Positive psychology has significantly influenced studies in the fields of moral philosophy, psychology and education, and scholars in those fields have attempted to apply its ideas and methods to moral education. Among various theoretical frameworks, virtue ethics is most likely to connect positive psychology to moral educational studies because it pursues eudaimonia (flourishing). However, some virtue ethicists have been concerned about whether the current mainstream concept of positive psychology can apply directly to moral education because it focuses on subjective aspects (...) of happiness, but not its objective and moral aspects. Thus, I will consider whether the concept of purpose, which was investigated recently by a group of psychologists and emphasizes both subjective and objective aspects of happiness, can address this issue. I will examine whether purpose is a moral virtue contributing to flourishing, consider if its nature is possibly a second-order virtue and whether it is distinguishable from other second-order virtues. (shrink)

Interest in youth purpose is growing among scholars around the world. With globalization, better understanding of life purposes in different countries becomes more important as this generation’s youth are influenced by ideas and events anywhere. This special issue contributes to this inclusive, worldwide frame of mind by showcasing work done outside the US on the development, functioning and moral import of purposes as personal ‘threads’ intertwined that contribute to a global ‘tapestry.’ This introduction provides frameworks for thinking about the (...) articles that follow, including: (1) the constructs and characteristics that different countries associate with purpose; (2) reciprocal and mutually reinforcing interactions of cultures’ values, norms, institutions and morals as sources of purpose with purpose-pursuing individuals’ perceptions of opportunities to act for shared benefit; (3) cultures’ contributions to whether and how purpose contributes to youths’ development of moral momentum in their lives. (shrink)

Life purpose is a long-term aim to make one’s life count. Education—especially moral education—might be considered a key cultural mechanism for young people to ‘thread’ their lives into the culture’s ‘bigger picture’ not only of the ‘good life’ but also of a ‘life of good.’ How does life purpose relate to educationally important attributes like motivation, feedback, institutional support, and emotional engagement, especially education aimed to make salient the impacts students have on others? This introduction explores the implications (...) of five papers from different countries regarding the challenges of self-transcendence, whether purpose is a calling from within or outside the self, and how purpose can pivot past-oriented reflection into future-oriented proflection that integrates students’ educational experiences into their anticipated future life path. Given the multicultural frame on these topics and their implications, how can researchers and practitioners move forward in purpose education? (shrink)

This study investigated the effects of internal and demographic variables on civic development in late adolescence using the construct civic purpose. We conducted surveys on civic engagement with 480 high school seniors, and surveyed them again two years later. Using multivariate regression and linear mixed models, we tested the main effects of civic purpose dimensions (beyond-the-self motivation, future civic intention), ethnicity, and education on civic development from Time 1 to Time 2. Results showed that while there is an (...) overall decrease in civic engagement in the transition out of high school, both internal and social factors protected participants from steep civic decline. Interaction effects varied. Ethnicity and education interacted in different ways with the dimensions of civic purpose to predict change in traditional and expressive political engagement, and community service engagement. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the current theory of liberalism by an eminent political theorist. It challenges the views of such theorists as Rawls, Dworkin, and Ackerman who believe that the essence of liberalism is that it should remain neutral concerning different ways of life and individual conceptions of what is good or valuable. Professor Galston argues that the modern liberal state is committed to a distinctive conception of the human good, and to that end has developed characteristic (...) institutions and practices - representative governments, diverse societies, market economies, and zones of private action - in the pursuit of specific public purposes that give unity to the liberal state. These purposes guide liberal public policy, shape liberal justice, require the practice of liberal virtues, and rest on a liberal public culture. Consequently the diversity characteristic of liberal societies is limited by their institutional, personal, and cultural preconditions. (shrink)

Defining the purposes of engineering ethics education (EEE) is paramount for the engineering education community, and understanding the purposes of EEE can be a catalyst for actively involving students in the learning process. This chapter presents a conceptual framework for systematically describing and comparing various approaches to the purposes of EEE. Such a framework is inherently embedded with a tension between a normative approach and a pragmatic approach regarding the purposes of EEE. The normative approach focuses on what the purposes (...) of EEE should be, an ‘ideal world’ scenario, given the needs of the engineering profession and of society at large. Conversely, the pragmatic approach starts from the question ‘What can be achieved through educational practice?‘ and results from ‘actual world’ situated outcomes of stakeholder negotiations. The authors’ framework balances these. They – scholars from diverse cultural backgrounds – assert that the purposes of EEE are socially constructed and vary from country to country based on unique historical, political, and cultural contexts. Their framework embraces both the individualistic and holistic aspects of EEE, incorporating perspectives from both Western and non-Western traditions. It identifies six purposes of EEE (knowledge, actions, personal traits, relationships, etc.), aligning these with examples (e.g., moral knowledge, desirable actions, ethical skills or competencies, care ethics, etc.) and theoretical frameworks (moral epistemology, moral psychology, virtue ethics, objects or qualities of relations, etc.). It is problematic and potentially dangerous when engineering educators design ethics-learning activities without critically examining the purposes of these activities and assessing whether these purposes are justified for educating ethically and professionally competent engineers. This chapter provides tools to help avoid such pitfalls. (shrink)

