This paper argues that al-Ghazali’s (1058–1111) distinction between taqlid (uncritical acceptance of authority) and ijtihad (independent reasoning) can offer a normative response to the contemporary challenge of fake news, thereby connecting a medieval epistemic framework to a pressing twenty-first-century problem. This study treats fake news as both an epistemic and an ethical challenge. Epistemically, fake news undermines the aim of belief, which is the aspiration toward truth, by introducing and sustaining falsehoods within the testimonial networks on which individuals depend (...) for knowledge. Ethically, it constitutes a form of deception that manipulates audiences, corrodes intellectual virtues such as honesty, and disintegrates the trust between individuals and public institutions that is essential for collective life. Methodologically, this paper adopts an analytical–critical approach. It examines recent philosophical literature on the epistemology of misinformation, reconstructs al-Ghazali’s taqlid–ijtihad framework from his original texts, and then adapts it to the conditions of digital information environments. The resulting model distinguishes between digital ijtihad, the responsible and competent verification of online information, and justified digital taqlid, the legitimate reliance on credible digital authorities when independent verification is impractical. The findings suggest that this adapted framework not only enriches contemporary epistemic theory but also offers practical normative guidance for cultivating responsible belief formation, including in educational contexts where teaching itself functions as a structured form of testimonial exchange. (shrink)

Medieval philosophy has often been stereotypically characterized as rigidly reliant on authority and lacking originality. However, the present research challenges this perception by unveiling the lively debates among medieval philosophers in the Islamic World regarding the autonomy of thought for both esteemed scholars and everyday individuals. Rather than passively accepting authoritative doctrines, these philosophers contemplated the extent to which independent reflection should play a role. Surprisingly, their reflections resonate in the contemporary world as we grapple with parallel questions about the (...) balance between authority and individual inquiry in our society. The first part of the paper introduces a timeless challenge faced by medieval Islamic philosophers: the formation of beliefs. This predicament persists today – how much should we rely on authority without critical examination, and when should we subject our beliefs to scrutiny? The paper introduces an Islamic classical tradition followed by Muslim jurists, theologians, and philosophers: the nuanced distinction between Taqlid (following authority) and Ijtihad (independent reasoning) to address this. The perspective of Al-Ghazali, a prominent representative of this tradition, is thoroughly examined, highlighting its contributions and challenges. In its methodological approach, this paper rigorously analyzes primary and secondary sources relevant to Al-Ghazali’s views in Arabic and English. This comprehensive analysis aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the intricate interplay between authority and independent reasoning in the context of medieval Islamic philosophy. (shrink)

Ijtihad is the mujtahid's putting forward all his efforts on a fiqh issue within the framework of methodological principles. Fatwa, on the other hand, are the explanations made regarding the questions asked in fiqh issues. Therefore, although there are similarities between fatwa and ijtihad in terms of declaring a fiqh knowledge, there are also some differences that distinguish both scientific activities from each other. Because of this difference, not every ijtihad qualifies as a fatwa that a Muslim (...) can apply in his life. A jurist who does not have the qualifications for ijtihad has to pay attention to when giving a fatwa by making use of the classical period ijtihad. The most important thing to consider when benefiting from the ijtihads that have been put forward is to correctly distinguish between the ijtihads that are historical and those that will always be used. In the fiqh books, there are many issues that can be described as historical ijtihad, in the context of their own time and conditions. Since it is not possible to present all such ijtihads within the framework of an article, in this study, the subject is discussed within the framework of ijtihads selected from fiqh books. From international relations to family law, there are many historically qualified ijtihads in the fields of fiqh, especially in the field of transactions. Today, international relations are quite different. It is of great importance to redefine the world and present fiqh rules accordingly. In the changing social structure, a new perspective is needed in the determination of the muruet. In the process of women's social position and participation in social life, great changes have been experienced all over the world and women have started to take part in many areas of life. In terms of the minimum age limit for marriage, it has become natural to marry at an older age than in the past. It has become almost impossible to act with the approach that those who have the same belief will obtain citizenship without other terms and conditions. It has become necessary to consider the views of jurists regarding the rights of non-Muslim citizens from a new perspective in the globalizing world structure. The implementation of views that give authority to private property owners regarding mineral ownership may be harmful to the security of the state and the public interest. There has been a need to look again at the legal provisions regarding the treasures under the ground in terms of public interest. In the article, it is stated why the ijtihads on the aforementioned issues have a historical character and in which framework the issue should be handled today. (shrink)

Studies in the sociology of religion in Turkey have always kept the concern of examining the objective with an impartial perspective. The fact that researches in Turkey have focused on the religion of Islam and different religious groups with Islamic origins has kept the problem of the objectivity of the sociology of religion on the agenda methodologically. However, it should not be forgotten that understanding Turkish society and other societies where Islam is the dominant religion will be possible by going (...) down to the first sources sociologically as well as religiously, and interpreting the behavior of the first believers of the revelation. In particular, the ijtihads of the "Rashid Caliphs Period", which is a special period in the history of Islam, have been referred to as a religious and rational source both in the formation of Islamic fiqh and in the social structures of Muslim nations. In this context, the question of what are the effects and sociological aspects of the ijtihads of the first four caliphs on the development of Islamic culture and civilization, the govarnance and social formation of Muslim societies will be examined. What social reasons did the Rashid caliphs take into account in their ijtihads, what social events they led to, and how they had an impact on institutions. This study, which will be an essay on "Sociology of Ijtihad", also aims to question the possibilities of a common study field for Sociology and Fiqh. (shrink)

