The debate over the benefits of female representation in top management is ongoing, with some arguing it enhances decision-making quality by bringing diverse perspectives, while others seeing it as symbolic or even detrimental. To make progress on the debate, this study takes an institutional perspective to develop a theoretical account examining the gender norms that constraining the effect of female representation in top management teams (TMTs) on corporate financial fraud. We offer two main insights: (a) female TMT representation is associated (...) with lower incidence of corporate fraud, and (b) the relationship becomes weaker for firms domiciled in regions with gender inegalitarian norms or gender stereotypical norms that are more gender stratified. Results based on archival data about Chinese public firms, and simultaneous estimation of fraud commitment and detection probabilities, support our predictions. Several alternative econometric specifications, including (but not limited to), instrumental variable analysis and matched sample analysis, enhance confidence in the robustness of our findings. The findings of this study make important contributions to the literatures of managerial diversity, corporate fraud, and institutional norms. (shrink)

This paper examines the transhumanist prospect of abolishing death and argues that technological immortality would undermine the conditions that make meaning and philosophy possible. Mortality is a biological limit but also the existential horizon against which identity, value, and narrative coherence are constituted. If death were eliminated, the structures that orient personhood, ethics, and motivation would be destabilized, along with the urgency and depth that characterize human life. The argument directly relates to current debates in AI ethics, bioethics, and (...) technoethics, as the pursuit of digital or biotechnological immortality raises questions about personhood, embodiment, responsibility, and the moral limits of technological intervention. The central claim is that the very practice of philosophy presupposes mortality as its constitutive horizon, such that removing it would deprive philosophy of its central subject matter. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, it shows that life’s narrative coherence depends on finitude, for without an end, a life cannot take shape. Second, it claims that moral and communal values such as legacy, sacrifice, and generational concern rest on mortality. Third, it considers how the scarcity of time gives urgency to reasoning and commitment. Without temporal limits, projects can always be deferred, eroding their significance. Philosophy has long drawn its seriousness from the confrontation with death, from Platonic Socrates’ practice to modern existentialism. I conclude that transhumanist immortality would not extend philosophy but radically transform or undermine it, since the existential tension supplied by mortality has been indispensable to philosophy. (shrink)

This paper presents findings from qualitative interviews with nineteen cancer patients and survivors, examining how they experience and articulate the existential structure Heidegger calls being-towards-death. The study accomplishes two goals. First, it responds to the widespread misinterpretation of Heidegger in contemporary death studies, palliative care, and psycho-oncology. While existing research often treats being-towards-death as a vague metaphor or rhetorical gesture, this study takes Heidegger’s account as a serious philosophical framework. Our team – composed largely of phenomenological philosophers – integrated his (...) concepts into every stage of inquiry, from the design of interview protocols to the interpretation of participant narratives. We also employed an original qualitative method, presented in a form that is clear and transferable to future research. Second, we show how engaging Heidegger’s account as a substantial framework has direct and unsettling implications for clinical care. If care is to address the human being – not merely stabilize the body – then two practices must be reconsidered. First, the collapse of meaning following diagnosis should not automatically be pathologized, but recognized as a possible opening to authentic existence. Second, symbolic reframing, legacy projects, and spiritual reassurance are not neutral forms of support. They function to deny death’s finality and re-anchor the patient in social norms just as those norms begin to lose their hold. Rather than fostering resilience, these strategies may interrupt the one moment when patients can begin to live – and die – on their own terms. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Existential Analytic: Terminable or Interminable? Death's Representatives: Some Dead Ends The Existential Approach: Death in/from/as Life The Modalities of Mortal Existence Getting Ahead of Ourselves: Heidegger's Analysis between Angst and Conscience.

Why is death bad for us, even on the assumption that it involves the absence of experience? Is it worse for us than prenatal nonexistence? In this first volume of the two-volume Morality, Mortality, Kamm begins by considering these questions, critically examining some answers other philosophers have given. The book examines specifically what differences between persons are relevant to the distribution of any scarce resource, discussing for example, the distribution (and acquisition) of bodily organs for transplantation.

