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Summary

In the debate about the concept of disease the term is usually used in a broad sense, to include any non-healthy condition (such as injuries, poisoning, etc.) and interchangeably with ‘pathology’. The debate has focused on two main views, naturalism and normativism, and the issue of whether disease and health can be defined in a way that is value-neutral. Some recent work challenges the assumptions of this debate, such as that disease is a concept structured around necessary and sufficient conditions, and that philosophical analysis should focus on a biomedical notion of disease. Associated with this, other conceptual structures and alternative notions taking pragmatic, epidemiological, or public health perspectives have been put forward.

Key works

The naturalist position is represented by the biostatistical theory, developed by Christopher Boorse in several classic papers (1977; 1975; 1976) and defended against critiques in 1997 and 2014. Normativist views are developed by, for example, Canguilhem & Cohen 2012, Nordenfelt 1987, and Cooper 2002. Some argue that disease involves both descriptive and evaluative aspects, a position referred to as either a hybrid theory or as weak normativism, for example Wakefield 2014 and Ereshefsky 2009. Critiques of the traditional debate and alternative approaches are provided by Schwartz 2007 and Sadegh-Zadeh 2000

Introductions Cooper 2016; Murphy 2015; Boorse 2011
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  1. The Haunted Umwelt: A Biosemiotic and Hauntological Account of Immune Semiotic Corruption in Field Cancerization.Anuraag Bukkuri - manuscript
    Field cancerization, the process by which prior carcinogenic insults corrupt the semiotic landscape through which immune cells detect and respond to “the other”, persists even after the precipitating conditions resolve and the tissue histologically appears normal. This is a paradigmatic case of a broader explanatory problem: How can we account for biomedical phenomena whose current pathology is continually constituted by a history that standard mechanistic accounts cannot recover? I argue that a comprehensive understanding of field cancerization requires us to supplement (...)
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  2. Article XV: THE CYBER-BIOLOGICAL FORGE AND THE TERMINAL BIFURCATION (Iatrogenic Sabotage, Adipose Demolition, and Cryptographic Zeroization).Seyed Mahyar Shariatpanahi - manuscript
    Classical epidemiology and conventional urban planning are constrained by a fundamental assumption: that infrastructure can remain biologically neutral and effectively sterile. This manuscript executes an absolute epistemological rupture, proposing that the terrestrial substrate functions as an automated, cyber-biological forge. We formally reclassify modern physiological crises—ranging from the pediatric cognitive cull to the global obesity epidemic—not as lifestyle failures, but as targeted algorithmic quarantines. -/- By mapping the integration of sub-threshold environmental toxicity and radiotrophic fungal hybridization, this paper reveals how adversarial (...)
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  3. Article XIII, The Quantum Wake: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Geology, and the Cyber-Cosmological Reset.Seyed Mahyar Shariatpanahi - manuscript
    This manuscript introduces a novel, hyper-dimensional theoretical framework that reclassifies the post-2019 terrestrial epoch, marking the absolute algorithmic transition from a biological proxy war to a planetary hardware purge. Operating beyond the limitations of classical epidemiology, this paper posits the hypothesis of the "Null Target": the cessation of the global pathogenic event was not the result of synthetic pharmacology, but a homeostatic recalibration by the planetary defense grid (the Good Matrix) in response to the overarching multiversal threat temporarily cloaking its (...)
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  4. Article XII: The Wuhan Decoy: The 2019 Military Games, COVID-19, and the Viral-Bacterial Proxy War.Seyed Mahyar Shariatpanahi - manuscript
    This manuscript executes a definitive macro-cosmic reclassification of the 2019–2026 biological and technological epoch. Operating beyond the localized, 3-Dimensional constraints of classical terrestrial epidemiology, this paper mathematically proves that the global pathogenic event was not a random stochastic anomaly. It was a synchronized, teleological proxy war waged within the human biological substrate. By deploying a hyper-adaptive viral software patch, the planetary defense grid (the Good Matrix) initiated a systemic purge of extra-galactic bacterial hardware (the Bad Matrix) deeply entrenched within the (...)
