The best arguments for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem all require that when Beauty awakes on Monday she should be uncertain what day it is. I argue that this claim should be rejected, thereby clearing the way to accept the 1/2 solution.

How confident does the history of science allow us to be about our current well-tested scientific theories, and why? The scientific realist thinks we are well within our rights to believe our best-tested theories, or some aspects of them, are approximately true.2 Ambitious arguments have been made to this effect, such as that over historical time our scientific theories are converging to the truth, that the retention of concepts and claims is evidence for this, and that there can be no (...) other serious explanation of the success of science than that its theories are approximately true. There is appeal in each of these ideas, but making such strong claims has tended to be hazardous, leaving us open to charges that many typical episodes in the history of science just do not fit the model. (See, e.g., Laudan 1981.) Arguing for a realist attitude via general claims – properties ascribed to sets of theories, trends we see in progressions of theories, and claimed links between general properties like success and truth that apply or fail to apply to any theory regardless of its content – is like arguing for or via a theory of science, which brings with it the obligation to defend that theory. I think a realist attitude toward particular scientific theories for which we have evidence can be maintained rationally without such a theory, even in the face of the pessimistic induction over the history of science. The starting point at which questions arise as to what we have a right to believe about our theories is one where we have theories and evidence for them, and we are involved in the activity of apportioning our belief in each particular theory or hypothesis in accord with the strength of the particular evidence.3 The devil’s advocate sees our innocence and tries his best to sow seeds of doubt. If our starting point is as I say, though, the innocent believer in particular theories does not have to play offense and propose sweeping views about science in general, but only to respond to the skeptic’s challenges; the burden of initial argument is on the skeptic.. (shrink)

Metaphysics has undergone two major innovations in recent decades. First, naturalistic metaphysicians have argued that our best science provides an important source of evidence for metaphysical theories. Second, social metaphysicians have begun to explore the nature of social entities such as groups, institutions, and social categories. Surprisingly, these projects have largely kept their distance from one another. Katherine Hawley has recently argued that, unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are not sufficiently successful to provide evidence about the metaphysical nature (...) of social entities. By contrast, I defend an optimistic view of naturalistic social metaphysics. Drawing on a case study of research into contextual effects in social epidemiology, I show that social science can provide a valuable evidence for social metaphysicians. (shrink)

This article defends the democratic ideal of inclusive public discourse, as articulated in Democratic Speech in Divided Times, against the critiques offered by Billingham, Fraser, and Hannon. Specifically, it considers and responds to three core challenges. The first challenge argues, notably, that the “shared reasons” constraint should either apply everywhere or not at all, and that, if this constraint is to apply in divided circumstances, its justificatory constituency must be idealized. The second challenge contends that the resistance of hate speech (...) and misinformation to counterspeech cannot adequately be explained by considerations of salience, and therefore cannot adequately by countered (as I suggest) by “positive” forms of counterspeech. Finally, the last challenge objects that the ideal of inclusive public discourse I defend remains, as pessimists allege, excessively idealistic. (shrink)

Creative self-efficacy (CSE) is a core influencer of creative behavior and has a positive impact on well-being and development. However, the positive psychological processes that help to promote CSE in foreign-language learning (FLL) remain under-studied. Focusing specifically on FLL students, the present study examined the associations among optimism, hope, empathy, and CSE and investigated the possible mediating roles of hope and empathy in the relationship between optimism and CSE. A sample of 330 FLL students from two Chinese universities (...) participated in this study. The results showed that (i) optimism, hope, and empathy were all positively related to CSE and that (ii) optimism did not directly predict CSE but indirectly and positively predicted CSE through hope and empathy. These findings suggest that optimism, empathy, and hope potentially play positive roles in facilitating CSE in FLL students. Based on the present results, some practical approaches are discussed that could help improve the CSE of FLL students, paying particular attention to the effects that potentially motivate their positivity. (shrink)

§1. Overview. Philosophers and mathematicians have drawn lots of conclusions from Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and related results from mathematical logic. Languages, minds, and machines figure prominently in the discussion. Gödel's theorems surely tell us something about these important matters. But what?A descriptive title for this paper would be “Gödel, Lucas, Penrose, Turing, Feferman, Dummett, mechanism, optimism, reflection, and indefinite extensibility”. Adding “God and the Devil” would probably be redundant. Despite the breath-taking, whirlwind tour, I have the modest aim of (...) forging connections between different parts of this literature and clearing up some confusions, together with the less modest aim of not introducing any more confusions.I propose to focus on three spheres within the literature on incompleteness. The first, and primary, one concerns arguments that Gödel's theorem refutes the mechanistic thesis that the human mind is, or can be accurately modeled as, a digital computer or a Turing machine. The most famous instance is the much reprinted J. R. Lucas [18]. To summarize, suppose that a mechanist provides plans for a machine,M, and claims that the output ofMconsists of all and only the arithmetic truths that a human, or the totality of human mathematicians, will ever or can ever know. We assume that the output ofMis consistent. (shrink)