In Mortal Imitations of Divine Life, Diamond offers an interpretation of De Anima, which explains how and why Aristotle places souls in a hierarchy of value. Aristotle’s central intention in De Anima is to discover the nature and essence of soul—the prin­ciple of living beings. He does so by identifying the common structures underlying every living activity, whether it be eating, perceiving, thinking, or moving through space. As Diamond demonstrates through close readings of De Anima, the nature of the soul (...) is most clearly seen in its divine life, while the embodied soul’s other activi­ties are progressively clearer approximations of this principle. This interpretation shows how Aristotle’s psychology and biology cannot be properly understood apart from his theological conception of God as life, and offers a new explanation of De Anima’s unity of purpose and structure. (shrink)

This volume continues the examination of issues of life and death which F.M. Kamm began in Morality, Mortality, Volume I (1993). Kamm continues her development of a non-consequentialist ethical theory and its application to practical ethical problems. She looks at the distinction between killing and letting die, and between intending and foreseeing, and also at the concepts of rights, prerogatives, and supererogation. She shows that a sophisticated non-consequentialist theory can be modelled which copes convincingly with practical ethical issues, and (...) throws considerable light on some of the key distinctions and concepts of ethical discourse. (shrink)

This book demonstrates that we need not choose between seeing so-called Presocratic thinkers as rational philosophers or as religious sages. In particular, it rethinks fundamentally the emergence of systematic epistemology and reflection on speculative inquiry in Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. Shaul Tor argues that different forms of reasoning, and different models of divine disclosure, play equally integral, harmonious and mutually illuminating roles in early Greek epistemology. Throughout, the book relates these thinkers to their religious, literary and historical surroundings. It is (...) thus also, and inseparably, a study of poetic inspiration, divination, mystery initiation, metempsychosis and other early Greek attitudes to the relations and interactions between mortal and divine. The engagements of early philosophers with such religious attitudes present us with complex combinations of criticisms and creative appropriations. Indeed, the early milestones of philosophical epistemology studied here themselves reflect an essentially theological enterprise and, as such, one aspect of Greek religion. (shrink)

Mortality as a Philosophical-Anthropological Issue: Thanatology, Normativity, and "Human Nature" This paper examines mortality—the fact that we humans are all going to die—as an issue in philosophical anthropology, by applying a fourfold typology of some key forms of philosophical anthropology to the topic of death and mortality. First, this typology, originally suggested by Heikki Kannisto, is outlined; the mortality issue is, then, viewed from the perspective it opens. Finally, the challenges to our understanding of death and (...) mortality that this perspective may help us meet are discussed. The treatment of mortality from the perspective of philosophical anthropology may make it more understandable in a manner that will highlight the importance of the concept of normativity in the philosophical examination of any such humanly relevant issue. (shrink)

In the last two decades, interest in narrative conceptions of identity has grown exponentially, though there is little agreement about what a "life-narrative" might be. In connecting Kierkegaard with virtue ethics, several scholars have recently argued that narrative models of selves and MacIntyre's concept of the unity of a life help make sense of Kierkegaard's existential stages and, in particular, explain the transition from "aesthetic" to "ethical" modes of life. But others have recently raised difficult questions both for these readings (...) of Kierkegaard and for narrative accounts of identity that draw on the work of MacIntyre in general. While some of these objections concern a strong kind of unity or "wholeheartedness" among an agent's long-term goals or cares, the fundamental objection raised by critics is that personal identity cannot _be_ a narrative, since stories are artifacts made by persons. In this book, Davenport defends the narrative approach to practical identity and autonomy in general, and to Kierkegaard's stages in particular. (shrink)

Hans Jonas was a German Jew, pupil of Heidegger and Bultmann, lifelong friend and colleague of Hannah Arendt at the New School for Social Research, and one of the most prominent thinkers of his generation. The range of his topics never obscures their unifying thread: that our mortality is at the root of our moral responsibility to safeguard humanity's future. _Mortality and Morality_ both consummates and demonstrates the basic thrust of Jonas's thought: the inseparability of ethics and metaphysics, the (...) reality of values at the center of being. (shrink)

Death.--The absurd.--Moral luck.--Sexual perversion.--War and massacre.--Ruthlessness in public life.--The policy of preference.--Equality.--The fragmentation of value.--Ethics without biology.--Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness.--What is it like to be a bat?--Panpsychism.--Subjective and objective.

