ABSTRACTThis study examined differences in background, integrative/instrumental motivation, learning approach, leaning strategy and proficiency in second language and the determinants...

Abstract Our Hong Kong-based study used interviews with volunteers and other stakeholders to investigate the perceived integrity and commitment of firms’ adoption of actively managed corporate volunteerism (AMCV), to examine whether AMCV was removing barriers against voluntary community service work and to identify volunteers’ motives for AMCV involvement. Interviewees perceived that firms were adopting strategically instrumental approaches to AMCV, combining community service provision with corporate image promotion and/or with organisational development. They indicated that although AMCV was mobilizing people, who would (...) not otherwise have chosen to volunteer, instances of ‘conscription’ were uncommon. Those who had served as volunteers described positive motives for their own involvement, such as altruism, principlism, self-development, loyalty to the firm and relationship building with colleagues and service recipients. Some expressed that volunteering had been a highly rewarding self-transformation experience. Our study also used the career orientations inventory (COI) to examine career anchors. COI scores indicated that non-governmental organisation (NGO)-based employees and some firm-based paid AMCV organisers preferred the service/dedication to a cause anchor and that firm-based unpaid organisers-cum-participants preferred the lifestyle anchor. Volunteers without organiser roles had miscellaneous preferences but leaned toward the security anchor. From our findings, we argue that it would benefit all parties if firms, in close collaboration with NGOs, were to expand the range of volunteering opportunities that are available to employees and help them to choose activities and roles that are congruent with their career anchors, if they so wish. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-29 DOI 10.1007/s13520-011-0011-3 Authors Robin Stanley Snell, Department of Management, Lingnan University, 8, Castle Peak Road, Tuen Mun, New Territories, Hong Kong SAR, China Amy Lai Yu Wong, Department of Management & Marketing, Faculty of Business, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR, China Journal Asian Journal of Business Ethics Online ISSN 2210-6731 Print ISSN 2210-6723. (shrink)

Chung-ying Cheng was one of the first Anglophone interpreters of Dai Zhen’s thought who pointed to Dai’s philosophical subversion of the Cheng-Zhu li-based metaphysical scheme by privileging the existential manifestations of qing 情 (sentiments and emotion) and yu 欲 (desires) in the ontological realm of qi 氣 (psycho-physical force), such that his philosophy may be characterized as an architectonic vitalist worldview that features the dynamic creativity of humanity’s rationality and intellection in relation to its natural and biological constitutions of blood (...) and breath (xueqi xinzhi 血氣心知), whose workings find instantiations and expressions in the socio-cultural domain of “human relations and daily practice” (renlun riyong 人倫日用). My paper, inspired by Cheng’s pioneer study of Dai’s philosophy, ponders whether the Qing thinker’s rejection of the priority of li in ethical construal and his appeal to qing and qi may be read as an agent-driven moral sentimentalist ethics – what I call qing-ism – in which the test and criterion of right action is its leaning toward enhancing the welfare and care of oneself and fellow human beings. It may be argued that Dai conceives of emotions and desires as the basic premise of ren 仁 (humaneness) as well as the point of reference for moral terms (good-and-bad/right-and-wrong), adjudicated by affective and conative attitudes. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher’s ‘gory detail’ argument aims to prove that molecular biology does not always have an explanatory primacy over higher-level functional biology. Explanations of higher-level biological discipline – functional biology – are completely adequate for explaining higher-level biological phenomena, and none of the gory molecular details of biological processes improve our understanding of these biological facts. I dispute Kitcher’s arguments by pointing out three problems embedded in his accounts. First, his view of molecular biology does not aptly reflect the nature (...) of molecular biology that continuously provides richer and richer causal explanations about biological phenomena as well as information on their molecular level. Second, having this feature, molecular biology canhardly be deemed explanatorily irrelevant in explaining higher-level biological facts. Nor are explanations of molecular biology unexplainable. Third, functional biology fails to offer accurate and complete explanations about biological phenomena that are caused by the changes occurring at the molecular level. Functional biology does not remain stable in its ability to provide reliable explanations and thus loses its explanatory primacy to molecular biology. After all, molecular biology generates precise explanations of biological phenomena with reliable predictive power. (shrink)

