ends. To explain how this is possible I appeal to Wilfrid Sellars Kantian account of the moral point of view in Science and Metaphysics. (shrink)

In the Groundwork, we find three distinct conceptions of freedom: (i) A negative conception of freedom, understood as a capacity for spontaneous action independent of alien causes; (ii) a positive conception of freedom, understood as the capacity of giving law to oneself; and (iii) a second positive conception, understood as the capacity to give laws that bind others as well as oneself. The dominant interpretation of Kant ignores this third conception of freedom and interprets the second conception as a capacity (...) for self-determination or self-governance, which is seen as the most basic and important Kantian conception of autonomy. In this paper, we will focus mainly on explaining the distinction between the second and third conceptions of autonomy and will defend the claim that the third conception is morally the most basic. We will also explain briefly why Kant thinks that having the capacity for citizenship is necessary for having the capacity for self-governance. (shrink)

The concept of self-legislation or autonomy is one of the outstanding innovations of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that it also builds on previous positions. Even if Kant in the Groundwork classifies all other moral principles as heteronomous, it is important to recognize that Kant incorporates elements of Wolff’s theory of self-legislation and Crusius’ theory of obligation into his theory of autonomy. In this essay, I present the relevant themes in Wolff and Crusius and discuss how they (...) were taken up by Kant in the mid-1780s. (shrink)

The idea of autonomy, presented as Kant’s main achievement in the Groundwork and the second Critique, is hardly present in the ethics of the “Doctrine of Virtue”. Against Pauline Kleingeld’s recent interpretation, I argue that this does not amount to a disappearance of the Principle of Autonomy, but to an important development of the notion of autonomy. I first show that Kant still advocated the Principle of Autonomy in the 1790s along with the thought of lawgiving through one’s maxims. I (...) then argue that the role of autonomy in Kant’s later ethics has a different focus than in the previous works, which requires to connect autonomy with autocracy. Conversely, in the “Doctrine of Virtue”, autocracy, which Kant had employed before as an independent notion, is construed as a new layer of autonomy. What Kant there calls subjective autonomy is thereby considered as reason’s self-government in the maxims of each rational agent. (shrink)

Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...) und Gesetz nicht durch ihre Entgegensetzung bestimmen kann, sondern durcheinander erläutern muss. Wirkliche Freiheit ist nicht Freiheit von Gesetzen, sondern Freiheit in Gesetzen; verbindliche Normen sind nicht das, was Freiheit äußerlich beschränkt, sondern das, was Freiheit innerlich verwirklicht. Die Idee der Autonomie, die für die moderne praktische Philosophie seit Rousseau und Kant grundlegend ist, zielt so darauf, Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit in einem Zuge zu artikulieren: durch die Form selbstgegebener Gesetze. Mit Beiträgen von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard und Sebastian Rödl. (shrink)

The chapter deals with the two most distinctive elements of the Introduction of the Naturrecht Feyerabend, namely the notions of an end in itself and autonomy. I shall argue that both are to be interpreted with regard to the aim of explaining the ground of right. In this light, I suggest that the notion of an end in itself counters a voluntarist conception like Achenwall’s with a claim whose necessity has a twofold ground: First, the representation of an unconditional worth (...) emerges as a structural element of the practical use of reason. Second, that representation concerns the necessary self-understanding of moral subjects. Finally, I argue that the other distinctive element, the occurrence of the notion of autonomy, is best understood as an application of that idea to a specific issue, which Kant addresses by showing that freedom is a self-regulating domain. (shrink)

By defining freedom in terms of power, Spinoza understands individual freedom as irreducibly relational. I propose that Spinoza develops his theory of power to understand how individual power or freedom is limited and enhanced by the power of those around one. For Spinoza, the power of an individual is a function of that individual’s emotions, imaginative conceptions of itself and the world and its appetites. In this paper (1) I will argue that Spinoza reformulates a concept of freedom in terms (...) of power. (2) His mature theory of freedom as power proposes that individual power is determined through social interaction, and is thus best understood as a relational theory of freedom. (3) I will show that as a consequence of Spinoza’s theory, individual power and empowerment relies on those around the individual and, thus, to achieve individual liberation we must pursue collective empowerment. (shrink)