Book reviewed in this article: Morality, Mortality: Death and Whom to Save from It. By Frances Kamm.

In his latest book, the prolific writer and thinker Alphonso Lingis brings interdisciplinarity and lyrical philosophizing to the weight of reality, the weight of things, and the weight of life itself. Drawing from philosophy, anthropology, psychology, religion, and science, Lingis seeks to uncover what in our reality escapes our attempts at measuring and categorizing. Writing as much from his own experiences and those of others as from his longstanding engagement with phenomenology and existentialism, Irrevocable studies the world in which shadows, (...) reflections, halos, and reverberations count as much as the carpentry of things. Whether describing religious art and ritual, suffering, war and disease, the pleasures of love, the wonders of nature, archaeological findings, surfing, volcanoes, or jellyfish, Lingis writes with equal measures of rigor and abandon about the vicissitudes of our practices and beliefs. Knowing that birth, the essential encounters in our lives, crippling diseases and accidents, and even death are all determined by chance, how do we recognize and understand such chance? After facing tragedies, what makes it possible to live on while recognizing our irrevocable losses? Lingis’s investigations are accompanied by his own vivid photographs from around the world. Balancing the local and the global, and ranging across vast expanses of culture and time, Irrevocable sounds the depths of both our passions and our impassioned bodies and minds. (shrink)

This dissertation addresses fundamental questions surrounding mortality and does so existentially. Of central concern is what it means to be mortal, the value of mortality, how we ought to relate to it, whether immortality is preferable to mortality, and what moral obligations can be derived from our mortality. By engaging thinkers such as Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Jonas, Epicurus, and contemporary anglophone philosophers, this project seeks to challenge prevailing attitudes towards death. Through a meta-philosophical lens, I argue for (...) the value of mortality as a shaper of the meaningfulness of existence, and for the cultivation of what I call ‘genuine mortality consciousness’ (GMC), which serves as the framework against which competing views of mortality and human flourishing are measured. -/- The project begins with a dissection of Heidegger’s phenomenology of death in Being and Time, paying special attention to death’s role as a condition for the possibility of authenticity and its equiprimordial relation to care. Subsequently, Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘becoming subjective’ and his dictum to ‘think death into every moment’ is examined, which reveals how holding onto death in the present moment serves to structure a purposeful life. Together, the work of these two thinkers underpins my concept of GMC, which allows for the introduction of focus and urgency into life. Also addressed is technology’s obfuscation of GMC. -/- Having provided a framework from which to approach mortality, I transition to a critical analysis of diverse attitudes towards death, including Epicurus’s claim that death is nothing to us, Nagel’s claim that death is bad, and Fischer’s defense of the desirability of immortality, each of which is ultimately rejected. Against Epicurus and Nagel, I argue that GMC provides a model for relating to mortality that is more conducive to human flourishing. Against the desirability of immortality, I utilize the work of Williams to show that an immortal life would lack meaning. Finally, the project culminates with a moral argument against the transhumanist pursuit of life-extension technology. Utilizing Jonas’s ethics of responsibility, I argue that altering our lifespans is not only imprudent, but immoral because of our responsibility to conserve genuine human life. (shrink)

