Sixteen centuries ago the Neoplatonist philosopher Hypatia was murdered by a mob of Christians. Ever since, she has been remembered in poems, plays, paintings, and films as a victim of religious intolerance whose death symbolized the end of the classical world. But before she was a symbol Hypatia was a person. As one of antiquity's best-known female scholars, Hypatia's immense skills as a philosopher and mathematician redefined the intellectual life of her home city of Alexandria. Her talent as a teacher (...) enabled her to assemble a circle of dedicated male students. Her devotion to public service made her a force for peace and good government in a city that struggled to maintain trust and cooperation between pagans and Christians. These intellectual and political triumphs were all the more astonishing for being accomplished in a climate of gossip, scrutiny, and misogyny.Hypatia: The Life and Legend of an Ancient Philosopher is a major new account of this remarkable woman and the culturally rich and turbulent context in which she lived. Utilizing new techniques for reading ancient letters and mathematical and philosophical commentaries-as well as a number of previously unnoticed early modern sources-Edward J. Watts provides a revelatory narrative of Hypatia's life, her formidable achievements, the tragic story of the events that led to her murder, and the rich legacy of her life and death. (shrink)

Assertive community treatment (ACT) is a widely propagated team approach to community mental health care that ‘assertively’ engages a subgroup of individuals with severe mental illness who continuously disengage from mental health services. It involves a number of interested parties – including clients, carers, clinicians and managers. Each operates according to perceived ethical principles related to their values, mores and principles. ACT condenses a dilemma that is common in psychiatry. ACT proffers social control whilst simultaneously holding therapeutic aspiration. The clients’ (...) perspective of this dilemma was studied in interviews with 12 clients using the ‘grounded theory’ approach. Results suggest that clients’ disengagement is as much a historical and cultural phenomenon as a result of lack of insight. Many clients had experienced rejection of early help–seeking behaviour and all had been subject to coercive interventions. These coercive interventions were experienced as an attack on identity. All felt that their voice had not been listened to in previous interactions with psychiatric services. Consequentially the clients had an increased level of arousal around issues of power, which needs to be incorporated when examining the ethics of community psychiatry. Traditional notions of the difference between persuasion and coercion – for example – may need to be adapted for this client group. Results are compared with the provider perspective. We conclude that the perspectives differ on two key dimensions. Such an empirical approach to examining psychiatric ethics may ensure that we incorporate the subjectivities of various interested parties in the clinical decision–making process. (shrink)

The validity of psychiatric diagnoses has been at the heart of enduring and divisive debates in mental health discourse for over fifty years, often reaching a stalemate. Whilst some consider a diagnosis essential for validation and support, others view it as an obstacle to personal meaning-making. This chapter proposes that considering epistemic injustice may offer a valuable approach to overcome this impasse. By examining four facets of epistemic injustice—objectification, moral agency, trivialization, and narrative agency—it juxtaposes patient perspectives on borderline personality (...) disorder and depression, arguably the least and most popular diagnoses with patients in psychiatry. Leveraging these four facets, it delves into the experiences of two representative patients, Cara and John, showing how epistemic injustice operates differently across diagnoses. This analysis suggests the importance of epistemic injustice as a tool in critically evaluating the usefulness of specific psychiatric diagnoses, enriching traditional metrics of reliability and validity in nosology. Moreover, it encourages a shift in clinical training to embrace reflective practices and restructure power dynamics in clinical encounters, promoting greater epistemic participation. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for four related claims. First, Richard Levins’ classic “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology” was a statement and defense of theoretical population biology growing out of collaborations between Robert MacArthur, Richard Lewontin, E. O. Wilson, and others. Second, I argue that the essay served as a response to the rise of systems ecology especially as pioneered by Kenneth Watt. Third, the arguments offered by Levins against systems ecology and in favor of his own (...) methodological program are best construed as “pragmatic”. Fourth, I consider limitations of Levins’ arguments given contemporary population biology. (shrink)