Corporate net-zero carbon emission pledges abound and so does skepticism about the results they could deliver. Three approaches proposed here can ensure these pledges alleviate, rather than aggravate, the climate crisis.

This article intervenes in a critical debate about the use of consent to distinguish sex from rape. Drawing from critical contract theories, it argues that sexual consent is a cruel optimism that often operates to facilitate, rather than alleviate, sexual violence. Sexual consent as a cruel optimism promises to simplify rape allegations in the popular cultural imagination, confounds the distinction between victims and agents of sexual violence, and establishes certainty for potential victimizers who rely on it to convince (...) themselves and others that their partners implicitly or explicitly agreed to sex. In each of these cases, the power of consent rests in its tendency to obscure sexual violence in a set of questions around victimhood and agency, rather than to clarify whether or when it has occurred. Following in the critical contract tradition, this article argues that the optimistic attachment to the clarifying power of consent helps to explain the persistent commitment to better sexual consent as a ‘solution’ to the problems of rape and sexual violence, and that this ‘solution’ is insufficient to the task. (shrink)

This study examines the impact of various ethical climate types, dependency factors, and ethical training on ethical optimism of purchasing professionals (n = 151) in India. Instrumental and independence climate types had a significant negative impact on ethical optimism. Other climate types (professional, caring, rules, and efficiency) had no significant impact on ethical optimism. Among the dependency factors, while task uncertainty had a significant positive impact, monitoring had a significant negative impact on ethical optimism. None of (...) the other factors significantly impacted ethical optimism. (shrink)

"This book examines the longstanding debate between philosophical optimism and pessimism in the history of philosophy, focusing on Aristotle, Maimonides, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Camus. Philosophical optimists maintain that the world is optimally arranged and is accordingly valuable, and that the existence of human beings is preferable over their nonexistence. Philosophical pessimists, by contrast, hold that the world is in a woeful condition and ultimately valueless, and that human nonexistence would have been preferable over our existence. Schopenhauer criticizes the (...) optimism he locates in the Hebrew Bible and in Spinoza for being unable to square the presumed perfection of the world and its parts, including human life, with the suffering and misfortunes observable in them, and for leading to egoism and thereby to cruelty. Nietzsche, in turn, criticizes Schopenhauer's overtly pessimistic view, inter alia, for furtively positing a perfect state for one to aspire to, thus being latently optimistic. Similarly, Camus charges Nietzsche, who announces his rejection of both optimism and pessimism, with deifying the world and oneself, thereby reverting to optimism. Interestingly, Aristotle countenances an optimistic theory, later adopted and developed by Maimonides, that is arguably capable of facing Schopenhauer's challenge. Aristotelian optimism accounts for the perfection of the world in terms of a hierarchy of value between its parts, with human beings ranked relatively low, and recommends an attitude congruent with that ranking"--. (shrink)

Here’s something I’m willing to claim we know: Homo sapiens, in particular the Polynesian settlers who first arrived in Aotearoa around the twelfth century, take the lion’s share of causal blame for the extinction of a lineage of enormous flightless birds: the moa. Stretching to three metres at their tallest, moa were a distinctive and remarkable feature of Aotearoa’s primeval forests, playing the main browser and grazer role in this unique bird-based ecosystem. Once humans turned up forests were burned, moa (...) were stalked, and human-0introduced arrivals such as kiore had dramatic ecological repercussions. Within a few centuries, the moa were gone. (shrink)

McKenna’s version of non-ideal inquiry epistemology combines pessimism about the epistemic capacities of individuals with certain forms of optimism about the influence of social institutions on our epistemic lives. I suggest that the latter may amount to a problematic idealisation of the sort McKenna is trying to steer epistemology away from; moreover, a more thoroughgoing pessimism about the epistemic influence of institutions may make it clearer why we should value and strive for a degree of intellectual autonomy, even if (...) this is limited in scope and comes at a cost. I close by briefly considering two proposals that an inquiry epistemology that takes these points on board might make. (shrink)

