I develop a version of process theology inspired by Hartshorne. This development aims to reconcile Hartshorne both with recent science and with analytic metaphysics. It posits an endless series of ever greater cosmic epochs. Each cosmic epoch is a subcomputation in a divine organism. Each divine organism is like a phoenix. Just as new cosmic epochs are born from the ashes of old cosmic epochs, so new deities are born from the ashes of old deities. The result is a process (...) polytheism. (shrink)

Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism and monotheism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of polytheism. We develop an argument from infinitely many alternatives, which decisively demonstrates that if a monotheistic or polytheistic god-model obtains, it will almost certainly be polytheistic. Probabilistic calculations are performed in order to illustrate the difficulties faced by the monotheistic proponent. After considering possible objections, such as whether there should be limits placed on how many possible god-models could obtain, (...) we conclude that our argument from infinitely many alternatives is sound, and highly unlikely to be overcome. (shrink)

Christian philosophers and theologians have long been concerned with the question of how to reconcile their belief in three fully divine Persons with their commitment to monotheism. The most popular strategy for doing this—the Social Trinitarian strategy—argues that, though the divine Persons are in no sense the same God, monotheism is secured by certain relations that obtain among them. It is argued that if the Social Trinitarian understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is correct, then Christianity is not interestingly (...) different from the polytheistic Amun-Re theology of Egypt’s New Kingdom period. Thus, Social Trinitarianism should be classified as a version of polytheism rather than monotheism. (shrink)

In this reading of the Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro are seen less in a primordial conflict between reason and devotion, than as sincere Hellenic polytheists engaged in an inquiry based upon a common intuition that, in addition to the irreducible agency of the Gods, there is also some irreducible intelligible content to holiness. This reading is supported by the fact that Euthyphro does not claim the authority of revelation for his decision to prosecute his father, but rather submits it to (...) elenchus, and that Euthyphro does not embrace the ‘solution’ of theological voluntarism when Socrates explicitly offers it. Since the goal of this inquiry is neither to eliminate the noetic content of the holy, nor to eliminate the Gods’ agency, the purpose of the elenchus becomes the effort to articulate the results of this productive tension between the Gods and the intelligible on the several planes of Being implied by each conception of the holy which is successively taken up and dialectically overturned to yield the conception appropriate to the next higher plane, a style of interpretation characteristic of the ancient Neoplatonists. (shrink)

The comparison drawn by the Neoplatonist Olympiodorus between the Stoic doctrine of the reciprocal implication of the virtues and the Neoplatonic doctrine of the presence of all the gods in each helps to elucidate the latter. In particular, the idea of primary and secondary “perspectives” in each virtue, when applied to Neoplatonic theology, can clarify certain theoretical statements made by Proclus in his Cratylus commentary concerning specific patterns of inherence of deities in one another. More broadly, the “polycentric” nature of (...) Neoplatonic theology provides a theoretical articulation for henotheistic practices within polytheism without invoking evolutionist notions of “monotheistic tendencies.” The Neoplatonic distinction between the modes of unity exhibited by divine individuals (“henads”) and ontic units (“monads”), which is integral to the polycentric theology, also provides a theoretical basis for the non reductive crosscultural comparison between deities. The polycentric theology thus offers a promising foundation for a polytheistic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This book is both extraordinarily useful and wonderfully beautiful. It provides a sympathetic and articulate account of the basic philosophical and religious theory of Hindu polytheism, an analysis of some of its fundamental concepts, a systematic ordering and explanation of the major deities with their various names and symbols, and a clear picture of the structure and development of Hindu thought. The Sanskrit texts are printed separately, and there is a set of fine black-and-white plates. I can't imagine a (...) more delightful, or more useful, basic reference work on the subject. The earlier French edition, published in 1960, differs in minor points and does not contain the very valuable index.—W. G. E. (shrink)