Health Technology Assessment (HTA) has traditionally focused on efficacy, safety, and cost-effectiveness. There has long been concern, however, that this is determined by the goals of healthcare providers/payers, not patients. As a result, HTA arguably fails to reflect the overall value of health technologies—including their “non-clinical” or “personal” utility to patients and their families. The use of genomic testing in clinical care is one domain where this problem is evident, as the personal utility of results is often especially significant. As (...) such, there are growing calls for HTA frameworks to adopt personal utility as a distinct element of value when assessing clinical genomic tests. We agree that personal utility is important to HTA in clinical genomics. However, against a trend toward comprehensive conceptions of personal utility within HTA, we advocate for a restrictive approach to assessing the value of personal utility in the case of clinical genomic testing. (shrink)

Health Technology Assessment (HTA) has traditionally focused on efficacy, safety, and cost-effectiveness. There has long been concern, however, that this is determined by the goals of healthcare providers/payers, not patients. As a result, HTA arguably fails to reflect the overall value of health technologies—including their “non-clinical” or “personal” utility to patients and their families. The use of genomic testing in clinical care is one domain where this problem is evident, as the personal utility of results is often especially significant. As (...) such, there are growing calls for HTA frameworks to adopt personal utility as a distinct element of value when assessing clinical genomic tests. We agree that personal utility is important to HTA in clinical genomics. However, against a trend toward comprehensive conceptions of personal utility within HTA, we advocate for a restrictive approach to assessing the value of personal utility in the case of clinical genomic testing. (shrink)

These papers contain materials relating to the professional life of the American philosopher Jay Rosenberg, including manuscripts of his books and his professional articles, as well as drafts and outlines drawn from his teaching materials used in courses at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. There are also manuscripts that relate to the professional academic talks that he gave at conferences or at other universities, as well as to his administrative activities as a professor at a major research (...) university. There are also letters derived from his professional correspondence. Books and articles from his library and reprint collection have been retained if they contain substantive annotations. In addition to his own manuscripts and correspondence, the papers contain extensive materials from the work of Wilfrid Sellars, with whom Rosenberg studied while earning his Ph.D. at the University of Pittsburgh. This section of his archive contains photographs of not only Wilfrid Sellars, but other philosphers of science. These were often group photos taken at conferences. (shrink)

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

Technological developments in the sphere of artificial intelligence (AI) inspire debates about the implications of autonomous weapon systems (AWS), which can select and engage targets without human intervention. While increasingly more systems which could qualify as AWS, such as loitering munitions, are reportedly used in armed conflicts, the global discussion about a system of governance and international legal norms on AWS at the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) has stalled. In this article we argue for the (...) necessity to adopt legal norms on the use and development of AWS. Without a framework for global regulation, state practices in using weapon systems with AI-based and autonomous features will continue to shape the norms of warfare and affect the level and quality of human control in the use of force. By examining the practices of China, Russia, and the United States in their pursuit of AWS-related technologies and participation at the UN CCW debate, we acknowledge that their differing approaches make it challenging for states parties to reach an agreement on regulation, especially in a forum based on consensus. Nevertheless, we argue that global governance on AWS is not impossible. It will depend on the extent to which an actor or group of actors would be ready to take the lead on an alternative process outside of the CCW, inspired by the direction of travel given by previous arms control and weapons ban initiatives. (shrink)

A dual-processing model of moral whistleblowing in organizations is proposed. In this theory paper, moral whistleblowing is described as a unique type of whistleblowing that is undertaken by individuals that see themselves as moral agents and are primarily motivated to blow the whistle by a sense of moral duty. At the individual level, the model expands on traditional, rational models of whistleblowing by exploring how moral intuition and deliberative reasoning processes might interact to influence the whistleblowing behavior of moral agents. (...) The model combines individual variables, organizational variables, and external, societal variables to explain the moral whistleblowing process and the impact of moral agents on organizations and society. (shrink)