After the death of the Prophet, Muslims continued to apply the rulings deduced from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and in matters they did not know, they turned to those who were more knowledgeable than themselves. As sects spread in the following period, some people saw this situation as taqlid and ignored the existence of sects. In the discussions that have continued until today, there are those who argue that the door of ijtihad is closed, as well as those (...) who want to expand the boundaries of ijtihad, especially during the periods of decline of Islamic countries. In the discussions that have continued until today, it has been stated that in order to achieve the bliss of this world and the hereafter, taqlid should be abandoned and the Prophetic teaching, which is universal, should be addressed one-to-one. Albānī (d. 1999), who lived in the last century, also put forward some views on the idea of ijtihad and taqlid. Although he opposed taqlid in general, he stated that scholars are tools guiding the Qur'an and Sunnah. Thus, he did not completely condemn taqlid, but criticised adherence to sects by stating that scholars should not be taken as a goal. According to Albānī, what is required for Muslims who cannot reach the level of ijtihad is not taqlīd but ittibā'. Therefore, to live and convey Islam, it should be communicated to both Muslims and non-Muslims not through sectarian perspectives, but by adhering to the SunnahAl-Albānī stated that the imams of the sects were not guilty of any offence in this matter and urged the jurists and mujtahids to act without adhering to a sect. However, the scholars affiliated to the sect thought that the ijtihad was hadith-centred and accepted following the sayings of the ulema of the past period within the sect as ittibā, not taqlid. However, al-Albānī acted consistently in his objections and criticisms and drew a moderate path for the reform of the ummah. Although some of his views portrayed him as an extreme scholar, he spent his life in the way of determining and understanding hadith and sunnah. (shrink)

In this chapter, we analyse Iqbal’s understanding of the practice of ijtihad that is inherently spiritual. In other words, implicit in his understanding and practice is the notion that people are not just open and reflective about the human relations in becoming—that is, relations of cooperation, coexistence and recognition of one another. Also, what Iqbal’s exposition of the practice of ijtihad encourages are forms of living whereby people become deeply (i.e., spiritually) concerned about their own, perhaps unwarranted practices. (...) Introspection and a commitment towards identifying their deficiencies would become enabling practices to enhance human co-belonging and recognition of one another for the reason that people are prepared to take into critical scrutiny what they hold to be true. Their spiritual recognition that their own practices might be deeply flawed and in need of reparations is a profound recognition of ijtihadi proportions. That is, when people have internalised the fallibility of their own practices would they become more open to new re-beginnings. In this way, democratic education becomes a practice of immense spiritual propensity in the sense that people would be prepared and willing to amend distortions associated with their own indigenous ways of being and acting. (shrink)

This study examines the rejection of consensus (ijmāʿ) based on independent legal reasoning (ijtihād) as a significant critique raised by Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), a prominent representative of the Ẓāhirī tradition, against the classical uṣūl al-fiqh understanding of ijmāʿ. This issue is primarily analyzed within the context of the characteristic features of the Ẓāhirī school, and the traces of this approach are pursued throughout the study. The study reveals the evidence upon which Ibn Ḥazm rejects ijmāʿ founded on ijtihād, despite (...) its acceptance by the vast majority of uṣūl scholars. Furthermore, Ibn Ḥazm’s approach to the evidence used by the majority (jumhūr) on this matter, drawing from his own sources, is identified. The evidence presented by Ibn Ḥazm concerning the issue is classified into rational (ʿaqlī) and transmitted (naqlī) categories. In substantiating his position, Ibn Ḥazm relies on certain scriptural texts (nuṣūṣ), asserting that the path of the believers is constituted solely by divine revelation (naṣṣ), and that a path not based on revelation cannot be considered the path of the believers. He argues that ijmāʿ, in order to serve as a source of legal ruling, must be formed within the framework of the Qurʾān and the Sunna. Additionally, Ibn Ḥazm emphasizes that the religion, as articulated within the Qurʾān and Sunna, has been perfected, encompasses all aspects of life, and that seeking any evidential source beyond the revealed texts constitutes the innovation of a new religion. Finally, the study addresses certain examples of ijmāʿ that the majority claim are established upon opinion (raʾy) and analogical reasoning (qiyās), and examines Ibn Ḥazm’s approach to these examples within the framework of the Ẓāhirī school to which he belonged. The study demonstrates that in evaluating the issue of ijmāʿ based on ijtihād, Ibn Ḥazm adheres to the Ẓāhirī approach, which places at its center the absolute determinativeness of the revealed text (naṣṣ) in the derivation of divine rulings (ḥukm sharʿī). Consequently, for Ibn Ḥazm, God’s ruling is confined to what He has revealed, and to go beyond this is to add to the religion. In conclusion, this study examines Ibn Ḥazm’s views on the foundation of ijmāʿ within the framework of his Ẓāhirī perspective and elucidates his systematic stance against all human interpretive and inferential mechanisms that lie outside the revealed text. (shrink)