This essay has two goals. The first is to define the behavioristic study of natural events and to classify behavior. The second is to stress the importance of the concept of purpose.Given any object, relatively abstracted from its surroundings for study, the behavioristic approach consists in the examination of the output of the object and of the relations of this output to the input. By output is meant any change produced in the surroundings by the object. By input, conversely, (...) is meant any event external to the object that modifies this object in any manner. (shrink)

Leading a meaningful life characteristically requires committing ourselves to something or someone of value, since valuable achievements and relationships require resolve, persistence, and even sacrifice. But how can we rationally commit to any particular thing when faced with normative uncertainty about the relative value of our options? In his recent work, Paul Katsafanas argues that we can only rationally sustain resolute commitments and a sense of purpose if we render our core commitments invulnerable to the output of critical reflection, (...) and thus in a technical sense ‘devote’ ourselves to something. I raise some doubts about this. First, even if devotion is useful, this doesn’t suffice to make it rational, because the instrumental benefits of devotion don’t support a particular commitment from a first-person perspective. Moreover, rational insulation is prudentially very risky. Second, we can see that devotion isn’t necessary for resolute commitment even if there is some normative uncertainty, if we take an appropriate range of agent-relative or voluntarist reasons into account. And finally, devotion does not suffice for resolute commitment in rational agents, because it is not rational to wholeheartedly endorse a commitment one is aware of merely picking rather than choosing. (shrink)

Euteleology is a metaphysics according to which reality is inherently purposive and the contingent Universe exists ultimately because reality’s overall telos, the supreme good, is realized within it. This book provides an exposition of euteleology and a defence of its coherence. The main aim is to establish that euteleological metaphysics provides a religiously adequate alternative to the ‘personal-omniGod’ understanding of theism prevalent amongst analytic philosophers. The quest for an alternative to understanding the God of the Abrahamic traditions as an omnipotent, (...) omniscient, morally perfect personal being is motivated by criticizing the religious adequacy of this conception of God. This criticism deploys a ‘normatively relativized’ version of the ‘logical’ Argument from Evil: it is argued that an omnipotent personal agent would unavoidably be responsible for a morally flawed relationship with human beings caught up in horrendous evils. Reasons are given for preferring a ‘non-personalist’ account of theism, and the religious adequacy of a euteleological theism is then defended against two main objections—first, that it faces a problem of evil that threatens its coherence, and, second, that it cannot make good sense of the practices of prayer and worship that are essential to theist religion. An important theme is that, though God is not a personal being, nor any kind of ‘being amongst beings’ in basic euteleological ontology, God-talk may be understood as resting on a radical analogy that is apt for enabling right human responses to ultimate divine reality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Universities worldwide are beginning to counter the prevailing neo-liberal ideology by paying renewed attention to the moral development of students and fostering their life purposes. This mixed methods study investigates the life purposes of higher education students in four institutions in the Netherlands (nDutch = 663) and Finland (nFinnish = 846). Based on quantitative data, we identified four purpose profiles: purposeful, self-oriented, dreamer, and disengaged. Qualitative data showed that students’ willingness to contribute to a better world was not (...) particularly prominent. An exception was found in the data of a Dutch research university working with a specific worldview and value base and emphasizing moral education. We conclude that universities need to put more effort into educating young professionals whose life purpose goes beyond their self-interest and who are willing and able to address pressing societal and global problems. This particularly includes professionals in the domains of technology and economy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study investigates the development of Finnish adolescents’ perceptions of their life purposes and is based on a concept where purpose is understood as a long-term intention to accomplish something significant to the self while contributing to society. We follow 73 adolescents’ responses to online surveys in 2020 (N = 843) and 2022 (n = 73). At both timepoints, four purpose profiles were identified: Purposeful, Self-oriented, Dreamer, and Disengaged. Within two years, participants’ wish to contribute to the (...) world had increased, with changes towards the Purposeful profile related to higher parental education and towards the Dreamer to female gender. Adolescents’ written responses showed at both timepoints that most of the written life purposes included a quest for happiness, development, and a career. Triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative data indicated similarities in purpose development, suggesting that the beyond-the-self orientation manifests later in adolescence. (shrink)

