Objectives: This study aimed to conduct a systematic review and meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to improve subjective well-being (SWB), including evaluative, hedonic, and eudemonic well-being, and the mental component of quality of life (QOL) of working population. Methods: A literature search was conducted, using PubMed, Embase, PsycINFO, and PsycARTICLES. Eligible studies included those that were RCTs of any intervention, conducted among healthy workers, measured SWB as a primary outcome, and original articles in English. Study characteristics, intervention, outcomes, and (...) results on SWB outcomes were extracted by the investigators independently. After a brief narrative summarizing and classifying the contents of the interventions, the included outcomes were categorized into each aspect of SWB (evaluative, hedonic, and eudemonic well-being, and the mental component of QOL). Finally, the characteristics of the effective interventions for increasing each aspect were summarized, and the pooled effect of interventions on SWB was investigated by a meta-analysis. Publication bias was investigated by drawing a funnel plot and conducting Egger's test. Results: From the 5,450 articles found, 39 met the inclusion criteria for the systematic review. The interventions included in this review were classified into six categories (physical activity, ergonomics, psychological, environmental, multicomponent intervention, and others). The meta-analysis from 31 studies showed that the pooled effect of included interventions on SWB was significantly positive (standardized mean difference (SMD) = 0.51; standard error (SE) = 0.10). A funnel plot showed there were extremely large or small SMDs, and Egger's test was significant. Thus, we conducted sensitivity analysis, excluding these extreme SMDs, and confirmed that the estimated pooled effect was also significantly positive. Subgroup analyses for separate types of interventions showed the effects of psychological interventions (e.g., mindfulness, cognitive behavioral based approach, and other psychological interventions) were also significantly positive. Conclusion: The current study revealed the effectiveness of interventions for increasing SWB. Specifically, psychological interventions (e.g., mindfulness, cognitive behavioral based approach, and other psychological interventions) may be useful for improving SWB. (shrink)

Originally published as 「明治の哲学界：有機体の哲学とその系譜」in 井上克人編『豊饒なる明治』, Kansai Daigaku Shuppannbu, 2012, 3–22. Translated by Morisato Takeshi. German Idealism was introduced to Japanese intellectuals in the middle of Meiji era and was mainly received from a mystical or religious perspective, as we see in Inoue Tetsujirō’s “harmonious existence,” Inoue Enryō’s “unity of mind and body,” and Kiyozawa Manshi’s “existentialism.” Since these theories envisioned true reality as a unified and living whole, I group them under the label “philosophy of organism” and from (...) there argue that their conviction that “all is truth and truth is all” was shaped in large part by the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana. The understanding of Buddhist concepts by Meiji philosophers was philosophical in its content, and those who devoted themselves to the study of Western philosophy were encouraged to describe Eastern thought in Western philosophical terms. As a result, the philosophical world of the Meiji era developed an original standpoint that unified Eastern and Western perspectives by means of a logic of “phenomena-in-reality.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the most recent moderate republican conception of freedom is not sufficiently plausible in all relevant cases. The most recent moderate republican view does not capture the distinctive character of republican freedom, or freedom of the person, because it focuses exclusively on the type-difference of a supposedly powerful agent, not on the type-difference of those affected by that agent, such as civic-type or non-civic-type. This problem of focusing exclusively on the specific agent-type-difference becomes apparent when (...) considering the possible worlds in which, according to the most recent moderate republican view, the subjects of interference lack freedom as non-domination due to the absence of effective institutional arrangements. In this paper, I show that this ultimately undermines the most recent moderate republican view even in possible worlds where individuals appear to enjoy freedom as non-domination due to the presence of effective institutional structures. (shrink)

It is often argued that relational egalitarianism has a fundamental problem with intergenerational justice when compared to other theories of justice such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and luck egalitarianism. Recently, Timothy Sommers argued that there is no such comparative disadvantage for relational egalitarianism. His argument is quite modest: it merely aims to reject the claim that there could be no way to extend relational egalitarianism to intergenerational justice. This may be called the ‘No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis’. The present article challenges Sommers’s (...) argument in two ways. First, I show that Sommers fails to provide a reasonable constraint on causal efficacy, which is crucial to his argument for our relation (not relationship) to future generations. Second, I show that the chain-relatedness problem casts a shadow over Sommers’s argument for the No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis. More specifically, compared to the other theories of justice, relational egalitarianism (as it stands) can less easily justify that present persons have duties to future others. This is because relational egalitarianism cannot appeal to a specific principle in regard to the duties in question, because its principle is sensitive to current context and practice. I conclude that the No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis does not hold much promise. (shrink)