Autonomy is one of the central concepts of contemporary moral thought, and Kant is often credited with being the inventor of individual moral autonomy. But how and why did Kant develop this notion? The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy is the first essay collection exclusively devoted to this topic. It traces the emergence of autonomy from Kant's earliest writings to the changes that he made to the concept in his mature works. The essays offer a close historical and (...) philosophical analysis of what prompted Kant to develop his conception of autonomy, charting the historical background which prompted his search, and thoroughly analysing different stages of his writings in order to see which element of autonomy was introduced at which point. The resulting volume will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kantian moral philosophy, as well as to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill’s “liberty of thought and discussion” is both broader and narrower than some current understandings of free speech. On the one hand, Mill is not concerned only with state censorship: he argues against all attempts, official or otherwise, to restrict the range of opinion and public discussion. On the other hand, he seeks to defend uninhibited discussion of general topics, such as those to do with science, morality, religion, and politics. Thus, he opposes a social environment of orthodoxies (...) and heresies, but he does not defend defamatory falsehoods or incitements to violence. Mill’s approach is subtle and philosophically rewarding; it is worth revisiting, updating, and pondering for its implications at a time of contention over free speech issues. (shrink)

In spite of its everyday connotations, the term independence as republicans understand it is not a celebration of individualism or self-reliance but embodies an acknowledgement of the importance of personal and social relationships in people’s lives. It reflects our connectedness rather than separateness and is in this regard a relational ideal. Properly understood, independence is a useful concept in addressing a fundamental problem in social philosophy that has preoccupied theorists of relational autonomy, namely how to reconcile the idea of individual (...) human agency with the inevitable and necessary influence of other people, both directly and indirectly. I derive my account from the work of Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay, whose contributions have remained largely overlooked by current republican theorists. I have three purposes in this chapter. First, I set out the relational character of independence. Secondly, I outline a republican approach to the problem of structural social threats to agency. Finally, I hope to establish the basis for a fruitful dialogue between republicans and relational autonomy theorists on the requirements and dynamics of individual agency and freedom in oppressive social situations. I identify three distinctive features of the internal logic of freedom as independence that give it a relational character: it always locates the person within a community; there is a mediating role played by the notion of arbitrariness in connecting individual and collective perspectives; a causal relationship exists linking each person’s freedom as independence such that that the dependence of one class of persons jeopardizes the independence of the whole community. (shrink)

In Rousseau’s Social Contract, political laws are rationally binding because they satisfy the interests that motivate individuals to obey such laws. The later books of Emile justify morality by showing that it is continuous with the natural dispositions of a well-brought-up subject and is thus conducive to genuine happiness. In both the moral and political cases, Rousseau argues for an internal connection between the rational ground of an obligation and the broader aspects of human psychology that are satisfied and expressed (...) by acting from that obligation. Yet, inspired by Kantian philosophy, the recent and influential Social Autonomy interpretation has disjoined rationality and psychology. Criticising this interpretation, I argue that for Rousseau, obligations are justified because they satisfy the demands made by our moral psychology, most notably amour-propre, i.e. the desire to have one’s worth recognised by others. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an extensive examination of the political theory of Thomas Hobbes in order to discuss its relevance to an understanding of contemporary issues and challenges faced by criminal law and criminal justice theory. I start by proposing that a critical analysis of Hobbes’s account of punishment reveals a paradox that not only is fundamental to understanding his model of political society, but also can offer important insights into the preventive turn experienced by advanced liberal legal systems. (...) I then suggest that the main importance of an analysis of Hobbes’s theoretical framework lies in how it reveals an inextricable and problematic link between individual autonomy and political authority in the normative conception of the modern liberal state, grounded on the notion of insecurity. By exploring how legal scholars have recently engaged with aspects of this problematic in criminal law and punishment posed by Hobbes’s work, I argue that the paradox found in punishment is such that it both legitimates the criminal law and undermines its normative aspirations, particularly the possibility of securing individual liberty against the power of the liberal state. (shrink)