The article analyses whether it is correct to extrapolate the concept of "meaning in life" developed by Thaddeus Metz to the doctrines of ancient philosophers, including Thomas Aquinas. Is Metz’ concept of "purposes" that make "human life" meaningful analogous to Aquinas’ concept of "ultimate goal of man"? Significant points of Metz’ conception of "meaning in life" in our article are described and compared with Aquinas’ conception of "ultimate goal of man." As it turns out, these conceptions are only superficially similar. (...) In fact, they are profoundly different: (1) Aquinas is talking about the "goal of man", which implies objective teleology incompatible with Metz’ "naturalism", and is not talking about "meaning in life" (and even "purpose of life"); (2) "ultimate goal of man", for Aquinas, is intended to provide salvation and eternal life for man, not to make life "significant" in this world. Thus, Metz and Thomas not only use different terminology, but also address different problems. They deal with different questions, not just give different answers to the same question (about the "meaning in life"). Metz’s extrapolation may be correct, when viewed as a kind of rational reconstruction. However, Metz does not make appropriate reservations and groundlessly unifies heterogeneous problems. The article shows that more historically oriented methodology avoids impropriety in the exercise of rational reconstruction of "meaning in life" in the field of ancient and medieval philosophies. (shrink)

What must reality be like if the God of Abrahamic theism exists? How could the worldview of Abrahamic theism be understood if not in terms of the existence of a supremely powerful, knowledgeable, and good personal being? John Bishop and Ken Perszyk argue that it is reasonable to reject what many analytic philosophers take to be the standard conception of God as the 'personal omniGod'. They argue that a version of a 'logical' Argument from Evil is still very much in (...) play, contrary to the widely held view that this line of argument is bankrupt. This book provides a new presentation and defence of the alternative that Bishop and Perszyk have called euteleology. Its core claims are that reality is inherently purposive, and that the Universe exists ultimately because its overall end (telos), which is the supreme good, is made concretely real within it. There is no supreme agent ('standing by' while horrors take place); God is 'no-thing' in euteleology's basic ontology. Rather, talk of God-as-a-personal-being is a cognitive construction, treating ultimate reality by analogy with our ordinary ways of experiencing and talking about the world. But euteleological theism is also emphatically realist. Analogizing God-talk enables humans to align themselves with reality and is aptly deployed in prayer and worship-practices whose broad function is a human contribution to, and enjoyment of, the fulfilment of reality's inherent ultimate purpose. (shrink)

Two familiar worldviews dominate Western philosophy: materialist atheism and the benevolent God of the Abrahamic faiths. Tim Mulgan explores a third way. Ananthropocentric Purposivism claims that there is a cosmic purpose, but human beings are irrelevant to it. Purpose in the Universe develops a philosophical case for Ananthropocentric Purposivism that it is at least as strong as the case for either theism or atheism. He draws on a range of secular and religious ethical traditions to conclude that a (...) non-human-centred cosmic purpose can ground a distinctive human morality. Our moral practices, our view of the moral universe, and our moral theory are all transformed if we shift from the familiar choice between a universe without meaning and a universe where humans matter to the less self-aggrandising thought that, while it is about something, the universe is not about us. (shrink)

Some understand the evolutionary process as more or less predictable; others stress its contingency. I argue that both Christian evolutionists who have assumed that the purposes of the Creator can be realized only through more or less predictable processes as well as those who infer from the contingency of the evolutionary process to the lack of purpose in the universe generally, are mistaken if the Creator escapes from the limits imposed on the creature by temporality, as the traditional Augustinian (...) account supposes. The notion of “purpose” must itself be reinterpreted in such a case. It makes no difference whether the appearance of Homo sapiens is the inevitable result of a steady process of complexification stretching over billions of years, or whether it comes about through a series of coincidences that would have made it entirely unpredictable from the (causal) human standpoint. Either way, the outcome is of God's making, and from the biblical standpoint may appear as part of God's plan. (shrink)

According to many philosophers, “the meaning of life” refers to our cosmic purpose, the activity that we were created by God or a purposive universe to perform. If there is no God or teleology, there is no such thing as the meaning of life. But this need not be the last word on the matter. In this paper, I ask what the benefits provided by a cosmic purpose are, and go on to argue that thinking of our lives (...) in a particular way—in terms of a unified life narrative—can supply us with many of those benefits. We might lose little if there is no such thing as the meaning of life, since there is still something that can provide much of what is valuable about it. (shrink)

Recent work in judgement and decision-making has stressed that institutions, like individuals, often rely on decision-making heuristics. But most of the institutional decision-making heuristics studied to date are highly firm- and industry-specific. This contrasts to the individual case, where many heuristics are general-purpose rules suitable for a wide range of decision problems. Are there also general-purpose heuristics for institutional decision-making? In this article, I argue that a number of methods recently developed for decision-making under deep uncertainty have a (...) good claim to be understood as general-purpose decision-making heuristics suitable for a broad range of institutional decision problems. (shrink)