This essay offers an account of Kierkegaard’s view of the limits of thought and of what makes this view distinctive. With primary reference to Philosophical Fragments, and its putative representation of Christianity as unthinkable, I situate Kierkegaard’s engagement with the problem of the limits of thought, especially with respect to the views of Kant and Hegel. I argue that Kierkegaard builds in this regard on Hegel’s critique of Kant but that, against Hegel, he develops a radical distinction between two types (...) of thinking and inquiry: the ‘aesthetic-intellectual’ and the ‘ethico-religious’. I clarify this distinction and show how it guides Kierkegaard’s conception of a form of philosophical practice that involves drawing limits to the proper sphere of disinterested contemplation. With reference to two rival interpretations of Kierkegaard’s approach to the limits of thought—which I call ‘bullet-biting’ and ‘relativizing’—I further show how my ‘disambiguating’ account can better explain how, and why, his work courts a form of self-referential incoherence, in which it appears that certain limits of thought are at once affirmed and violated. (shrink)

The ethical decision making of researchers has historically been studied from an individualistic perspective. However, researchers rarely work alone, and they typically experience ethical dilemmas in a team context. In this mixed-methods study, 67 scientists and engineers working at a public R1 (very high research activity) university in the United States responded to a survey that asked whether they had experienced or observed an ethical dilemma while working in a research team. Among these, 30 respondents agreed to be interviewed about (...) their experiences using a think-aloud protocol. A total of 40 unique ethical incidents were collected across these interviews. Qualitative data from interview transcripts were then systematically content-analyzed by multiple independent judges to quantify the overall ethicality of team decisions as well as several team characteristics, decision processes, and situational factors. The results demonstrated that team formalistic orientation, ethical championing, and the use of ethical decision strategies were all positively related to the overall ethicality of team decisions. Additionally, the relationship between ethical championing and overall team decision ethicality was moderated by psychological safety and moral intensity. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation of the target of Søren Kierkegaard’s corrective to Luther as not merely cultural Lutheranism but Luther's very conception of what it means to be receptive to grace. On this interpretation, while Kierkegaard affirms that salvation is by grace alone, and through faith alone, he thinks that Luther errs when he conceives of salvation as a process in relation to which the believer is merely passive. Instead, in Kierkegaard’s view, receptivity to grace involves a distinctive, middle-voiced, form (...) of human agency in which the believer learns to acknowledge her need for grace. With reference to Kierkegaard’s discourses on patience, and their thematic proximity to the spirituality of the Philokalia, I illustrate this conception of active-passivity and show how it is compatible with an uncompromising Lutheran emphasis on human powerlessness. With reference also to his insistence of the irreducible importance of the participant’s perspective, I further draw out from Kierkegaard an account of why the temptation may arise to erroneously interpret the core tenets of Luther's teaching, in the mode of a theory of soteriological passivity. (shrink)

This essay re-examines Kierkegaard's view of Socrates. I consider the problem that arises from Kierkegaard's appeal to Socrates as an exemplar for irony. The problem is that he also appears to think that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented. And part of the problem is the paradox of self-reference that immediately arises from trying to represent x as unrepresentable. On the solution I propose, Kierkegaard does not hold that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates is in no (...) way representable. Rather, he holds that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented in a purely disinterested way. I show how, in The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard makes use of 'limiting cases' of representation in order to bring Socrates into view as one who defies purely disinterested representation. I also show how this approach to Socrates connects up with Kierkegaard's more general interest in the problem of ethical exemplarity, where the problem is how ethical exemplars can be given as such, that is, in such a way that purely disinterested contemplation is not the appropriate response to them. (shrink)

Predictive modeling in education draws on data from past courses to forecast the effectiveness of future courses. The present effort sought to identify such a model of instructional effectiveness in scientific ethics. Drawing on data from 235 courses in the responsible conduct of research, structural equation modeling techniques were used to test a predictive model of RCR course effectiveness. Fit statistics indicated the model fit the data well, with the instructional characteristics included in the model explaining approximately 85% of the (...) variance in RCR instructional effectiveness. Implications for using the model to develop and improve future RCR courses are discussed. (shrink)