At the heart of this book is a simple comparison: monotheistic religions are exclusive, whereas ancient polytheistic religions are inclusive. In this thought-provoking book, Maurizio Bettini, one of today's foremost classicists, uses the expansiveness of ancient polytheism to shine a bright light on a darker corner of our modern times. It can be easy to see ancient religions as inferior, less free, and remote from shared visions of a more inclusive world. But, as Bettini deftly shows, many ancient practices (...) tended to produce results aligned with contemporary progressive values, like pluralism and diversity. In Praise of Polytheism does not chastise the modern world or blame monotheism for all our woes but rather shows in clear, sharp prose how much we can learn from ancient religions, underscoring the limitations of how we view the world and ourselves today. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the Levinasian opposition between the violence of the production of identity and self-presence and its undermining in a charitable disburdening of the self for the sake of the monotheistic ethical other, is unable to provide all the resources required for a politically motivated critique of the present. As a critique of Levinas' almost Manichean opposition between identity and difference, I argue, by appealing to the Arendtian model of public space, that Levinas underestimates our capacity (...) to build and open up societal spaces within which a non-violent polytheistic political difference can proliferate. The identity of the built and legislated can constitute a non-violent stage upon which discursive political differences are played out. (shrink)

Polytheism is a strange view to hold in modernity. Connected as it is in the popular imagination with archaic, animistic, magical, prescientific systems of thought, we don’t hesitate much before casting it into the dustbin of history. Even if we are not monotheists, we are likely to think of monotheism as the obviously more plausible position. The traditional arguments for the existence of God, which have been enormously influential in Western philosophy of religion, do not necessarily rule out (...) class='Hi'>polytheism but they are clearly formulated with monotheism in mind. While there could be multiple first causes, intelligent designers, or beings than which nothing greater can be conceived, the simplest and most natural... (shrink)

This article discusses the turn to polytheism in postmodern theory. In postmodernism, there is a strong interest in polytheism as an alternative to the much-criticized dominance of onto-theology in the philosophical tradition. The article argues that the new polytheism cannot be unequivocally understood as an alternative for an onto-theological way of thinking, or as a ‘liberation’ from monotheism. Already in Romanticism, the engagement with polytheism and paganism was ambiguous. There was the familiar superiority of Christian monotheism (...) over polytheism. But there was also an appropriation of polytheism that served a new self-perception of the West. This article focuses on this second line of interpretation and argues that postmodern theory inherits the theo-political concerns central to eighteenth- and nineteenth- century Romanticism. The article sets out to sketch the role of polytheism in a post-secular paradigm. Subsequently, it sketches the engagement with polytheism in British and German Romanticism. It will be argued that in Romanticism, polytheism was always embedded in more substantial cultural and political narratives. The remainder of the article will scrutinize the function of polytheism in the writings of Richard Rorty and John Milbank and how their respective forms of polytheism give way to different political theologies. (shrink)

I initially characterize what I consider to be a growing consensus regarding the relationship between science and nature. This consensus contradicts the definition of scientific activity as a device for the instrumentalization of the natural world – something that it has been since its birth. Next, I criticize the Hegelian notion that science is endowed with an egalitarian politics vis-à-vis nature. Finally, I outline the broad outlines of what could turn out to be an authentic politics of this kind: only (...) possible within a set of polytheistic beliefs. In this environment, the conditions for the deobjectification of nature and the subjectification of the subject would be established – processes without which relations would remain defined in a hierarchical structure. From this change, more egalitarian relations between human beings and nature could be promoted: the basis for sustaining a truly ecological way of life. This would make it possible to overcome the slave mechanism of modern science whose gears take momentum from the spiritual impoverishment of nature. (shrink)

I show that if the ontological argument is sound, it proves that a number of maximally great beings must exist. I show that maximal greatness does not imply uniqueness, that such beings can be omnipotent and yet not restrict each other's power, and that each must have its own separate stream of consciousness. I also show that attempts to unify the beings by unifying the streams of consciousness leads to a form of pantheism.