This article offers a comprehensive critical review of Mohamed Mostafawi's book, "Philosophy of Jurisprudence: A Study of the Methodological Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence." The author explores the distinction between Usul al-Fiqh (traditional principles) and the "Philosophy of Fiqh" as a modern analytical field that examines the theoretical underpinnings and external factors influencing legal derivation (Istinbat). The review highlights the book’s attempt to move beyond repetitive scholarly cycles by analyzing the "Logical Structure" of Ijtihad and the historical influence of Aristotelian (...) logic on Islamic legal thought. Furthermore, it discusses the intersection of Fiqh with other disciplines such as theology (Kalam), linguistics, and social sciences. While acknowledging the book's depth, the reviewer notes a conceptual overlap where the work functions more as a "Philosophy of Usul al-Fiqh" rather than a philosophy of the legal branches themselves. This review is pivotal for understanding contemporary attempts to modernize Islamic legal methodology. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to explore the possibility defending women's rights (or, more broadly, expressing women's concerns) within a framework of Islamic concepts and ideas. This is to be accomplished by introducing a number of methodological principles that can, and (for feminists) should govern the practice of "religious interpretation" (ijtihad) which Muslims have used throughout the centuries to adapt Qur'anic and Islamic teachings to changing realities and circumstances.

Many question whether Islam and science can be compatible. In the first six hundred years of Islam, Muslims addressed all fields of knowledge available to them with unprecedented zeal and contributed immensely to the knowledge that became the precursor of the Renaissance in Europe. The Tatar invasion in the thirteenth century and the total destruction of Baghdad, the Muslim capital of knowledge and science, followed by the crusades, the ensuing hostility between East and West, and Western colonialism of Muslim countries (...) led to a distrust of all knowledge emanating from the West. Such distrust closed the doors to ijtihad, a dynamic method in Islamic jurisprudence for addressing change, new demands, and new acquired knowledge, even though the Qur'an challenges Muslims to think, contemplate, understand, comprehend, and examine everything around them—tasks that bring humankind closer to God as they find methods to apply God's laws of justice and equity to the benefit of all humankind. Islam is the religion of yusr (ease) and not ‘usr (hardship). The creation of the world was for human benefit and use. Innovation for such beneficial use and application is a must. (shrink)

The common method of the traditional Islamic Jurisprudence in seminaries has been challenged by Ayatollah Yousef Saanei, one of the ten prominent Iranian Grand Ayatollahs. Saanei is well known for attempting to institutionalize a new method of Ijtihad, known as searching Ijtihad, which seeks to reconsider the common mode of understanding religious texts and jurisprudential inferences. His experiences of observing the systematic ineffectiveness and discrimination in popular jurisprudence regarding women’s rights, family, and religious minorities persuaded him to take (...) scientific action in revising the common jurisprudential method. In the present paper, the necessity of revising the common jurisprudential approach in seminaries from Saanei’s point of view is firstly studied. Afterwards, the foundations, principles, and methods of modern Saanei’s Ijtihad will be investigated to determine the structure and foundations of his jurisprudential method and evaluate its impact on resolving the contradictions between traditional perceptions of religion and human rights. (shrink)

Abstract. In January 1985, about 80 Muslim religious scholars and biomedical scientists gathered in a symposium held in Kuwait to discuss the broad question “When does human life begin?” This article argues that this symposium is one of the milestones in the field of contemporary Islamic bioethics and independent legal reasoning (Ijtihād). The proceedings of the symposium, however, escaped the attention of academic researchers. This article is meant to fill in this research lacuna by analyzing the proceedings of this symposium, (...) the relevant subsequent developments, and finally the interplay of Islam and the West as a significant dimension in these discussions. (shrink)

How do we judge whether we should be willing to follow the views of experts or whether we ought to try to come to our own, independent views? This book seeks the answer in medieval philosophical thought. In this engaging study into the history of philosophy and epistemology, Peter Adamson provides an answer to a question as relevant today as it was in the medieval period: how and when should we turn to the authoritative expertise of other people in forming (...) our own beliefs? He challenges us to reconsider our approach to this question through a constructive recovery of the intellectual and cultural traditions of the Islamic world, the Byzantine Empire, and Latin Christendom. Adamson begins by foregrounding the distinction in Islamic philosophy between taqlid, or the uncritical acceptance of authority, and ijtihad, or judgment based on independent effort, the latter of which was particularly prized in Islamic law, theology, and philosophy during the medieval period. He then demonstrates how the Islamic tradition paves the way for the development of what he calls a "justified taqlid," according to which one develops the skills necessary to critically and selectively follow an authority based on their reliability. The book proceeds to reconfigure our understanding of the relation between authority and independent thought in the medieval world by illuminating how women found spaces to assert their own intellectual authority, how medieval writers evaluated the authoritative status of Plato and Aristotle, and how independent reasoning was deployed to defend one Abrahamic faith against the other. This clear and eloquently written book will interest scholars in and enthusiasts of medieval philosophy, Islamic studies, Byzantine studies, and the history of thought"-- Back cover. (shrink)