The use of genomic testing in pregnancy is increasing, giving rise to questions over how the information that is generated should be offered and returned in clinical practice. While these tests provide important information for prenatal decision-making, they can also generate information of uncertain significance. This paper critically examines three models for approaching the disclosure of variants of uncertain significance (VUS), which can arise from forms of genomic testing such as prenatal chromosomal microarray analysis (CMA). Contrary to prevailing arguments, we (...) argue that respect for reproductive autonomy does not justify adopting a model on which an offer to disclose VUS is a routine part of genetic counselling. Instead, we contend that a commitment both to solidarity between healthcare providers and pregnant women and to the acceptance of a novel principle of caution under normative uncertainty means that we should instead adopt a model of VUS disclosure that imposes a strong presumption against offering to disclose VUS. The upshot of this is that it should be standard practice to only offer to disclose VUS when this is requested by the woman undergoing CMA. We defend our position against claims that arise from an alleged right to such information and that a presumption against an offer will lead to inequity. (shrink)

Thorough and wide-ranging examination of the science of morals, reviving and defending the tradition of a scientific approach to ethics. Engages with recent debates on modernism and morality, demonstrating the contemporary relevance of Durkheim's ideas. This book is intended for social and political theory, philosophy of science and Durkheimian studies within sociology, philosophy and politics.

This paper reexamines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [Fordoblelse], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. I further show how these points shed (...) much-needed light on the relationship between objective and subjective truth, conceived not as different kinds or species of truth but as different ways in which truth manifests itself as a standard of success across different contexts of inquiry. (shrink)

Sahan et al draw much needed attention to the ethical complexity encountered by clinical laboratory scientists. They point out that, on the one hand, clinical laboratories are increasingly required to analyse ‘much broader swathes’ of genomic information than had previously been the case and to consider how best to report—or not report—the results that arise. On the other hand, they also note how clinical laboratory services are supporting genomic testing that is transitioning from specialist to mainstream services, such that questions (...) of whether and how to report genomic information must ‘accommodate the considerations of an expanded multidisciplinary team (MDT)’.1 These two factors, among others, increase both the ‘range and complexity’ of ethical dilemmas faced by clinical laboratory scientists. This trajectory will continue in line with trends towards further mainstreaming of genomic medicine, and the use of genomic sequencing (generating ‘much broader swathes’ of information) over more targeted approaches. In this challenging environment, Sahan et al contend that the notion of ‘ethical preparedness’ (EP) has a crucial role to play. Here ‘EP’ is understood as a state of both systems and individuals that is characterised by the ‘capability, opportunity and motivation to respond to the ethical issues arising in a particular clinical situation, as well as being able to anticipate ethical concerns in advance in areas where practice is rapidly evolving’.1 Notably, cultivating the …. (shrink)

This paper draws out from Kierkegaard’s work a distinctive critical perspective on an influential contemporary approach in moral philosophy: namely, Christine Korsgaard’s transcendental argument for the value of humanity. From Kierkegaard’s perspective, we argue, Korsgaard argument goes too far, in attributing absolute value to humanity – but also that she is required to make this claim if her transcendental argument is to work. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, to place this sort of value in humanity is problematic since it threatens to (...) make the relation between individuals too claustrophobic. Finally, we explore the possibility of a rival approach, in which we should view others as ethically significant because they too are related to the kind of ‘third’ which Kierkegaard argues is needed to bring stability to the structure of the self. In this way, we claim, a different and more successful transcendental argument to the value of humanity can be found in the work of Kierkegaard. (shrink)