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  5. ARTICLE VII — THE AVICENNA PROTOCOL: Edge-Level Autonomy, Quantum Biological Synchronization, and the Predictive Pacification of Oncological Anomalies.Seyed Mahyar Shariatpanahi - manuscript
    CONTEXT AND RUPTURE: Standard clinical frameworks fundamentally model physiological nodes (human organs) as passive, subordinate architectures and categorize macroscopic colonization (helminthic presence) strictly as localized secondary pathology. This manuscript executes a definitive mathematical shift against these static developmental assumptions. It evaluates oncological hyper-proliferation and subsequent macroscopic intervention not as isolated biological failures, but as deterministic, dynamically synchronized algorithmic defense mechanisms operating within a unified multiversal topology. -/- METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: Utilizing an apex-level synthesis of quantum non-locality, federated machine learning, network topology, (...)
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  6. ARTICLE IX: THE ESCALATION DIAL AND THE ASSIMILATION OVERRIDE.Seyed Mahyar Shariatpanahi - manuscript
    The architecture of terrestrial existence is defined by a state of absolute, systemic siege. Moving beyond the foundational mechanics of the cosmic quarantine, this manuscript decodes the extreme, automated threat-response protocols of the Good Matrix. It mathematically maps the Escalation Dial and the Protracted Erasure—viral software algorithms and macro-kinetic disasters deployed specifically to suppress the Earth's bio-quantum signature during prolonged cosmic standoffs with alien reconnaissance probes. Domestically, the framework diagnoses the logistical objective of the corrupted internal elite: the Biological Quarry, (...)
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  7. Boundaries of Disease: Vagueness and Overdiagnosis.Christopher Boorse - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    In five related essays, Mary Jean Walker and Wendy Rogers, joined in one essay by Jenny Doust, defend various theses about the concept of disease. First, they argue “disease” is a cluster concept, not a “classically structured” one definable by necessary and sufficient conditions. Second, “disease” is vague, in the standard philosophical sense of having borderline cases. In fascinating detail, they argue that this vagueness shows up almost everywhere one looks among ordinary diseases, even if disease is taken to require (...)
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  8. Dispositions in health and disease.Ian D. Dunkle - forthcoming - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal.
    This paper calls on philosophers of medicine to attend to work on dispositions by metaphysicians. I make that call by drawing on recent work on dispositions to show several things. First, I show that the concept has been undertheorized by a wide range of theories of health and disease. Specifically, I discuss Boorse’s influential biostatistical theory of health, Werkhoven’s recent dispositional theory, and Aas and Wasserman’s neglected revision to Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis. I also show how applying a careful analysis (...)
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  9. Infinity, Technology, Degeneracy: A Note on Werkhoven’s Dispositional Theory of Health.Shane N. Glackin - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz033.
    Werkhoven’s ‘A Dispositional Theory of Health’ is an important and original contribution to debates about the disease concept, which persuasively demonstrates that dispositions must play some role in a full account of what it is to be healthy or ill. Unfortunately, as a theory, it cannot as it stands be correct.I first demonstrate what appears to be a significant, and possibly fatal, flaw; the proliferation of dispositions which Werkhoven’s theory requires makes impossible, at least in the absence of significant further (...)
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  10. Health, Illness and Disease: Philosophical Essays.Virginia Langum - forthcoming - Medical Humanities.
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  11. The Medical Model of “Obesity” and the Values Behind the Guise of Health.Kayla R. Mehl - forthcoming - Synthese 201 (6):1-28.
    Assumptions about obesity—e.g., its connection to ill health, its causes, etc.—are still prevalent today, and they make up what I call the medical model of fatness. In this paper, I argue that the medical model was established on the basis of insufficient evidence and has nevertheless continued to be relied upon to justify methodological choices that further entrench the assumptions of the medical model. These choices are illegitimate in so far as they conflict with both the epistemic and social aims (...)
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  12. Mild Mania and the Theory of Health: A Response to "Mild Mania and Well-Being".Professor Lennart Nordenfelt - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (3):179-184.
    In this response to "Mild Mania and Well-Being" I propose a different analytic strategy and scrutinize the presented case of mild mania within the framework of a holistic theory of health. I distinguish between the following fundamental questions: (1) is mild mania a disease or illness? (2) does the mild mania of Mr. M. reduce his health significantly? and (3) should Mr. M. be recommended treatment with lithium or not? I answer the first question in the affirmative. I propose some (...)