Hyde claims that the trickster spirit is necessary for the renewal of culture, and that he lives only in the ‘complex terrain of polytheism’. Fortunately for those of us in monotheistic cultures, Weber gives reasons for thinking that polytheism is making a return, albeit in a new, disenchanted form. The plan of this paper is to elaborate some basic notions from Weber, to explore Hyde’s thesis in more detail and then to take up the question of the plurality (...) of spirits both around and within us and whether the trickster is one of them. Weber has three roles in this argument. First, he theorises rationalisation, disenchantment and bureaucracy; second, he offers an argument that in a certain sense polytheism is returning ; and third, he presents a way to translate the mytho-poetic register in which Hyde works into terms acceptable to social science of a more materialist bent. The claim of the paper is that polytheism as a practical attitude means recognising that there are diverse and contradictory ethical orders built into the world around us and active with our psyches. Weber explains why this is especially difficult for us, and Hyde offers us the hope that we may be tricky enough to cope. (shrink)

Long recognized as an important and abiding influence in the European artistic and intellectual circles of the last century, the work of Pierre Klossowski is slowly gaining recognition in the Anglo-American scholarly community. The older brother of the painter Balthus, a friend of Rilke and Gide among others, and a celebrated artist in his own right, Klossowski is a difficult if not impossible thinker to categorize. From quite early in his career, Nietzsche was an important influence on Klossowski’s work. In (...) addition to translating two volumes for Nietzsche’s Oeuvres Complètes (1967, 1976), as well as Heidegger’s four-volume work on Nietzsche (1976), Klossowski also wrote a number of essays on Nietzsche as well as a book, Nietzsche et le Cercle Vicieux (1969). In a note to Différence et Répétition, Gilles Deleuze, citing “Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody” as well as “Forgetting and Anamnesis in the Lived Experience of the Eternal Return of the Same,” writes that Klossowski’s work has “renewed the interpretation of Nietzsche.” “Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody” appeared as the final essay of Klossowski’s book, Un si funeste désir (Such a Deathly Desire), first published in 1963. It is one of two essays in the book that are devoted explicitly to Nietzsche; the second, “On Some Fundamental Themes of Nietzsche’s Gaya Scienza,” is the opening essay of the volume and had previously appeared as an introduction to Klossowski’s translation of The Gay Science. “Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody” had not previously appeared in print, although Klossowski had presented it as a lecture at the Collège de Philosophie in Paris in 1957. Together, the two essays bound a series of reflections on Gide, Blanchot, Bataille, and others, all of which appeared previously – sometimes in a different form – and that taken together explicate Klossowski’s conception of “the demon.” The conception of the demon, drawn from The Gay Science, is for Klossowski a figuration of the double life of the existing human being: both conscious, rational, goal-directed, and vital, passionate, a victim of intensities. (shrink)

In the Qurʾān, it is mentioned that those who disbelieve insist on not believing by putting forward various excuses. One of them is that deniers attribute polytheism to Allah’s wish. When those who disbelieve are asked why they do not believe, they argue that they cannot deny unless Allah wills. On the other hand, expressions in line with the words spoken by the polytheists in the Qurʾān are also attributed to Allah. Such a paradoxical appearance between the verses requires (...) a detailed examination of the subject. In this study, the reasons for using these expressions by the deniers and the historical contexts of the verses will be examined. In addition, we will talk about the discussion of whether the expressions that bind polytheism to the wish of God are absolutely correct, since the subject is related to the wish. Because the interpretation of the verses varies according to both views. In addition to this, whether the deniers are sincere in these words is an element that affects the interpretation. Ahl al-Sunna scholars argue that this proposition is absolutely correct and that the deniers say this sentence with a mocking attitude. On the other hand, Muʿtazilī scholars are of the opinion that the proposition is absolutely wrong and that the deniers say this word with conviction. In addition, while Muʿtazilī scholars think that the nature of the Allah’s wish in both verses is different; Ahl Sunna scholars think that both are the same. Although it seems at first glance that the disbelievers attribute their denial to the legacy of Allah is an attitude that mocks them and believes that Allah is pleased with them, in reality, this is because they deny fate and turn to coercion and do not believe in prophethood and the Hereafter. Because, saying “If Allah willed, we would not associate” is based on the conviction that Allah gave consent to this belief they inherited from their ancestors and left them in accordance with their current beliefs. Devotion to ancestors is not necessarily a bad thing. However, if loyalty to ancestors is through prophethood, it leads to a true faith and ensures that faith is transferred to the next generations in a healthy way. On the other hand, if traditional practices in the name of religion turn into a practice that is against the spirit of the religion after a while, devotion to ancestors becomes an element that leads to denial. The fact that their ancestors lived a very prosperous life in the world even though they also had this belief reveals that they did not believe in the hereafter. Because, according to their opinion, if their ancestors had not been on the right path, God should have punished them in this world. Another reason why they attribute their denial to the legacy of Allah is their lack of belief in prophethood. Because, according to them, prophethood does not have an effect, nor it is necessary, for their faith, which depends only on the legacy of Allah. The most important factor that determines whether the propositions in the verses we examined are correct is the context of the sentence and the intention of the people using the proposition. In other words, the meaning and value of attributing denial to Allah’s wish differs according to the addressee. Because one can mean the falsehood with a true word. The same expression used in different contexts used for this may also be false, due to the difference in context and purpose. As pointed out in verse 148 of Surat al-An’am, a person who has the ability and power to believe, abandon polytheism and rebellion, ignoring this opportunity and power given by Allah and implying that he is pleased with a deed that Allah is not pleased with like idolatry. “If Allah willed, we would not associate idolatry” is a false sentence and false claim that is expressed in the verse. On the other hand, as pointed out in verse 107 of the Surat al-An’am and verse 99 of Surat Yunus, our Prophet who is desperate in the current situation and who has an extreme sense of responsibility because they do not believe, consoled our Prophet that his only duty was to convey the truth to the deniers with the statement “If Allah so willed, they would not have converted to Islam” and “If Allah willed, all those on earth would have believed,” indicating that he allowed them to practice idolatry as a requirement of the test and that he did not force people to believe, in order to state that he is not a guardian and that he should not force them to believe. Therefore, each different situation points to a different dimension of the truth about God’s legitimacy. (shrink)