Empirical philosophers of science aim to base their philosophical theories on observations of scientific practice. But since there is far too much science to observe it all, how can we form and test hypotheses about science that are sufficiently rigorous and broad in scope, while avoiding the pitfalls of bias and subjectivity in our methods? Part of the answer, we claim, lies in the computational tools of the digital humanities, which allow us to analyze large volumes of scientific literature. Here (...) we advocate for the use of these methods by addressing a number of large-scale, justificatory concerns—specifically, about the epistemic value of journal articles as evidence for what happens elsewhere in science, and about the ability of DH tools to extract this evidence. Far from ignoring the gap between scientific literature and the rest of scientific practice, effective use of DH tools requires critical reflection about these relationships. (shrink)

Ecological communities are seldom, if ever, biological individuals. They lack causal boundaries as the populations that constitute communities are not congruent and rarely have persistent functional roles regulating the communities’ higher-level properties. Instead we should represent ecological communities indexically, by identifying ecological communities via the network of weak causal interactions between populations that unfurl from a starting set of populations. This precisification of ecological communities helps identify how community properties remain invariant, and why they have robust characteristics. This respects the (...) diversity and aggregational nature of these complex systems while still vindicating them as units worthy of investigation. (shrink)

Binding specificity is a centrally important concept in molecular biology, yet it has received little philosophical attention. Here I aim to remedy this by analyzing binding specificity as a causal property. I focus on the concept’s role in drug design, where it is highly prized and hence directly studied. From a causal perspective, understanding why binding specificity is a valuable property of drugs contributes to an understanding of causal selection—of how and why scientists distinguish between causes, not just causes from (...) noncauses. In particular, the specificity of drugs is precisely what underwrites their value as experimental interventions on biological processes. (shrink)

Synthetic biology has immense potential to ameliorate widespread environmental damage. The promise of such technology could, however, be argued to potentially risk the public, industry, or governments not curtailing their environmentally damaging behaviour or even worse exploit the possibility of this technology to do further damage. In such cases, there is the risk of a worse outcome than if the technology was not deployed. This risk is often couched as an objection to new technologies, that the technology produces a moral (...) hazard. This paper describes how to navigate a moral hazard argument and mitigate the possibility of a moral hazard. Navigating moral hazard arguments and mitigating the possibility of a moral hazard will improve the public and environmental impact of synthetic biology. (shrink)

Moral hazard occurs when the presence or promise of a new technology or policy reduces incentives for responsible behaviour, because the consequences of risky behaviour are perceived to be reduced, transferred, or mitigated. Moral hazard risk has been widely empirically investigated in the case of geoengineering for climate change, but other novel technologies have not been subject to such scrutiny. Ever since de-extinction was announced to the public as a viable possibility with modern biotechnology, a series of commentators have argued (...) that the promise of de-extinction will create a moral hazard. The thought is that extinction has been perceived as permanent. Any change in this belief, such as the idea that species can be brought back, potentially undermines the motivation for current conservation efforts. This is an empirical claim that we investigate. Our study assesses the public's support for conservation in scenarios that promise the use of de-extinction to address actions that are likely to cause extinction. We did not find that people were more likely to accept the extinction of a species if its de-extinction was promised in the future. We did, however, find an association between extinction acceptance and judgments that de-extinction could successfully resurrect species. The findings of this study represent a crucial step in assessing the risks novel biotechnology creates. (shrink)

One of the major developments in cancer research in recent years has been the construction of models that treat cancer as a cellular population subject to natural selection. We expand on this idea, drawing upon multilevel selection theory. Cancer is best understood in our view from a multilevel perspective, as both a by-product of selection at other levels of organization, and as subject to selection at several levels of organization. Cancer is a by-product in two senses. First, cancer cells co-opt (...) signaling pathways that are otherwise adaptive at the organismic level. Second, cancer is also a by-product of features distinctive to the metazoan lineage: cellular plasticity and modularity. Applying the multilevel perspective in this way permits one to explain transitions in complexity and individuality in cancer progression. Our argument is a reply to Germain’s scepticism towards the explanatory relevance of natural selection for cancer. The extent to which cancer fulfills the conditions for being a paradigmatic Darwinian population depends on the scale of analysis, and the details of the purported selective scenario. Taking a multilevel perspective clarifies some of the complexities surrounding how to best understand the relevance of evolutionary thinking in cancer progression. (shrink)

