Counterexample thought experiments (hereafter thought experiments) are the usual way to show that some philosophical theses that are proposed as necessarily true are, in fact, false. This paper explores a positive epistemic role for thought experiments in philosophical theorising. At least in most cases, the rationale of employing the intuitive judgement of a thought experiment, say, ψ1, against a target thesis is that it satisfies the formal requirement of the Non-empirical Instance: If φ is ψ, then if φ1 (/ψ1), one (...) can see in a non-empirical way that ψ1 (/φ1), where φ1 and ψ1 are instances of φ and ψ, respectively (section 1). This paper shows why deep understanding (or general intuition) does not do any non-empirical justificatory work to support substantive philosophical theses (section 2). It then analyses the two most promising strategies for non-empirical justification, namely, the Abduction and the Pragmatic (sections 3 & 4). These strategies involve adopting a weaker notion of intuition that is to the least extent suitable for judging particular thought experiment cases non-empirically. The non-empirical justification they render to (most) substantive philosophical theses can be put as follows: Given the presupposition that a substantive philosophical thesis can be defended successfully against thought experimentation, such a thesis is only justified non-empirically in the sense that it is rational to choose it, in contrast to its rivals, because it deals with relevant thoughtful challenges better. Without engaging in experimental philosophers’ criticisms, this paper presents another reason why general intuitions should not do essential justificatory work to support substantive philosophical theses by means of the analysis of the positive role of thought experimentation (section 5). (shrink)

In this paper, we reconstruct the debate between Zhuangzi 莊子 and Hui Shi 惠施 that took place on the bridge over the Hao River 濠水 as a substantive debate concerning the epistemic other‐mind skepticism according to which no one mind knows the mental states of the other. We demonstrate how this reconstruction leads to substantive conclusions of the viability of Hui Shi’s position in particular and of the other‐mind skepticism in general. This demonstration is accomplished by means of the contemporary (...) philosophical development regarding, for example, whether asserting a proposition implies that the asserter knows the proposition, whether the closure principle of epistemic logic should be held, and whether knowing something is a mental state. We hold that this debate’s resolution is substantively entangled with contemporary philosophical concerns. (shrink)

The argument from faultless disagreement employed by the relativist purports to show that contextualism falls short of explaining cases of faultless disagreement. The demonstration is intended to give credence to the relativist semantics of epistemic modality expressions. In this paper we present some cases showing that even though cases of faultless disagreement do reveal some intrinsic features of epistemic modality claims, they do not support the relativist semantics. The sophistication of faultless disagreement goes beyond what the relativist semantics can cope (...) with. We also advance an epistemologically oriented proposal to account for faultless disagreement. (shrink)

Williamson's counterfactual-based modal epistemology (WM) holds that, given the background knowledge of constitutive facts, modal knowledge can be acquired by counterfactual imagination. However, if knowledge of constitutive facts is also a sort of knowledge of metaphysical modality, then WM is prone to the methodological circularity. To parry the circularity problem, Williamson and Dohrn similarly make a distinction between knowledge of a proposition that is necessary and knowledge of the modal status of the proposition. The idea is to sort the knowledge (...) of constitutive facts into the former kind. In this paper, we argue that the Dohrn -Williamson proposal fails to settle the circularity issue of WM, and even if it is granted that the proposal works, it makes WM less attractive as a modal epistemology. (shrink)

One task of historians is to construct causal ascription of singular historicals between eminent historical events. For instance, the controversy resulting from the confusing butterfly ballot of Florida’s year 2000 presidential election cost Gore his presidency. However, to research into these matters is inevitably to appeal to counterfactual deliberation in an epistemic fashion because the past is fixed. One standard idea is Max Weber’s, Weber causation: “f was a cause of φ” is assertable iff “¬f □→ ¬φ” is assertable. Reiss (...) gives an exceptionally good analysis of this topic and outlines historians’ reasoning, claiming that backtracking analyses of counterfactual conditionals employed in historical thought experiments is the signature of historical study of causal ascription of singular historicals. Nevertheless, he concludes that it is very difficult to reach an uncontroversial ascription for this sort in most cases. For this reason, he proposes to find difference-making relations that will suffice. The objective of this paper is to provide a more fine-grained, intervention-based, backtracking analysis of counterfactual conditionals upon which a more satisfactory account of causal ascription of singular historicals can be given. Reiss’ account of difference-making relation will be shown to be unsatisfactory. Moreover, a formal ground of the epistemology of historical thought experiments can be given, along with the constraints of this account resultant from the semantic features of non-transitivity and strong centering of counterfactual conditionals. Finally, some epistemological points of causal ascription of singular historicals and historical thought experiments will be given. (shrink)