Extrinsic mortality is a key influence on organisms’ life history strategies, especially on age at maturity. This historical longitudinal study of 125 women in rural Domenica examines effects of extrinsic mortality on human age at maturity and pace of reproduction. Extrinsic mortality is indicated by local population infant mortality rates during infancy and at maturity between the years 1925 and 2000. Extrinsic mortality shows effects on age at first birth and pace of reproduction among these (...) women. Parish death records show huge historical variation in age-specific mortality rates. The infant mortality rate (IMR) in the early 1920s was low, increased dramatically beginning in 1929, and reached a maximum in the 1950s, at which point IMR declined steadily to its present low rate. The mortality rate early in life showed a quadratic association with age at first birth. Women who experienced conditions of low IMR early in life reproduced relatively late in life. Those born into moderately high levels of infant mortality tended to reproduce earlier than those born at low levels. At very high infant mortality levels early in life, women went on to delay reproduction until relatively late, possibly as a result of somatic depletion and energetic stress associated with the conditions that lead to high IMR. Population mortality rates at age of maturity also showed a quadratic association with age at first birth. The pace of reproduction, estimated as number of surviving offspring controlled for maternal age, showed a similar quadratic effect. There were complex interactions between population mortality rates in infancy and at maturity. When extrinsic mortality was high during infancy, extrinsic mortality later in life had little effect on timing of first birth. When extrinsic mortality was low to moderate in infancy, extrinsic mortality later in life had significant effects on adult reproduction. I speculate that these effects are mediated through development of personality facets associated with reproduction. (shrink)

This article reconsiders the concept of radical reflection in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, arguing that, in its decentring of the subject who engages in reflection, radical reflection intimates a distinct theory of this very subject – one which will be developed in the final section of the Phenomenology and elsewhere. This reading diverges from those which consider radical reflection strictly in terms of a deflation of the reflective subject, and which position the concept in relation to a philosophy of nature (...) as a process into which this subject would effectively be subsumed. My reading instead proposes that the critical insight of radical reflection into the worldly, situated, and finite character of philosophical reflection articulates three essential dimensions of subjectivity: self-consciousness, sociality, and (consciousness of) mortality. In developing this account of the subject of radical reflection, the article shows such a conception of subjectivity to be at stake at once in Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology and in his work on history and politics. (shrink)

This wide ranging and challenging book explores the relationship between subjectivity and mortality as it is understood by a number of twentieth-century French philosophers including Sartre, Lacan, Levinas and Derrida. Making intricate and sometimes unexpected connections, Christina Howells draws together the work of prominent thinkers from the fields of phenomenology and existentialism, religious thought, psychoanalysis, and deconstruction, focussing in particular on the relations between body and soul, love and death, desire and passion. From Aristotle through to contemporary analytic philosophy (...) and neuroscience the relationship between mind and body has been persistently recalcitrant to analysis, and emotion is the locus where the explanatory gap is most keenly identified. This problematic forms the broad backdrop to the work’s primary focus on contemporary French philosophy and its attempts to understand the intimate relationship between subjectivity and mortality, in the light not only of the ‘death’ of the classical subject but also of the very real frailty of the subject as it lives on, finite, desiring, embodied, open to alterity and always incomplete. Ultimately Howells identifies this vulnerability and finitude as the paradoxical strength of the mortal subject and as what permits its transcendence. Subtle, beautifully written, and cogently argued, this book will be invaluable for students and scholars interested in contemporary theories of subjectivity, as well as for readers intrigued by the perennial connections between love and death. (shrink)

There is a fear of death that persistently eludes adequate explanation by contemporary philosophers of death. The reason for this is their focus on mortal harm issues, such as why death is bad for the person who dies. Claims regarding the fear of death are assumed to be contingent on the resolution of questions about the badness of death. In practice, however, consensus on some mortal harm issues has not resulted in comparable clarity on mortal fear. I contend we cannot (...) do justice to fear of death unless we detach it from theories about the badness of death, including the overwhelmingly-popular deprivation theory. The case for this involves disambiguation of certain aspects of mortal harm, a broad conception of what is involved in accounting for an emotion, and close attention to the nature of the fear in question. The source of fear of death is our departure from a context in which self-directed emotions have coherent application; our attitudes become ‘unmoored,’ in Samuel Scheffler’s phrase. While this does not result in a fear that is sui generis, it does demand that we remove the object of fear from the realm of well-being in order to make sense of it. (shrink)

The Platonic strain -- The Epicurean strain -- Kierkegaard's death project -- Kierkegaard's appropriation and criticism of the tradition -- Death in Being and time -- Heidegger's reception of Kierkegaard : the existential philosophy of death -- The limits and legacy of the existential philosophy of death.