Purpose represents a unique opportunity for identifying and analyzing the complexity of human reasoning, considering that its constitution brings together cognitive, affective and social elements. In this article, we use the Theory of Organizing Models of Thinking (OMT), an epistemological and methodological approach based on developmental psychologist Jean Piaget’s work, to present a different perspective on how to analyze youth purpose and to explain the cognitive-emotional dynamics of reasoning in everyday thinking. We introduce OMT and its benefits, then (...) explore the insights it can provide through examining seven OMTs used by Brazilian youth about their life purposes. These models focus on: consumerism and financial stability, interpersonal relationships, only work, work and family, idealization of work and family, altruistic intentions, and fragile purpose projections. These models show how reasoning and emotion are complexly linked in everyday thinking. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the present study, I explore the relationship between purpose, which was measured by the Claremont Purpose Scale, and moral psychological indicators, moral reasoning, moral identity, and empathy. Purpose was quantified in terms of three subcomponents: meaning, goal, and beyond-the-self motivation. Moral reasoning was assessed in terms of utilization of postconventional moral reasoning. Moral identity was examined with two subscales: moral internalization, and symbolization. Among diverse subscales of empathy, I focused on empathic concern and perspective taking, (...) which have been reported to be strongly related to morality. To explore the best prediction models using the data, I employed Bayesian Model Selection and Bayesian regression analysis. In general, purpose was significantly predicted by most surveyed moral psychological indicators but not by moral symbolization. The best prediction model for beyond-the-self motivation included the most moral psychological indicator predictors including moral reasoning, which did not significantly predict other dependent variables. (shrink)

In this commentary, I will discuss the relationship between purpose and morality from developmental and educational perspectives based on empirical and philosophical works. Reviewing previous psychological studies, I will explore the potential association between purpose and moral development. I will also analyze a dataset including variables related to purpose and moral functioning. Furthermore, based on recent works in moral philosophy, particularly those focusing on wisdom cultivation, I propose that pursuing a purpose that embraces virtues and ethical (...) values, instead of a non-moral purpose, will be conducive to flourishing. Finally, I will discuss the implications of moral purpose within educational contexts. While working on these points, the connection between William Damon’s two main research themes (i.e., ethical development and purpose development) will be reviewed and discussed. My primary intent is to integrate his views and works in those two dimensions of human development to propose ideas for flourishing and eudaimonic well-being. (shrink)

I argue that addiction is not a chronic, relapsing, neurobiological disease characterized by compulsive use of drugs or alcohol. Large-scale national survey data demonstrate that rates of substance dependence peak in adolescence and early adulthood and then decline steeply; addicts tend to “mature out” in their late twenties or early thirties. The exceptions are addicts who suffer from additional psychiatric disorders. I hypothesize that this difference in patterns of use and relapse between the general and psychiatric populations can be explained (...) by the purpose served by drugs and alcohol for patients. Drugs and alcohol alleviate the severe psychological distress typically experienced by patients with comorbid psychiatric disorders and associated problems. On this hypothesis, consumption is a chosen means to ends that are rational to desire: Use is not compulsive. The upshot of this explanation is that the orthodox view of addiction as a chronic, relapsing neurobiological disease is misguided. I delineate five folk psychological factors that together explain addiction as purposive action: strong and habitual desire; willpower; motivation; functional role; and decision and resolve. I conclude by drawing lessons for research and effective treatment. (shrink)

This paper examines the effects of employees’ sense that they work for a purpose-driven company on their workplace sustainability behaviors. Conceptualizing corporate purpose as an overarching, relevant, shared ethical vision of why a company exists and where it needs to go, we argue that it is particularly suited for driving employee sustainability behaviors, which are more ethically complex than the types of employee ethical behaviors typically examined by prior research. Through four studies, two involving the actual employees of (...) construction companies, we demonstrate that purpose drives the sustainability behaviors of employees by causing them to take psychological ownership of sustainability. In addition, we show that the sustainability-enhancing effect of purpose is stronger when employees perceive that they have higher autonomy in enacting their sustainability actions and for those employees for whom being moral is more central to their sense of self. (shrink)

A brief, accessible history of the idea of purpose in Western thought, from ancient Greece to the present Can we live without the idea of purpose? Should we even try to? Kant thought we were stuck with purpose, and even Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which profoundly shook the idea, was unable to kill it. Indeed, teleological explanation—what Aristotle called understanding in terms of “final causes”—seems to be making a comeback today, as both religious proponents of intelligent (...) design and some prominent secular philosophers argue that any explanation of life without the idea of purpose is missing something essential. In On Purpose, Michael Ruse explores the history of the idea of purpose in philosophical, religious, scientific, and historical thought, from ancient Greece to the present. Accessibly written and filled with literary and other examples, the book examines “purpose” thinking in the natural and human world. It shows how three ideas about purpose have been at the heart of Western thought for more than two thousand years. In the Platonic view, purpose results from the planning of a human or divine being; in the Aristotelian, purpose stems from a tendency or principle of order in the natural world; and in the Kantian, purpose is essentially heuristic, or something to be discovered, an idea given substance by Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection. On Purpose traces the profound and fascinating implications of these ways of thinking about purpose. Along the way, it takes up tough questions about the purpose of life and whether it’s possible to have meaning without purpose, revealing that purpose is still a vital and pressing issue. (shrink)