This chapter shows how Mary Astell and Margaret Cavendish can reasonably be understood as early feminists in three senses of the term. First, they are committed to the natural equality of men and women, and related, they are committed to equal opportunity of education for men and women. Second, they are committed to social structures that help women develop authentic selves and thus autonomy understood in one sense of the word. Third, they acknowledge the power of production relationships, especially friendships (...) among women, in cultivating fulfilling lives for women. All three forms of feminism promote greater liberty for women. Moreover, the chapter establishes that many of these conclusions are especially forceful given Cavendish’s use of the genre of literature, and given the method that literature allows, namely that of presenting alternate points of view. (shrink)

Kant and Hegel share a common foundational idea: they believe that the authority of normative claims can be justified only by showing that these norms are self-imposed or autonomous. Yet they develop this idea in strikingly different ways: Kant argues that we can derive specific normative claims from the formal idea of autonomy, whereas Hegel contends that we use the idea of freedom not to derive, but to assess, the specific normative claims ensconced in our social institutions and practices. Exploring (...) these claims, I argue that each approach encounters certain difficulties. I then argue that Nietzsche develops a theory of normative authority that avoids these potential difficulties. Nietzsche’s theory proceeds, in part, by reconciling the most compelling aspects of the Kantian and Hegelian accounts—aspects that have seemed, to many interpreters, to be incompatible. The resultant theory generates a unique and fruitful account of normative authority. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that Immanuel Kant's account of the moral wrongness of contempt in the Metaphysics of Morals provides important resources for our understanding of the nature of moral subjectivity. Although Kant typically emphasizes the subject's position as autonomous addressor of the moral law, his remarks on contempt bring into relief a dynamic relationship at the heart of practical subjectivity between the addressor and addressee positions. After tracing the development of reflection concerning the addressor and addressee positions in (...) early modern philosophy, beginning with Francisco Suarez and Samuel Pufendorf, I articulate and defend what I take to be a Kantian conception of the relation between those positions. More specifically, I argue that to be a moral subject at all is necessarily to position oneself as the addressor of the moral law, but that one must at the same time maintain oneself in the addressee position, resisting the full conversion to the addressor position that autonomy seems to demand. (shrink)

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being-with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, (...) sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life. (shrink)

An existential interpretation of student angst in Chinese universities raises issues of autonomy and freedom. The governance arrangements in China create a conflict for Chinese students who in their coursework are urged to become critical-minded and open-minded. In this essay, Kant’s moral theory provides access to this phenomenon. His theory of duty–rationality–autonomy–freedom relates the liberty of thought to principled action. Kantian ideals still influence western business and university practice and they become relevant in China as that country modernises. The abilities (...) of graduates which officials say the country needs—insightfulness, creativity, innovation, progressiveness and commitment—are only achievable by professionals who are independent minded, rational and who commit to act on their own conclusions. Such people are Kant’s autonomous persons. Chinese students increasingly confront a conflicted educational environment. Universities require students to think, analyse and argue. An outcome of this deliberation is freedom, as construed by Kant as an ‘inner’construct. When students are unable to exercise Kantian freedom in matters which concern them they experience the angst of freedom. Students may carry a burden derived from bridles on information and authoritarian restrictions on dialogue. (shrink)

Before setting up the notion of “creation of the self,” Sartre intends to defeat the very concept of creation on the ontological level. He makes the statement that the created entity would not enjoy the least autonomy because it would depend wholly upon its creator. Sartre maintains that a created being cannot escape divine subjectivity, unless it is self-supported and self-sustained, that is, uncreated. Catholic scholar Sertillanges completely changes the deal: in his view, it is because of its existential autonomy (...) that some entity may be described in terms of dependence upon a creator, which does not jeopardize the autonomy of the creature. Focusing on the arguments rather than on the broader topic of self-creation in existentialism, this paper compares these two accounts of what the metaphysical thesis of creation amounts to. (shrink)