In political philosophy, reflective equilibrium is a standard method used to systematically reconcile intuitive judgments with theoretical principles. In this paper, we propose that survey experiments and a model selection method—i.e., the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)-based model selection method—can be viewed together as a methodological means of satisfying the epistemic desiderata implicit in reflective equilibrium. To show this, we conduct a survey experiment on two theories of distributive justice, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism. Our experimental test case and AIC-based model selection method (...) demonstrate that the refined sufficientarian principle, a widely accepted principle of distributive justice, is no more plausible than the prioritarian principle. This tells us that some changes of certain intuitions revolving around sufficientarianism should be examined (separately) based on the findings of the survey experiment and AIC model selection. This shows the potential of our approach—both practically and methodologically—as a novel way of applying reflective equilibrium in political philosophy. (shrink)

According to the idea of public reason, fundamental political questions should be resolved solely on the basis of considerations that all citizens can reasonably accept. While various rationales—such as the ideal of civic friendship—have been offered in support of public reason, most arguments assume ideal, well‐ordered conditions. Yet many real‐world societies are far from ideal, often dominated by unreasonable persons—sometimes even those in power. Emil Andersson addresses the question of how familiar rationales for public reason fare under such conditions. More (...) specifically, he argues that the political community view—which grounds public reason in the ideal of civic friendship—faces serious challenges in non‐well‐ordered, asymmetrically divided contexts characterised by large numbers of unreasonable people. In this paper, I show that, while Andersson's critique of the political community view of public reason is on target, his argument against the most plausible construal of this view—namely the inclusive political community view—is unsuccessful, because the value of inclusion can be understood as carrying sufficient weight even in non‐well‐ordered contexts. I then argue that Andersson's alternative conception—namely Rawlsian political autonomy—does not convincingly address the rationale for, or the applicability of, public reason in non‐well‐ordered societies, especially when compared to the inclusive political community view. (shrink)

This theoretical paper develops a conceptual framework that explains how companies can influence consumer behavior in terms of both social and business benefits through their corporate social marketing initiatives. Drawing from the source credibility literature, the article asserts that the effectiveness of CSM depends largely on the corporate credibility of a company in supporting a social cause. Based on this assertion, the framework identifies ten different antecedents of CSM credibility, which are organized into attributes of the company, attributes of the (...) CSM initiative, and attributes of the cause. Furthermore, this framework shows that CSM credibility affects the two examined consequences, intended prosocial behavior and consumer loyalty. Several research and managerial implications are developed based on the propositions specified in the framework. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show the plausibility of John Rawls’s treatment of efficiency within the system of justice. While in political philosophy efficiency is often treated as an independent condition for establishing justice, or more precisely, as a necessary condition for establishing justice, Rawls considers efficiency as a non-negligible factor that has normativity in general circumstances. This is similar to the view that efficiency is a presumptive condition for evaluating social arrangements. However, Rawls’s view is salient in (...) a more substantive way. This paper demonstrates the salience of Rawls’s view of efficiency by responding to G. A. Cohen’s Impure Justice Objection to Rawls’s theory of justice. This shows that there is no impure connection between Rawls’s justice and efficiency. Moreover, the combined thesis of Rawls’s justice and efficiency is superior to Cohen’s pluralist theory of justice, making it a fruitful approach. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 3, Page 370-394, September 2022.