Raphael Lataster and Herman Philipse present an argument which they think decisively demonstrates polytheism over monotheism, if theism is assumed. Far from being decisive, the argument depends on very controversial and likely false assumptions about how to treat infinities in probability. Moreover, these problems are well known. Here, we focus on three objections. First, the authors rely on both countable additivity and the Principle of Indifference, which contradict each other. Second, the authors rely on a particular way of dividing (...) up the possibility space, when there are equally as reasonable alternative divisions which give different answers to the one the authors arrived at. Third, the authors’ argument proves too much, giving us an argument against many positions we should not be able to argue against so easily. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to demonstrate that Proclus articulates a metaphysics not merely compatible with his polytheism, but to which in fact polytheism is integral. For Proclus the One Itself, which according to the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides neither is, nor is one, is instead as each henad, that is, as each God. The henads or Gods thus form a multiplicity unlike any other. Ontic multiplicities always exhibit mediation, in accord with a logic subordinating the many to the (...) one. Correlatively, ontic unity is formal unity, structured by a logic of wholes and parts. These are the dominant characteristics of the realm of Being. The huperousios, or "supra-essential" domain of the Gods, by contrast, is that of a multiplicity of absolute individuals with no totalizing principle over them and no reciprocal relations between them, insofar as either of these would diminish that quality which they pre-eminently possess, namely unity. The supreme form of unity in Proclus' universe, therefore, is the individuality possessed by each absolutely unique God. Chapters 1--4 are concerned with elucidating the nature of the Gods as such. ;The last three chapters provide a close reading of the third, fourth and fifth books of Proclus' Platonic Theology, which I read as an account of the emergence of ontic unity out of henadic unity through the Gods' progressive self-diremption by which a space of mediation is constituted through which they come ultimately to be conceivable as a multiplicity like any other. The key stages in this process are the ontic hypostases of Being, Life and Intellect. The first represents the analysis of the "elements" of each God as such; the second represents the positing of the Gods in co-emergent groupings or pantheons; the third the emergence of fully reciprocal relations in the actions of mythic narrative. At the end of this cosmogonic process, the basic intellectual structures have been constituted which allow the formulation of the philosophical system. The relationship between the Gods and Being is thus embodied in that between myth and dialectic, theology and philosophy. (shrink)

Since publishing my argument for polytheisms over monotheism with Herman Philipse, I have encountered many monotheists who were perturbed, but who had not formulated a proper rebuttal. It is also hard not to notice that there is generally a dearth of publications arguing for monotheism's being more probable than polytheism, perhaps because it is generally taken for granted. As such, I am delighted that Mark Saward has taken up the challenge to address at least some of the original article's (...) claims. Unfortunately, his critique fails to establish why polytheism is improbable, and why monotheism is to be privileged by philosophers of religion. I further reiterate that the threat of extreme agnosticism is a bizarre approach for the monotheistic evidentialist, posing no problems whatsoever for agnostic atheists, such as myself In fact, I assert that extreme agnosticism still allows discussants, even further encourages them, to declare monotheism (and also classical theism) to be epistemically improbable. (shrink)