In the last two decades, interest in narrative conceptions of identity has grown exponentially, though there is little agreement about what a "life-narrative" might be. In connecting Kierkegaard with virtue ethics, several scholars have recently argued that narrative models of selves and MacIntyre's concept of the unity of a life help make sense of Kierkegaard's existential stages and, in particular, explain the transition from "aesthetic" to "ethical" modes of life. But others have recently raised difficult questions both for these readings (...) of Kierkegaard and for narrative accounts of identity that draw on the work of MacIntyre in general. While some of these objections concern a strong kind of unity or "wholeheartedness" among an agent's long-term goals or cares, the fundamental objection raised by critics is that personal identity cannot _be_ a narrative, since stories are artifacts made by persons. In this book, Davenport defends the narrative approach to practical identity and autonomy in general, and to Kierkegaard's stages in particular. (shrink)

Taking Catholic sexual ethics and liberal feminist ethics as points of departure, this essay argues that both frameworks are ill-prepared to deal with the moral problems raised by sex trafficking: while Catholic sexual ethics is grounded in a normative understanding of sexuality, liberal feminist ethics argues for women's sexual autonomy, resting upon freedom of action and consent. From a perspective that attends both to the phenomenological interpretation of embodied selves and the Kantian normative interpretation of dignity, it becomes possible to (...) critique both the Catholic and the liberal feminist frameworks of ethics. I argue that Catholic sexual ethics requires a reconceptualization as social ethics in order to meet the challenges of our present time, but that the shift is possible without giving up the moral imperatives of both Catholic and feminist ethics to protect human dignity and women's rights. (shrink)

It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of experience) (...) is essentially the same sort of spontaneity found in the practical use of reason. Accordingly, the faculties of understanding and practical reason both possess genuine autonomy. (shrink)

O presente artigo aborda a dimensão ética no pensamento de Jean-François Lyotard. Como conceito decisivo para essa relação, é aqui proposto o conceito de receptividade. Partindo dele, deseja-se mostrar que é possível reconstruir uma concepção de responsabilidade ética no pensamento do filósofo francês, a qual se coloca em sentido diametralmente oposto à concepção de autonomia: a obrigação ética se torna por conta disso afetiva, fundada e repousando na capacidade de se deixar falar. Com vistas a uma determinação mais acurada dessa (...) posição, serão consultadas as reflexões de Lyotard acerca da filosofia da linguagem em Le Differénd: a concepção do “acontecimento da fase” se deixa mostrar na ética do diálogo, que deixa espaço para a assimetria, alteridade e transformação. O pensamento do conflito insolúvel mostra-se como plenamente implicado com essa ética. This contribution examines the ethical dimension in the thinking of Jean-François Lyotard. It is shown that receptivity is crucial to its understanding. On these grounds, ethical responsibility can be conceived as fundamentally different from the standard conceptions of autonomy: ethical obligation has its sources in affection and is founded by a capacity of responsivity. This position is further developed by drawing on Lyotard ’s thoughts on language in Le Différend: the idea of a “sentence event” can be conceptualized within the framework of an ethics of dialogue, which leaves room for asymmetry, alterity, and transformation. The philosophy of the irreconcilable conflict turns out to be a form of ethics in this sense. (shrink)

Law functions on the basis of some presuppositions of what a person is. The purposes and tasks that are projected on a legal system depend on an understanding of personhood. Also, courts continuously find themselves in situations where they have to define the person or the legal subject, at times with surprising consequences. However, legal theory lacks clear criteria for personhood. We do not know who or what a legal person is, nor do we know what kind of being we (...) want her to be. There is clearly a need for critical examination of the concept of legal personhood. This article takes its inspiration from a historical theory, which sheds light on the complex logics of subjectivity. Reflecting on the thought of Johann Gottlieb Fichte we can contemplate fundamental aspects of personhood, especially in its politico-legal dimensions. It is claimed in this article that even though the legal subject has to be autonomous to some degree, acknowledging otherness inside the self is a compelling way of understanding legal personhood. (shrink)

This collection of essays brings together the central lines of thought in Onora O'Neill's work on Kant's philosophy, developed over many years. Challenging the claim that Kant's attempt to provide a critique of reason fails because it collapses into a dogmatic argument from authority, O'Neill shows why Kant held that we must construct, rather than assume, the authority of reason, and how this can be done by ensuring that anything we offer as reasons can be followed by others, including others (...) with whom we disagree. She argues that this constructivist view of reasoning is the clue to Kant's claims about knowledge, ethics and politics, as well as to his distinctive accounts of autonomy, the social contract, cosmopolitan justice and scriptural interpretation. Her essays are a distinctive and illuminating commentary on Kant's fundamental philosophical strategy and its implications, and will be a vital resource for scholars of Kant, ethics and philosophy of law. (shrink)

