Abstract

This paper develops an intellectualist account of the transmission of knowledge-how. The question of whether knowledge-how can be transmitted to others, or whether it is more difficult to transmit than knowledge-that, is the central debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. After several discussions, anti-intellectualists have come to endorse a promising view that unlike knowledge-that, knowledge-how is difficult to transmit by testimony. On this basis, they conclude that existing intellectualist theories cannot explain this asymmetry. However, I argue that this assumption is mistaken. I refine the notion of successful transmission of knowledge-how in terms of counterfactual success. On this basis, I claim that knowledge-how can be transmitted when the hearer acquires the capacity to succeed in nearby possible worlds through appropriately communicated propositional information. I further develop this claim by proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for testimonial knowledge-how. By making these refinements, this paper offers a revised intellectualist account of testimonial knowledge-how.