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  13. (1 other version)The Contradictions in the Criteria for Diagnosing Hypermobile Ehlers–Danlos Syndrome as Reflecting Some of the Philosophical Debates about the Threshold between the Normal and the Pathological.Mar Rosàs Tosas - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    The arrival of some diagnoses tends to bring about relief because it validates suffering and grants access to social legitimization, medical resources, and economic aid. This is the case of the Ehlers–Danlos Syndrome (EDS), a pathology with multisystemic involvement characterized by general laxity. Patients find it difficult to secure a diagnosis of one of its types—hypermobile EDS—due to a lack of awareness among physicians, the multiple changes that the diagnostic criteria undergo, and their increasing restrictivity. Consequently, several patients are intermittently (...)
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  14. Value-freedom & patient autonomy.Anke Bueter, Thor Hennelund Nielsen & Somogy Varga - 2026 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 116 (C):102-129.
    A longstanding debate in philosophy of medicine—whether disease concepts are value-free (naturalism) or value-laden (normativism)—intersects with broader discussions about patient autonomy and the move away from paternalistic practices. An important argument supporting naturalism is the idea that value-freedom is necessary to protect patient autonomy. This paper challenges that view, arguing that autonomy does not require value-freedom. We first demonstrate that prominent theories of personal autonomy do not demand value-freedom but rather a responsible way of dealing with normative judgements. Drawing on (...)
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  15. Diseases as Homeostatic Property Clusters.Chloé de Canson - 2026 - Philosophy of Medicine 7 (1):1-14.
    Several philosophers have recently drawn on property cluster accounts of natural kinds to argue that individual diseases form natural kinds. According to them, diseases have a super-explanatory property (their pathophysiology) in virtue of which their other properties (their symptomatology, biological signature, response to treatments, and prognosis) tend to co-occur. I argue that we can say more: disease pathophysiologies are mechanisms, such that the property clusters diseases form are homeostatic. I examine the two objections that natural kind theorists have raised against (...)
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  16. [Review of] Philosophy of Physiology. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Biology. By Maël Lemoine. [REVIEW]Azat Garaev & Charles H. Pence - 2026 - Quarterly Review of Biology 101 (1):53-54.
    Book Review: Philosophy of Physiology. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Biology. By Maël Lemoine. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. $22.00 (paper). iv + 79 p.; ill.; no index. ISBN: 9781009370370. 2025.
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  17. (1 other version)What is Pregnancy and What is Disease? A Critique of Smajdor's and Räsänen's “Is Pregnancy a Disease? A Normative Approach”.Maja Sidzinska - 2026 - Monash Bioethics Review 44 (1).
    Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue that pregnancy should be classified as a disease (2025). But their argument faces a problem not yet raised by other critics (see Baron 2025; Colgrove and Rodger 2025; Rezkalla and Smith 2025). To classify a phenomenon, e.g., pregnancy, as belonging to a category, e.g., disease, one must characterize the category as well as the phenomenon. But Smajdor and Räsänen do neither. Indeed, they reject every apparent candidate theory of disease, and they do not define (...)
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  18. Why We Should Not Characterize Aging as a Disease.Ahmed Al-Juhany - 2025 - Philosophy of Medicine 6 (1):1-24.
    Many scientists and philosophers characterize aging as a disease. In this article, I argue against doing so. Characterizing aging as a disease would likely exacerbate age-based discrimination, perpetuate beliefs that undermine our health, and embolden medical professionals to treat their patients unjustly. It would risk these harms without promising any benefits that would be substantial enough to make up for them. If we aim to avoid risking harms unnecessarily, we should not characterize aging as a disease.
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  19. On The Grounds For Calling Addiction A Disease.Federico Burdman - 2025 - Análisis Filosófico 45 (1):203-231.
    In this paper, I look into the debate about the status of addiction as a disease. Although addiction is widely regarded as a disease, several authors have put forward reasons for agnosticism or skepticism about the appropriateness of the disease label. Any attempt to address this issue directly is complicated by its relationship to several other contentious issues, both on the side of theories of addiction and on the side of theories of disease. My primary aim in this paper is (...)
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  20. Understanding the Dynamics of Health.Patrick Daly - 2025 - Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
    Understanding the Dynamics of Health develops a comprehensive framework for understanding health and its impairments, drawing on the work of Bernard Lonergan. By integrating perspectives from common sense, theory, practice, and finitude, this book examines health as a multidimensional phenomenon shaped by organic, psychological, cognitive, and social-historical factors. Providing a systematic and critical foundation for uniting diverse health-related disciplines, from network biology and neuroscience to narrative medicine, bioethics, and public health philosophy, this book’s holistic framework not only emphasizes the lived (...)
