Abstract

Counterexample thought experiments (hereafter thought experiments) are the usual way to show that some philosophical theses that are proposed as necessarily true are, in fact, false. This paper explores a positive epistemic role for thought experiments in philosophical theorising. At least in most cases, the rationale of employing the intuitive judgement of a thought experiment, say, ψ1, against a target thesis is that it satisfies the formal requirement of the Non-empirical Instance: If φ is ψ, then if φ1 (/ψ1), one can see in a non-empirical way that ψ1 (/φ1), where φ1 and ψ1 are instances of φ and ψ, respectively (section 1). This paper shows why deep understanding (or general intuition) does not do any non-empirical justificatory work to support substantive philosophical theses (section 2). It then analyses the two most promising strategies for non-empirical justification, namely, the Abduction and the Pragmatic (sections 3 & 4). These strategies involve adopting a weaker notion of intuition that is to the least extent suitable for judging particular thought experiment cases non-empirically. The non-empirical justification they render to (most) substantive philosophical theses can be put as follows: Given the presupposition that a substantive philosophical thesis can be defended successfully against thought experimentation, such a thesis is only justified non-empirically in the sense that it is rational to choose it, in contrast to its rivals, because it deals with relevant thoughtful challenges better. Without engaging in experimental philosophers’ criticisms, this paper presents another reason why general intuitions should not do essential justificatory work to support substantive philosophical theses by means of the analysis of the positive role of thought experimentation (section 5).