William James's influence on Richard Rorty's neopragmatism increased during the last decade of his life. I point out two themes that are not entirely consistent in Rorty's vision of the future of philosophy. Rorty's later “romantic polytheism” was more pluralistic and closer to James's view than his earlier atheism, but his commitment to the “linguistic turn” prevented him from accepting James's reconstruction of metaphysics and epistemology. I argue that Rorty's rejection of the concept of experience committed what James called (...) the fallacy of “vicious intellectualism,” and yet the overall impact of his work was enormously beneficial in challenging the traditional self‐image of philosophy and moving it in the direction of James's pluralism. (shrink)

This paper develops an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, drawn from Augustine and the Athanasian Creed. Such a doctrine includes divinity claims (the persons are divine), diversity claims (the persons are distinct), and a uniqueness claim (there is only one God). I propose and defend an interpretation of these theses according to which they are neither logically incompatible nor do they do entail that there are three (or four) gods.

Alternative Conceptions of the Spiritual engages with polytheism, henotheism, pandeism, cosmopsychism, world-soul ontologies, animism and theophanism as propounded by recent philosophers and by members of lesser-known non-western faith communities, new religious movements, and esoteric groups. Treating the topics with comparative philosophical exploration and assessment, Travis Dumsday brings Christian doctrines, specifically from an Eastern Orthodox perspective, into dialogue with these alternative viewpoints.

This paper explains Hume's thinking on the origins of polytheism and monotheism, or presents my interpretation of Hume. Hume thinks monotheism - specifically, there is one God who designed nature - is the outcome of reflecting on the neat regularities of nature and that this would have come after polytheism, because the curiosity or pure love of truth which leads to these reflections belongs to a more refined age. I appeal to Raymond Firth's We, The Tikopia - a (...) study of a remote and technologically simple people - to propose that we cannot be confident of this claim of Hume (that curiosity about the regularities of nature did not exist in primitive circumstances) and also that it is difficult for us to reliably anticipate what specific questions would preoccupy their curiosity (is there any land where one cannot hear the sound of the sea?). I also propose that, if you could somehow send a traveller back in time and then cause him to return, probably any so-called primitive people (or competitive members of them) would react by sending the traveller back with an indirect message: "We are better than this fellow.". (shrink)

Weber's theory of value spheres outlines a project of institutional polytheism, each ordered around a ‘god’. This suggests not only that social theory can build a religious sociology, but that a theory of institutions must be an exercise in comparative religions. Weber's comparative sociology of religions, however, does not align with his theory of value spheres in terms of his distinction between polytheism and monotheism, transcendence and immanence, salvation and mysticism, being possessed and possessing. A theory of institutional (...) logics points beyond Weber's separation of value and instrumental rationality, faith and practice, and hence the ways in which he partitioned the institutions of modernity. (shrink)

The sublime and sublimation are always haunted and made possible by their other of slime and the uncanny, the combination of fascination and horror. The uncanny is associated with the obverse of the sublime. This chapter traces the uncanny from the work of Schelling that comes out of his philosophy of polytheismpolytheism and mythologymythology, the bases for monotheismmonotheism and theology. At a time and for a world in which some sectors of the monotheistic religions are in aggressive, and sometimes violent, (...) contention against those of other monotheistic religions, and even against other sectors within their own monotheistic religion, Schelling’s discussion of the uncanny enables rethinking the relationship between mythology, and monotheistic and polytheistic religions in a culturally and politically liberatory and progressive way in the Anthropobscene. This chapter makes a plea for polytheism in a world and age riven by conflicts between and within monotheistic religions. Polytheism is living with nature in the earthly household of the ecosphere. The uncanny is the means to do it. It taps into a timely and rich vein of thinking about the divine, darkness, light, auraaura, religion, mythology, and the monstrous that enables rethinking the inter-relationship between all of them in environmentally and animal friendly terms. (shrink)

Professor Ward has offered a bold alternative to traditional doctrines of the Trinity. I focus on his proposal for understanding the identity of Jesus Christ. I note some ambiguities and raise some concerns, and I show that his theology is not obviously free of the error that motivates his rejection of more traditional views.

