We show that in quantum logic of closed subspaces of Hilbert space one cannot substitute quantum operations for classical (standard Hilbert space) ones and treat them as primitive operations. We consider two possible ways of such a substitution and arrive at operation algebras that are not lattices what proves the claim. We devise algorithms and programs which write down any two-variable expression in an orthomodular lattice by means of classical and quantum operations in an identical form. Our results show that (...) lattice structure and classical operations uniquely determine quantum logic underlying Hilbert space. As a consequence of our result, recent proposals for a deduction theorem with quantum operations in an orthomodular lattice as well as a, substitution of quantum operations for the usual standard Hilbert space ones in quantum logic prove to be misleading. Quantum computer quantum logic is also discussed. (shrink)

In a text written during his stay in Paris, Leibniz, to deny ontological reality to relations, employs an argument well known to the medieval thinkers and which later would be revived by Francis H. Bradley. If one assumes that relations are real and that a relation links any property to a subject – so runs the argument – then one falls prey to an infinite regress. Leibniz seems to be well aware of the consequences that this argument has for his (...) own metaphysical views, where the relation of inherence plays such a central role. Thus, he attempts first to interpret the relation of inherence as something ‘metaphoric’, originating from our ‘spatial way’ of looking at the surrounding world; and then he tries to reduce it to the part-whole relation which clearly he considers weaker, from the ontological point of view, than that of ‘being in’. (shrink)

Philologus, founded in 1846, is one of the oldest and most respected periodicals in the field of Classics. It publishes articles on Greek and Latin literature, historiography, philosophy, history of religion, linguistics, reception, and the history of scholarship. The journal aims to contribute to our understanding of Greco-Roman culture and its lasting influence on European civilization. The journal Philologus, conceived as a forum for discussion among different methodological approaches to the study of ancient texts and their reception, publishes original scholarly (...) contributions with a strong international focus. Publications languages are: German, English, Italian, French. As of 2014 the publication of supplementary volumes will be resumed. The series Philologus. Supplemente / Philologus. Supplementary Volumes will publish monographs and edited volumes pertaining to all aspects of the study of ancient literature and its reception, with a special focus on topics concerning literary theory, philosophy and the history of scholarship from an interdisciplinary perspective. (shrink)

Objective Apeiron was founded in 1966 and has developed into one of the oldest and most distinguished journals dedicated to the study of ancient philosophy, ancient science, and, in particular, of problems that concern both fields. Apeiron is committed to publishing high-quality research papers in these areas of ancient Greco-Roman intellectual history; it also welcomes submission of articles dealing with the reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition. The journal appears quarterly. Articles are peer-reviewed on (...) a double-blind basis. Topics ancient philosophy ancient science reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition Article formats Original Articles. (shrink)

Philologus, founded in 1846, is one of the oldest and most respected periodicals in the field of Classics. It publishes articles on Greek and Latin literature, historiography, philosophy, history of religion, linguistics, reception, and the history of scholarship. The journal aims to contribute to our understanding of Greco-Roman culture and its lasting influence on European civilization. The journal Philologus, conceived as a forum for discussion among different methodological approaches to the study of ancient texts and their reception, publishes original scholarly (...) contributions with a strong international focus. Publications languages are: German, English, Italian, French. As of 2014 the publication of supplementary volumes will be resumed. The series Philologus. Supplemente / Philologus. Supplementary Volumes will publish monographs and edited volumes pertaining to all aspects of the study of ancient literature and its reception, with a special focus on topics concerning literary theory, philosophy and the history of scholarship from an interdisciplinary perspective. (shrink)