Prior to the productive encounters that can be staged between Emmanuel Levinas’sthought and cinema at the level of reception, Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne introducehis philosophy to their filmmaking at its moment of inception.1Luc Dardenne’s diary Audos de nos images documents their filmmaking from 1991 to 2005, and isinterspersed with brief but erudite references to Levinas’s work. While Levinasianthinking is one among many cited influences in this text, which also features quotationsfrom the writings of novelists, poets, and other philosophers, along with (...) detailedreferences to other filmmakers, his work is a signal point of inspiration and ethicalaspiration for their filmmaking. The Dardenne brothers seek permanently to unsettlereceived ideas of what cinema is. In this, their approach is bound up explicitly, but notexclusively, with the ethical underpinnings of Levinas’s thought. Levinas’s reformulationof ethics as first philosophy creates a fissure at the root of the philosophy of being. TheDardennes’ films, in turn, perform a Levinasian-inspired challenge to the being ofcinema. At its most extreme moments, to kill or not to kill is the key question that theircinema raises. This tacit rewriting of the interrogative opening to Hamlet’s infamous soliloquy, shifts attention away from a self-centered concern with being or non-being,and towards the survival of the other. The passage from being to non-being, whichwould involve the death of the subject, is displaced here by a preoccupation with killing,or failing to kill, someone else. This particular move from dying to killing lies at the heartof the Dardennes’ mortal ethics. (shrink)

Successive UK governments have adopted failure as a strategy in the reform of public education in England: first, to construct crises in order to blame professionals/parents/children for a failing system; and second, to provide rescue solutions that are designed to fail in order to sustain the change imperative. We describe this as policy mortality, or the integration of systemic and organisational ‘death’ within reform design. Our research demonstrates the interplay between the blame for the ‘wrong’ type of school, leader, (...) teacher, pupil, parent, and the claimed ‘solutions’ in the form of new schools (e.g., between 70 and 90 different types in England), organisations (e.g., MATs), professionals (e.g., CEOs), pupils (e.g., branded access to a school place), and parents (e.g., consumer choice). Our research contribution is conceptual through the development of new thinking about policy mortality, whereby the claim is for ‘success’ but the reality is that some professionals, schools, children and parents are required to fail. (shrink)

Bernard Williams’ discussion of immortality in “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” has spawned an entire philosophical literature. This literature tends to focus on one of Williams’ central claims: if we were to relinquish our mortality, we would necessarily become alienated from our existence and environment—“bored,” in his terms. Many theorists have defended this claim; many others have challenged it. Even if this claim is false, though, it still isn’t obvious that we should choose to relinquish (...) our mortality, given the option. And this is puzzling. Death is generally regarded as an evil, meriting anxiety, dread, and avoidance. What is it about our mortality that makes us hesitant to relinquish it? In this paper, I aim to explain this hesitancy and to argue in its favor: we should be hesitant to relinquish our mortality. Further, I take my discussion to suggest that most of us probably shouldn’t take this option if we were given it. To make these points, I draw on Williams’ discussion of immortality, developing and extending his thought in order to better understand how mortality shapes the way we relate to our lives, particularly the commitments and values that make them meaningful. Our mortality, it seems, plays a crucial role in our lives standing for something. Relinquishing it thus means risking the loss of this value. (shrink)

The Apology is often read as showing a conflict between democracy and philosophy. I argue here that Socrates’s defense critically engages deeply political Athenian conventions of death, showing a mutual entanglement between Socratic philosophy and democratic practice. I suggest that Socrates’s aporetic insistence within the Apology that we “do not know if death is a good or a bad thing” structures a critical space of inquiry that I term “mortal ignorance;” a space from which Socrates reapproaches settled questions of death’s (...) appropriate place in political life, ultimately prompting a partial transformation of Athenian democracy. I argue here that Socratic mortal ignorance supports a self-reflective politics of death, one which produces many potential responses and accepts the impossibility of closing off death’s meaning in any final sense—an aporia suitable for the unending, precarious work of democratic politics. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 1 Seiten: 79-90.