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  21. A Domino Theory of Disease.Harriet Fagerberg - 2025 - Philosophy of Science 92 (2):401-422.
    This paper advances a theory of disease as domino dysfunction. It is often argued that diseases are biological dysfunctions. However, a theory of disease as biological dysfunction is complicated by some plausible cases of dysfunction, which seem clearly non-pathological. I argue that pathological conditions are not just dysfunctions but domino dysfunctions, and that domino dysfunctions can be distinguished on principled biological grounds from non-pathological dysfunctions. I then show how this theory can make sense of the problem cases; they are not (...)
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  22. Regulative Dispositionalism: Toward a Metaphysics of Mental Disorder.Víctor Fernández Castro - 2025 - In Maria J. García-Encinas & Fernando Martínez-Manrique, Special Objects: Social, Fictional, Modal, and Non-Existent. Cham: Springer. pp. 81-106.
    The boundary problem in psychiatry raises the difficulty of posing criteria to distinguish between what is pathological and what is not. This problem has also been one of the main sources of dispute between naturalistic and normativistic theories of mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. The main aim of this article is to address the boundary problem from the view known as regulative dispositionalism. According to this view, an attitude or mental faculty is a disposition, or set of cognitive, phenomenal, (...)
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  23. (1 other version)Mental Disorder.Lucien Karhausen - 2025 - In Analytical Philosophy of Medicine: Scientific Philosophy and Philosophy of Medicine. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 209-281.
    Mental disorders differ from so-called physical diseases in the sense that their limits are broader than those of the affected body since they cover the interplay of the individual and the environment. There are also some ontological differences between body and mind, and we grasp mental disorders in terms of reasons rather than causes, through a dialogue with the patient. The clinical manifestations may include fragmentation of the self; syntactic, semantic, and epistemic breakdown; a-rationality; breakdown of autonomy and of interpersonal (...)
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  24. Function and Medicine’s Hybrid Concepts.Lucien Karhausen - 2025 - In Analytical Philosophy of Medicine: Scientific Philosophy and Philosophy of Medicine. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 117-142.
    This chapter analyses the concept of function and how to avoid teleological standpoints and the machine analogy. Functions are not natural facts: they are not natural laws, but they are quasi-teleological since they are relative to our sets of values. They are hybrid-concepts since they are empirical and normative. One distinguishes functional role from functional capacity. Dysfunctions define functions counterfactually. The causal structure of physiological processes is intrinsic to the organism, but functions are never intrinsic but always relative to an (...)
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  25. Diseases, Injuries, and Impairments.Lucien Karhausen - 2025 - In Analytical Philosophy of Medicine: Scientific Philosophy and Philosophy of Medicine. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 179-208.
    This chapter come to grips with diseases, injuries, and impairments as well as with mental disorders. An attempt is made to define those conditions, how they are being construed and some of the features, which constitute them, though most of them are provisional conventions. Diseases are clusters of signs and symptoms. An important distinction is being made between mere manifestational or purely observational disorders, and single-criterion, usually causal disorders, i.e. disorders defined by their causes. Mental disorders differ from so-called physical (...)
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  26. Functional Indeterminacy, Addiction, and the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis.Matthew Kern - 2025 - Philosophy of Science 92 (5).
    According to Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction account, a mental disorder must involve an objective dysfunction couched in evolutionary terms. However, selected effects functions are indeterminate because (i) the same trait can be both selectively advantageous and disadvantageous, and (ii) the functional activity of a trait can be assessed according to conflicting norms, given the trait’s place in a hierarchy of functions. Therefore, there may be a dysfunction that can be described in multiple empirically adequate ways. The choices involved in these (...)
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  27. Health as No Disease.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2025 - In Health, Well-Being, and Quality of Life: A Philosophical Analysis. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 85-117.
    This chapter explores the concept of health as the absence of disease. It distinguishes between the pathologist’s focus on functional normality and the clinician’s emphasis on clinical relevance. Defining health as the absence of clinical disease separates individual issues from those needing social action. It also shields medicine from political and ideological influence. The chapter questions the superiority of holistic or patient-centered definitions. Instead, it highlights the practical benefits of a minimalist approach. Stable and objective criteria help advance universalist goals (...)
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  28. Conceptual Choice in Medicine.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2025 - In Health, Well-Being, and Quality of Life: A Philosophical Analysis. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 47-84.