This paper argues that the Lockean proviso can be utilized as a relevant principle of justice for food security under global climate change. Since reducing GHG emissions is key to enhancing food security, we suggest a global food security scheme that systematically allots, among all people, access to GHG sinks in food systems impacted by global climate change. For consideration of the scheme, it is important to have a principle of justice. Furthermore, it should incorporate the value of fairness. A (...) relevant principle of climate justice for food security should meet the following criteria: (1) the parties concerned under the scheme are states; (2) fairness does not undermine the requirement that the basic needs of all people must be met; (3) when determining fair burdens, a fair distribution of the rights to use GHG sinks should be sensitive both to each state’s responsibility for its GHG emissions and to (4) each state’s effort to reduce such emissions. With them in mind, first, we argue that the Lockean proviso can provide legitimate guidance for each state. Second, the Lockean proviso reasonably enjoins that a state has a right to a food system that secures its citizens’ basic needs, and a duty to meet the basic needs of other people. Third, the Lockean proviso can be deployed as a principle of both global justice and intergenerational justice for food security. Finally, the Lockean proviso enables us to count the reduction of GHG emissions by each state as “the fruits of its labors”. (shrink)

A dialectical contradiction can be appropriately described within the framework of classical formal logic. It is in harmony with the law of noncontradiction. According to our definition, two theories make up a dialectical contradiction if each of them is consistent and their union is inconsistent. It can happen that each of these two theories has an intended model. Plenty of examples are to be found in the history of science.

This chapter purports to give empirical feedback on impartial reasoning to justice by using online survey experiments. More precisely, the study focuses on whether and how the different conceptions of the veil of ignorance and John Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium affect real people’s impartial reasoning to justice. The findings show that, while ordinary people support impartial reasoning to the difference principle (maximin), their endorsement of it echoes neither John Harsanyi’s nor Rawls’s reasoning. The results illuminate that findings in human (...) psychology, such as the principles of loss aversion and “perceived luckiness,” cannot be dismissed for denoting the relevant impartial reasoning to justice. (shrink)

This chapter purports to give empirical feedback on impartial reasoning to justice by using online survey experiments. More precisely, the study focuses on whether and how the different conceptions of the veil of ignorance and John Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium affect real people’s impartial reasoning to justice. The findings show that, while ordinary people support impartial reasoning to the difference principle (maximin), their endorsement of it echoes neither John Harsanyi’s nor Rawls’s reasoning. The results illuminate that findings in human (...) psychology, such as the principles of loss aversion and “perceived luckiness,” cannot be dismissed for denoting the relevant impartial reasoning to justice. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Powers and Faden’s non-ideal, comprehensive theory of justice cannot keep in line with the proposed moderateness of their essentialist approach. My argument is as follows: Powers and Faden’s comprehensive theory of justice contravenes the thrust of moderate essentialism, in claiming that their theory values health for its own sake. Why do they define their conception of justice as valuing health for its own sake when it is likely to be incongruous with their essentialist approach? (...) To understand this, we should examine their sufficientarian proposal. There are two requirements for plausible sufficientarianism. The first requirement is to specify the threshold below which people are seriously deprived and must be urgently benefited in a non-arbitrary manner. The second requirement is that sufficientarianism should be sensitive to certain inequalities above the threshold. Powers and Faden’s approach convincingly meets the first requirement. However, the non-ideal aspect of their approach, which is key to meeting the second requirement, makes it explicit that at least one of the listed dimensions of well-being must be valued for their own sake. This is not reconcilable with their own characterization of moderate essentialism. For this reason, we should conclude that Powers and Faden fail to argue for moderate essentialism. (shrink)

明治の世には、西欧的近代化の流れの中にあっても「日本人としての矜持と風格」といったものがあった。それはいわば凜乎とした倫理意識と、土着的な共同体意識である。それらは漢籍の教養に裏打ちされた至高なる精神 性であったと言ってよい。明治は、思想・文化の面において、日本の精神史上、「豊饒の時代」であった。.

The harshness objection is the most important challenge to luck egalitarianism. Very recently, Andreas Albertsen and Lasse Nielsen provided a scrupulous analysis of the harshness objection and claim that only the inconsistency objection—the objection that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with the ideal of basic moral equality—has real bite. I argue that the relevantly construed incoherence objection is not as strong as Albertsen and Nielsen believe. In doing so, first, I show that the deontological luck egalitarian conception of equal treatment does (...) not endorse harsh policies such as excessive responsibility-sensitive healthcare that would be disrespectful to the imprudent. Second, I demonstrate that deontological luck egalitarianism is not troubled by the case that involves a lack of respect for the prudent, which vexes Anderson’s relational egalitarianism that Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s argument highlights. I thus claim that the harshness objection is not a truly decisive objection against the luck egalitarian project. (shrink)