Response to commentary. We are grateful to Crockett and Craigie for their interesting remarks on our paper. We accept Crockett’s claim that there is a need for caution in drawing inferences about patient groups from work on healthy volunteers in the laboratory. However, we believe that the evidence we cited established a strong presumption that many of the patients who are routinely taking a medication, including many people properly prescribed the medication for a medical condition, have morally significant aspects of (...) their cognition and behavior modified in a way that is unintended and may sometimes be unwelcome. Crockett notes that in some cases the effects of long-term drug use may differ, sometimes markedly, from the effects of short-term use. However, if acute use of a drug affects a neural system involved in mediating moral cognition or behavior, this nevertheless provides some evidence that chronic use of the drug may affect that same system and thus have morally significant effects. It is also plausible, in some cases, that an acute moral effect would give rise to a chronic moral effect via cognitive mechanisms. ... (shrink)

One path into the semantics of the deontic modals _ought_ and _should_ approaches them indirectly, by starting with an investigation of the non-deontic, seemingly epistemic reading of these modals. Seth Yalcin’s chapter embarks down that path. It has two main objectives. First, a case is made against the idea that _ought_ and _should_ are susceptible to true epistemic readings. These modals admit of a certain reading distinct from, but easily confused with, the epistemic flavor of modality. It is suggested that (...) this “pseudo-epistemic” reading suffices to explain the data that have prompted theorists to suppose that there is a true epistemic reading of these modals. The second objective of this chapter is to explore the nature of the pseudo-epistemic reading, including its relation to normality and the connections between these modals and default reasoning. (shrink)

The notion of normality has gained significant attention in recent works in epistemology. Goodman and Salow (Philosophical Studies, 175, 183–196. 2018, 2021, Philosophical Review, 132(1), 89–145. 2023) introduced an abstract class of structures, namely normality structures, and a framework based on them that can support a diverse range of normality-based epistemic theories. In this work, we provide a formal study of the normality structures introduced by Goodman and Salow (2021). There are two general motivations for such (...) a study: first, to explore the structures as mathematical entities, and second, to study them as semantic structures appropriate for reasoning about epistemic and doxastic concepts. To pursue these aims, we propose two distinct languages: a modal language and a conditional one. We then develop the logic of normality structures in each language and establish their soundness and completeness with respect to normality structures. Within the second language we propose, not only can we define certain epistemic modalities that satisfy the desired conditions, but we can also potentially provide the logic for a more generalized class of frames, suitable for a more abstract notion of normality that relaxes some of the more controversial conditions imposed by Goodman and Salow. Finally, we briefly demonstrate how these formal tools can contribute to ongoing debates in formal epistemology. (shrink)

Although an invasive medical intervention, Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) has been regarded as an efficient and safe treatment of Parkinson’s disease for the last 20 years. In terms of clinical ethics, it is worth asking whether the use of DBS may have unanticipated negative effects similar to those associated with other types of psychosurgery. Clinical studies of epileptic patients who have undergone an anterior temporal lobectomy have identified a range of side effects and complications in a number of domains: psychological, (...) behavioural, affective and social. In many cases, patients express difficulty adjusting from being chronically ill to their new status as ‘treated’ or ‘seizure free’. This postoperative response adjustment has been described in the literature on epilepsy as the ‘Burden of Normality’ (BoN) syndrome. Most of the discussion about DBS postoperative changes to self is focused on abnormal side effects caused by the intervention (ie, hypersexuality, hypomania, etc). By contrast, relatively little attention is paid to the idea that successfully ‘treated’ individuals might experience difficulties in adjusting to becoming ‘normal’. The purpose of this paper is (1) to articulate the postoperative DBS psychosocial adjustment process in terms of the BoN syndrome, (2) to address whether the BoN syndrome illustrates that DBS treatment poses a threat to the patient’s identity, and (3) to examine whether the current framework for rehabilitation after DBS procedures should be updated and take into account the BoN syndrome as a postoperative self-change response. (shrink)

In their 2016 ‘Taking a Chance on KK’, Jeremy Goodman and Bernhard Salow offer an interesting epistemic model that validates KK. The springboard for my discussion will be a mistake in their presentation, one that points to a real problem with the model. My remarks will have a broad interest, since certain of the key examples point to intriguing questions concerning the epistemic contours of testimony and memory. I'll also raise instructive difficulties for a theoretically important weakening of the JTB (...) treatment of knowledge. (shrink)