Some critics of invasion biology have argued the invasion of ecosystems by nonindigenous species can create more valuable ecosystems. They consider invaded communities as more valuable because they potentially produce more ecosystem services. To establish that the introduction of nonindigenous species creates more valuable ecosystems, they defend that value is provisioned by ecosystem services. These services are derived from ecosystem productivity, the production and cycling of resources. Ecosystem productivity is a result of biodiversity, which is understood as local species richness. (...) Invasive species increase local species richness and, therefore, increase the conservation value of local ecosystems. These views are disseminating to the public via a series of popular science books. Conservationists must respond to these views, and I outline a method of rejecting such arguments against controlling invasive species. Ecological systems are valuable for more than local productivity and biodiversity is not accurately described by a local species count. (shrink)

The introduction of new genetic material into wild populations, using novel biotechnology, has the potential to fortify populations against existential threats, and, controversially, create wild genetically modified populations. The introduction of new genetic variation into populations, which will have an ongoing future in areas of conservation interest, complicates long-held values in conservation science and park management. I discuss and problematize, in light of genetic intervention, what I consider the three core goals of conservation science: biodiversity, ecosystem services, and wilderness. This (...) uneasy relationship, however, does not forgo the use of such interventions. I argue there is a case for the application of this technology within some interpretations of the moral frameworks of wilderness and biodiversity, despite apparent conflict between these values and the technology, and the possibility that this technology's use displays some limitations of the ecosystem services framework. Ultimately, the advent of biotechnology assisted restoration highlights the need for us to reevaluate our ethical concepts of conservation at times of global environmental and technological change. (shrink)

Biodiversity is a key concept in the biological sciences. While it has its origin in conservation biology, it has become useful across multiple biological disciplines as a means to describe biological variation. It remains, however, unclear what particular biological units the concept refers to. There are currently multiple accounts of which biological features constitute biodiversity and how these are to be measured. In this paper, I draw from the species concept debate to argue for a set of desiderata for the (...) concept of “biodiversity” that is both principled and coheres with the concept’s use. Given these desiderata, this concept should be understood as referring to difference quantified in terms of the phylogenetic structure of lineages, also known as the ‘tree of life’. (shrink)

If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological arrangements and control the presence of populations that create ecosystem malfunctions. Invasive species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale (...) ecosystems. Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be controlled, because biodiversity is a good all prudent agents should want to preserve. (shrink)

Shannon information is commonly assumed to be the wrong way in which to conceive of information in most biological contexts. Since the theory deals only in correlations between systems, the argument goes, it can apply to any and all causal interactions that affect a biological outcome. Since informational language is generally confined to only certain kinds of biological process, such as gene expression and hormone signalling, Shannon information is thought to be unable to account for this restriction. It is often (...) concluded that a richer, teleosemantic sense of information is needed. I argue against this view, and show that a coherent and sufficiently restrictive theory of biological information can be constructed with Shannon information at its core. This can be done by paying due attention some crucial distinctions: between information quantity and its fitness value, and between carrying information and having the function of doing so. From this I construct an account of how informational functions arise, and show that the “subject matter” of these functions can easily be seen as the natural information dealt with by Shannon’s theory. (shrink)

This chapter explores the idea that phylogenetic diversity plays a unique role in underpinning conservation endeavour. The conservation of biodiversity is suffering from a rapid, unguided proliferation of metrics. Confusion is caused by the wide variety of contexts in which we make use of the idea of biodiversity. Characterisations of biodiversity range from all-variety-at-all-levels down to variety with respect to single variables relevant to very specific conservation contexts. Accepting biodiversity as the sum of a large number of individual measures results (...) in an empirically intractable framework. However, large-scale decisions cannot be based on biodiversity variables inferred from local conservation imperatives because the variables relevant to the many systems being compared would be incommensurate with one another. We therefore need some general conception of biodiversity that would make tractable such large-scale environmental decision-marking. We categorise the large array of strategies for the measurement of biodiversity into four broad groups for consideration as general measures of biodiversity. We compare common moral justifications for the conservation of biodiversity and conclude that some form of instrumental value is the most plausible justification for biodiversity conservation. Although this is often interpreted as a reliance on option value, we opt for a broadly consequentialist characterisation of biodiversity conservation. We conclude that the best justified general measure of biodiversity will be some form of phylogenetic diversity. (shrink)