    This chapter introduces conceptual choice in medicine through three examples: cancer classification, obesity as a disease, and the definition of pain. Conceptual choice assesses concepts based on their goals, questioning whether specific goals are worth pursuing. Two objections are addressed. The implementation challenge argues that concepts are too entrenched to change, but conceptual work focuses on expert conceptions—definitions in guidelines and research protocols—that are stable, normative, and shaped by medicine’s procedural objectivity. The irrelevance objection, prevalent in the philosophy of medicine, (...)
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  29. The Disunity of Disease.Hane Htut Maung - 2025 - Philosophy of Medicine 6 (1).
    In a recent paper, Harriet Fagerberg argues that the disease debate in the philosophy of medicine makes little sense as conceptual analysis but instead should proceed on the assumption that disease is a real kind. I propose an alternative view. The history and practice of medicine give us reasons to doubt that the category of disease forms a real kind. Instead, drawing on work by Quill R. Kukla, I argue that the disease debate makes good sense on an understanding of (...)
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  30. Medicine and Meaning in Life.Thaddeus Metz - 2025 - In Alex Broadbent, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine. Oxford University Press. pp. 302-322.
    Insofar as value theory is relevant to the philosophy of medicine, two goods have dominated reflection: well-being and morality. This essay casts doubt on whether those values are sufficient to resolve an array of important debates about medical practice, maintaining that the value of what makes a life meaningful should play a much larger role. After first indicating how meaningfulness differs from happiness and rightness, the essay argues that meaningfulness cannot reasonably be ignored when thinking comprehensively about the proper aims (...)
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  31. Medicina mental e medicina orgânica no jovem Foucault: considerações em torno de René Leriche.Marcio Luiz Miotto - 2025 - ARGUMENTOS - Revista de Filosofia 17 (1):10-31.
    O presente trabalho trata, sob os novos arquivos de Michel Foucault, da relação entre doença mental e doença orgânica no “jovem Foucault”, mais especificamente em seu primeiro livro, Maladie Mentale et Personnalité (republicado em 1962, com modificações, sob o título Maladie Mentale et Psychologie). O trabalho reconstrói e avalia a argumentação de Foucault à luz dos novos arquivos depositados desde 2013 na Biblioteca Nacional da França (BNF), mais especificamente à luz das fichas de leitura que Foucault produz sobre René Leriche, (...)
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  32. Mental Disorder: What Is It and How Valid Is the Definition?Dirk Richter - 2025 - In Human Rights in Psychiatry: Prospects and Dilemmas of Abolishing Coercion in Mental Health Care. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 63-86.
    A central and necessary building block for the justification of psychiatric coercion is the identification of a mental illness or mental disorder. This chapter examines the question of how valid the identification of mental disorders is. This begins with the question of whether people have a psyche or a consciousness at all and addresses the problem of drawing the line between “healthy” and “ill”. It is concluded that the current scientific definition does not provide a valid background for the identification (...)
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  33. (1 other version)The Contradictions in the Criteria for Diagnosing Hypermobile Ehlers–Danlos Syndrome as Reflecting Some of the Philosophical Debates about the Threshold between the Normal and the Pathological.Mar Rosàs Tosas - 2025 - -The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 50 (4):248-261.
    The arrival of some diagnoses tends to bring about relief because it validates suffering and grants access to social legitimization, medical resources, and economic aid. This is the case of the Ehlers–Danlos Syndrome (EDS), a pathology with multisystemic involvement characterized by general laxity. Patients find it difficult to secure a diagnosis of one of its types—hypermobile EDS—due to a lack of awareness among physicians, the multiple changes that the diagnostic criteria undergo, and their increasing restrictivity. Consequently, several patients are intermittently (...)
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  34. Towards A Naturalistic Proposal about Mental Disorders that Does Not Rely on Biological Functions.Javier Silva-Silva - 2025 - Dissertation, Universidad de Santiago de Chile
    The goal of this thesis is to propose a naturalistic definition of mental disorders. Naturalistic theories about disease generally attempt to establish what makes a biological phenomenon a disease by relying on the concept of biological function, stating that diseases and biological dysfunctions are equivalent. This implies the need to ground normative judgments on supposedly objective phenomena, which conflicts with descriptive scientific discourse and opens the gate to rebuttals on the supposed objective nature of diseases. However, at least theoretically, the (...)
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  35. (1 other version)The Concepts of Health and Disease.H. Tristram Engelhardt - 2025 - In Lisa M. Rasmussen & Søren Holm, 50 Years of Philosophy and Medicine. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 35-47.