This article probes the philosophical and political significance of the relationships between wheelchair activists and their wheelchairs. Analyzing disability memoirs and the work of a professional wheelchair dancer, I argue that wheelers frequently experience complex relationality and queer kinships with their wheels. By bringing the artistry of disabled writers and dancers into conversation with the notions of human–material relations in the work of Donna Haraway, Jane Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, and Mel Chen, I show how alternative animacies shape wheelers’ conceptions of (...) interdependence and movement. The sensuous pleasure they take in their wheels queers conventional conceptions of how humans should relate to things. New materialist philosophy has increasingly drawn attention to the porous boundaries between the human and material world. But where posthumanist philosophers have largely aimed to dethrone the sovereignty of the human, disability activists use alternative animacies to raise up a devalued and discounted portion of humanity: to emphasize the agency and capacity of those whose lives are often cast as pitiable and powerless, to express a queer feminist disability culture and politics, and to claim the transgressive vitality and vibrant artistry of life with disability. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders certain of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's theoretical philosophy in the light of recent interpretations of the latter. The paper seeks to show how these criticisms, far from being merely parochial or rhetorical, turn on central issues concerning the nature of thought and what it is to think. I begin by introducing Hegel's conception of "pure thought" as this is distinguished by his commitment to certain general requirements on a properly philosophical form of inquiry. I then outline Hegel's (...) strategy for resolving a crucial problem he takes himself to face. For his account of the nature of thought depends upon the idea of a form of inquiry in which nothing whatsoever is presupposed; but this idea appears basically paradoxical inasmuch as the mere act of beginning to inquire in a certain way embodies an assumption about how it is appropriate to begin. Turning to Kierkegaard, I consider a key objection to the effect that Hegel's strategy for resolving this paradox depends on the incoherent idea of a purely reflexive act of thinking. Finally, I draw out some central features of the alternative account of "situated" thought and inquiry which Kierkegaard presents as distinctively Socratic. © 2007 Taylor & Francis. (shrink)

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The (...) concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a (...) central line of argument in Wittgenstein that problematizes this question by establishing the basis our ability to follow rules in our spontaneous responses. I argue that Kierkegaard not only strongly anticipates this line of argument but also offers a distinctive story about what, at bottom, makes the difference between human rule‐following and behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. In a word, on Kierkegaard's story, what makes the difference is: anxiety. (shrink)

From the middle of the twentieth‐century onwards, there has been a growing emphasis on the importance of relationality in what it means to be human, which we call a “relational turn.” This is found in various domains, including philosophical psychology, psychoanalysis, and theological anthropology. Many have seen a close connection between relationality and personhood. In the second half of the article, we consider the implications of this trend for artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. So far, AI has largely neglected relational (...) intelligence, though that could perhaps be about to change. Cybernetics was rendered more open to assumptions about the contextuality of intelligence by its rather different assumptions from AI. Social robotics increasingly requires relational intelligence, and promising steps might be found in computational modeling of human relationships. Questions about whether robots can achieve personhood are difficult to resolve, though the possibility should not be ruled out. (shrink)

The expansion of newborn bloodspot screening (NBS) programs through genomic sequencing is proposed as a way to revolutionise infant and lifelong healthcare. But for all its promise, profound ethical challenges arise too. Robust analysis of these ethical challenges, which include technological and commercial imperatives, as well as balancing individual rights with communal goods, first necessitates clarity as to which ethical approach is best suited to considering the use of genomics in NBS. We use normative ethical analysis to provide a critical (...) comparison of three ethical approaches to the expansion of NBS that shape debates over the implementation of genomic newborn screening (gNBS): liberal individualism, public health ethics, and genomic healthcare as a human right. While these approaches often overlap in practice, their distinct priorities illuminate tensions between individual autonomy, collective welfare, and rights-based claims to genomic information and attendant healthcare. We argue that public health ethics should be the primary ethical approach for gNBS. Yet, none of the three approaches are individually sufficient to fully address the ethical complexities involved. This is because each approach sheds useful light on distinct benefits and limitations of gNBS. While rigorous evidence-gathering to inform the ethical and societal impacts of gNBS is critical, this must be accompanied by – and interpreted through – normative ethical analysis that clearly articulates the values and tensions at stake. Overall, ethical implementation of gNBS requires a policy approach that (i) adopts public health ethics for programme design, (ii) operationalises select human-rights claims in accordance with established screening principles, and (iii) embeds liberal protections against state or parental overreach. (shrink)