The distinction between assets and ideas lies at the core of the misunderstanding between Islam and secularism, the strongest version of which is unfolding in the United States. Muslims view Islam as knowledge-based (intellectual) property, not an idea. Secularists reduce Islam to a mere idea, reserving the notion of intellectual property for literary and artistic works, inventions, patents, films, computer programs, designs, trademarks, and trade secrets. Muslims elevate the knowledge-based assets of Islam to the highest level of protection, more than (...) the intellectual work of any scientist, artist, or corporation. Even in the face of a rising tide of secularism throughout the world, they refuse to consign their religion to the marketplace of ideas, a place where ideas are depreciated and trashed. This clash of understanding between Islam as an idea and Islam as intellectual property breeds mutual mistrust between secularists and Muslims. (shrink)

Debates about preserving, modifying and applying sharia through principles of taqlid or ijtihad are immensely useful in thinking through a sharper definition of tradition for political theorists and historians of political thought more generally. Political theorists and historians of political thought have tended to use tradition in a range of ways without specifying key elements of the concept. Building on debates in Islamic thought related to taqlid and its relationship to ijtihad, and through a focus on the ideas (...) of a contemporary thinker, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, this paper proposes that tradition in political thought can be defined as a framework for knowledge production and consumption constituted of two key elements: method and sensibility. Further, the paper suggests that this definition allows us a better understanding of vibrancy in a tradition: vehement debate, contradictions and internal contestation are not signs of decay but of vitality within a tradition. It is the severe delinking of the two elements of a tradition, method and sensibility, which has greater potential to reduce its vibrancy. (shrink)

This book approaches the question of technology from an Islamic ethical perspective. The book tries to broaden the scope of the Sharia to deal comprehensively with the ethical questions and dilemmas that arise in the midst of a postmodern technological culture due to the absence of well-defined religious-ethical ends. It looks at the maqasid as a universal ethical theory to be interpreted and applied in the global technological context. It weaves the contemporary philosophical analysis of technology within the maqasid discourse (...) and assesses modern technology through the lens of the ultimate aims and purposes of the Sharia. It works out the relationship between the various objectives and how they can be developed into an Islamic ethics of technology. Following in the recent interest in the objectives of the Sharia, the book further expands the scope of the maqasid and carries it further to encompass metaphysical and ethical debates surrounding technology. Anyone interested in finding alternatives to the existing technological model will find this book valuable. Specifically those interested in Islam and Modern World and how ijtihad is being undertaken to tackle contemporary ethical problems will find this book helpful. (shrink)

The issue of inheritance distribution for transgender individuals in Muslim societies presents a legal and ethical dilemma that necessitates a multidisciplinary inquiry. This study explores the compatibility of Islamic inheritance law and international human rights standards, focusing on transgender rights, gender identity, and justice. The primary objective is to assess whether Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) can evolve to accommodate contemporary understandings of gender while preserving doctrinal integrity. Methodologically, the research employed a normative legal analysis combined with comparative case studies and fatwa (...) reviews from multiple Muslim-majority countries. It also utilized the maqashid al-shari’ah framework and human rights principles such as non-discrimination and the right to property. Key sources included classical and reformist Islamic scholarship, human rights declarations, national legal reforms, and court precedents. The findings reveal that classical fiqh lacks provisions for transgender inheritance but allows reform via maqashid al-shari’ah and legal maxims like al-‘adah muhakkamah. Human rights norms, notably those found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Yogyakarta Principles, advocate for equitable inheritance rights. Fatwas from institutions in Iran, Egypt, and Malaysia provide partial support for gender recognition post-transition, though inheritance rights remain inconsistently applied. National laws, such as Pakistan’s Transgender Act, signal a shift toward inclusivity. Reformist scholars propose contextual ijtihad and hybrid legal models as pathways to justice. This research concludes that the harmonization of Islamic inheritance law and human rights is not only possible but essential. It contributes to legal pluralism and highlights the potential of ijtihad to bridge doctrinal law and social realities, urging further empirical studies on transgender Muslims’ lived experiences. (shrink)