This chapter argues that while William James claimed it is best to go ‘round Kant’ rather than ‘through him’, a consideration of James’s arguments against determinism display a clear Kantian pedigree, particularly in the light of Kant’s famous claim that the moral law is the _ratio cognoscendi_ for freedom. However, exactly what this claim amounts to, both in Kant and in James, is a much disputed matter, where for some it has seemed to put our belief in freedom beyond the (...) pale of rationality, or perhaps to make it something other than a belief at all. This chapter suggests that both Kant and James can be seen as evidentialists about this issue, but where they are distinctive is in taking practical reason to provide us with the evidence for freedom that is required, thus giving it primacy over theoretical reason in this quite specific (and more defensible) sense. (shrink)

This chapter considers the contrast that Kant draws between the human and the holy will, and the significance of this contrast to his ethics more broadly. The key issue here is Kant’s claim that while the human will is subject to the imperatival force of morality, because we have desires that pull against moral action, for the holy will there are no such desires, and thus no such imperatival force. This chapter then explains how, when it comes to familiar debates (...) in ethics between realism and anti-realism, and between externalism and internalism, we can see Kant’s distinction as enabling him to combine elements of both sides in a way that may fruitfully resolve these controversies, and so contribute to the contemporary discussion. (shrink)

This volume presents a selection of Robert Stern's work on the theme of Kantian ethics. It begins by focusing on the relation between Kant's account of obligation and his view of autonomy, arguing that this leaves room for Kant to be a realist about value. Stern then considers where this places Kant in relation to the question of moral scepticism, and in relation to the principle of 'ought implies can', and examines this principle in its own right. The papers then (...) move beyond Kant himself to his wider influence and to critics of his work, and the volume concludes with a consideration of a broadly Kantian critique of divine command ethics offered by Stephen Darwall. General themes considered in this volume include value, perfectionism, agency, autonomy, moral motivation, moral scepticism, and obligation, as well as the historical place of Kant's ethics and its influence on thinkers up to the present day. (shrink)

This introduction outlines the main themes of this book. It sets out the central arguments of the chapters, and shows how they relate to one another, and the overarching themes of value, obligation, and agency. It is explained how the book offers a ‘hybrid’ account of Kant’s view of obligation; shows how Kant and Christine Korsgaard can be compared on the issue of moral scepticism; how ‘ought implies can’ and how this relates to Kant’s ethics; how Hegel’s critique of Kant’s (...) ethics is to be understood, and how Hegel’s ethics and that of the British Idealists relate to the perfectionist tradition; how Kant’s account of freedom can be compared to William James’s; how K. E. Løgstrup’s critique of Kant is to be assessed; and how Stephen Darwall’s critique of divine command theory is to be rejected. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in _some_ form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it has been taken up in some of the current literature. In particular, it is argued that the principle has been used too strongly, to determine not only what we are obliged to do, but also what is right or wrong in (...) itself. Second, Kant’s understanding of the principle is considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant does not, so that there is an important divergence here which can easily be overlooked. (shrink)

This chapter examines different ways in which the principle that ‘ought implies can’ might be rendered plausible. This chapter sets the principle in the context of the kind of theories of obligation that might go with it (where it considers divine command accounts, natural law accounts, self-legislation accounts, and social command accounts), and explores the way that each offers a rather different perspective on the principle, and why it might hold. The aim here is not to defend the principle as (...) such, but to explore the kind of commitments that might be required to make it seem compelling, where it turns out that they can be interestingly various. (shrink)