How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of (...) crisis, in which our ethical self-understanding is radically undermined. I further examine his alternative account of ethical constancy, by clarifying Kierkegaard's idea of a ‘second ethics’, as addressed to those who feel ethically powerless and as requiring an ongoing process of self-transformation. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a (...) central line of argument in Wittgenstein that problematizes this question by establishing the basis our ability to follow rules in our spontaneous responses. I argue that Kierkegaard not only strongly anticipates this line of argument but also offers a distinctive story about what, at bottom, makes the difference between human rule‐following and behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. In a word, on Kierkegaard's story, what makes the difference is: anxiety. (shrink)

Explores language and mysticism, Buddhism and Zen, Christianity, comparative religion, psychedelics, and psychology and psychotherapy. Gold Winner for Philosophy, 2017 Foreword INDIES Book of the Year Awards To commemorate the 2015 centenary of the birth of Alan Watts (1915–1973), Peter J. Columbus and Donadrian L. Rice have assembled a much-needed collection of Watts’s scholarly essays and lectures. Compiled from professional journals, monographs, scholarly books, conferences, and symposia proceedings, the volume sheds valuable light on the developmental arc of (...) class='Hi'>Watts’s thinking about language and mysticism, Buddhism and Zen, Christianity, comparative religion, psychedelics, and psychology and psychotherapy. This definitive collection challenges Watts’s reputation as a “popularizer” or “philosophical entertainer,” revealing his concerns to be much more expansive and transdisciplinary than is suggested by the parochial “Zen Buddhist” label commonly affixed to his writings. The editors’ authoritative introduction elucidates contemporary perspectives on Watts’s life and work, and supports a bold rethinking of his contributions to psychology, philosophy, and religion. Peter J. Columbus is Administrator of the Shantigar Foundation in Rowe, Massachusetts. Donadrian L. Rice is Professor of Psychology at the University of West Georgia. Together they are the coeditors of Alan Watts—Here and Now: Contributions to Psychology, Philosophy, and Religion, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

It is sometimes assumed that when the gospels talk about demon possession they are just using different terminology for what would now be called psychosis or epilepsy. However, these terms come from different discourses that need to be distinguished, but do not need to be kept completely separate. The nature of the relationship between religion and mental health is complex. There is usually a positive correlation, but it is more difficult to be confident about the nature of the causal connection. (...) Poor mental health can become intertwined with religion in a way that drags both down. It is a consistent feature of Jesus' interactions that he encourages people to believe that more is possible than might have been imagined. His impact on the mental health of those around him seems to have been largely a matter of what might now be called positive psychology. (shrink)

Recent developments toward a more holistic biology do not eliminate reductionism and determinism, but they do suggest more complex forms of them, in which there are multiple, interacting influences, as there are in complex or chaotic systems. Though there is a place in biology for both systemic and atomistic modes of explanation, for those with a theological perspective the shift to complex explanations in biology is often welcome. It suggests a more subtle view of divine action in which God's purposes (...) are affected through engagement with the complex systems of creation rather than by discrete interventions. It also invites us to connect the biological interdependence with the interdependence in the nature and purposes of God, and it is consonant with a mystical vision of the unity of all things. (shrink)

This article describes some key features of the distinctive approach to issues in science and religion of the Epiphany Philosophers (EPs), and introduces a set of articles from a recent meeting. The objective of the EPs is not merely to establish harmonious coexistence between science and religion. Rather, they are dissatisfied with both, and have a reformist agenda. They see science as unduly constrained by arbitrary metaphysical assumptions, predominantly of an atheist kind, and wish to see it liberated from such (...) constraints. They are also interested in the potential contribution of contemplative enquiry to scientific research. They see no reason why science should not engage with the transcendent, but they do not support any simplistic argument from scientific research to religious belief. They wish to see an approach to religion that is rooted more firmly in the contemplative path. (shrink)