There is a prevalent view against the disquotational and the minimal theories of truth, that the most sensible solution to the Liar—that is, the gappy solution—is not available to them. I would like to argue that, though this solution is unavailable to the two theories, the prevailing argument and the reasoning behind this view are wrong. This paper mainly focuses on Simmons’ “Deflationary Truth and the Liar” (1999), within which the idea that disquotationalism can take the Liar in its stridein (...) terms of the gappy option is thoroughly criticised. Albeit Simmons’ account is about disquotationalism, it is in fact about truth theories with the disquotational feature. For Horwich’s minimal theory of truth to be feasible, it is in need of providing an account of which the primary truth bearers are utterances or sentences. The reasoning behind Simmons’ account and his argument is a widely accepted but in my opinion mistaken reading of deflationary theories, reading the deflationary axiom schemata as emphasising the redundant feature of the true predicate only. By analysing and criticising this reasoning the mistakes of this interpretation of the deflationary theories of truth are revealed. Simmons bases his argument on two premises: taking disquotational theory of truth asdefinitional theory and considering the main feature of the disquotational truth predicate as eliminability. In terms of the notion of parasitic liar, I will argue that Simmons fails to show the plausibility of one crucial premise of his argument—that is, the paradoxical or the pathological feature is missing from the disquotational mirrors of the Liar. I will further show what deflationary feature is misunderstood by those accounts similar to Simmons’. (shrink)

In Quine's philosophy stance, the most clearly is not his "real" view. Perhaps he is most concerned about the experience and the theoretical relationship between the content of experience, evidence, and the wide expanse between scientific theories associated. "True," this concept in his theoretical philosophy, it seems to swing in between different stance. For example, speaking, Quine's theory of experience equal to what is really home and country-style stance , Davidson is the support that the coherence theory of truth management (...) results. On the other hand, Quine seems to think that Tarski's truth language management frame, the true theory should provide management In order to meet reasonable description. Of course, Quine is also abbreviated true doctrine of the early advocates of management theory, one clear description of the "truth is quoted to eliminate ". This will be Quine's own theory, based on digestion of Quine quotes for "real" coherence "true" symbol should be "true" or inner "true" of諸-like ideas. I want regardless permit, we must take seriously Quine's digestion quotes "true" theory, so in order for him above on the "real"諸as of speech, proposed the same explanation. In my opinion, not in the digestion Quine quotes "real," but also suggested that regardless of any knowledge or ontology of "true." All his report on the "real" considerations, are can and should to counteract quotes "true" interpretation of the theory as a starting point. "Real" word in the context of the emergence of many, should be regarded as a collection of words, abbreviations or the expression is a common feature associated with the "real" language sentence only. Among Quine's philosophy, his account on truth is probably the mistiest part. Perhaps what concerns him most is the relation between experience and scientific theories, is the relation between empirical content, evidence, and scientific theories in the broad sense. His attitude toward the conception of truth seems to vacillate between different theories, due to his various philosophical positions. For instance, regarding Quine's sectarian position of which empirically equivalent theories should be taken as true, Davidson thinks that it is the consequence of holding the coherence theory of truth. On the other hand, Quine appears to consider Tarski's T schema as giving the correspondence theory of truth a sensible account. Moreover, Quine is one of the trail-blazers of the deflationary theory of truth, stating specifically "Truth is disquotation". This paper is based on Quine's own theory, discussing his multiple claims regarding disquotational truth, coherent truth, correspondence truth, or immanent truth. What I would like to argue is that, in order to consistently explain his various claims concerning truth, we have to take Quine's disquotational theory of truth seriously. I think that, except his disquotational account, Quine does not make any claim of epistemological truth or ontological truth. All of his consideration regarding truth can be and should be explained in terms of his disquotational theory of truth. The appearance of the word 'true' / 'truth' in many contexts should be seen as playing a collective term, as abbreviating or expressing true sentences with the same feature. (shrink)