    Health and disease are cardinal concepts of the biomedical sciences and technologies. Though the models of health and disease may vary, these concepts play a defining role, indicating what should and what should not be the objects of medical concern. The concepts are ambiguous, operating both as explanatory and evaluatory notions. They describe states of affairs, factual conditions, while at the same time judging them to be good or bad. Health and disease are normative as well as descriptive. This dual (...)
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  36. (1 other version)The Wicked and the Ill.Somogy Varga, Andrew J. Latham & Edouard Machery - 2025 - Philosophical Psychology 78.
    This study investigates the influence of evaluative judgments, specifically regarding an individual's moral character, on judgments of health and disease. Though it might seem that assessments judgments of health and disease should be impervious to evaluative judgments, two hypotheses suggest that health and disease judgments might be influenced by evaluative judgments: the "naturalization hypothesis" which centers on our inclination to assign blame, and the "pathologization hypothesis" rooted in the belief of a just world. These hypotheses lead to opposing predictions about (...)
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  37. Into the Valley of the Sick.Sloane Wesloh - 2025 - New England Journal of Medicine 393 (5):421-423.
    With her Cushing’s disease in remission, a philosopher of medicine realizes she’s an imposter both in the hospital and outside it, as she lives on the edge of the valley of the sick. But she’s not alone there.
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  38. A risk-informed concept of disease: a tool for medicine.Sloane Wesloh - 2025 - Mefisto 9 (1).
    To determine what defines the concept of disease and whether that concept is value laden, some authors (Lemoine 2013; 2015) advocate for an inductive approach. Lemoine argues that this examination should avoid considering value-laden disease judgments by looking at scientific descriptions of disease. I examine what medicine considers a scientific description of disease, finding that diseases are increasingly described in terms of risk. But in the face of uncertainty about what level of risk constitutes disease, decision-makers turn to non-epistemic values, (...)
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  39. Pregnancy Is a Survival Pathology.Jolie Zhou - 2025 - Philosophy of Medicine 6 (1).
    This paper argues that biostatistical theory (BST) cannot categorically exclude pregnancy from pathology. Common harmful conditions in typical pregnancies are integral to the notion of pregnancy per se. Given this definition, there are two potential ways to classify pregnancy as non-pathological within the BST: (i) most common conditions in pregnancy are not pathological within the appropriate reference class; or (ii) pregnancy’s reproductive value counterbalances its pathological survival harms, rendering it non-pathological. I challenge both views, arguing that non-pregnant women of the (...)
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  40. Mental disorders in entangled brains.Awais Aftab - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):583-595.
    In this commentary on Anneli Jefferson’s book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?,” I offer an overview of her central thesis, and then propose my own modified account of when we are justified in calling mental disorders as “brain disorders.” In doing so, I draw on recent work in neuroscience that understands the relationship between brain and behavior in complex, dynamic, and computational terms. In particular, I disagree with Jefferson’s criterion of sufficiency, that a particular brain process should always realize a (...)
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  41. Learning from disability studies to introduce the role of the individual to naturalistic accounts of disease.Ozan Altan Altinok - 2024 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 27 (3):407-417.
    Disability studies have been successfully focusing on individuals' lived experiences, the personalization of goals, and the constitution of the individual in defining disease and restructuring public understandings of disability. Although they had a strong influence in the policy making and medical modeling of disease, their framework has not been translated to traditional naturalistic accounts of disease. I will argue that, using new developments in evolutionary biology (Extended Evolutionary Synthesis [EES] about questions of proper function) and behavioral ecology (Niche conformance and (...)
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  42. Pregnancy, pain and pathology: a reply to Smajdor and Räsänen.Teresa Baron - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 51 (1):48-49.
    In their recent paper ‘Is pregnancy a disease?’, Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue in the affirmative, highlighting features shared by both pregnancy and paradigmatic diseases. In particular, they point to the harmful symptoms and side effects of pregnancy, and the provision of medical treatment to both pregnant patients and those aiming to avoid pregnancy. They consider both subjectivist and objectivist approaches taken by philosophers of health in defining disease, and point out that neither approach convincingly excludes pregnancy. Finally, they (...)
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  43. Is depression a vague concept in psychiatry?Elodie Boissard - 2024 - Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 11 (1):45-55.