This article examines Iranian secondary students’ (N = 336) life purposes. Economic and hedonistic life goals were the most valued. Relationships in terms of having a family and children were also appreciated. In the students’ views, religiousness was associated with social goals such as helping others in need and volunteering in the community. Gender differences in students’ life goals occurred only in aesthetic goals, which applied more to girls than to boys. K-Cluster analysis identified four purpose profiles: self-oriented dabblers, (...) beyond-the-self (BTS) dreamers, self-oriented life goal pursuers and purposeful youth. The dominant profile among the youth was self-oriented life goal pursuer (37%). The study validated Damon’s conceptual work on purpose profiles in a previously unstudied cultural context. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate in legal philosophy about how to attribute purposes to rules. Separately, within cognitive science, there has been a growing body of research concerned with questions about how people ordinarily attribute purposes. Here, we argue that these two separate fields might be connected by experimental jurisprudence. Across four studies, we find evidence for the claim that people use the same criteria to attribute purposes to physical objects and to rules. In both cases, purpose attributions appear (...) to be governed not so much by original intention or by moral value as by current practice. We argue that these findings in the cognitive science of purpose attribution have implications for jurisprudential questions involving purposivist legal interpretation. (shrink)

Selected-effects theories provide the most popular account of biological teleology. According to these theories, the purpose of a trait is to do whatever it was selected for. The vast majority of selected-effects theories consider biological teleology to be introduced by natural selection. We want to argue, however, that natural selection is not the only relevant selective process in biology. In particular, our proposal is that biological regulation is a form of biological selection. So, those who accept selected-effects theories should (...) recognize biological regulation as a distinctive source of biological teleology. The purposes derived from biological regulation are of special interest for explaining and predicting the behavior of organisms, given that regulatory mechanisms directly modulate the behavior of the systems they regulate. This explanatory power, added to the fact that regulation is widespread in the biological world, makes the idea that regulation gives rise to its own form of teleology a substantial contribution to the debate on biological teleology. (shrink)

Sean M. Carroll notes that, despite popular stereotypes of existential “philosophers sitting in cafes, smoking cigarettes and drinking apricot cocktails” and neuroscientists decked out in lab coats, there is an undeniable connection between existentialism and science. This is perhaps easy to see with biology and neuroscience, but the connection goes beyond this. Carroll maintains that, “An honest grappling with the questions of purpose and freedom in the universe must also involve ideas from physics and cosmology.” He goes on to (...) argue that if we want to create purpose and meaning at the scale of individual human lives, we must understand the nature of the larger universe of which we are a part. After discussing what modern physics can tell us about determinism, quantum mechanics, the arrow of time, and emergence, Carroll concludes by exploring the existential implications of these insights for freedom and meaning. (shrink)

This book addresses a key issue in Hegel's philosophical legacy - his account of purposiveness and teleology - that has often been wrongly criticised and misunderstood. Its re-examination of the issue has implications for the whole of Hegel's philosophical legacy.

Kant’s analysis of the concept of natural purpose in the Critique of judgment captured several features of organisms that he argued warranted making them the objects of a special field of study, in need of a special regulative teleological principle. By showing that organisms have to be conceived as self-organizing wholes, epigenetically built according to the idea of a whole that we must presuppose, Kant accounted for three features of organisms conflated in the biological sciences of the period: adaptation, (...) functionality and conservation of forms..Kant’s unitary concept of natural purpose was subsequently split in two directions: first by Cuvier’s comparative anatomy, that would draw on the idea of adaptative functions as a regulative principle for understanding in reconstituting and classifying organisms; and then by Goethe’s and Geoffroy’s morphology, a science of the general transformations of living forms. However, such general transformations in nature, objects of an alleged ‘archaeology of nature’, were thought impossible by Kant in the §80 of the Critique of judgment. Goethe made this ‘adventure of reason’ possible by changing the sense of ‘explanation’: scientific explanation was shifted from the investigation of the mechanical processes of generation of individual organisms to the unveiling of some ideal transformations of types instantiated by those organisms. (shrink)

This chapter follows Edward Craig’s (1990) advice: ask what the concept of knowledge does for us and use our findings as clues about its application conditions. What a concept does for us is a matter of what we can do with it, and what we do with concepts is deploy them in thought and language. So, the chapter examines the purposes we have in _attributing_ knowledge. This chapter examines two such purposes, agent-evaluation and informant-suggestion, and brings the results to bear (...) on an important debate about the application conditions of the concept of knowledge—the debate between contextualists and their rivals. (shrink)

Autonomy Theory characterizes agency as a subset of functions of an autonomous entity that controls the interactions of the living being with its environment so as to maintain its organization, considered as its intrinsic purpose. Yet, this understanding of agency faces a major philosophical and theoretical problem: there seems to be many purposive interactive behaviors that do not directly contribute to survival, or even run contrary to it, such as playing or smoking a cigarette. The challenge, therefore, is to (...) elucidate these more complex interactive capacities within the framework of the Autonomy Theory. In this chapter, I explore three key hypotheses to address this challenge: first, the idea that such behaviors might respond to underlying biological “needs”; second, the idea that, as emphasized by the enactivist perspective, these behaviors are embedded in a sensorimotor level of organization; and third the idea that these behaviors relate to a social level of closure. (shrink)