In this study, Abu Hanifa, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Celaleddin Devvanî’s approaches for justice and economic justice will be analyzed. Their views on Islam have been studied within a certain string of thought. For the purpose is examined in order to maintain the existence of a system according to God’s righteousness in accordance with justice processes, the works of these names which aim to produce solutions to the problems of their ages by making ijtihads. From this point (...) of view, the current meanings and validity of the ideas they produced in their times on justice and economic justice were evaluated. Their anecdotes were reviewed for the healthy functioning of social, political, legal and economic structures. Information that they gave about state, justice, economy, society, national consciousness, division of labor and specialization shed light on their time periods. Furthermore, their ideas include thoughts that guide the leaders and social scientists of future generations. Therefore; Hanifa, Rushd, Tusi and Devvani’s analyses contain important explanations about the policies towards providing social harmony in multinational and heterogeneous social structures. This study, submits a different perspective to examine the solutions offered by Abu Hanifa, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Nasirüddin Tûsî and Celaleddin Devvanî in the times they lived and to the future generations. The solutions they developed against the complicated conflicts of their ages, include information that can be taken as examples for now and future. Their decisions and judgments on social, political, legal and economic issues in their positions give effective methods to their interlocutors. -/- Bu çalışmada Ebu Hanife, İbn Rüşd (Averroes), Nasîrüddin Tûsî ve Celaleddin Devvanî’nin adaleti ve iktisadi adaleti ele alış biçimleri analiz edilmektedir. İslam üzerine geliştirdikleri görüşler belirli bir mantık silsilesi içerisinde incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda Allah’ın indirdiğine uygun bir sistemin hakkaniyet olarak adalete yönelik işlemler dahilinde mevcudiyetini sürdürebilmesi için, içtihadlar yaparak çağlarının sorunlarına çözümler üretme amacı güden bu isimlerin yaptıkları irdelenmiştir. Buradan hareketle zamanlarında adalete ve iktisadi adalete dair ürettikleri fikirlerin güncel anlamları ve geçerlilikleri değerlendirilmiştir. Sosyal, siyasal, hukuki ve iktisadi yapının sağlıklı işleyebilmesi için ortaya koydukları anekdotlar gözden geçirilmiştir. Yaşadıkları zaman dilimlerinde devlet, adalet, iktisat, toplum, millet bilinci, işbölümü ve uzmanlaşma gibi hususlarda verdikleri bilgiler kendi dönemlerine ışık tutmuştur. Bunun da ötesinde gelecek nesillerin yöneticilerine ve sosyal bilimcilerine yol gösterecek fikirler içermektedir. Dolayısıyla Hanife, Rüşd, Tusi ve Devvani’nin ortaya koyduğu analizler çok milletli ve heterojen toplum yapısına sahip ülkelerde sosyal ahengi sağlamaya yönelik politikalara dair önemli açıklamalar ihtiva etmektedir. (shrink)

At the end of the verses 44th, 45th, and 47th of the Surat al-Māʾida, it is seen that those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are described as unbelievers, oppressors, and fāsiqs with the general expression. Especially in verse 44th of the surah, the fact that those who do not judge by Allah's revelations are characterized as misbelievers has been a subject of debate since the early period. Many different opinions have been expressed by the mufassirs about (...) who are included in this scope, who are the addressees of the verse, whether the” kufr” here is blasphemy in the form of denying Allah and leaving the religion, or is it a different type of “kufr”. As it is understood from the information in the sources regarding the asbāb al-nuzūl of these verses were revealed as the Jews destroyed the provisions set by Allah in the Torah, changed them with various ways, and discriminated between people in various ways and applied them. With the relevant verses in Sūrah al-Māʾida, all these injustices, lawlessness, and unfairness were made away and the Jews who committed them were strongly criticized. In this regard, it is seen that some commentators have devoted themselves to the reason for the verdict of the relevant verses and interpreted the characterizations in the verse as infidels, cruel, and fāsiqs as covering only the Jews who committed these acts. However, even if the information about the contents of the relevant verses shows that these verses are about the Jews, this does not mean that the scope of the verse should be limited to them. Because both the universality of the messages of the Qur'an in general and the fact that the address in the verses came in a public way do not allow these provisions to be allocated only to a certain group. In addition, according to the rules of istinbat, the fact that the reason for making a religious provision is specific does not prevent the generalization of it. When considered within the framework of the principles we have explained, it becomes clear that narrowing down the provisions of the verses by allocating them only to a certain group is not a correct approach. In this article, it is aimed to draw attention to the richness of meaning that emerges when the relevant verses are evaluated in terms of the types of indications in the fiqh method. When the verses within our subject are evaluated in terms of the types of indications, it is seen that these verses indicate that the implementation of a provision in force cannot be avoided. In the relevant verses, it's concluded that important principles and rules of law such as the realization of justice, the rule of law, equality before the law, no one's being privileged in the sight of the law, the powers of the head of state are limited, that there is no place for ijtihad where Allah's clear judgment exists. (shrink)

As it is known, in the early Islamic period, that is, during the time of the Prophet and his companions it was not difficult to find answers to the questions. However, when we look at the later periods, we see that people who had just accepted Islam, belonging to many new cultures, asked new questions. It was not so easy to answer these questions merely based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah. For this reason, Kufa scholars considered it necessary to (...) use ijtihad with raʾy (free legal reasoning). They were subjected to a lot of criticism in that period and today because they resorted to raʾy while doing ijtihad. One of the two main schools that criticized the Ahl al-Ra’y the most was the Ahl al-Hadith (people of hadith) school. From the early days of the formation of the Hadith school of jurisprudence, the Iraqi school has been accused of abandoning the book and the Sunnah in the interpretation of Shari'ah rulings and preferring the rulings obtained by the intellectual method. This intellectual method that we are talking about has been the target of criticism in certain historical periods, sometimes in the name of ra’y, sometimes inthe name of qiyas (analogy), and sometimes in the name of istihsan. Abu Hanifa is one of the famous scholars who have been criticized by Ahl al-Hadith. This article deals with the life, works and school of ra’y of Abu Hanifa. (shrink)