McKenna’s version of non-ideal inquiry epistemology combines pessimism about the epistemic capacities of individuals with certain forms of optimism about the influence of social institutions on our epistemic lives. I suggest that the latter may amount to a problematic idealisation of the sort McKenna is trying to steer epistemology away from; moreover, a more thoroughgoing pessimism about the epistemic influence of institutions may make it clearer why we should value and strive for a degree of intellectual autonomy, even if (...) this is limited in scope and comes at a cost. I close by briefly considering two proposals that an inquiry epistemology that takes these points on board might make. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to present Aristotle’s attitude to sense-perception. I will refer to this attitude as “perceptual optimism”. Perceptual optimism is, very briefly, the position that the senses give us full access to reality as it is. Perceptual optimism entails perceptual realism, the view that there is a reality out there which is accessible to our senses in some way or other, and the belief that our senses are veridical at least to some extent, (...) but it is more comprehensive than that. For instance, a perceptual optimist does not admit such things as qualities which are perceptible in principle but not by us or bodies too small to be perceptible. In this paper I argue that Aristotle is a perceptual optimist, since he believes that reality, at least in the sublunary sphere, is indeed fully accessible to our senses. In the first and largest part of this paper, I will show, in seven distinct theses, what Aristotle’s perceptual optimism entails. In the second and shorter part, I will put Aristotle’s position in a wider context of his epistemology and show why it was important for him to be a perceptual optimist. (shrink)

My argument will be that our understanding of human beings, which is what I take the Christian doctrine of man to be concerned with, will benefit considerably from an examination of two different but related clusters of human attitudes which can be found respectively under the headings ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’. There are many pitfalls in the way of such an enterprise, and occasionally some prejudices to be overcome. For example L. E. Loemker in the relevant articles in the Encyclopedia (...) of Philosophy concludes a fairly lengthy discussion with the rather terminal judgement. (shrink)

In this study, we explore the sincerity of the rhetorical tone of 664 annual letters to shareholders (CEO letters). Prior studies adopt Impression Management theory to predict that firms obfuscate failures and emphasize successes to unfairly enhance their image and maintain organizational legitimacy. Yuthas et al. (J Bus Ethics 41:141–157, 2002) challenged such a view, showing that firms reporting earnings surprises engage in ethical discourse with shareholders. We adopt the methodology of Yuthas et al. (J Bus Ethics 41:141–157, 2002) to (...) explore the association between firm performance and the rhetorical features of CEO letters in a large sample of Fortune 500 firms in the wake of the global economic crisis. In contrast to most prior research, we find that optimistic tone is congruent with both past and future performance. We conclude that under tough macroeconomic conditions, incentives to distort public information strategically are low. Rather, firms tend to engage in communicative action aimed at dialoguing with shareholders through sincere disclosure. However, in our conclusions, we warn about the impact of accounting and rhetorical manipulation on the congruence between optimistic tone and financial performance. (shrink)

Leibniz’s account of moral necessity does double heavy-duty: it aims a) to provide explanations of divine choices without rendering these divine choices metaphysically necessary, thus permitting for divine freedom; and b) to ground the conviction that God did the best God could have done in creating the world, or Leibnizian Optimism. I present a novel interpretation of what Leibniz calls ‘the principle of the best’ as a second-order will to do what is best (read de dicto) that grounds a (...) set of subjunctive conditionals of divine freedom. These conditionals encode what God would do (namely the best) if God were to deliberate about creating one of a set of mutually exclusive options which are metaphysically possible for God to create. I argue that this reading of the principle of the best enables Leibnizian moral necessity to do the mentioned double heavy-duty. (shrink)

Researchers and ethicists have long been concerned about the expectations for direct medical benefit expressed by participants in early phase clinical trials. Early work on the issue considered the possibility that participants misunderstand the purpose of clinical research or that they are misinformed about the prospects for medical benefit from these trials. Recently, however, attention has turned to the possibility that research participants are simply expressing optimism or hope about their participation in these trials. The ethical significance of this (...) therapeutic optimism remains unclear. This paper argues that there are two distinct phenomena that can be associated with the term ‘therapeutic optimism’—one is ethically benign and the other is potentially worrisome. Distinguishing these two phenomena is crucial for understanding the nature and ethical significance of therapeutic optimism. The failure to draw a distinction between these phenomena also helps to explain why different writers on the topic often speak past one another. (shrink)

In Explanatory Optimism about the Hard Problem of Consciousness, Josh Weisberg tries to debunk the hard problem of consciousness. In his view, although consciousness appears to have DISC (directly accessed, indescribable, simple, contingently connected) properties, it does not: the appearance is better explained by automation, ‘a quick and seemingly spontaneous kind of cognitive processing, one whose underlying mechanistic activity is subjectively inaccessible to us’ (p. 92). I raise two problems for Weisberg’s argument. First, even if automation explains why consciousness (...) appears DISCy, that is not enough to explain the hard-problem intuitions. Second, neither methodological naturalism nor the impressive track record of scientific explanations suffices to justify ascribing presumptive status to the claim that consciousness can be fully explained in structural-dynamic terms. (shrink)

Optimism (also sometimes called optimalism or axiarchism) says the best is productively responsible for the existence of all things. Despite its ancient Platonic pedigree, optimism has failed to flourish in recent analytic philosophy. Here I aim to support it by showing how it helps to solve problems in the foundations of logic, mathematics, and cosmology. I use reasoning from analytic metaphysics to justify the existence of the One, which points to the Good. Following Neoplatonism, I outline five optimal (...) emanations: the One emanates the Best Logic, the Best Class Theory, the greatest model of that Best Class Theory, the Best World, and the greatest model of that Best World. I show how optimism helps to define the class of possible universes in a variant of Lewisian modal realism. While optimism is often thought to support monotheism, the optimism developed here is non-theistic. It is a kind of atheistic metaphysical Platonism. Nevertheless, it supports a polytheistic hierarchy of non-theistic deities. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 7, July 2019, Page 26-28.

The commentaries on our article encourage us to believe that researchers are beginning to take seriously the goal of achieving the broad adequacy that Newell aspired to. The commentators offer useful elaborations to the criteria we suggested for the Newell Test. We agree with many of the commentators that classical connectionism is too restrictive to achieve this broad adequacy, and that other connectionist approaches are not so limited and can deal with the symbolic components of thought. All these approaches, including (...) ACT-R, need to accept the idea that progress in science is a matter of better approximating these goals, and it is premature to be making judgments of true or false. (shrink)

The first comprehensive survey of the criticisms of Leibniz's philosophical optimism in the first half of the eighteenth century, when what has been called the ‘debacle of the perfect world’ first began.

This chapter explores an overlooked aspect of the optimism debate: meliorism, the belief that the world increases in perfection over time. Contrary to the simplistic view of meliorism as a middle ground between optimism and pessimism, this chapter outlines a nuanced typology of meliorism that emerged over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Three forms are identified: inclusive meliorism (M1), where the world is the best and increases in perfection over time; mediating meliorism (M2), where the (...) world eventually becomes the best through increases in its perfection; and exclusive meliorism (M3), where the world perpetually increases in perfection without ever becoming the best. The chapter traces the development of these forms, starting with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's inclusive meliorism, then examining André-Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval's mediating meliorism, before finally investigating the exclusive meliorism of late-nineteenth-century French philosophers, who viewed continual improvement as the true form of optimism. The chapter thus illuminates how these thinkers developed different forms of meliorism within the context of the debate about optimism, and thereby provides a comprehensive understanding of meliorism's evolution and its relation to optimism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 37.1 (2004) 1-20 [Access article in PDF] Endoxa, Epistemological Optimism, and Aristotle's Rhetorical Project Ekaterina V. Haskins Communication Department Boston College Aristotle's crucial role in institutionalizing the art of rhetoric in the fourth century BCE is beyond dispute, but the significance of Aristotle's rhetorical project remains a point of lively controversy among philosophers and rhetoricians alike. There are many ways of reading and evaluating Aristotle's (...) Rhetoric that depend on the philosophical, theoretical, and pedagogical purposes of the scholar.1 Most philosophical and rhetorical exegeses of the Rhetoric, however, while focusing on the text's connections to Aristotle's corpus and to the rhetorical tradition before and after Aristotle, seem to lack a critical perspective on Aristotle's relationship with his cultural context. Yet, like other parts of Aristotle's encyclopedic intellectual endeavor, much of Rhetoric 's cultural content was provided by endoxa, "reputable or received opinions."Since G. E. L. Owen's essay "Tithenai ta phainomena" (1961) many scholars have accepted the claim that endoxa, rather than empirical observations, are the source of Aristotle's own philosophical principles. The "linguistic" turn within Aristotelian studies has drawn attention to the role of "facts" of language and ordinary experience within Aristotle's philosophical method. As a result, a view of Aristotle as a hard-core empiricist has given way to a picture of a humanist who is attuned to the nuances of his cultural milieu. Still, this new portrait fails to take into account that Aristotle's manner of selecting and categorizing his linguistic resources allows him to transform what we would consider cultural beliefs into natural, and hence, atemporal premises. This pattern can be explained by Aristotle's "epistemological optimism," in itself a blend of several cultural assumptions about perception in general and vision in particular, the function of language, and the cyclical nature of human history. Part of this essay's objective, then, will be an explanation of these components of Aristotle's epistemological optimism. By appreciating Aristotle's difference [End Page 1] on these issues from our modern assumptions, we will be in a better position to understand why Aristotle relies on endoxa on all three levels of philosophical discourse (theoretical science, moral philosophy, and productive arts of poetics and rhetoric). Aristotle remains consistent in his treatment of endoxa throughout; rhetoric, however, presents a major challenge to Aristotle's epistemological optimism and his conception of language. I shall argue that Aristotle recognized this challenge and that he answered it by isolating proofs and rhetorical genres from their linguistic medium (lexis ), and postulating linguistic transparency (sapheneia ) as a stylistic norm. I. Aristotle's openness to appearances (phainomena ) and opinions (endoxa ) was accorded prominence especially thanks to the work of G. E. L. Owen and Martha Nussbaum. Owen was first to defend a linguistic translation of Aristotle's phainomena as "ordinary beliefs" and "appearances" against the then-prevalent rendition "observed facts." In so doing he asserted the crucial impact of the philosopher's cultural context on the formation of speculative discourse. Owen (1961) nonetheless demanded that phainomena be understood as empirical observations in Aristotle' treatises on biology and meteorology (84-86), so as to preserve the methodological and epistemological distinctions between inquiries into the natural world, on the one hand, and the world inhabited by human agents, on the other. Nussbaum (1986) went much further than Owen in asserting the role of phainomena and endoxa in Aristotle's inquiry. Unlike Owen, Nussbaum sees no fundamental difference between "experiences" of a philosopher and linguistic expressions of cultural beliefs and interpretations—his discursive data—from which Aristotle constructs his philosophical accounts. Nussbaum's chief (and highly influential) claim is that Aristotle's method is marked by a deep concern for the experiential world of his fellow men and their language. Aristotle's philosophical insights into the human condition, on this reading, echo and amplify classical Greek tragedy, despite the austere diction of Aristotle's extant treatises.Owing to this openness to the world of ordinary beliefs, Aristotle seems to depart from the Eleatic and Platonic distrust of human... (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the idea that libertarians may be “Strawsonian Optimists”—that is to say, that they may consistently hold that even if determinism is true, there need be no threat of any kind to the concepts and practices constituting our commitments to moral responsibility and personhood. My defence of this position takes place in the context of John Fischer’s attempt to defend what I call the “Invulnerability Intuition”—that is to say, the intuition that it would not be the (...) case that we ought to give up our commitments to moral responsibility and personhood if we were to be told unequivocally one day by theoretical physicists that there is simply no doubt that the universe is deterministic. Fischer not only defends the Invulnerability Intuition; he also insists that the libertarian cannot accept it—and criticizes what he takes to be van Inwagen’s attempt to claim otherwise, characterizing van Inwagen’s strategy as a variety of “metaphysical flipflopping.” In this paper, I not only insist that flipflopping can be acceptable—I claim also (i) that flipflopping is easier to defend if one is an Agency Incompatibilist, than if one is a more standard kind of libertarian; and (ii) that flipflopping is a preferable strategy for saving the Invulnerability Intuition than Fischer’s own strategy—the metaphysics of semicompatibilism. (shrink)

One of the most original contributions to the optimism debate of the eighteenth century was put forward by the maverick French Enlightenment thinker, André-Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval, in an essay entitled “General misunderstanding on the question of optimism”. This essay, which seeks to develop a “middle point” between the polarized pro- and anti-optimist positions that characterized the optimism debate, prefigures the development of process or neoclassical theism in important ways. The essay is presented here in English (...) for the first time, along with an analysis of the essay itself and of the context in which it was written. (shrink)

We seek an evolutionary explanation for why in some situations humans maintain either optimistic or pessimistic attitudes toward uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of their environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility with respect to neo-additive capacities allowing for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude toward uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist overweighs good outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents’ changes of (...) actions. We focus on sub- and supermodular aggregative games and provide monotone comparative statics w.r.t. optimism/pessimism. With qualifications, we show that in finite populations, optimistic complete ignorance is evolutionary stable and yields a strategic advantage in submodular games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in these classes of games. (shrink)

Purpose of review: What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about style of thinking and mental health. Recent findings: Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks (...) involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way unrealistic optimism is beneficial. Summary: We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs. (shrink)

In the first of our three pieces responding to Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion, David Benatar suggests that Dawkins is preaching.