This chapter borrows what Frank Jackson says about propounding arguments, a phenomenon in the dialectical domain, and transposes it to the epistemological domain. It seeks to clarify the notion of transmission of epistemic warrant and, particularly, the idea of failure of warrant transmission (transmission failure). In this transposition there will be, corresponding to the two purposes of arguing, two kinds of epistemic project. These are referred to as _deciding what to believe_ (corresponding to the teasing-out purpose of arguing) and (...) _settling the question_ (corresponding to the convincing purpose). For each kind of epistemic project, there will be a property of arguments that makes an argument ill-suited for use in projects of that kind. Each property might be called ‘transmission failure’. The two accounts of transmission failure (one analogous to Copi's account of begging the question and the other to Jackson's) provide principled limitations on the arguments that can properly be used in pursuing epistemic projects of the respective kinds (deciding what to believe and settling the question). (shrink)

In a recent essay Professor Taylor criticizes the criteria used by Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow in 1943 to distinguish purposeful from non-purposeful behavior. He also criticizes our definition of behavior, our concept of the vague as opposed to the general, our use of the word correlation, and our statement that a system may reach a final condition. Indeed, there seems to be little, if anything, in our paper to which he does not emphatically object.He maintains that the notions of (...) class='Hi'>purpose and teleology are not only useless for the understanding of mechanical behavior, but wholly incongruous when applied to this behavior. He further affirms that our use of the term purpose “bears no similarity whatever to the meaning which is ordinarily attached to it.” He does not state, however, his own notions of purpose and teleology; and the meaning which he considers to be ordinarily attached to the term purpose. This omission weakens his criticism considerably. (shrink)

What are the purposes of education and what is the relationship between educational research and policy? Using the twin lenses of Visible Learning and educational philosophy these are among the many fascinating topics discussed in extended conversations between John Hattie and Steen Nepper Larsen. This wide-ranging, and informative book offers fundamental propositions about the nature of Education. It maps out in fascinating detail a coming together of Hattie's empirical data and world-famous Visible Learning paradigm with the rich heritage of educational (...) philosophy. As well as exploring the inevitable questions of the purpose of education and the development of students in a learning society. Part clash of cultures, part meeting of minds, always fascinating and illuminating, this intriguing book will inspire teachers, students and parents at all levels of the educational system - from kindergarten through school to university. Conversations include: What is the purpose of education? Does educational data speak for itself? What is the role of the teacher? Is learning a visible phenomenon? Is it important to teach and learn specific subjects? What is the role of Neuroscience research? What is the relationship between educational research and educational politics? What is the role of the state in education? (shrink)

In this paper we explore the nature of the emerging purpose ecosystem and its role in transforming and supporting business to help address the UN Sustainable Development Goals. We argue that interactions among its ‘private actors’, who share efforts and belief in changing and redefining the purpose and nature of business by advocating broader non-financial performance outcomes, have the potential to contribute to a wider sustainability-oriented transformation of the business sector. Through interview data collected in the UK and (...) Australia, we identify six main roles that characterise the activities and interactions among its actors and their stakeholders. Our research contributes to expanding knowledge on the emerging phenomenon of the purpose ecosystem and how its actors support the achievement of the UN SDGs by seeking to change the purpose of business and integrating the goals into their operations and engagements with stakeholders. (shrink)

The competing expressions of ideology flooding the contemporary political landscape have taken a turn toward the absurd. The Radiance Foundation’s recent anti-abortion campaign targeting African-American women, including a series of billboards bearing the slogan “The most dangerous place for an African-American child is in the womb”, is just one example of political "discourse" that is both infuriating and confounding. Discourse with these features – problematic intelligibility, disinterest in the truth, and inflammatory rhetoric – has become increasingly common in politics, the (...) press, and even the arguments made by ordinary folk. It is often criticized for its falsehood or its hurtfulness; however, these critiques tend to miss its pernicious potential. This essay characterizes this insidious discourse as purposeful nonsense. Part of the way that purposeful nonsense functions, we argue, relies on taking advantage of harmful stereotypes and denigrating narratives that are already present in our culture. Purposeful nonsense both draws upon harmful ideology and fortifies it. The effect is that members of oppressed social groups are confronted with disparaging ideology, while its authors are free to deny responsibility for it. Black feminist and intersectional analysis – particularly in the discussion of race, abortion, and reproductive justice – are useful in identifying and criticizing the harmful subtext in the Radiance Foundation’s billboard campaign. The notion of purposeful nonsense serves to extend the reach of these criticisms. Purposeful nonsense – disguised as merely logically confused discourse – is a key factor in maintaining an oppressive and unjust society; however, feminist, black feminist, and intersectional analysis contextualizes purposeful nonsense, potentially disrupting its harmful influence. We conclude that purposeful nonsense employs a variation on stereotype threat, a phenomenon in which being reminded of negative stereotypes about one’s social group causes stereotypical performance failures. We suggest that the notion of stereotype threat combined with intersectional analysis offers a fruitful avenue along which research on this sort of discourse might be expanded. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate in legal philosophy about how to attribute purposes to rules. Separately, within cognitive science, there has been a growing body of research concerned with questions about how people ordinarily attribute purposes. Here, we argue that these two separate fields might be connected by experimental jurisprudence. Across four studies, we find evidence for the claim that people use the same criteria to attribute purposes to physical objects and to rules. In both cases, purpose attributions appear (...) to be governed not so much by original intention or by moral value as by current practice. We argue that these findings in the cognitive science of purpose attribution have implications for jurisprudential questions involving purposivist legal interpretation. (shrink)