In this article, the essential claims and approaches seen in American and Scandinavian legal realism are presented and compared with Islamic law. The uncertainty on which it is based constitutes the essence of legal realism; In terms of Islamic law, there is no possibility of an uncertainty approach as seen in legal realism. The agreed points became clear and fixed. On the other hand, there are different appearances of clarification, not ambiguity in ijtihad issues. Even though realists reject the (...) understanding of root and source, Islamic law, based on the Book and Sunnah is a legal system that consists of certain roots and develops with them. Despite the rejections of realists, morality and values have a central place and importance in Islamic law. While realists define justice as part of the law and subject to the direction of the law; Islamic jurists are based on the approach of interdependence. While realists reject all the rules of law formed in the process; Islamic jurists systematized the rules of law and compiled works in this context. In contrast to the realists' approach that the law will become clear and come into existence with the decision of the judge, Islamic jurists have declared the system of law, which has come into existence with ijtihad as well as what has become clear with the texts. Contrary to the unlimited pluralism seen in realism due to the rejection of the understanding of root and source, there has been limited pluralism in Islamic law, which finds its traditional meaning within the framework of source understanding. After analyzing these issues in the article, the study was completed with the presentation of the results obtained. (shrink)

The early period Ismaili jurist Al-Qādî al-Nu'mān appears as an important figure in the formation of Ismaili jurisprudence. There is very little information about Kadı Nu'mân's family, childhood, education and intellectual environment. His full name is Abû Hanîfah Nu'man b. Muhammad b. Mansûr al-Qādî at-Tamîmî Al Qayrawānî. He was born around 290/903 (late 3rd (9th) century) into an educated family in Qayravan in North Africa. There are different opinions about the sect he belonged to when he was growing up. On (...) the other hand, it is difficult to say for certain whether Nu’mān received education in the Ismaili sect due to the understanding of taqiyya in the madhhab. However, it is understood from the basic jurisprudence texts Nu’mān wrote that he most likely did not receive a Sunni education. Historians refer to him as 'Qadi Nu’mān or Abu Hanifah al-Shi'i' in order not to confuse him with the imam of the Hanafi school. Qādî Nu’mān served at different levels of the Fatimid State. Around 313/925, he entered the service of the first Fatimid caliph, Mahdi (r. 909-934 CE/297-322 AH), as a copyist and secretary. During the reigns of the third caliph Mansur and the fourth Fatimid caliph Mu’izz (d. 365/975), Qādî Nu’mān first served as a judge in Tripoli and then in Mansouriya, the Fatimid capital. After the Fatimids conquered Egypt and the center of government was moved to Cairo, Qādî Nu’mān was appointed by the fourth caliph Mu’izz as the head of the appellate courts (maẓālim). Qadi Numans career was at the peak in the period of Caliph Muiz. Qādî Nu’mān worked as a judge in the Fatimid State for about twenty-six years and continued this duty until his death in 363 (973). After the fall of the Fatimid caliphate, there haven’t been any other Fatimid or Ismaili jurists. Qādî Nu’mān is considered by contemporary Ismaili writers as a figure who systematically transformed Ismaili fiqh into an independent sect of fiqh. It can be said that Ismaili fiqh was developed through his works in the Fatimid period. His works continued as the main references in the fiqh studies and after the Fatimid period. With the death of Qādî Nu’mān, the period of ijtihad in Ismaili fiqh and its the establishment phase of Ismaili fiqh came to an end; The sect, in which esoteric interpretations were at the forefront, emerged as a distinctive school of fiqh by discarding ambiguity. Qādî Nu’mān was a very productive writer. He wrote important works related to the field of furu al-fiqh and usûl al-fiqh. Among his works, Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib is undoubtedly one of the most important works in the early history of fiqh methodology. The work in question, which was originally written with the aim of rejecting the Sunni fiqh method, discusses the approaches of the Sunni schools of fiqh on ikhtilāf, taqlid, ijma, nazar, qiyas, istihsan, ijtihad and ra’y in a polemical manner. It reveals the differences of the Ismaili method from the Sunni method in terms of the sources on which the fiqh is based, the authority to make ijtihad and the theory of interpretation of the texts. Qādî Nu’mān examined the relationship between reason and revelation in general and the role of religious authority in comprehending and interpreting the texts while criticizing Sunni methods. Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib has the characteristics of the works of development period as a form. It is possible to observe the question-answer and dialectic form which can be seen in the works of the development period throughout the work in question. Qādî Nu’mān endeavoured to persuade his opponents with a dialectical and argumentative style. Again, he replied to the Sunnis, who were his interlocutors, with their own proofs. In addition to these, Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib has a unique feature in the matter of content. Because it is not very familiar to any Sunni handbook of usûl al-fiqh. It does not mention the hâss, âmm, ijma, qiyas, amir, nahy, alfaz bets, etc. The text is very similar to the Ahbari movement of the Jafari sect for it rejects all forms of ijtihad. It was written at a time when fiqh was not yet stable. Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib gives us crucial information about the development of different usûl and fiqh sources in the middle of the fourth century. However, what is interesting here is that the information he gives about Ismaili method and fiqh is very little compared to the one about Sunni method and fiqh. Much of it centered on Sunni thought and its rejection. However, his ultimate goal was to defend the Ismaili doctrine. (shrink)