I will entertain and reject three arguments which putatively establish that the individuals produced through de-extinction ought to be the same species as the extinct population. Forms of these arguments have appeared previously in restoration ecology. The first is the weakest, the conceptual argument, that de-extinction will not be de-extinction if it does not re-create an extinct species. This is misguided as de-extinction technology is not unified by its aim to re-create extinct species but in its use of the remnants (...) of extinct populations as a resource. The second is the argument from authenticity; the populations produced by de-extinction technologies will be inauthentic if they are not of the extinct species and, therefore, will not be valuable. I argue authenticity is not required in conservation as the value of authenticity varies between people and cultures, and the novelty of de-extinct species will be equally desirable in many cases. The third argument is from retributive justice; we need the de-extinct population to have the same species identity as we owe a moral debt to the extinct population. I find the case for retributive justice unconvincing and argue that acting as if we have a duty to resurrect extinct species will result in a world with less species. Ultimately all the arguments that connect de-extinction technology to species identity fail, leaving us to consider a more complex calculus for the justification of de-extinction in conservation. (shrink)

Bio-ontologies are digital frameworks for handling biological and biomedical data. They consist of theoretical entities and relations with explicitly defined logical structures and precise definitions, whose purpose is to provide a shared language for representing information to be distributed and integrated across diverse scientific contexts. It is tempting to view bio-ontologies as clear and formal expressions of a scientific community’s ontological commitments about their domain of inquiry, and to view their integration as tantamount to the metaphysical unification of science that (...) some philosophers have envisaged. However, I argue that the local, practical, social and technological factors that influence their design prevent us from straightforwardly reading metaphysical conclusions from them. I discuss these complications and suggest how they can be overcome, revealing more general lessons for the development of a well-founded scientific metaphysics. (shrink)

Eric Katz in Zombie Arguments defends the thesis authenticity is indispensable to conservation. I agree. However, I argue authenticity appears in degrees and can be reclaimed by populations through their continuing evolutionary responses to the world. This means that interventions that diminish the value of a population through reducing their authenticity can be permitted in limited cases. When our actions retain the remaining authentic features in a threatened population we should allow such a diminishment as authenticity can be reclaimed in (...) time. (shrink)

Jacques Monod (1971) argued that certain molecular processes rely critically on the property of chemical arbitrariness, which he claimed allows those processes to “transcend the laws of chemistry”. It seems natural, as some philosophers have done, to interpret this in modal terms: a biological relationship is chemically arbitrary if it is possible, within the constraints of chemical “law”, for that relationship to have been otherwise than it is. But while modality is certainly important for understanding chemical arbitrariness, understanding its biological (...) role also requires an account of the concrete causal-functional features that distinguish arbitrary from non-arbitrary phenomena. In this paper I elaborate on this under-emphasised aspect by offering a general account of these features: arbitrary relations are instantiated by mechanisms that involve molecular adapters, which causally couple two properties or processes which would otherwise be uncorrelated. Additionally, adapters work by acting as intermediate rather than cooperating causes. (shrink)

Environmental conservation as a practice and philosophy has been implicitly and explicitly backward-looking: preserving, conserving, restoring, and maintaining the features of the biotic world we inherit. Increasingly, this bias has been confronted by anthropogenic environmental change. There has been a call to support the practice of creating novel ecological arrangements and to incorporate the value of engineered biotic novelty. I question what, in principle, could justify a bias in value towards preserving biodiversity over creating biodiversity. First, I will consider reasons (...) from axiology on why value conserved is better than value gained. Second, I present a reconsidered version of ‘authenticity’ as a justification for preserving biodiversity. (shrink)

The concept of biodiversity must function simultaneously as a scientific metric for biotic difference, a normative goal, and a political instrument. These differing aims have their origins in the very formation of the concept and pull any clarification of it in different, sometimes incompatible, directions. Scientific precision requires narrowing the concept in ways that reduce its ethical reach and political flexibility, while political usability requires a vagueness that undermines scientific rigour and ethical salience. This central tension in the concept explains (...) the division of the philosophical literature into realist, eliminativist, and deflationary camps, each prioritising one of these aims. Realists anchor biodiversity to causally significant features of the natural world; eliminativists argue that the concept distorts or displaces the full range of nature's value; deflationists derive biodiversity from the political procedures by which conservation is practised. This review surveys the philosophy of biodiversity literature through this tripartite lens and uses it to identify emerging challenges to the concept. (shrink)