Employees play a critical role in materializing the company's purpose as they are the ones responsible for planning and executing all the organizational activities. Considering their vital role, we explored how employees, currently working full‐time from home, perceive their participation in the company's purpose. To do so, we performed online interviews with 23 employees from 14 companies. In addition to employees' perspectives, we collected textual data from the companies' websites where these employees were working, allowing us to compare (...) both perspectives and better understand employees' perspectives. Results revealed that employees do not directly recognize the organizational purpose concept and that the term purpose is barely found on the companies' websites. Therefore, we found that besides a problem of conceptual lack of clarity in the literature, organizational purpose is still on the way to being comprehended within companies. To help solve this problem, based on stakeholder theory, we discuss the meaning of organizational purpose and compare it to related concepts such as mission and vision. Finally, we offer managers orientation on how they should operationalize their companies' purpose and how they may externally communicate it online. (shrink)

Rachel Zuckert - The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant's Aesthetic Formalism - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 599-622 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant's Aesthetic Formalism Rachel Zuckert In the "critique of aesthetic judgment," Kant claims that when we find an object beautiful, we are appreciating its "purposive form." Many of Kant's readers have found this claim one of his least interesting (...) and most easily criticized claims about aesthetic experience. Detractors hold up his aesthetics as a paradigmatic case of narrow formalism; and even many admirers of Kant's aesthetics take Kant's claims about form to be problematic, but argue that they are inessential to his aesthetics . Though these critics come to differing evaluations of Kant's aesthetics as a whole, they agree on two points. First, interpretively: that when Kant claims that it is the "form" of an object we find beautiful, he means that in aesthetic appreciation, we find certain spatial and/or temporal properties aesthetically pleasing—and that such properties are exclusively responsible for an object's beauty. Second, evaluatively: that Kant is wrong, at least about this. In this paper, I shall propose that we need not endorse either claim. I shall argue that one may interpret Kant's.. (shrink)

This article argues that conceptualising corporate purpose as a normative question which can be examined in isolation from its socio-historical context is inappropriate and ultimately futile. Corporate purpose is examined here as historically determined, a social fact, independently from whichever theoretical position might prevail in scholarly debates. Interestingly, corporate law doctrine pertinent to corporate purpose has remained mostly static but fairly open-ended. This has allowed purpose itself to oscillate between shareholder primacy and the balancing of stakeholder (...) interests rather seamlessly as a socio-historical phenomenon. However, the article finds that, where it is used by private business organisation, corporate law has a limited capacity to accommodate purpose oscillations. Those are limited to merely one-dimensional movements representing corporate income distribution choices considered as socially legitimate each time. Using concepts such as Polanyi’s ‘double-movement’ and Gramsci’s ‘passive revolution’, the article argues that, for as long as social dynamics focused on wealth distribution, private corporate purpose had little difficulty in absorbing social critique and in finding a legitimacy basis for the private business corporation. However, more recently, critique has been shifting away from merely distributional trepidations and towards other non-economic concerns caused by economic growth per se. These concerns add new dimensions for corporate purpose oscillations, which cannot be accommodated irrespective of how open-ended corporate law doctrine on purpose might be. The article concludes with an analysis of what this might entail for corporate law as a socially legitimate structure for private business. (shrink)

In this article I investigate Joshua Oldfield's contribution to the early Enlightenment rearticulation of logic as a practical art of thinking. The specific feature of Oldfield's logic that I will focus on – as seen in his An Essay towards the Improvement of Human Reason in the Pursuit of Learning and Conduct of Life (1707) – is the connection between logic and conduct, according to which the former is framed as a means of regulating inner thought with a view towards (...) cultivating proper behaviour, taking fruitful action, and observing one's daily religious-devotional duties. I show that Oldfield develops this articulation by drawing on a notion of proper thinking as orderly, directional, and purposeful, which is mainly elaborated in two seventeenth-century contexts: practical-devotional handbooks on the government of thoughts and natural philosophical writings on the variety of wits and the conduct of the understanding. My aim is twofold: first, I offer a survey of this conception of the well-governed mind, exploring its connection to the practical redefinition of invention and the emerging theme of the train of thoughts in the mind; secondly, I show that this conception of purposeful thinking shapes Oldfield's understanding of means-ends reasoning in the sphere of practical conduct. (shrink)