This chapter argues that there is a deeper issue underlying Hegel’s ‘empty formalism’ critique of Kant, which goes beyond the familiar worry that Kant’s Principle of Universalizability is contentless. Rather, it is suggested that Hegel wants to reject the whole project of which Kant’s attempt at formulating an ethical principle is an instance, namely the project of searching for _the_ ‘supreme principle of morality’, as based on a false rationalism in ethics that will lead us astray. It is then suggested, (...) however, that a rapprochement between the two philosophers may still be possible, once we see that Kant’s aim in seeking this principle was not to resolve puzzling moral questions as such, but rather to help us see through our temptations to act in a non-moral way, by making clear what it is at stake in acting morally in an admittedly artificial but suitably stark manner. (shrink)

Hegelian ethics is often said to involve an account of self-actualization based on a form of social holism, such that the individual’s well-being is then bound up with the well-being of others, so that egoism must give way to altruism. However, H. A. Prichard famously argued that this sort of approach to ethics rests on a ‘mistake’, as this position still fundamentally grounds morality in self-interest, and he criticized the British Hegelians accordingly. This chapter considers whether this criticism is justified, (...) or whether the Hegelian’s claim concerning social holism can be given weight, but without any such apparently objectionable implication. (shrink)

This chapter considers Christine Korsgaard’s argument for the value of humanity, and the role that her transcendental argument plays in this, to the effect that an agent must value her own humanity. Two forms of that argument are considered, one of which turns on a regress of identities, and the other on a regress of value. The second form of the argument is defended. The analysis of her position is also put in the context of debates about transcendental arguments more (...) generally, where it is suggested that this counts as a ‘modest’ form of transcendental argument, as it takes anti-realism about value for granted, and so is ‘subject-directed’ rather than ‘world-directed’, and hence modest in this sense. (shrink)

One argument that has been used by Christine Korsgaard and others in favour of constructivism, is that the constructivist is better able than the realist to avoid the threat of moral scepticism, where this has also fuelled a certain way of reading Kant, namely as a constructivist rather than a realist about the moral value of rational beings. For, it is held, we can see a constructivist and not a realist sensibility at work in the way in which Kant seeks (...) to address sceptical concerns over such value claims, particularly in the Formula of Humanity argument in the _Groundwork_. By contrast, this chapter argues that when properly understood this text suggests the opposite: namely, that Kant’s attitude to scepticism here fits better with the one that Korsgaard attributes to the realist, and that the constructivist manoeuvres that she claims to identify are not to be found. (shrink)

This chapter considers Stephen Darwall’s recent attempt to overturn Elizabeth Anscombe’s claim that moral obligation only really makes sense in terms of a divine command account, where he argues that in fact this account must give way to a more secularized and humanistic position if it is to avoid incoherence and an adequate account of divine authority. It is suggested that Darwall’s attempt to establish this is flawed, and thus that his internal critique of divine command ethics fails, where it (...) is argued that the divine command theorist can account for God’s authority on the one hand, while consistently holding that he alone is capable of possessing this authority on the other. (shrink)

This chapter considers the British Idealist’s place in the perfectionist tradition in ethics. By ‘perfectionism’ here, is meant the suggestion (often associated with Aristotle in particular) that following the moral life will lead to human self-realization and thus well-being. It is suggested that Kant’s critique of perfectionism led the British Idealists to develop this tradition in two contrasting directions, which before Kant had been conjoined, but which under Kantian pressure came apart. The first, exemplified by Green, saw perfection in terms (...) of the development of certain capacities of the individual, while the second, exemplified by Bradley, saw the perfection of the individual in holistic terms, as constituted by a unity of elements within a single coherent self. It is suggested that Bradley’s model is to be preferred. (shrink)

This chapter considers the idea of ‘my station and its duties’ as it figures in the work of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley, who pioneered its significance. The central focus is what theory of duty or obligation this position is meant to embody. It is most usually assumed that in tying obligations to social roles, the British Idealists were offering what the chapter calls an _identificatory_ account of obligation: that is, acting in a certain way has an obligatory (...) force because it relates to a role which constitutes your identity. In this chapter this sort of theory is contrasted with two other accounts, which it calls _hybrid_ accounts and _social command_ accounts—and suggests that in fact Green held the former and Bradley the latter; and he also argues that this puts Green’s account of obligation close to Kant’s, while Bradley may be seen to be following Hegel. (shrink)