There is a paradox that lies at the heart of every investigation of normality, namely, its dependence on its other (e.g., deviation, break, difference). In this paper, I want to show that this paradox is the reason for the dynamism as well as fragility of normality. In this regard, I will not only argue that every normality is fragile, but also that normality can only be established because it is fragile. In the first part of this (...) paper, I will present and re-visit Husserl’s account of normality as concordant and optimal with regard to its dynamic or fragile aspects. In the second part of this paper, I will apply this account to recent findings in phenomenological pathology regarding schizophrenia and depression to show how Husserl’s account could be helpful for differentiating between different aspects (such as concordance and optimality) as well as genetic levels of (disturbances of) normality. (shrink)

Many believe that severe intellectual impairment, blindness or dying young amount to serious harm and disadvantage. It is also increasingly denied that it matters, from a moral point of view, whether something is biologically normal to humans. We show that these two claims are in serious tension. It is hard explain how, if we do not ascribe some deep moral significance to human nature or biological normality, we could distinguish severe intellectual impairment or blindness from the vast list of (...) seemingly innocent ways in which we fail to have as much wellbeing as we could, such not having super-intelligence, or not living to 130. We consider a range of attempts to draw this intuitive normative distinction without appealing to normality. These, we argue, all fail. But this doesn't mean that we cannot draw this distinction or that we must, implausibly, conclude that biological normality does possess an inherent moral importance. We argue that, despite appearances, it is not biological normality but rather statistical normality that, although lacking any intrinsic moral significance, nevertheless makes an important moral difference in ways that explain and largely justify the intuitive distinction. (shrink)

The paper begins with a conceptual discussion of Michael Dummett's proof-theoretic justification of deduction or proof-theoretic semantics, which is based on what we might call Gentzen's thesis: 'the introductions constitute, so to speak, the "definitions" of the symbols concerned, and the eliminations are in the end only consequences thereof, which could be expressed thus: In the elimination of a symbol, the formula in question, whose outer symbol it concerns, may only "be used as that which it means on the basis (...) of the introduction of this symbol".' The intuitive philosophical content of Dummett's notions of harmony and stability is that harmony obtains if the grounds for asserting a proposition match the consequences of accepting it, and stability obtains if the converse also holds. Rules of inference define the meanings of a logical constant they govern if and only if they are stable. Gentzen observed that 'it should be possible to establish on the basis of certain requirements that the elimination rules are functions of the corresponding introduction rules.' One of the objectives of this paper is to specify such a function: I will specify a process by which it is possible to determine the elimination rules of logical constants from their introduction rules, and conversely, to determine the introduction rules from the elimination rules. I'll give the general forms of rules of inference and generalised reduction procedures for the normalisation of deduction. I'll give a formally precise characterisations of harmony and stability and show that deductions in logics that contain only constants governed by stable rules always normalise. (shrink)

In this article, I will discuss the Husserlian phenomenology of animality, by focusing on several texts of the 1920s in which the animal is determined as an abnormal variation of the human being. My aim is to address the question of the abnormality of the animal by reintegrating it in its original context, which is Husserl’s theory of normality. I will sketch the general framework of this theory, its articulations and strata, in order to eventually raise some paradoxical issues, (...) specifically in relation to how the question of animality is interpreted through the couple normality/abnormality. (shrink)

The Winged Bull is the first of Fortune’s novels to be written with the intention of catalysing initiatory experience in their readers. Fortune believed that her novels could catalyse initiation in individuals and, through them, bring about the regeneration of British society, allowing it to become the forerunner of an inevitable movement into a new era of spiritual enlightenment: the New Age. While the idea of textual initiation was by no means unique to Fortune, the intended audience of her texts (...) represented a distinctly twentieth-century market for the psycho-spiritual experience of literary initiation. In this chapter I will focus on the way Fortune’s work was explicitly oriented towards a particular audience, the interwar British middle classes, to whom she believed she could offer a psycho-spiritual regeneration that would bring a new outlook on life and the healing of sexual, emotional, and mental health issues. I will explore Fortune’s relationship with Modernism and the stylistic choices she made to ensure her work was accessible. I will argue that Fortune’s work was underpinned by a commitment to removing unnecessary barriers to participation in the occult. She was particularly dismissive of economic and social barriers, repeatedly rejecting the ring-fencing of occultism because of financial status and gender. She believed that more equity within the occult world would lead to more participation by women, which would more quickly catalyse the larger evolutionary process of initiation. (shrink)