A wide-ranging exploration of traditional Chinese views of mortality.

SummaryInfand mortality for the period 1950—70 has been analysied in a North-Swedish isolate, a population characterized by a high incidence of schizopherenic psychoses and other neuorpsychiatric disorders. Infand mortality is higher than in Sweden generally. As many as 45·9% of the deceased infands in the population sccumbed during the first week of their life, compard to 28·1% in the general Swedish population.

Mortal and immortal DNA : Craig Venter and the lure of "lamia" -- Homeopathy : Holmes, hogwarts, and the Prince of Wales -- Citizen Pinel and the madman at Bellevue -- The experimental pathology of stress : Hans Selye to Paris Hilton -- Gore's fever and Dante's Inferno : Chikungunya reaches Ravenna -- Giving things their proper names : Carl Linnaeus and W.H. Auden -- Spinal irritation and fibromyalgia : Lincoln's surgeon general and the three graces -- Tithonus and the (...) fruit fly : new science and old myths -- Swiftboating "America the beautiful" : Katharine Lee Bates and a Boston marriage -- Nothing makes sense in medicine except in the light of biology -- Apply directly to the forehead : Holmes, Zola, and Hennapecia -- Elizabeth Blackwell breaks the bonds -- Chronic lyme disease and medically unexplained syndromes -- Eugenics and the immigrant : Rosalyn Yalow and Rita Levi-Montalcini -- Science in the Middle East : Robert Koch and the cholera war -- How to win a Nobel prize : thinking inside and outside the box -- Homer Smith and the lungfish : the last gasp of intelligent design -- DDT is back : let us spray! -- Academic boycotts and the Royal Society -- Teach evolution, learn science : John William Draper and the "bone bill" -- Diderot and the yeti crab : the encyclopedias of life -- Dengue fever in Rio : Macumba versus Voltaire. (shrink)

It is often argued, most recently by Samuel Scheffler, that we should reconcile with our mortality as constitutive of our existence: as essential to its temporal structure, to the nature of deliberation, and to our basic motivations and values. Against this reconciliatory strategy, I argue that there is a kind of immortal existence that is coherently conceivable and potentially desirable. First, I argue against the claim that our existence has a temporal structure with a trajectory that necessarily culminates in (...) an ending. This claim is based on two false assumptions: that a life as a whole calls for narrative structure, and that narratives necessarily require closure as temporal endings. Second, I reject the proposal that temporal finitude is constitutive of the basic elements of diachronic agency, including the nature of deliberation and of our values. I argue that only finitude as scarcity of opportunities is constitutive of these elements. Additionally, scarcity might be present in an endless existence. Therefore, it is not incoherent to conceive of a recognizable and potentially desirable immortality that grounds the core features of diachronic agency. Thus, against the reconciliatory strategy, I conclude that we might never fully reconcile with mortality. Although we might embrace our inescapable mortality as essential to a fuller range of features of our existence, we can still justifiably regret our missing on an immortal existence. (shrink)