The issue of distributive justice receives substantial amount of attention in our society. On the one hand, we are sensitive to whether and the extent to which people are responsible for being worse off. On the other hand, we are mindful of society’s worst-off members. There has been a debate over luck egalitarianism, which relates to the former concern, and relational egalitarianism, which echoes the latter. By investigating the psychological processes of these two concerns, this paper examines the reliability of (...) the argument that Elizabeth Anderson, a renowned relational egalitarian, presents against luck egalitarianism and for relational egalitarianism. It also considers whether it is possible to support luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously, using an online experiment. The results of the experiment show that, first, for ordinary people, the luck consideration is as important as the basic capabilities consideration. Second, while real people consider the degree of compensation through the factors of causality and responsibility, the lack of basic capabilities directs them to determine how much victims of bad luck should be compensated. This suggests that pluralist egalitarianism is on the right track. (shrink)

This paper develops an intellectualist account of the transmission of knowledge-how. The question of whether knowledge-how can be transmitted to others, or whether it is more difficult to transmit than knowledge-that, is the central debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. After several discussions, anti-intellectualists have come to endorse a promising view that unlike knowledge-that, knowledge-how is difficult to transmit by testimony. On this basis, they conclude that existing intellectualist theories cannot explain this asymmetry. However, I argue that this assumption is mistaken. (...) I refine the notion of successful transmission of knowledge-how in terms of counterfactual success. On this basis, I claim that knowledge-how can be transmitted when the hearer acquires the capacity to succeed in nearby possible worlds through appropriately communicated propositional information. I further develop this claim by proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for testimonial knowledge-how. By making these refinements, this paper offers a revised intellectualist account of testimonial knowledge-how. (shrink)

Understanding whether the long and elaborate songs of male gibbons have syntax and hierarchical structures is an interesting question in the evolution of language, because gibbons are near humans in the phylogenetic tree and a hierarchically organized syntax is considered to be a basic component of human language. We conducted field research at Danum Valley Conservation Area in northern Borneo to test the hypothesis that gibbon songs have syntax and chunks. We followed one Mueller’s gibbon group for 1 week in (...) the dry and rainy seasons every year from 2001 to 2009, collecting vocal and behavioral data. Results show that songs emitted by the studied male gibbon were governed by combinatory rules. Some context-dependent songs had different combinatory rules, although they overlapped with the songs whose contexts were uncertain. The male Mueller’s songs had characteristics that suggest existence of chunk structure. These results provided an important perspective in the study of language origin. (shrink)

In this paper, we shall show that the following translation \(I^M\) from the propositional fragment \(\bf L_1\) of Leśniewski's ontology to modal logic \(\bf KTB\) is sound: for any formula \(\phi\) and \(\psi\) of \(\bf L_1\), it is defined as (M1) \(I^M(\phi \vee \psi) = I^M(\phi) \vee I^M(\psi)\), (M2) \(I^M(\neg \phi) = \neg I^M(\phi)\), (M3) \(I^M(\epsilon ab) = \Diamond p_a \supset p_a. \wedge. \Box p_a \supset \Box p_b.\wedge. \Diamond p_b \supset p_a\), where \(p_a\) and \(p_b\) are propositional variables corresponding to (...) the name variables \(a\) and \(b\), respectively. In the last, we shall give some comments including some open problems and my conjectures. (shrink)

This paper examines whether Kok-Chor Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is successful as a pluralist luck egalitarian theory of justice and morality. In recent years, pluralist luck egalitarianism has become a salient theory of justice. Tan’s pluralist proposal for institutional luck egalitarianism is attractive because it seems to refute the metaphysical and practical challenges against luck egalitarianism. This paper demonstrates that, although Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is indeed a most sophisticated systematic pluralist theory of justice and morality, his argument fails because (...) the application of luck egalitarianism to the domain of distributive justice and to the basic institutions of society is not justified from the luck egalitarian point of view. This paper concludes that Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism does not succeed in demonstrating that his theory is an outstanding achievement of luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