Social Deviations, Labelling and Normality This paper discusses the issues of labelling, normality and social deviation. I focus on the sociological and socio-psychological aspects of these topics in light of their importance for pedagogy. Labelling mainly concerns the ways in which the formal and constitutive institutions of social control, including schools, respond to behaviour. Mainly children and young people are "marked" or labelled according to both their existing and presumed patterns of deviant behaviour. School, as a social institution, (...) expects its students to be normal. It has the power to define normality and, moreover, a network of social control to achieve it. However, from the perspective of the school it is very important not to prematurely label pupils negatively during the selection process. On the contrary, school should enable as many pupils as possible to contribute successfully towards the requirements of a knowledge society. Research indicates that there is a correlation between a child's school performance and the perceptions and expectations held by the teacher. Recent studies, concerning for example violence at school, have shown how strongly the aggressive behaviour of pupils is connected to the teacher's behaviour. The theory of labelling is concerned with the fundamental question of why some individuals and groups are branded as deviating from norms more often than others. Stigma is a relative phenomenon; it is the result of successful labelling, delivering a punitive and disapproving response. In order to better understand labelling, the concepts of social norms and social deviance also require clarification. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that a phenomenological concept of normality can be helpful to understand the experiential side of post-truth phenomena. How is one’s longing for, or sense of, normality related to what we deem as real, true, or objective? And to what extent is the sense for “what (really) is” related to our beliefs of what should be? To investigate this, I combine a phenomenological approach to lived normality with a genealogical account of represented (...) class='Hi'>normality that sheds light on the social and historical contingency of definitions of normality and their intertwinement with structures of power. It is my contention that such an approach to normality is well-suited to investigate how is and ought are interrelated within subjective experience and practice. This might in turn help overcoming one-sided debates on post-truth, which rely on the strict opposition of objectivity versus subjectivity, universal truth versus subjective experience, facticity versus meaning, or reason versus stupidity. It also sheds light on the ambivalent or contested status of experience within debates of post-truth and feminist theory. I will conclude that post-truth is related to what Hannah Arendt has termed the lack of a common world (i.e., normality), arguing that a plurality of experiences is needed to let the “real world” stand its ground again. (shrink)

Hoeltje :101–118, 2017) raises a number of important issues about my theory of generics. In this brief reply, I address some of these challenges.

Few have given an extended treatment of the non-statistical sense of normality: a sense captured in sentences like “dogs have four legs,” or “hammers normally have metal heads,” or “it is normal for badgers to take dust baths.” The most direct extant treatment is Bernhard Nickel’s Between Logic and the World, where he claims that the normal or characteristic for a kind is what we can explain by appeal to the right sorts of explanations. Just which explanatory strategies can (...) ground normalities, though, is difficult to determine without inviting circularity into the account. After raising this and other worries for Nickel’s account, I develop my own account according to which normal features are those which are explained by the kind of thing involved. (shrink)

We generalize a theorem of Mundici relating compactness of a regular logic L to a strong form of normality of the associated spaces of models. Moreover, it is shown that compactness is in fact equivalent to ordinary normality of the model spaces when L has uniform reduction for infinite disjoint sums of structures. Some applications follow. For example, a countably generated logic is countably compact if and only if every clopen class in the model spaces is elementary. The (...) model spaces of L are not normal for vocabularies of uncountable power ωα. It also follows that first-order logic is the only finite-dependence logic having normal model spaces and satisfying at the same time the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and uniform reduction for pairs. (shrink)