Moral cognition, by its very nature, stems from intuitions about what is good and bad, and these intuitions influence moral assessments outside of conscious awareness. However, because humans evolved a shared set of moral intuitions, and are compelled to justify their moral assessments as good and rational (even erroneously) to others, moral virtue and moral progress are still possible.

This chapter argues for a pragmatic approach toward artificial intelligence and robotics by addressing some of the specific issues encountered in laboratories, in experimental human–machine interaction contexts and in user experience research. Adopting the perspective of multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork, the chapter aims to address the multiple reconfigurations that intelligent machines and robotic systems may have on societies. Drawing on Lucy Suchman’s study of human–robot interaction, we will see that reconfigurations take place in various contexts and at various scales, inviting us (...) to extend this notion well beyond the mere scope of human–machine interaction experiments. This chapter will show that it is in fact not possible to fully grasp the social reconfigurations resulting from robotics and computer science research without considering at least three categories of problems. The first one is ontological. It concerns the ambiguous status of objects imitating vital and cognitive processes which existence affects our representations of life. The second, which concerns interaction, is about the new relations we have with these technical objects. Finally, the third concerns the way in which the increasing hybridization of socio-technical systems is participating in a reconfiguration of the community which affects not only activities but also their organization. (shrink)

The introduction of new medical treatments based on invasive technologies has often been surrounded by both hopes and fears. Hope, since a new intervention can create new opportunities either in terms of providing a cure for the disease or impairment at hand; or as alleviation of symptoms. Fear, since an invasive treatment involving implanting a medical device can result in unknown complications such as hardware failure and undesirable medical consequences. However, hopes and fears may also arise due to the cultural (...) embeddedness of technology, where a therapy due to ethical, social, political and religious concerns could be perceived as either a blessing or a threat. While Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) for treatment resistant depression (TRD) is still in its cradle, it is important to be proactive and try to scrutinize both surfacing hopes and fears. Patients will not benefit if a promising treatment is banned or avoided due to unfounded fears, nor will they benefit if DBS is used without scrutinizing the arguments which call for caution. Hence blind optimism is equally troublesome. We suggest that specificity, both in terms of a detailed account of relevant scientific concerns as well as ethical considerations, could be a way to analyse expressed concerns regarding DBS for TRD. This approach is particularly fruitful when applied to hopes and fears evoked by DBS for TRD, since it can reveal if our comprehension of DBS for TRD suffer from various biases which may remain unnoticed at first glance. We suggest that such biases exist, albeit a further analysis is needed to explore this issue in full. (shrink)

This chapter presents a modified Santayanan view on the nature of aesthetic objects, according to which evil or its representation, properly understood, negates the aesthetic value of the object in which it is contained. This contrasts with Santayana’s official early view—a variant of “co-existentialism”. By interpreting themes from Santayana’s early aesthetic theory through the lens of his later account of complex essencehood, I propose a revision to this view. The proposed revision affirms the intrinsic positivity of art, and is what (...) I call “aesthetic optimism”. It also rejects more generally Santayana’s early conception of aesthetic objects as units of pleasurable feeling and imagistic profiles compounded together during episodes of immediate appreciation. (shrink)

Mood and optimism have been demonstrated to influence risk-taking decisions; however, the literature on mood, optimism, and decision-making is mixed and conducted primarily with western samples. This study sought to address this gap in the literature by examining the impact of mood and dispositional optimism on risk-taking and whether these associations differed between undergraduate students from the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Both samples completed a dispositional optimism questionnaire and an autobiographical mood induction (...) task. They were then tasked with choosing to complete the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices reasoning task on easy, medium, or hard difficulty for hypothetical money. Selecting harder difficulties was interpreted as more risk-taking due to a higher chance of failure. More positive mood and higher dispositional optimism were associated with decreased risk-taking, i.e., selecting easier puzzle difficulties, in the American sample but increased risk-taking decisions, i.e., selecting harder difficulties, in the Chinese sample. These findings suggest that the effect of mood and optimism on decision-making may differ by nationality and/or culture. (shrink)