The trolley problem is a classic thought experiment that evokes an ethical dilemma. Thomson’s “bystander” and “footbridge” versions of the trolley problem induce different intuitive judgments about what to choose in the ethical dilemma. However, we can question how robust these intuitive judgments are. We thus conducted an online survey experiment of Thomson’s versions of the trolley problem which showed that more respondents tended to choose not pulling the lever in the bystander version and pushing a person off the bridge (...) in the footbridge version when they believed they were not being watched. These results illustrate that people’s decisions deviate from the social norms in the absence of the public’s attention. To activate the practice of holding the manufacturers to a normative expectation based on the social norms, we suggest the law must be changed. (shrink)

In contemporary political philosophy, reflections on poverty demand careful treatment in the light of key ethical concepts—especially autonomy. While the negative effects of poverty on autonomy are acknowledged, the welfare dependency of the poor is seen as an autonomy-undermining factor, which I call the “autonomy–poverty dilemma.” This chapter discusses contemporary political theories about autonomy and poverty in terms of how they relate to this dilemma. The features and problems of three pertinent theories are addressed in such a way as to (...) resolve the autonomy–poverty dilemma. The first is luck egalitarianism, which weighs individual responsibility in defining just distributions, but may leave some of the incapacitated unattended in order not to annul their personal responsibility and may stigmatize those who are dependent (such as people with mental disabilities) who are not personally responsible. Such stigmatization is also a problem with relational egalitarianism, which bases egalitarian justice on the equal standing of individuals, in that the ideal of socially embedded autonomous agents could be degrading to the dependent. While the capability approach overcomes that problem by providing a powerful buttress for the dependent and allowing them to emerge from poverty, it runs the risk of a paternalistic, perfectionist idealism. In closing, this chapter proposes an alternative view, which I call the “radical pluralist view of egalitarian justice,” based on a consideration of the features and problems of these three key theories. (shrink)

Abstract:What is Hume’s hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which a passion arises? How does it operate in structuring his system? These are primary questions that need to be answered in order to understand Hume’s intention in the Treatise. Yet, there exists no reasonable answers, nor serious attempts to answer them, probably because this hypothesis is considered as a limited issue, relevant only to the indirect passions, or because it is too mechanical and unsophisticated to excite (...) critics’ curiosities. My present aim is to show that Hume’s double relation of impressions and ideas operating in the production of indirect passions is integral to his entire system not only in that it serves as a powerful weapon to advocate his naturalistic position, but also in that it is a highly sophisticated psychological mechanism that functions as a schema for the cooperation of the imagination and the passions. (shrink)

This article shows that the democratic borders argument is defensible, albeit not in the way Arash Abizadeh proposes. The democratic borders argument depends on the All-Subjected Principle, according to which the exercise of political power is justified only insofar as everyone who is subjected to that power is guaranteed a right to vote. According to the so-called “scope objection,” the scope of the All-Subjected Principle is too broad, however, and therefore, the argument can be refuted by reductio ad absurdum. Here (...) I argue that Abizadeh’s appeal to the narrow-scope interpretation of jurisdictionally circumscribed legal requirements is not a plausible way of defusing this reductio. Instead, I show that the democratic borders argument is successful if the All-Subjected Principle consists of two individually sufficient conditions corresponding to narrow-scope and qualified wide-scope interpretations. (shrink)

We recently described a novel form of stress‐associated bidirectional plasticity at GABA synapses onto hypothalamic parvocellular neuroendocrine cells (PNCs), the apex of the hypothalamus‐pituitary‐adrenal axis. This plasticity may contribute to neuroendocrine adaptation. However, this GABA synapse plasticity likely does not translate into a simple more and less of inhibition because the ionic driving force for Cl−, the primary charge carrier for GABAA receptors, is dynamic. Specifically, stress impairs a Cl− extrusion mechanism in PNCs. This not only renders the steady‐state GABA (...) response less hyperpolarizing but also makes PNCs susceptible to the activity‐dependent accumulation of Cl−. Accordingly, GABA synapse plasticity impacts both the robustness of GABA voltage response and dynamic Cl− loading, imposing nonlinear influences on PNC excitability during circuit activities. This theoretical consideration predicts roles for GABA transmission far more versatile than canonical inhibition. We propose potential impacts of GABA synapse plasticity on the experience‐dependent fine‐tuning of neuroendocrine stress responses. (shrink)