One can consider μ‐Martin‐Löf randomness for a probability measure μ on 2ω, such as the Bernoulli measure given. We study Bernoulli randomness of sequences in with parameters, and we reintroduce Bernoulli normality, where the uniform distribution of digits is replaced with a Bernoulli distribution. We prove the equivalence of three characterizations of Bernoulli normality. We show that every Bernoulli random real is Bernoulli normal, and this has the corollary that the set of Bernoulli normal reals has full Bernoulli (...) measure in. We give an algorithm for computing Bernoulli normal sequences from normal sequences so that we can give explicit examples of Bernoulli normal reals. We investigate an application of randomness to iterated function systems. Finally, we list a few further questions relating to Bernoulli randomness and Bernoulli normality. (shrink)

Thomas & Karmiloff- Smith ’ argument that the Residual Normality assumption is not valid for developmental disorders has implications for models of cognition in schizophrenia, a disorder that may involve a neurodevelopmental pathogenesis. A limiting factor for such theories is the lack of understanding about the nature of the cognitive system. Moreover, it is unclear how the proposal that modularization emerges from developmental processes would change that fundamental question.

Thomas & Karmiloff- Smith show that the assumption of residual normality does not hold in connectionist simulations, and argue that RN has been inappropriately applied to childhood disorders. We agree. However, we suggest that the RN hypothesis may never have been fully viable, either empirically or computationally.

Se reflexionó sobre la personalidad normal, su relación con los valores ético-morales, y los aspectos en los que la personalidad del paciente con trastornos neuróticos se aparta de la normalidad y que varios criterios de la normalidad constituyen precisiones del concepto de valor ético-moral. Se concluyó que la personalidad del paciente con trastornos neuróticos se aparta de la mayoría de los criterios analizados de normalidad de la personalidad: los criterios de ausencia de psicopatología, el estadístico, el de relaciones interpersonales, el (...) evolutivo, y el funcional. It was reflected on the normal personality, its relationship to the ethical-moral values and aspects in which the neurotic personality deviates from normality and that various criteria of normality are clarifications of the moral value concept. It was concluded that the neurotic personality moves away from the absence of psychopathology, the statistics, the interpersonal relationships, the evolutionary and functional criteria, which constitute the majority of the analyzed criteria of normal personality. (shrink)

코로나-19 시국에 호명되는 평범한 일상이라는 표어는 코로나 이전의 시기를 정상성의 범주로 규정한다. 정상과 비정상의 이분법으로 현 사태를 보면, 코로나라는 문명사적 파국은 블랙스완의 비유처럼 예측하지 못한 우발적 사건이 된다. 하지만 아도르노는 정상성의 문화가 자연과 동물에 대한 절대적 폭력에 기초해 있다고 말한다. 그에게 정상성은 죽음인데, 그 이유는 평범한 일상이야말로 잘못된 사회가 타자화시킨 것들에 대한 지배에 기초해 있기 때문이다. 오늘날 인간의 기대수명은 100세를 바라보고 있다. 하지만 인간의 사회적 주체성, 그 사회적 생명은 그러한 기대수명에 부합하는가? 100세를 산다 한들, 개인이 사회 속에서 자유하지 못하면, 그러한 (...) 건강성은 병든 건강성일 뿐이다. 평범한 일상의 회복이라는 표어가 범람하는 요즘, 아도르노와 함께 이 사태를 해석할 때, 우리는 정상성이야말로 죽음이고 평범한 일상이야말로 시대의 질병이라는 진실을 발견하게 된다. 이 글의 목적은 아도르노와 함께 건강성의 모순을 해독하여 정상성의 문화를 사회적 병리의 관점으로 규명하는 것이다. 이를 위해, 이 글은 지성·과학기술·동물지배에 대한 아도르노의 성찰을 경유하여, 오늘날 개인이 경험하는 고통은 평범한 일상의 정상성 속에 있는 죽음에 바탕을 두고 있음을 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

Analysing ten interviews with women diagnosed with and treated for congenital absence of the vagina, this article theorises the notion of ideal (hetero)relational normality. It explores how women in my case study negotiate, relate to and challenge this notion and examines the normative and bodily work for which it calls. The article specifically underscores the corporeal dimension of (hetero)relational normality. I argue that this notion of normality shapes the bodies of the women through medical interventions, while concurrently (...) being reinforced through the corporeal shapings that the women undergo. These corporeal shapings consolidate enacted norms concerning heterosexuality and form understandings of female and male bodies. The analysis also reveals how these women nevertheless find ways to re-negotiate and question the notion of ideal (hetero)relational normality and its intertwinement with medical practice. The article contributes both to the critical examination of genital surgery and to feminist discussions of how to critically examine heterosexuality without rejecting it. Furthermore, it provides a deeper understanding of how medical interventions designed to create a vagina, or dilate a vagina considered ‘too small’, are made meaningful by the women affected. (shrink)

The human being as a constituted objectivity is a fragile ‘figure’ who lives in through their individual and shared experience. As a constituted objectivity, it influences our experiences, actions and the constitution of our community. Nevertheless, it appears to us, who actually constitute it, as a completely independent and immutable object, as a mere fact our experience has to comply with, and as a normative representation of the human being. This paper inquires - from a phenomenological point of view - (...) about the structure that underlies the norm at work in our experience, as well as in the high- and low-level dimensions of the intersubjective community. Indirectly, such a structure can be identified through the connection between Husserl’s understanding of normality and objectivity. My claim is that normativity can be understood as a necessary function and thus can be distinguished from objectivity and normality. Normativity appears, therefore, as a function of objectivity, which allows one to distinguish the latter from normality. As such, normativity should not be confused with an active agreement or regulation, but rather identified as a necessary constitutive structure arising from experiential intersubjective sense-borrowing performance. At the same time, due to its connection to objectivity, normativity also appears to strongly influence the social production of validity, therefore being endorsed by institutions. (shrink)

Normic laws have the form "if A, then normally B." They are omnipresent in everyday life and non-physical 'life' sciences such as biology, psychology, social sciences, and humanities. They differ significantly from ceteris-paribus laws in physics. While several authors have doubted that normic laws are genuine laws at all, others have argued that normic laws express a certain kind of prototypical normality which is independent of statistical majority. This paper presents a foundation for normic laws which is based on (...) generalized evolution theory and explains their omnipresence, lawlikeness, and reliability. It is argued that the fact that normic laws are a product of evolution must establish a systematic connection between prototypical and statistical normality. (shrink)

A variety of recent work in epistemology employs a notion of normality to provide novel theories of knowledge or justification. While such theories are commonly advertised as affording particularly strong epistemic logics, they often make substantive assumptions about the background notion of normality and its logic. This article takes recent normality-based defences of the KK principle as a case study to submit such assumptions to scrutiny. After clarifying issues regarding the natural language use of normality claims, (...) the article isolates a number of choice points regarding the role of contingency, context-sensitivity and similarity in our theorizing with normality. It turns out that both weaker and stronger logics of normality can be motivated depending on how such choices are resolved. And yet securing logics of normality strong enough for normality to play its envisaged role in epistemology may have unwelcome downstream consequences for the resultant theories of knowledge or justification. (shrink)

It is not uncommon to read the Moomin tales through existentialist lenses. Although there might be natural reasons for focusing on and privileging the nine classical Moomin books, it would, however, be a mistake to overlook Jansson’s comic strips. This is so, not only because of the quality of Jansson’s drawings and because of the way she innovatively worked with and developed that graphic medium, but certainly also because of the stories they contain. When read alongside the books, the comic (...) strips add important aspects and nuances to Jansson’s portrayal of human existence. By allowing herself the freedom to radically change the setting and scenery of the stories, Jansson was able to explore quite different topics than was possible in the novels, and in particular to offer a somewhat different account of the role of customs, normality and tradition. (shrink)