Kin marriages have been a subject of literary, historical, sociological, religious, and medical studies from past to present. Such a marriage has been discussed within the science of fiqh in terms of religion. Ḥanafī and Mālikī mujtahids stated that this marriage is permissible. While Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī mujtahids did not recommend kin marriage by seeing it permissible. Based on the fundamental doctrines of Islamic law, they argued that marrying a foreign candidate is mustahabb and answered the related criticisms against their (...) fatwa. In scientific studies, genetic risks in kin marriages were found to be twice as high. Therefore, the kin marriage was not recommended and it is suggested that those who will marry with relatives should undergo carrier tests. In some contemporary religious studies, it has been argued that the families established by kin marriages are stronger, the genetic research does not have absolute precision, and it may be ideological in the form of weakening the family-society structure. Besides, the ijtihads distant to close kin marriage is weak in terms of evidence and opposing evidence has been put forward to defend kin marriage. On the other hand, in some sociological studies, it has been argued that kin marriage is predominantly caused by religion and that it wekaned the social solidairty. This study analyzes the classical and contemporary approaches to kin marriage in detail within the framework of thesis-antithesis in terms of fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, and evidence, and evaluates such studies from a fiqh point of view by including medical research results and some sociological studies on kin marriage. A generally accepted deterministic link cannot be established between kin marriage and genetic disorders. Because, the same risks are found in marriages with foreigners and also arise from harmful substance addiction. However, the genetic risk rate in marriage with close relatives is twice that of marriage with a foreign candidate. The least of the two possible losses is preferred. So it is very sensible that a marriage that is twice as likely to take such a risk should not be recommended by religion. Because, the main purpose of religion in marriage is to protect the generation and ensure its continuation. The fact that such a marriage is not religiously prohibited does not mean that it was recommended. Because it is left to individuals and public authority to limit the ibaha on the grounds of maṣlaḥa. On the grounds that the hereditary risk rate is high, kin marriage is not recommended in the fiqh and an effort has been made to prevent such a marriage from becoming widespread. Sociologically, marriages with a foreign candidate who is equivalent to a close relative are more appropriate in terms of strengthening the social organization. It is seen that Shafi'i and Hanbali ijtihad, which do not recommend close relatives marriage, are supported by current medical and genetic research. It is understood that the ijtihads that does not recommend marriage with close relatives is inaccurate in terms of evidence, and the views that argue that such marriages are stronger in terms of benefits are not in place. In general, it is seen that religion is distant from kin marriage, and such marriages are mostly caused by psychological, sociological, and cultural reasons. The fact that such marriages are common in areas belonging to the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī schools that do not recommend marriage with close relatives, on the other hand, the fact that marriages between close relatives are less in Hanafi regions, which state that the same marriage is only permissible, supports this. In this respect, some claims arguing that such a marriage stems from religion based on the understandings that refer to that kin marriage is recommended by religion, are not accurate. For this reason, it is difficult to establish a connection between the disintegration of social unity, the spread of hereditary diseases, and the claims that religion recommends consanguineous marriage. Today, enlightening the religious aspect of kin marriage will be beneficial in protecting society against hereditary risks. (shrink)

The sciences of kalam and fiqh, which have a special importance in the history of Islamic thought and science, became prominent with their interactions with other sciences in their formation processes and their contributions to the evolution of religious thought. In the literature, the field representing the linguistic, religious, mental and practical aspects of fiqh has become widespread with the concepts of usūl-i fiqh and fürū-i fiqh, and the part about creed as usūlü'd-dīn or fiqhu'l-akbar. It has drawn our attention (...) that Imam Abū Ḥanīfa and Imam Shāfiʿī's ijtihads, fatwas and thoughts have remained up to date in every century without exception in the vortex of overdoing and understatement in these two disciplines. However, there are some narrations stating that although these imams were interested in kalam, they kept a distance from it. Their, famous students also indicated that they gave them advice in this sense. Therefore, this study has been prepared in order to examine the background of the aforementioned issues. For this purpose, the reasons why two imams preferred the science of fiqh in the main axis of the subject were subjected to a general criticism. Consequently, it has been seen that both imams had similar concerns and their ideas have been overlapping in the face of the creed developments of the period. (shrink)

This article examines the regional (and, in particular, Iraqi) response to the Wahhabi daʾwa (call) as first promulgated by Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab in Najd in the middle of the eighteenth century. The first conclusion drawn from the primary sources of the period concerns the reaction of regional scholars and rulers to the message of the Najdi shaikh, and suggests that, for reasons having to do with the unusual way that the Wahhabis interpreted a central set of beliefs long associated (...) by Muslims with the era of the Prophet and the Companions (and called after them, al-salafiyya), the movement may have promoted a mixed message. That is, while it attracted some adherents from among regional sheikhs and notables, it deterred many more. There was, however, no disagreement with the Wahhabis’ most steadfast principle: its pursuit of takfir, which was to create instant enemies for the cause.The second conclusion, however, points to evidence that the Wahhabi movement elicited a deeper and more ambiguous response from its regional audience, and that it is precisely this constantly shifting zone of interaction and controversy between supporters and enemies of the movement that may be its most interesting legacy. These two features—intense debate over the Wahhabi interpretation of Salafi Islam, and the ambivalence it engendered among its wide regional audience—are particularly important in the life and work of the Iraqi shaikh Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi (1856–1924). Al-Alusi was an important anti-Wahhabi Salafi in turn-of-the-century Iraq, whose teachings and philosophy still attracted controversy. Although he was virulently against the Wahhabis in some of his books, he was still associated with them by most observers in his time and ours, if only because he was steadfastly reformist, anti-Sufi, and pro-ijtihad. (shrink)