En 1996, R. Parker (R.P.) publiait Athenian Religion. A History, un ouvrage qui tentait le pari difficile d’inscrire les manifestations de la vie religieuse athénienne dans une perspective chronologique qui en identifie les évolutions et les changements. Le pari était réussi, mais il avait un prix : la mise à l’écart d’un traitement circonstancié d’éléments essentiels de cette vie religieuse dont la dimension historique, au sens chronologique du terme, peinait à rendre compte. On attendait do...

What does Gilles Deleuze mean by his equation of forces and gods in Nietzsche and Philosophy? Are the gods metaphorical figures for the forces central to this text? Are they real divinities to whom one might pray or sacrifice? Or is the ontological status of these gods more ambiguous and paradoxical? This article takes seriously Deleuze's equation, exploring its implications for the Nietzschean–Deleuzian theory of forces. For Deleuze reading Nietzsche, the one that wants in the will is the relationality of (...) gods, and the will to power, embodied in Dionysus, is a will towards relational complexes of divine potencies luring becoming. (shrink)

This paper presents the Database (DB) developed within the ERC Mapping Ancient Polytheisms (MAP) project, which aims to study the religious systems of the Greek and West Semitic worlds in the longue durée (ca. 1000 BCE – 400 CE) through the prism of “divine onomastic attributes”. By this we mean the names, epithets, verbal forms, and other designations that the Ancients attributed to their gods. The construction of such a tool, which is not without precedent, but which strives to take (...) a quantitative and qualitative step forward, has a double objective: on the one hand, to allow the exhaustive treatment of myriads of divine denominations, by taking into account the diversity of contexts in which they appear; on the other, to use these denominations as markers of divine configurations and human agency. The complexity inherent in divine onomastic sequences requires the development of a carefully structured, flexible and precise database. Therefore, an exhaustive treatment of the latter requires the development of flexible modelling. Thus, after a terminological and historiographical discussion, we here present the structure of the MAP database, and in particular the formula analysis that allows the modelling of divine onomastic sequences. (shrink)

In a famous quote reported by his biographer Marinus, Proclus says that a philosopher should be like a “priest of the whole world in common”. This essay examines what this universality of the philosopher’s religious practice entails, first with reference to Marinus’ testimony concerning Proclus’ own devotional life, and then with respect to the systematic Platonic understanding of divine ‘locality’. The result is, first, that the philosopher’s ‘universality’ is at once more humble than it sounds, and more far-reaching; and second, (...) that the meaning of locality in the Platonic metaphysics is more flexible and dynamic than we might have expected. Particular attention is given to the relations of ‘universality’ and ‘particularity’ as they exist among the Gods, and to the account in Proclus’ Timaeus commentary concerning the places sacred to the Gods as immaterial intervals (diastêmata) not identical to physical places, and the consequences of this for understanding changes in the religious life of places and in the localization of cults. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s assessment of theism is ambivalent. His criticism of monotheism is radical, yet in The Gay Science, he discusses the idea of gods and overmen positively concerning their historical and potential future value. This initial ambivalence can be resolved when considering how polytheism and monotheism fundamentally differ in the establishment of values-either through polytheistic agonism or through the monotheistic utilization of the absolute value of truth to exclude rivalling interpretations. Passages from The Gay Science show Nietzsche’s genuinely positive attitude (...) toward the idea of polytheism, which he considers to be a historical prerequisite to both individualism and the ability to form peoples. In the same passages, though, he includes the fundamental criticism of assuming “One true God,” which propels the greatest threat to humanity, the possibility to develop into “one normal human type”-a “Normalmensch.” I will follow the adaptation of this distinction in Thus spoke Zarathustra, where his fictional protagonist introduces both a quasi-polytheistic model of the overman and depicts a normalized human type as the greatest danger of humanity. I will argue that Nietzsche-some time ahead of Foucault-introduces a model of normalization through exclusion from agonistic discourse as a strong critique regarding monotheism and modern science. (shrink)