    In this paper I investigate whether "depression" is a vague concept in psychiatry and the consequence of this for philosophers who would like to contribute to the elaboration of an objective definition of it. Assuming that this concept aims at referring to a mental disorder, I show that the current definition of "depression" is controverted: we lack a unified scientific model of it, so a consensual objective definition of it. Actually there is its clinical definition in the nosology but this (...)
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  44. Wakefield’s Harm-Based Critique of the Biostatistical Theory.Christopher Boorse - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (4):367-388.
    Jerome Wakefield criticizes my biostatistical analysis of the pathological—as statistically subnormal biological part-functional ability relative to species, sex, and age—for its lack of a harm clause. He first charges me with ignoring two general distinctions: biological versus medical pathology, and disease of a part versus disease of a whole organism. He then offers 10 counterexamples that, he says, are harmless dysfunctions but not medical disorders. Wakefield ends by arguing that we need a harm clause to explain American psychiatry’s 1973 decision (...)
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  45. Kurt Goldstein, de la clinique des lésions cérébrales au soin et à l’accompagnement des maladies chroniques et du handicap : soigner la personne, « réarranger le milieu ».Agathe Camus - 2024 - Philosophia Scientiae 28-3 (28-3):95-116.
    Goldstein’s conceptions of pathological states as specific relationships to the milieu, based on his clinical work and observations with First World War soldiers with brain injuries, pay unprecedented attention to chronicity as a particular form of the pathological, capable of stabilizing in forms of health. From this stems a concept of holistic care which pays attention to the person as a whole and to the possibilities for restructuring his or her relationship with the milieu. While the directions he took in (...)
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  46. No, pregnancy is not a disease.Nicholas Colgrove & Daniel Rodger - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 51 (1):45-47.
    Anna Smajdor and Joona Räsänen argue that we have good reason to classify pregnancy as a disease. They discuss five accounts of disease and argue that each account either implies that pregnancy is a disease or if it does not, it faces problems. This strategy allows Smajdor and Räsänen to avoid articulating their own account of disease. Consequently, they cannot establish that pregnancyisa disease, only that plausible accounts of disease suggest this. Some readers will dismiss Smajdor and Räsänen’s claims as (...)
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  47. Santé et pathologie au prisme du milieu : les ambivalences de la pensée de Kurt Goldstein.Marco Dal Pozzolo - 2024 - Philosophia Scientiae 28-3 (28-3):75-94.
    Kurt Goldstein’s thinking on health and disease is based on the concept of milieu [Umwelt], which he inherited from the ethologist Jacob von Uexküll, while at the same time reforming the concept in an original way. Goldstein’s interpretation of the organism-environment relationship emphasises the dynamic nature of this relationship and the reciprocal structuring of the two poles; this hypothesis forms the basis of his original conception of pathology as the shrinking of the patient’s environment. The German neurologist’s position is characterized (...)
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  48. Beyond Conceptual Analysis: Social Objectivity and Conceptual Engineering to Define Disease.Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (2):147-159.
    In this article, I side with those who argue that the debate about the definition of “disease” should be reoriented from the question “what is disease” to the question of what it should be. However, I ground my argument on the rejection of the naturalist approach to define disease and the adoption of a normativist approach, according to which the concept of disease is normative and value-laden. Based on this normativist approach, I defend two main theses: (1) that conceptual analysis (...)
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  49. Brain Disorders, Dysfunctions, and Natural Selection: Commentary on Jefferson.Justin Garson - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):558-569.
    I argue that despite the merits of Jefferson’s account of a brain disorder, which are many, the notion of function she deploys is unsuitable to the overall goals of that account. In particular, Jefferson accepts Cummins’ causal role theory of function and dysfunction. As the causal role view, in its standard elaborations, is wedded to human interests, goals, and values, it cannot serve as a value-neutral anchor for her hybrid “harm-dysfunction” account of disorder. I argue that the selected effects theory, (...)
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  50. Computational psychiatry and the evolving concept of a mental disorder.Konstantin Genin, Thomas Grote & Thomas Wolfers - 2024 - Synthese 204 (3):1-23.
    As a discipline, psychiatry is in the process of finding the right set of concepts to organize research and guide treatment. Dissatisfaction with the status quo as expressed in standard manuals has animated a number of computational paradigms, each proposing to rectify the received concept of mental disorder. We explore how different computational paradigms: normative modeling, network theory and learning-theoretic approaches like reinforcement learning and active inference, reconceptualize mental disorders. Although each paradigm borrows heavily from machine learning, they differ significantly (...)
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