We examined the relation between home literacy environment (HLE) and early literacy development in a sample of children learning four alphabetic orthographies varying in orthographic consistency (English, Dutch, German, and Greek). Seven hundred and fourteen children were followed from Grade 1 to Grade 2 and tested on emergent literacy skills (vocabulary, letter knowledge, and phonological awareness) at the beginning of Grade 1 and on word reading fluency and spelling at the end of Grade 1, the beginning of Grade 2, and (...) the end of Grade 2. Their parents responded to a questionnaire assessing HLE [parent teaching (PT), shared book reading (SBR), access to literacy resources (ALR)] at the beginning of Grade 1. Results showed first that PT was associated with letter knowledge or phonological awareness in Dutch and Greek, while ALR was associated with emergent literacy skills in all languages. SBR did not predict any cognitive or early literacy skills in any language. Second, PT and ALR had indirect effects on literacy outcomes via different emergent literacy skills in all languages. These findings suggest that not all HLE components are equally important for emergent literacy skills, reading fluency, and spelling. No specific trend in the role of orthographic consistency in the aforementioned relations emerged, which suggests that other factors may account for the observed differences across languages when children start receiving formal reading instruction in Grade 1. (shrink)

descent represents a progression in this relationship whereby the Chorus, in finally abandoning their chariot and agreeing to approach Prometheus and listen to him, jeopardize their detachment from him and his fate, offer tentative support, and give him scope to develop his storytelling abilities and apply his persuasive powers. Although this progression does not represent an unequivocal commitment to Prometheus–for the Chorus fluctuate throughout the play between sympathy and reproach for him–it is none the less a crucial step as signalled (...) by the intensity of Prometheus' insistence that they descend and hear his story through to the end. (shrink)

First, the author argues that Daniels and Sabin’s way of setting priorities in healthcare is implausible. Daniels and Sanin think there is a lack of consensus on comprehensive principle(s) of justice that can resolve the issue of priority-setting in healthcare. Nevertheless, their argument appeals to the deliberative democracy-based idea of accountability for reasonableness that involve the conception of justice construed naturally as comprehensive. The author then proposes a comprehensive conception of justice, an equal opportunity-based principle of justice, with which the (...) issue of priority-setting can be resolved. Although Daniels addresses two critical issues on the equal opportunity-based principle of justice, the author contends that it can be defended in ways that overcome these issues while being applicable to priority-setting conditions. (shrink)

Centrosomes are the main microtubule organizing centers in animal cells. In particular during embryogenesis, they ensure faithful spindle formation and proper cell divisions. As metazoan centrosomes are eliminated during oogenesis, they have to be reassembled upon fertilization. Most metazoans use the sperm centrioles as templates for new centrosome biogenesis while the egg's cytoplasm re-prepares all components for on-going centrosome duplication in rapidly dividing embryonic cells. We discuss our knowledge and the experimental challenges to analyze zygotic centrosome reformation, which requires genetic (...) experiments to enable scrutinizing respective male and female contributions. Male and female knockout animals and mRNA injection to mimic maternal expression of centrosomal proteins could point a way to the systematic molecular dissection of the process. The most recent data suggest that timely expression of centrosome components in oocytes is the key to zygotic centrosome reformation that uses male sperm as coordinators for de novo centrosome production. Centrosome reformation at fertilization is essential for metazoan development. It requires a complicated interplay of sperm centrioles and the cytoplasm of the oocyte, which has eliminated its centrioles during oogenesis. The male centrioles launch centrosome duplication using female centrosome proteins for the first metazoan cell divisions. (shrink)

This article aims to defend responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism by arguing for the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility as a plausible conception of an agent's responsibility for inequalities caused by his or her choice in responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I show that the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility is not only philosophically defensible as a conception of genuine choice, but also promising enough to ward off two common worries which cast doubt on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (qua luck egalitarianism): first, the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility (...) allows the assignment of differential degrees of responsibility to rational agents in proportional terms, which may make it echo the adverse effects of their childhood environments. Second, its proportional construal essentially allows that nobody possesses a full degree of rational capacities. This enables responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to refute the harshness objection. (shrink)

of (from Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy).