Reale's monumental work establishes the exact dimensions of Aristotle's concept of first philosophy and proves the profound unity of concept that exists in Aristotle's Metaphysics.

In this book Reale presents Plato and Aristotle. At the center of Reale’s interpretation of Plato is the fulcrum of the supersensible, the metaphysical discovery that Plato presented as a result of the Second Voyage. This discovery of the supersensible is, in Reale’s view, not only the fundamental phase of ancient thought, but it also constitutes a milestone on the path of western philosophy. Reale presents Plato in three different dimensions: the theoretic, the mystical-religious, and the political. Each of these (...) components takes on meaning from the Second Voyage. In addition, Reale has shown that only in the light of the Unwritten Doctrines handed down through the indirect tradition, do these three components, and the Second Voyage itself, acquire their full meaning, and only in this way is a unitary conception of Plato’s thought achieved. The interpretation of Aristotle that Reale proposes depends on his interpretation of Plato. Aristotle read without preconceptions is not the antithesis of Plato. Reale points out that Aristotle was unique among thinkers close to Plato, in being the one who developed, at least in part, his Second Voyage. The systematic-unitary interpretation of Aristotle which Reale has previously supported converges with the new systematic-unitary interpretation of Plato. Certain doctrinal positions which are usually reserved to treatments in monographs will be explored, because only in this way can the two distinctive traits of Aristotle’s thought emerge: the way in which he tries to overcome and confirm the Socratic-Platonic positions, and the way in which he formally creates the system of philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter examines the relationship between language and thought in Kant and contemporary philosophy. It argues that Kant, despite his substantive contributions to the philosophy of language, would not have followed the linguistic turn in philosophy. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, the sharp distinction between words and concepts, as well as between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ concepts; secondly, the view that philosophical inquiries are genuinely directed at ‘concepts of things’ rather than at ‘concepts of words.’ The first section (...) analyses the word-concept distinction in Kant. The following section examines the conflation of words and concepts in both everyday and professional philosophical language, as well as Kant’s possible response. The next part is dedicated to the problem of conceptual and topical discontinuity as well as the distinction between words, concepts, and conceptions from both contemporary and Kantian points of view. Finally, the concluding section offers an alternative perspective on the significance of words and continuity in philosophy. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that the attempt by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire and Multitude to “theorize empire” should be read both against the backdrop of speculative philosophy of history and as a development of the conception of a “principle of intelligibility” as this is discussed in Michel Foucault’s recently published courses at the Collège de France. I also argue that Foucault’s work in these courses can be read as implicitly providing what I call “prolegomena to any (...) future speculative philosophy of history.” I define the latter as concerned with the intelligibility of the historical process considered as a whole. I further suggest, through a brief discussion of the classical figures of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, that the basic features of speculative philosophy of history concern the articulation of both the telos and dynamics of history. My claim is that Hardt and Negri provide an account of the telos and dynamics of history that respects the strictures imposed on speculative philosophy of history by Foucault’s work, and thus can be considered as providing a post-Foucauldian speculative philosophy of history. In doing so, they provide a challenge to other “theoretical” attempts to account for our changing world. (shrink)

This work considers the novelty of Neoplatonism against platonic philosophy, characterising the former by three principie points: the monopolaristic conception, the One which is productive (a self difftisive One-Good) remaining as indefinable or ineffable and its consequences and implications. Plotino's metaphysics, therefore, finds itself before a new problem, not put by Plato: to give reason of the One, and with this, of the production of the many from the One, and in its resolution he introduces an irreductable novelty into not (...) only the platonic categories, but also into Greek thought (as the idea of positive infinitude). (shrink)

After the establishment of the Republic in 1910, arouses a nationalist ideology revealing the classical values of Portugal, in which two main paths must be distinguished: on one side, Teixeira de Pascoaes, lyrical and providentialistic, messianic, and, on the other, António Sardinha, monarchical, founder of the movement of “Lusitanian Integralism.” This paper aims at an analysis of such proposals, revealing the particular contexts of their emergence and the meaning of their conceptions.

Este artículo examina el significado del desarrollo humano integral propugnado por Benedicto XVI en Caritas in veritate, destacando su continuidad con Populorum progressio y, en general, con el magisterio social precedente. Tras dar razón del vínculo existente entre la economía, la ética y la antropología, el autor trata de espigar las principales orientaciones ético-económicas que han sido propuestas en esa última encíclica social con vistas a un tal desarrollo, articulándolas a partir de dos concepciones antropológicas de honda raigambre en la (...) doctrina social de la Iglesia, a saber, la dignidad humana y el personalismo comunitario.Comenta, finalmente, la relevancia económica de la antropología cristiana y su potencial crítico frente al homo oeconomicus, así como la capacidad de interlocución con diversas corrientes de pensamiento contemporáneas que dicha antropología proporciona a la doctrina social de la Iglesia.This article examines the meaning of the human, complete development defended by Benedict XVI in Caritas in veritate, emphasizing its continuity with Populorum progessio and with the previous social teaching in general. After stating the existing link between economy, ethics and anthropology, the author tries to select the main ethic-economic orientations proposed in that last social encyclical in relation to a such development, and structures them beginning with two anthropological conceptions deep-rooted in the social doctrine of the church, that is, human dignity and personalism of the community. Finally, the article comments on the economic importance of Christian anthropology and its critical potential against the homo oeconomicus, as well as the capacity of being an interlocutor with several contemporary trends of thought that anthropology provides the social doctrine of the church with. (shrink)

Kraus's 'Kant's Ideas of Reason' offers a 'perspectivalist interpretation' of a part of the Transcendental Dialectic. I will focus on two central topics: the concept of ideas and the concept of reason. First, I argue that Kraus's reconstruction of the concept of ideas requires significant refinement. Despite what the title of her work might suggest, her analysis is limited to transcendental ideas without engaging with Kant's broader typology, which includes at least seven distinct types of ideas. Greater (...) attention to the fundamental features of the concept of ideas, as well as to the relevant scholarship, could help avoid the introduction of the problematic 'isms' 'noumenalism' and 'fictionalism'. Second, I highlight that Kraus does not clearly distinguish between reason in its broader and narrower senses, nor does she provide a precise definition of reason in the narrower sense. I propose modifying the 'perspectivalist interpretation' in accordance with my suggestions. (shrink)

This essay offers an interpretation of Descartes’ treatment of the concepts of place and space in the Principles of Philosophy. On the basis of that interpretation, I argue that his understanding and application of the concept of space supports a pluralist interpretation of Descartes on extended substance. I survey the Scholastic evolution of issues in the Aristotelian theory of place and clarify elements of Descartes’ appropriation and transformation thereof: the relationship between internal and external place, the precise content of (...) the claim that space and body are really identical, and the way we conceptually distinguish space from body. Descartes applies his concept of space in ways that illuminate the metaphysical structure of extension. In particular, he uses the concept to specify the degree to which finite parts of matter are independent of each other. I argue that for Descartes, conceiving extension as indivisible is an artifact of conceiving it as a space. That is, pace the monistic reading of Cartesian extended substance, regarding extension as indivisible is an artifact of conceiving it in a way more removed from its real nature. (shrink)

Scientia et Vita Terra: Concept Bank in Earth and Life Science for Senior High School is a comprehensive instructional resource designed to support the K–12 Earth and Life Science curriculum for Senior High School learners. Developed to provide students with a strong foundational understanding of geoscience and biology, the book integrates essential scientific concepts with structured learning modules, experiential activities, and formative assessments. It traces the Earth’s history and structure, examines geological and atmospheric processes, and explores natural hazards and (...) adaptive strategies, as presented in the Earth Science component. -/- The Life Science component covers the characteristics, origins, and classification of life; cellular processes; bioenergetics; genetics and reproduction; evolution; organismal survival mechanisms; plant biology; and ecological interactions. Each chapter includes “Experiential Learning Enhancers,” which encourage hands-on, inquiry-based activities and contextualized applications to promote deeper engagement and conceptual mastery. With over 80 hours of structured learning content, the book offers a sequential, outcomes-based approach aligned with national curriculum standards, making it a practical guide for both teachers and learners. -/- Overall, Scientia et Vita Terra serves as a complete concept bank that synthesizes key principles of Earth and Life Science into clear, organized, and student-friendly modules. It aims to strengthen scientific literacy, critical thinking, and environmental awareness among senior high school students through accessible explanations, visual enhancements, and real-world applications. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the virtual is rooted in a tradition that conceptualizes it in terms of potentiality rather than illusion or falsity. His theory of the relationship between the virtual, the actual, the real, and the possible presents similarities with critical realism’s ontological domains of the real and the actual, and thus offers alternative and/or additional realist ways of thinking about those domains, especially regarding causal powers residing in relationships rather than entities. Virtuality applies to the (...) empirical domain as well due to experience’s grounding in signs, which are relational. Deleuze also employs virtuality to formulate a concept of simulacra, which illuminates the nature of scientific models and provides a starting point for a critical realist approach to artworks. (shrink)

In the ontological argument for the existence of God, Descartes famously argues that the idea of God is the idea of a perfect being. As such, the idea of God must combine all of the perfections. Now, as (necessary) existence is a perfection, God must exist. Leibniz criticized Descartes’ argument, pointing out that it rests upon the hidden assumption that God is possible. Leibniz argues, however, that God is really possible because realities cannot oppose one another, and so there could (...) be no real opposition between the perfections. So, at least in the case of God, conceivability entails real possibility. Kant rejects this assumption and insists that the non-contradictoriness of an idea is not an adequate criterion for the real possibility of the object of the idea, for although predicates may be combined in thought to form a concept, this does not entail the properties they indicate may be so combined in reality. For this reason, Kant believes that it is impossible to prove the real possibility of God, and so the ontological argument is not sound. In this paper, we examine Kant’s reasons for reaching this conclusion. We pay particular attention to Kant’s argument in the Amphiboly, which deals with the concepts of agreement and opposition, and where Kant stresses the importance of the distinction between logical and real opposition. We will argue that this distinction plays a crucial role in Kant’s rejection of the ontological argument and rationalist Leibnizian–Wolffian metaphysics in general. We also show how Kant’s rejection of the possibility of what he calls the complete determination of a concept in the Ideal of Pure Reason, plays a role in his rejection of the conceivability entails real possibility principle. (shrink)

One 1120 pages volume, with 4000 entries covering - Western philosophy: authors, schools, concepts and terminology; - religions, cultural anthropology, eastern philosophies; - Psychology and psychoanalysis; - linguistics and semiotics; - sociology and political theory.

Este artículo propone una explicación e interpretación del contenido y estructura de Différence et répétition (1968) de Gilles Deleuze. La obra expone un sistema de filosofía contemporánea cuyo objetivo es determinar las condiciones de la experiencia real. El sistema se compone de varias partes: crítica de la forma y contenido del concepto filosófico; métodos filosóficos; estesiología trascendental; dialéctica de las Ideas; estética de las intensidades. Esta interpretación muestra el recorrido y función de la razón suficiente en varios descubrimientos: el (...) método como procedimiento de determinación filosófica, la afectividad diferencial, las nociones no-categoriales, la función de los imperativos ontológicos, la triple figura de la determinación, la determinación individuante, la apertura a la ética de las cantidades intensivas. Esta manera de interpretar la obra incorpora la filosofía de Deleuze a preocupaciones ontológicas, gnoseológicas, éticas, estéticas, de la filosofía tradicional. Además, puede ser útil para dar un sentido al conjunto de su obra posterior. (shrink)

The paper analyzes Max Weber’s concepts of rationality and rationalization as components of modernization processes in modern society. The author reconstructs Weber’s interpretation of “spiritual factors” of social development, which emerge in the ethos of Protestantism. The research demonstrates how Weber’s study of capitalism in terms of rationality corresponds with concepts of other classics of German sociology, such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Georg Simmel and others. The article emphasizes the relevance of Weber’s sociology for XX— XXI centuries and how (...) its basic concepts and methodological approaches have been further developed by scholars, including Ukrainian ones. Weber’s concept of rationality is applicable not only to the mental-epistemological sphere, it also acquires a social meaning. This approach has gained recognition in phenomenological sociology, theory of social systems, communicative theory and more. In addition to the formal rationality of the economy, modern social sciences use such concepts as social, aesthetic, ethical, environmental, and practical rationality. Weber’s “diagnosis of the age” is still a component of the “diagnosis” of modern society. The gap between values and interests remains an integral feature of the “risks and threats society” in the XXI century. This situation is especially evident in international relations, when “real politics” (Realpolitik), based on interests, becomes insensitive to “value postulates”. The author also discovers ways of value (moral and ethical) reclamation of modern society, particularly in the concepts of “ethical economy”, universalist ethics of discourse, global ethos and more. Keywords: purposive rationality, rationality (formal, material, communicative, systemic), value, ethos. (shrink)

This chapter develops the Lacanian concept of jouissance—a traumatic excess of enjoyment which may not be felt as such—in relation to the real, imaginary, and symbolic registers. I demonstrate how Lacan extracts these concepts (and others, such as das Ding, objet a, $, S1, S2) from some of Freud’s major texts. I also discuss how the Lacanian real is an antagonism immanent to the symbolic, the symbolic’s own structural inconsistency. This conceptualization will be central to my subsequent (...) integrations with neuroscience. (shrink)

In a variety of disciplines, there exists a consensus that human rights are individual claim rights that all human beings possess simply as a consequence of being human. That consensus seems to me to obscure the real character of the concept and hinder the progress of discussion. I contend that rather than thinking of human rights in the first instance as “claim rights” possessed by individuals, we should regard human rights as higher order norms that articulate standards of (...) legitimacy for sociopolitical and legal institutions. (shrink)

Under an ‘antitheodicy’, I understand any attempt to show the principal impossibility of a morally respectable and rationally convincing theoretical answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is understood as a problem of consistency and rational coherence between propositions. In this paper, I will analyse the concept of rationality which is presupposed at least in some strands of antitheodicy. A. Gleeson’s ‘A frightening love. Recasting the Problem of Evil’ presupposes a dichotomy between an engaged-existential and a detached-impersonal kind (...) of philosophical thinking which are respectively characterized by a stress on authenticity and the acknowledgement of particularity and contingency in the first case and by precision, logic, provability and an instrumental understanding of rationality in the second case. The second kind of reasoning which underlies all theodicies is inapt for dealing adequately with the real problem of evil. I try to show that the dichotomy of impersonal objective and existentially subjective kinds of philosophy is not a contradictory one but leaves out a broad field in-between which can be characterized as ‘informal reasoning’ and which allows a morally sensitive answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is not isolated from the ‘real’ problem of evil. (shrink)

The problem of freedom is becoming ever more pressing in our day, as the effectuation of real and complete freedom for all people who work is one of the principal objectives of the social morality of communism set forth in the Program of the CPSU. On the other hand, capitalism and its ideological defenders in the struggle against the world communist movement seek to turn the idea of freedom to their own ends, distorting and limiting this concept so (...) as to prove the unprovable, to wit, that the capitalist social system is the "free world," while socialism and communism constitute a violation and destruction of freedom. In so doing they recognize the fundamental opposition of the Marxist and bourgeois conceptions of freedom, while holding, naturally, that their standpoint represents truth and the Marxist, confusion. Here, for example, are the words of a bourgeois theoretician: "The Marxist concept of freedom as recognition of necessity changes the meaning of freedom so as to make it unrecognizable. It pays formal respect to free will, while accepting determinism in its entirety". (shrink)

The contemporary conception of metaphysics is represented by Lublin philosophical school with its leading representative Mieczyslav A. Krapiec. Metaphysics as the most universal autonomous science has its specific object: the reality, i. e. the real things. The first task of the methaphysics is the determination of its object. Its method should not be derived neither from any philosophical school, nor from any theory of knowledge. It rather should arise from the nature of its own object - from the reality (...) itself. The realism and the scientific character of metaphysical know_ledge is based rather on the explanation of the reality in the perspective of its existence than on the explanation of our ideal constructions of knowledge. It is a complex methodological process , which must meet the standards of scientific neutrality and its controlable proceedings. This process does not result in any abstract, essenital, unambiguous concept of being, but rather in an analogical - transcendental concept of being verified by all analogically existing plurality of particular beings. The proportion of existence to essence varies in every being, but is at the same time analogical in all of them. The method of separation is not subject to any systematic changes - it is corrected by the relaity itself, to which it is directed. (shrink)

Leibniz’s and Whitehead’s analyses of motion are at the heart of their metaphysical schemes. These schemes are to be considered as two blueprints of a similar metaphysical intuition that emerged during two breakthrough eras, that is, the 17th century and the beginning of the 20th century, and retained the Aristotelian idea that existence requires an active principle. The two philosophers’ attempts to elucidate this idea in the context of their analyses of motion still interact with central, longstanding questions in philosophy, (...) in particular that concerning the ontological status of change. For both thinkers, the phenomenon of motion is an example par excellence, of the metaphysically fundamental principle of action that is required for change in the world. I focus on Leibniz’s and Whitehead’s similar understanding of the concept of transition that is inserted as an essential constitutive component of motion and ensures its status as something real.Keywords: Gottfried Leibniz; Alfred Whitehead; Motion; Change; Relativity; Transition. (shrink)

The article analyzes the meaning of the concept of res in Descartes? metaphysics. The basic meaning is that thing is an essence that could have even real existence. Through the analysis of Descartes? works that meaning has made more precise against the background of the rational distinction between essence and existence. The relations among the thing and the notions of reality, the degrees of reality and the modes of reality were shown. The special attention is dedicated to the (...) relation between the thing and the causality, i.e., to the problems how the things could cause and what is the cause of things. The problem of causality is connected with Descartes? teaching concerning the creation of eternal truths; that connection expresses the difference between his and scholastics? concept of thing, which is obvious in his concept of the causation of the degrees of reality. At the end the late, scholastics? notion of supertranscendental meaning of thing is shown in Descartes. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Enraciné dans la philosophie politique au XVIIIe siècle français, le concept d’association occupe une place essentielle dans la philosophie de Saint-Simon. Chez cet auteur, l’association a pour objet la production, elle présuppose une organisation intégrée et constitue l’unité de la société. La société organique de Saint-Simon évolue selon un principe de complexification vers un grand but industriel commun. Fourier place aussi l’association comme condition de la coopération, mais elle en est le moteur. L’organisation de l’investissement psychologique dans l’association (...) créerait continuellement la société fouriériste. De Saint-Simon, Marx semble retenir l’idée d’association créant l’organisme productif; il emprunte à Fourier la production d’une société nouvelle collectivisant toutes les dimensions personnelles. Mais l’association devient chez Marx le fruit de la dialectique de l’histoire, dont le moment négatif rend l’organisme collectif à lui-même et lui confère une individualité nouvelle. L’association chez Marx s’impose comme une unité. Chacun participe nécessairement à cette réalité qui doit l’affranchir des limites de sa propre individualité. ABSTRACT Rooted in the french philosophy of the XVIIIth french century, the concept of association holds an essential place in the philosophy of Saint-Simon. In this author, association concerns production, it is generated by an integrated organization and forms unity in the society. In Saint-Simon, the organized society evolves according to a principle of complexification towards a great industrial aim. Fourier equally sets association before cooperation, considering it as a real driving force. According to Fourier, psychological commitment in association should make dynamic any cooperation. Marx possibly deducted from Saint-Simon the idea that association should create the collective organism. He borrowed from Fourier the production of a new society, getting collective the whole human person. But, association in Marx's thought becomes the result of the dialectic of history. A negative phase in this dialectic gives the collective organisme to itself back and confers on it a new individuality. In Marx, association is essential as a unity. Each one necessary takes part in this reality which will make him free from the limits of his own individuality. (shrink)

The Indian philosophy of Maya is devoutly reviewed with extended analysis of Amobindo and Radhakrishnan. Introductions pose sharply the centrality of the concept, but in her faithfulness to the positions discussed, the author fails to reveal Maya as a unitary concept. Reyna's greatest admiration seems to be for the Sankaran formula that the phenomenal world is not real, a description which she "finds" vindicated by modern science.--E. W.

This open access book is about the German term ‘Menschenbild’. This term concerns basic beliefs about humanity such as equality or hierarchy, the desirability of freedom or control, and the relationship of people to nature. Such beliefs shape everything - how to live, how to treat others, how society is built. They underpin laws, morals, politics, and education. They shape how children are raised, how society functions, and how people view the future. This book examines these beliefs, exploring why they (...) matter, and how they affect people. Drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche, it argues three things: Everyone holds a set of basic beliefs about what it means to be human. These beliefs shape our knowledge, values, and institutions. They are not passive; they become real. Over time, they influence people. By uncovering the hidden power of these beliefs, this book introduces a concept as foundational as it is overlooked and offers a new lens for understanding today’s cultural and political conflicts. It suggests that rethinking our understanding of humanity might be key to shaping a better future. The Concept of Menschenbild and What it Means to be Human is essential reading for all scholars, researchers and advanced students of social philosophy and the philosophy of the human self. It is also of interest to researchers of the philosophy of language, linguistics and theology. (shrink)

Concepts are highly theoretical entities. One cannot study them empirically without committing oneself to substantial preliminary assumptions. Among the competing theories of concepts and categorization developed by psychologists in the last thirty years, the implicit theoretical assumption that what falls under a concept is determined by description () has never been seriously challenged. I present a nondescriptionist theory of our most basic concepts, which include (1) stuffs (gold, milk), (2) real kinds (cat, chair), and (3) individuals (Mama, Bill (...) Clinton, the Empire State Building). On the basis of something important that all three have in common, our earliest and most basic concepts of substances are identical in structure. The membership of the category like that of is a natural unit in nature, to which the concept does something like pointing, and continues to point despite large changes in the properties the thinker represents the unit as having. For example, large changes can occur in the way a child identifies cats and the things it is willing to call without affecting the extension of its word The difficulty is to cash in the metaphor of in this context. Having substance concepts need not depend on knowing words, but language interacts with substance concepts, completely transforming the conceptual repertoire. I will discuss how public language plays a crucial role in both the acquisition of substance concepts and their completed structure. (shrink)

Though ‘evil’ is often used loosely as merely the generic opposite of ‘morally good’, used precisely it is the worst possible term of opprobrium available. In this essay it is taken as applying primarily to persons, secondarily to conduct; evil deeds must flow from the volition to do something evil. An evil action is one so horrendously bad that no ordinary decent human being can conceive of doing it, and an evil person is one who knowingly wills or orders such (...) actions. Malignant evil—doing evil because it is evil—is not just possible but real, and is one of several kinds of evil delineated. There are incidental discussions of cruelty, Rosenbaum on Explaining Hitler, Baumeister on Evil, and Benn on wickedness. Footnotes1 Dedicated to Alan Gewirth, in honour of his 90th birthday, and in appreciation of his superb, illuminating, and ground-breaking philosophical work over many years. (shrink)

The concept of disease is deeply rooted in medical practice, and one can hardly conceive of caring for patients without this tool. Nevertheless, under this seemingly uncontroversial idea there are some highly polemical axioms that we usually take for granted, even though they often lead us to some uncomfortable inconsistencies and contradictions. Some of the conceptual issues derived from our traditional view of disease, which condition the way we conceive and practice medicine, include:We conceive of disease as a (...) class='Hi'>real entity that affects a previously healthy person, thus making him ill. The purpose of medicine is to identify and fight this entity. If it succeeds, the patient is cured; otherwise, the patient will .. (shrink)

Process philosophies tend to emphasise the value of continuous creation as the core of their discourse. For Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze, and others the real is ultimately a creative becoming. Critics have argued that there is an irreducible element of (almost religious) belief in this re-evaluation of immanent creation. While I don’t think belief is necessarily a sign of philosophical and existential weakness, in this paper I will examine the possibility for the concept of universal creation to be a (...) political and ethical axiom, the result of a global social contract rather than of a new spirituality. I argue here that a coherent way to fight against potentially totalitarian absolutes is to replace them with a virtual absolute that cannot territorialise without deterritorialising at the same time: the Creal principle. (shrink)

When we say that what two people feel for each other is 'true love,' we seem to be doing more than simply clarifying that it is in fact love they feel, as opposed to something else. That is, an experience or relationship might be a genuine or actual instance of love without necessarily being an instance of true love. But what criteria do people use to determine whether something counts as true love? This chapter explores three hypotheses. The first holds (...) that the ordinary concept of true love picks out love that is highly prototypical. The second, that it picks out love that is especially good or valuable. The third, that people distinguish between psychological states that are 'real' or not, and that it picks out love that is real. Two experiments provide evidence against the first hypothesis and in favor of the second and third. Implications for real-life disagreements about love are also discussed. (shrink)

The familiar irony of ‘real existing socialism’ is that it never was. Socialist ideals were used to legitimize regimes that fell far short of realizing those ideals – indeed, that violently repressed anyone who tried to realize them. This paper suggests that the derogatory concept of ‘the criminal’ may be allowing liberal ideals to operate in contemporary political philosophy and real politics in a worryingly similar manner. By depoliticizing deep dissent from the prevailing order of property, this (...) concept can obscure what I call the legitimation gap. This is the gulf between (a) liberal accounts of state legitimacy, and (b) the actual functioning of liberal states. Feminists have long pointed out that the exclusion of what is deemed ‘personal’ from political consideration is itself a political move. I propose that the construction of the criminal as a category opposed to the political works similarly to perpetuate unjust forms of social power. (shrink)

The concept of the three domains of reality is widely used in empirical critical realist research. However, there has been little scrutiny of how the domains are conceptualized and what they contribute to critical realism and how they should be applied in empirical research. This paper involves four arguments. First, Tom Fryer and Cristián Navarrete argue that the three domains of reality are redundant, confusing, and unsupported by Bhaskar’s theorizing. Second, Dave Elder-Vass argues that the three domains schema embodies (...) a distinction between the actual and the non-actual real. Regardless of whether we call them domains we need to retain this distinction. Third, Tobin Nellhaus argues that there are several reasons to uphold the three domains, but ‘the empirical’ is flawed and must be enfolded within a more encompassing theory. Fourth, Ruth Groff argues that the metaphor of ontological stratification is a problem when readers take it literally, often misconstruing the actual metaphysical content that it is meant to capture. (shrink)

In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the (...) key to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects. (shrink)

Summary The article deals with the concept of religion in the contemporary theology of religions. Many theologians in the current debate work with a general concept of religion. Such a conception of religion unifies the distinctive religious diversities. This article argues that against the background of the previous debate, a theology of religions must proceed from a concept of religion as communication. This concept emerges out of the Christian religious tradition: it carries a particular meaning and (...) hence should not be treated as universally applicable. Starting with a concrete concept of religion, a theology of religion has the task neither to give a foundation for other “religions”, nor that of Christianity. Only this could be a basis for a real pluralistic conception. From this starting point follows the question on how other religions understand religion. (shrink)

This paper addresses an important yet neglected existential issue sometimes faced by persons with bipolar disorder (BD): confusion about the extent to which what one is like is influenced by BD. Although such confusion is common in psychiatric illnesses, BD raises idiosyncratic difficulties due to its intricate interactions with personality, cognition and behavior. The fluctuating mood phases of BD can generate inconsistency in one's self-experience and sense of self. One way to resolve this confusion would be to coherently account for (...) BD within one's overall self-concept. To facilitate this task, this paper introduces a heuristic taxonomy of different relationships wherein BD can be viewed in light of self-related beliefs. The relationships are as follows: (1) BD contributes to the self, (2) BD scaffolds the self, (3) BD gradually becomes part of the self and (4) BD is not part of the ‘real self’. As the individual presentation of BD varies extensively, the type of relationship one feels holds true depends on one's personal experience of managing and living with the disorder. These relationships act as an organizing framework for one's self-related beliefs about how to account for the effects of BD on personality, behavior, cognitive patterns and other self-expressions. (shrink)

The recent alleged doping case of the figure skater Kamila Valieva at the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing 2022 dramatically raised the issue of the protection of minors in anti-doping policy. We firstly present the literature on doping in relation to minors. Secondly, we present WADA’s Protected Person (PP) concept and its implications. Thirdly, we analyse the WADA Code’s purpose and the vulnerability of minors under the Code, and fourthly, we identify the real threats from which minors should (...) be protected by analysing the ineffective PP concept, and showing how it cannot be a real protection. We explain how preventing one threat can generate another, thus converting minor athletes from victims into suspects. We conclude by stressing the necessity for further research, and we indicate our future research direction, towards the development of a much wider concept of protection, and its application into sporting contexts. (shrink)

Special issue: "Henri Bergson. Creative Evolution and Philosophy of Life." I read the genealogy of the concept of energy through Bergson's Creative Evolution to argue that, historically, energy and its proto-concepts are grounded in spatialized notions of time. Bergson's work not only demands that we rethink energy and its relation to time, it also allows us to see that the concept of energy as we know it depicts time and materiality as a numerical multiplicity, which effaces the differences (...) in kind which are characteristic of energy transformations and real duration. To make this case, I first provide an analysis of Bergson’s concept of the cinematographical mechanism of thought, which splits duration into a composition of distinct states strung together by the idea of an impersonal becoming. Bergson claimed that this is the epistemological model for both ancient philosophy and modern science, meaning that it is also the epistemological ground within which energy concepts in western philosophy and science have been theorized. I then show how Bergson offers a way to overcome this model of theorizing through his method of intuition, and how these conclusions might be extended to future energy concepts. Thus, I argue that 1) Bergson’s work on duration allow us to interpret the genealogy of energy as the history of attempts to provide an account of change in terms of spatialized notions of time; 2) that his work offers a way of incorporating historicity into our understanding of energy; and 3) that thinking energy in the context of duration offers the possibility of conceptualizing energy as change. (shrink)

Is it possible to say that there is no real self if we take a non-Cartesian view of the body? Is it possible to say that an organism can engage in pragmatic action and intersubjective interaction and that the self generated in such activity is not real? This depends on how we define the concept "real". By taking a close look at embodied action, and at Metzinger's concept of embodiment, I want to argue that, on (...) a non-Cartesian concept of reality, the self should be considered something real, and not simply an illusion. (shrink)

Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary clarify the question “Are Psychiatric Kinds Real?” as “Do psychiatric concepts refer to natural kinds?” our preliminary understanding of a natural kind being a set of things which form a kind regardless of human belief or interest. I propose that they need to distinguish between these two questions: “Are psychiatric kinds real?” and “Could psychiatric kinds be real? Is it possible for them to be real?” They start with the former question (...) but sometimes sound as if they are addressing the latter question. Also I think they need to distinguish between a person who addresses the question while accepting that physics, chemistry, and biology identify natural kinds and a person who does not: one of their arguments against what I call “a natural account of natural kinds” is that it is incompatible with recent accounts of what a species is, but categories like schizophrenia show a long-term robustness and seem to merit a less fashionable defence (put crudely). They use an account which emphasizes explanatory value and predictive success as indicators of a concept which picks out a natural kind but they ignore the existence of multiple psychiatric diagnostic systems, even within Western culture. They want to support the DSM system, it seems. But an explanation for why the National Health Service does not use psychoanalysis, say, is that it is simply too expensive, not that something epistemically-compelling favours the current DSM. The diagnostic system recommended by the UK government is probably the outcome of considerations which do not guarantee its being better than other systems as “pure science.” Put snobbishly, it is for the poor. (shrink)

What are we to make of Western Buddhism? Glenn Wallis argues that in aligning their tradition with the contemporary self-help industry, Western Buddhists evade the consequences of Buddhist thought. This book shows that with concepts such as vanishing, nihility, extinction, contingency, and no-self, Buddhism, like all potent systems of thought, articulates a notion of the "real." Raw, unflinching acceptance of this real is held by Buddhism to be at the very core of human "awakening." Yet these preeminent human (...) truths are universally shored up against in contemporary Buddhist practice, which contradicts the very heart of Buddhism. The author's critique of Western Buddhism is threefold. It is immanent, in emerging out of Buddhist thought but taking it beyond what it itself publicly concedes; negative, in employing the "democratizing" deconstructive methods of François Laruelle's non-philosophy; and re-descriptive, in applying Laruelle's concept of philofiction. Through applying resources of Continental philosophy to Western Buddhism, A Critique of Western Buddhism suggests a possible practice for our time, an "anthropotechnic", or religion transposed from its seductive, but misguiding, idealist haven. (shrink)

Untested theories and uncontested ideas have gained a hold in the social sciences with serious ramifications for applied disciplines such as psychotherapy. This paper describes the activist turn that has not only subverted the traditional route of knowledge production, but has also changed the profession’s healing telos into a political one. The consequences for practitioners, trainees and clients have been harmful. Many factors have contributed to cementing this new hegemony in place, but chief amongst them is the silencing of all (...) public critique and debate. We explore the potential for a new political thesis—meta-critical post-progressivism—to provide a means of breaking the silence. As an example, we apply the deconstructive method, suggested by the thesis, to shed light on a specific concept and praxis called ‘decolonial/decolonising therapy’. We conclude that a meta-critical lens reveals the power dynamics intrinsic to this novel form of therapy and that such exposure will help classical clinicians and theorists promote public critical debate and withstand specious accusations of bigotry. (shrink)

Heraclitus uses paradoxical language to present the relationship between opposites in his worldview. This mode of expression has generated much controversy. Some take the paradoxes as evidence of a contradictory identity of opposites (Barnes), while others propose a dynamic union through transformation without identity that avoids the contradiction (Graham). By examining B88 and B62, I seek to identify the stronger and weaker points of such readings. The contradictory identity reading thwarts the transformation between opposites. The dynamic reading offers a plausible (...) alternative. However, it skips a characterization of how Heraclitus conceives of the transformation between opposites in physical terms. To fill this gap, I consider Heraclitus’ use of what I call the anti-cognate internal object in B62. I argue that ‘living the death and dying the life’ is a case of change as mixture, a popular conception among the early Presocratics. Upon closer examination, the anti-cognate internal object suggests that real contradictions belong to Heraclitus conception of change. The details reveal a philosophically compelling view. (shrink)