This paper explores the paradoxical nature of human mortality through the lens of existential philosophy, grounded in poetic meditation and lived experience. Drawing from the immediacy of near-death encounters and the quotidian reality of death, its omnipresence, it argues that mortality functions as both cosmic jest and profound truth, inviting an embrace of contradiction rather than a search for resolution. By reframing death as a transformative process rather than a terminal event, the work shows that mortality’s “joke” (...) lies not in falsity but in its capacity to simultaneously reveal and conceal existential truths. Synthesising existential dread, satirical awareness, and contemplative acceptance, the meditation proposes a philosophy that honoursterror and comedy alike, suggesting authentic response lies neither in denial nor morbid fascination but in a meditative wonder that holds multiple truths in productive tension. Methodologically, the paper integrates phenomenological analysis, interdisciplinary empirical findings, and poetic exegesis to bridge abstract theory and embodied experience. It examines how proximity to death sharpens perception, dissolves hierarchies, and democratisesbeing by exposing shared vulnerability across species and social strata. It is this democratising function that provides the ethical foundation from which the paper’s implications for moral solidarity, compassionate care, and public philosophy proceed. The argument advances implications for ethics, æsthetics, and end-of-life practice, proposing that recognisingdeath’s transformative role can foster creative living, compassionate care, and public philosophy that engages communities. Ultimately, the paper contends that mortality’s paradoxical character is a source of wisdom: a destabilising jest that, when attended to with humility and curiosity, deepens meaning and cultivates a more generous, attentive way of living. It invites readers to live more fully in each fragile present moment now. (shrink)

The paper examines the account of the mortal parts of the human soul in theTimaeus. What is their nature? What is their relationship to the immortal part of the soul and its inner structure on the one hand, and to the body and its organs and their functioning on the other? Are they incorporeal or corporeal? What kind of movement do they have? In what sense precisely are they ‘another kind of soul’ ?

Alison Gemmill et al. claim that in 2022, infant mortality in Texas increased due to its 2021 abortion restrictions. In response, various sources reported that abortion restrictions threaten infants. This is misleading. Gemmill et al.’s study showed that infant deaths increased in Texas primarily because abortion is no longer permitted when ‘congenital anomalies’ are detected in utero. Infant mortality increased because fetal mortality decreased. Comparatively, we can prevent the death of a teenager by causing their death before (...) age thirteen. Doing so does not save their life, however. Likewise, abortion restrictions may lead to more infants dying, since fewer subjects are aborted. But this does not imply that abortion restrictions harm infants. In fact, the opposite seems true, as we shall argue. Specifically, in this essay, we argue that it is reasonable to regard Texas’s 2021 abortion bans as a net benefit for infants. We also highlight ways in which ableist attitudes pervade Gemmill et al.’s study and coverage of it. Next, we discuss the impact of abortion restrictions on pregnant individuals (and their families) when their children are diagnosed with ‘congenital anomalies.’ We end by calling for bipartisan efforts to support these families and to combat infant mortality sensibly. (shrink)

This paper explores the effects of generative artificial intelligence (AI) on the politics of text, memory, and archive. Generative AI is a simulation of the work of mourning, the form of labor by which people address mortality and the intergenerational responsibilities that it entails. Since generative AI is not mortal, it cannot bear such responsibilities. The absence of mortality, mourning, and responsibility distinguishes the machine-generated text from its human counterpart. As generative AI produces an increasing portion of verbal (...) and multimodal texts, its immortal labor subsumes the labor of mortals. Machine-generated texts flood the archive with the simulacra of mourning. The archive is therefore undergoing a transformation in its sociopolitical function as a site of the relations between generations living and dead. More specifically, the simulation of text and archive alienates mortals from their semiosphere to an unprecedented degree. (shrink)

This issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy assesses the deep and abiding tensions that exist among the competing epistemic perspectives that bear on medicine and morality. Concepts of health and disease, as well as the theoretical framing of medical ethics and health care policy, intersect with an overlapping set of culturally situated communities, striving to understand and manipulate the world in ways that each finds explanatory, appropriate, or otherwise befitting. The articles explore the complexities of framing public health (...) care policy to guide bioethical decision making in the face of the plurality of ethical viewpoints and moral rationalities—including health enhancing supplements, continuous sedation until death, medical futility, the protection of vulnerable populations, and competing professional obligations. (shrink)