Ecosystems are increasingly being represented as marketplaces that produce goods for humanity, and because of this, economic metaphors for increasing efficiency have been introduced into conservation. A powerful model for economic growth is the globalised free market and some are implicitly deploying it to suggest changes in conservation practice. Ecological globalisation is the position that we should not control the free movement of species and re-wilding occurs most efficiently through non-intervention. When species can move and interact with new ecological systems, (...) they create novel ecosystems. These novel arrangements create experimental markets in nature's economy, providing opportunities for the efficient production of goods for humans, also known as ecosystem services. When invasive species supersede local populations, it indicates previous biotic systems were inefficient, which is why they were replaced, and therefore it is wrong to protect indigenous ‘losers’ from extinction. Those who defend indigenous species are accused of being xenophobic against recent biotic migrants. This position is flawed both empirically and morally as there is a disconnect between these economic and political arguments when applied to human economies and nature's economy. (shrink)

The question of whether there are laws of nature in ecology has developed substantially in the last 20 years. Many have attempted to rehabilitate ecology’s lawlike status through establishing that ecology possesses laws that robustly appear across many different ecological systems. I argue that there is still something missing, which explains why so many have been skeptical of ecology’s lawlike status. Community ecology has struggled to establish what I call a General Unificatory Theory. The lack of a GUT causes problems (...) for explanation as there are no guidelines for how to integrate the lower-level mathematical and causal models into a larger theory of how ecological assemblages are formed. I turn to a promising modern attempt to provide a unified higher-level explanation in ecology, presented by ecologist Mark Vellend, and advocate for philosophical engagement with its prospects for aiding ecological explanation. (shrink)

Lynch et al. propose an extremely useful framework to assess microbiome research. By utilising advances in the causation literature, they argue that many of the claims in microbiome research are ‘weak or misleading’ as these claims lack stability, specificity, or proportionality. In the final paragraph before the conclusion they entertain and rapidly dismiss the ‘ecological version’ of microbiomes, in which microbiome properties are emergent from their constituent populations and can fulfil Koch’s postulates. I assess the possibility of microbiomes having emergent (...) causal efficacy on host health and suggest they can. (shrink)

Understanding community-level selection using Lewontin’s criteria requires both community-level inheritance and community-level heritability, and in the discipline of community and ecosystem genetics, these are often conflated. While there are existing studies that show the possibility of both, these studies impose community-level inheritance as a product of the experimental design. For this reason, these experiments provide only weak support for the existence of community-level selection in nature. By contrast, treating communities as interactors (in line with Hull’s replicator-interactor framework or Dawkins’s idea (...) of the “extended phenotype”) provides a more plausible and empirically supportable model for the role of ecological communities in the evolutionary process. (shrink)

Arthur E. Lean’s irreverent and con­troversial essays represent the distillation of many ideas about education—ideas developed during most of a lifetime spent in and about schools. In the second edition of this popular work, to which he has added eight new essays, he presents his latest observations on current ele­ments and programs in education—such as the grading system, academic rank, the teaching process, assessment of edu­cational progress—concluding that many of them are not only unnecessary but actually harmful to the (...) very process which they are supposed to serve. Covering a broad spectrum of current issues in its criticism of American edu­cation at all levels, _And Merely Teach _is a book to be read by veteran educator, beginning teacher, and lay citizen alike. Though critical of the teaching profes­sion, Arthur Lean also offers constructive suggestions in the form of practical solu­tions that are urgently needed to save our ailing educational system. (shrink)

In “Trompe L'Oeil”, the seventh episode of Westworld, Bernard Lowe discovers the plans for his own body. Bernard's are ready‐made by someone else and uploaded into his brain, apparently unrelated to any real events. Bernard has memories of his son Charlie, which he thought referred to a real boy with whom he had a real relationship, and whose real death is the cause of his inescapable grief. Bernard might respond that lifelong grief is an excessive response to the death of (...) a fictional character. He realizes that the memories of that trauma have been fabricated by Robert Ford. Whether Charlie is a lie, a fiction, or a stranger, by grieving for him Bernard is sharing in a very human kind of experience. As malicious as Ford's motives were, maybe he was right about the need for a “cornerstone” of suffering to make Bernard human. (shrink)

本书内容包括:“化境”论溯源、文学翻译的起点、文学翻译的过程、译文的生命、“化境”论的当代意义与理论反思等。.

本书分为十章,主要内容包括:体育哲学的性质及发展、体育哲学方法论、游戏的本质及对体育的意义、身心观与体育、体育与健康、体育与教育、体育与娱乐、体育伦理问题等.