A spate of social scientific literature gives the impression that societies in the twenty-first century are overrun with ‘neoliberal subjects’. But what does it actually mean to be a neoliberal subject? And in what ways does this concept relate to ‘neoliberalism’, more generally? In this article, I distinguish between four common ways of thinking about ‘neoliberalism’: (1) as a set of economic policies, (2) as a hegemonic ideological project, (3) as a political rationality and form of governmentality and (4) as (...) a specific type of embodied subjectivity. I argue that while neoliberalisms (1), (2) and (3) potentially hold clear conceptual connections to one another – notwithstanding the quite real tensions between them – their relationship to neoliberalism (4) is often (although not always) tenuous at best. That is, the evidence routinely offered to demonstrate the existence of neoliberalism (4) bears almost no necessary relationship to neoliberalisms (1), (2) or (3). I conclude that, for both academic and political reasons, scholars should be more careful when invoking the monolithic notion of a ‘neoliberal subject’. (shrink)

After hearing Donald Trump's acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention held in Cleveland, Ohio, Newt Gingrich was interviewed live on CNN about the menacing tone of the address. Gingrich not only defended Trump's nearly apocalyptic vision of America if he was not elected, the former Speaker of the House swiped aside the clear data that indicated that the criminalized landscapes portrayed in Trump's speech might just be the work of a frenzied and fearful imagination rather than based in fact. (...) "'People feel more threatened,'" Gingrich insisted. "'As a political candidate, I'll go with what people feel '". Commenting in Forbes shortly thereafter, Ethan Siegel, a scientist and science... (shrink)

My central claim in this paper is that Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is governed by the basic aim to articulate a real dilemma, and to elicit its proper recognition as such. I begin by indicating how Kierkegaard’s works are shaped in general by this aim, and what the aim involves. I then show how the dilemmaticstructure of Fear and Trembling is obscured in a recent dispute between Michelle Kosch and John Lippitt regarding the basic aims and upshot of the book. (...) Finally, I consider two critical questions: Why does Kierkegaard present his dilemmatic reasoning in the form of a “dialectical lyric”? And why does he write a book that aims only to articulate a dilemma, and not also to resolve it? (shrink)

I show how Kierkegaard’s work offers a cogent alternative to the standard view which interprets despair as hopelessness and evaluates despair as unambiguously bad. On Kierkegaard’s alternative account, despair is not to be equated with feelings of futility or hopelessness, or any other sort of psychological state. It is instead a distinctive sort of ability: the ability to give up on oneself, that is, the ability to decline or refuse to take up one’s own life as a task. So conceived, (...) despair inheres in the very structure of human selfhood, as a continually activated potential. While it may remain latent in a person’s life, when despair comes thematically to consciousness, it has a vital role to play in disclosing self-becoming as a task – a task that requires continually resisting the pull of despair and acknowledging one’s dependence on others. As a potentiality that is always at work in human life, and while thoroughly bad and destructive if allowed to become fully actual, despair can even be appreciated as a force for our good. (shrink)

Historians of philosophy are often challenged to discern the relative impacts of the ideas and the actions of ancient philosophers. The ideas of these thinkers often stand alone in an almost disembodied fashion, set apart from the physicality of a philosopher, his or her personality, and even their intellectual development over time. This article considers the tension between the people, the ideas, and the social context in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria and investigates the way in which genial and difficult (...) personalities influence the fate of Neoplatonic schools in the two cities in the late fifth and early sixth centuries AD. (shrink)