This article addresses the embodied nature of laboratory human—animal practices in order to understand the notions of care that take place within an institution of domination — the apparatus of animal experimentation. How is it possible to both love and harm in this context? Building on animal studies and feminist ethics, the theme of emotionality is explored in the section ‘loving animals’. Here it is demonstrated that empathy and affection for individual animals, as well as species, are strong components of (...) an experimental ethos expressed by the informants. The second empirical section deals with the issue of ‘killing well’. The good kill is supposed to be done with care: quickly and compassionately. This is performed by way of bodily measures of care, technological refinement and personal skills and, sometimes, with the help of a division of labour. In the concluding section, the empirical findings are read through the framework, where the feminist theoretical analysis of love, dependency and care from an embodiment perspective understands the dialectics of instrumentalisation and exploitation of — and care for — animals, not as something that goes on above or outside of relations, but rather as something that can be understood from within. ‘Mortal love’ is the attempt to capture and theorise this dialectic, arguing that emotions of love and friendship are not mere justifications for the harm and killing performed, but rather intrinsic dimensions of the embodied animaling of experimental human—animal relations. (shrink)

In the first instance, this paper offers a new interpretation of the logic of Xenophanes B18.1. Contrary to the two ways in which previous commentators have construed this line, Xenophanes neither categorically rejects the notion of divine disclosure nor acquiesces in traditional understandings of it. Rather, Xenophanes rejects traditional conceptions of divine disclosure as theologically faulty and supplants them with his own, alternative notion of disclosure. Having argued that Xenophanes developed a conception of divine disclosure, I advance further suggestions concerning (...) its function and characteristics. I follow and develop Lesher’s (1983) argument that Xenophanes arrives at his understanding of the limitations of human knowledge by rejecting traditional divinatory assumptions. But Lesher, I suggest, tells only half the story. On Xenophanes’ conception of disclosure, the divine purposively facilitates mortal belief-formation and mortal inquiry. That is, Xenophanes’ own understanding of disclosure underlies his positive views regarding what does lie within the scope of mortal epistemology. More speculatively, I develop two alternative interpretations of the precise notion of purposiveness which underlies Xenophanean disclosure. Most probably, Xenophanes reconceptualises the notion of divine disclosure radically as the view that the divine purposively facilitates all mortal experience and belief-formation as part of its intelligent direction of the cosmos and its inhabitants. Another, somewhat less likely possibility is that Xenophanes maintains less idiosyncratically that the divine guides particular mortals in particular circumstances. Finally, I ask how the proposed interpretation of Xenophanes’ epistemology may lend nuance to our understanding of the complexity of his critical engagement with the traditional mantic model of divine disclosure. (shrink)

If we take Charles Peirce's "Immortality in the Light of Synechism" at face value, synechism has implications for "religious questions" or, one might say, for questions regarding the destiny of human life. In that same essay, Peirce begins to work out some of these enigmatic yet insightful consequences concerning the problem of immortality. The aim of this paper is to apply the principles of Peirce's philosophy, chiefly synechism and related doctrines, in order to investigate the nature of one of the (...) most enigmatic problems concerning the destiny of human life, namely, the nature of human death. If immortality can be clarified in the light of synechism, as Peirce maintains, what about mortality? Is it possible to... (shrink)

David Bowie’s swansong album Blackstar occupies a unique position in its proximity to the artist’s death: just two days. It thus provides an opportunity to examine how music, nostalgia, and mortali...

The question of origins continues to captivate human thought and sentiment, despite the postmodern insistence that knowledge of origins is impossible since it must lie beyond the boundaries of the origin of knowledge. Knowledge cannot seek causes that precede its own existence, it is said. Still, theoretical narratives continue to arise accounting for such things as the origin of the universe, of our star and solar system, of Earth, of life on the planet, of the human species, of self-aware human (...) cultures, and so on down into the origins of the local and particular. This should not be surprising; we sense that knowing our origins will tell us who we are. With this in mind, this particular originary analysis of the origin of language will critically compare some of the foundational tenets of generative anthropology with the objective findings of palaeoanthropology and linguistics. Furthermore, an originary proposal of my own will be tendered. (shrink)