The legality of decisions made for political purposes is a recurring issue in administrative law. In this article, it will be argued that generalisations should not be made about ‘political’ decisions as a single category. Instead, there are different types of political consideration, which raise different issues when assessing the legality of a decision. This article singles out a particular type of political decision for condemnation: decisions made to gain a political advantage by deliberately changing the systems of democratic accountability. (...) Examples include the engineering of the electoral system to produce favourable results, the use of public power to punish critics and the use of public resources to publish partisan propaganda. The article will argue that the legality of such political decisions should not be assessed solely within the ordinary administrative law framework, but under a constitutional principle of anti-entrenchment and process protection. (shrink)

Over the last years, both in the popular press, policy and business circles and in academia, people call for corporations to orient their behavior towards ‘purpose’. This is meant as a move away from shareholder value maximization as the lodestar for corporate action. But purpose-advocates are torn between two directions in thinking about corporate governance: towards corporate governance on behalf of stakeholders by an independent board, and towards corporate governance by stakeholders through a responsive board. The paper’s aim (...) is to enlighten this choice by placing it in a trilemma with a third option: corporate governance on behalf of shareholders. This corporate governance trilemma shows us which trade-offs are at stake in making choices between the relevant values: the minimization of externalities, collective decision-making costs and agency costs. It discusses the various trade-offs in the trilemma. Finally, the paper argues that corporate purpose is best served by a balance between board independence and responsiveness. (shrink)

Are evolution and creation irreconcilably opposed? Is 'intelligent design' theory an unhappy compromise? Is there another way of approaching the present-day divide between religious and so-called secular views of the origins of life? Jacob Klapwijk offers a philosophical analysis of the relation of evolutionary biology to religion, and addresses the question of whether the evolution of life is exclusively a matter of chance or is better understood as including the notion of purpose. Writing from a Christian point of view, (...) he criticizes creationism and intelligent design theory as well as opposing reductive naturalism. He offers an alternative to both and an attempt to bridge the gap between them, via the idea of 'emergent evolution'. In this theory the process of evolution has an emergent or innovative character resulting in a living world of ingenious, multifaceted complexity. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Hegel’s claim that purposiveness or teleology is, in his unusual terminology, “the truth of” mechanism. First, I defend several important insights about this from Maraguat’s book, True Purposes in Hegel’s Logic. Second, I argue that what follows from these insights is that there is an outstanding problem about Hegel’s account of teleology, not solved in this book, or other recent work on the topic; I conclude with reason to expect that a solution would have to involve (...) a radically idealist account of teleology. (shrink)

Business Roundtable (BRT) firms have faced intense scrutiny from investors, media, and the public following their 2019 “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation,” which marked a shift from shareholder-centric governance to a stakeholder-focused approach. This shift has sparked debate over whether BRT firms are genuinely committed to social responsibility or merely using it as a branding strategy without implementing meaningful changes. This paper contributes to the debate by empirically examining a key dimension of social responsibility—corporate tax behavior. Using (...) a difference-in-difference analysis covering 2004–2022, we find that BRT firms engage in higher levels of tax avoidance than other publicly listed U.S. firms. More importantly, our results indicate that BRT firms have not significantly adjusted their tax behavior since the 2019 Statement, suggesting a disconnect between their stated commitment and actual practices. Our findings provide new insights into the social responsibility of BRT firms and contribute to the broader literature on the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and CSR. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a strong continuity between the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature and the transcendental deduction of the ideas from the first critique. On these grounds, I provide an interpretation of the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature in which I argue that: 1) the necessity of the principle of purposiveness of nature does not derive from its role in solving some specific philosophical problem but from its relation to (...) a cognitive goal; 2) the representation of nature as conforming to the maxims of judgement is a direct, immediate consequence of a certain cognitive goal that the necessity of the empirical laws mentioned by Kant in the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature is not so much their nomic necessity, but their necessity as consequences of higher laws. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories aspire to develop a naturalistic account of intentional agency and thought by appeal to biological teleology. In particular, most versions of teleosemantics study the emergence of intentionality in terms of biological purposes introduced by Darwinian evolution. The aim of this paper is to argue that the sorts of biological purposes identified by these evolutionary approaches do not allow for a satisfactory account of intentionality. More precisely, I claim that such biological purposes should be attributed to reproductive chains or (...) lineages, rather than to individual traits or organisms, whereas the purposes underlying intentional agency and thought are typically attributed to individuals. In the last part of the paper I suggest that related difficulties are also faced, despite appearances, by accounts of intentionality relying on alternative organizational approaches to biological teleology. (shrink)