I introduce a distinct challenge to religious belief: the Ethical Argument from evil. By this argument, paradigmatic forms of religious practice constitutively involve failures of ethical acknowledgement with respect to the reality of evil. I show how standard discussions of the problem of evil, as a purely logical or epistemic issue, abstract away from its fundamentally ethical dimensions. Drawing on an analogy with Moore’s paradox, I argue that the Ethical Argument presents a genuine theoretical problem, not merely a practical or (...) pastoral one: the problem of how religious devotion can be compossible with properly acknowledging the reality of evil. I further argue that, in order properly to address this problem, the philosophy of religion needs to take a phenomenological turn. To illustrate this approach, I focus on the case of thankful prayer and draw out from Kierkegaard’s writings a religious ideal of unconditional gratitude. Developing the relevant notion of a failure of ethical acknowledgement in terms of two vices—wishful self-deception and spiritualized self-absorption—I show how Kierkegaard’s account can help us to assess whether expressions of religious devotion are objectionable on these grounds. (shrink)

How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of (...) crisis, in which our ethical self‐understanding is radically undermined. I further examine his alternative account of ethical constancy, by clarifying Kierkegaard's idea of a ‘second ethics’, as addressed to those who feel ethically powerless and as requiring an ongoing process of self‐transformation. (shrink)

This chapter examines critical theoryCritical theory as a way of explaining, contesting and acting upon social injustice. Critical theories, of which there are many, have been a significant source of explanatory power and motivating action for social work. As will be shown, there are a number of different generations and formulations of critical theoryCritical theory. What links these different theories is that they combine explanationsInjusticeexplanations of of social reality with practical aims for addressing social injustices. The chapter explains what makes (...) critical social scienceCritical social science critical, and then outlines Marxist, feminist and postcolonial theoryPostcolonialtheory by explaining each position in relation to a theory of false consciousness, theory of crisis, theory of education and a theory of transformative action. (shrink)

Social justice in the social work literature is frequently equated with Fairness and equality in the distribution and access to resources, opportunities and rights and liberties. This is a version of social justice known as the Distributive theories of justice. The most influential exponent of this theory is philosopher John Rawls, outlined primarily in his book ATheory of justice. Given the influence of the Distributive theories on social work specifically, Welfare state welfare StateSee also nation-state generally, this chapter explains the (...) Distributive theories of justice according to Rawls. The location of justice as the first virtue of institutions is explained, as are Rawls’ two main principles of justice: (1) justice as equal rights and opportunities; and (2) Rawls, Johndifference principleDifference principle, which may be seen as socially just inequality. How and why Rawls arrived at these principles is explained, as are his objections to utilitarian and meritocratic conceptions of justice. (shrink)

Capitalism and neoliberalism are widely critiqued in social work. Neoliberalism in particular is considered a problematic form of economic and social philosophy that is detrimental to human and ecological well-being and leads to the dismantling of social welfare. As such, neoliberalism is criticised on the grounds that it is an anathema to social justice. Critiques of neoliberalism in the social work literature posit that neoliberalism is deeply implicated in various injustices and contend that social work must challenge neoliberal discourses, hegemony (...) and practice. However, these descriptions of neoliberalism suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity. This chapter will draw on critical and post-structural literature to explain the Liberal, Marxist and Keynesian perspectives on Capitalism, outline the neoliberal critique in social work, and describe in detail the historical and contemporary formation of neoliberalism. (shrink)

In a series of recent articles, including his Boyle Lecture, Rowan Williams has developed a theology of the role of intelligence and attention in spiritual life. There is a sense in which all intelligence is spiritual activity. Current approaches to intelligence are often mechanistic, but intelligence in spiritual life needs to be understood in a more embodied and organic way. Attention is often thought of as a matter of choosing which already‐formed objects to focus on. That overlooks the fact that (...) sensory information is often confusing and ambiguous, and neglects how habits of attention make the world appear more atomized than it really is. If we can learn restraint in how we impose order upon the world around us in attending to it, there is an opportunity to encounter the divine Spirit which is the source of all that we experience. That leads to a more participatory, less objectifying, way of engaging with the world. (shrink)