The essay outlines some of the controversies associated with the construction of taqlid argued by Twelver Shi'i scholars in both classical and modern juridical treatises, with illustrations of the legal reasoning behind them. Among the questions addressed are the necessity of taqlid, taqlid in fundamental beliefs, the boundaries between those who may do ijtihad and those who must instead follow, taqlid and probabilism, and taqlid of a deceased jurist. The essay concludes with a consideration of how these issues have (...) entered into modern discussions of authority. It is demonstrated that, although the principle of taqlid has become central to Shi'ism, the issues involved in it have always been subject to dispute, and that these disputes lend flexibility to the doctrine and enable potential change. (shrink)

In this article, the views of Yusuf al-Qaradawi (d. 2022) on the change of the fatwa are discussed. Other issues of the fatwa method are generally excluded from the scope. At the point of solving new problems, the change of the fatwa is important. The aim of the study is to reveal al-Qaradawi's contribution to the issue of changing the fatwa. In this study, in which the qualitative research method was used, thematic reading was made. As it is known, scholars (...) have adopted the idea that the provisions open to ijtihad can be changed. According to al-Qaradawi, there is even a consensus on this. Likewise, there is a consensus that the final provisions are not subject to change. al-Qaradawi mentioned that independent ijtihad activities should continue. Because only in this way can fiqh remain alive and dynamic. Therefore, it can solve new problems. Therefore, the idea that the door of ijtihad is closed cannot be accepted. On the other hand, scholars should take into account the ancient jurisprudence. It should contribute to this information by adding or correcting it. The principles that allow the change of the fatwa are four in the form of time, place, situation and custom. al-Qaradawi stated that he added six new elements to these. These are as follows: The change of information, the change of people's needs, the change of people's power and possibilities, umumu'l-balwa, the change of social, economic and political conditions, the change of opinion and idea. The author has reached these six elements as a result of a deep research. Muftis should take these factors into consideration when issuing a fatwa. Because the maslahah of the servants and the principle of convenience require this. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

In this chapter, we have developed the substantive content of the Tawhidi epistemic worldview as the qur’anic law, contrary to the mistaken understanding of shari’ah, fiqh, and fatawa being the composite of Islamic law. The Qur’an in conjunction with its supportive organs of the sunnah and ijtihad establishes the evolutionary knowledge-centered nature of the Tawhidi socio-scientific order. From Tawhid as law germinate axioms and assumptions for theory construction. In this study, the occidental ideas are critically examined in respect of (...) encompassing the holistic worldview that yields planetary wellbeing with its socio-scientific features. This nature of the Islamic knowledge-yielding process opens new grounds to view the world and cosmos in terms of a unified field theory of “everything.” Amid such a theory, the dichotomous and multiple perceptions of reality, as between the a priori and the posteriori domains, disappear. The one-many problem of discerning reality is negated. Unification rules supreme and is logically tied together with its supportive and integral components, namely, the properties of simultaneity and order. These are shown to be the underlying substantive contents of the Tawhidi precept in terms of its functional role on pervasive complementarities in the realm of creation. This creative impact finds its definitive meaning in all the socio-scientific domains. (shrink)

The contribution of the generation of Tâbi’un in the formation of Islamic sciences in general and in the development of hadith in particular is known. Various studies have been done on the quality of this contribution. Being a part of such an aim is among the targets of this study as well. Not to conducted any work on the hadithism of especially Abdullah b. Abbas' student and after him Atâ ibn Abi Rabah who the most famous teacher of the Mecca (...) school was another encouraging reason. While examining the life and scientific personality of Ata who was one of the early personalities, it has been tried to reach some results with the information obtained from the sources from the first period, especially the fatwa and rumors belonging to him. Atâ who was leading an observable, active political life, lived in the intellectual and social turmoil that emerged in the early period. Atâ who drawing attention with his educator personality, added his own experiences to the scientific heritage he received from the companions in the first instance Ibn Abbas, and had been passed it on to the next generations. Being a fatwa authority in Makkah mufti and pilgrimage organizations for many years is one of his important experiences. In addition to being well-known for his devotion to the Sunnah, he has been taken place between those known among the generation of Tâbi’un with his fatwa and ijtihad. Ata, who is a critical hadith reciter, is accepted as the absolute authority in the hadith. The fact that he was one of the first to make talfiq in the hadith shows that he knew the diversity of the sources he reported and the many tarikh of the narrations. He wrote narrations and encouraged writing of hadith. He contributed to the development of hadith terms with some of the hadith concepts he used and drew attention with the abundance of mursal hadiths. (shrink)

In the period of the Saḥāba (Companions), Tābiʿīn (Successors), and Atbāʿ al-Tābiʿīn (Followers of the Successors), those who had the capacity to do ijtihād on religious issues would act according to their ijtihād without being tied to any a particular person or school. Those who did not have the capacity to perform ijtihād could obtain a fatwā from any muftī whom they consulted, without any school-sectarian affiliation. However, with the emergence of the schools of jurisprudence (madhhab) in II-IV centuries AH, (...) the issues of ijtihād, taqlīd and madhhab have been discussed and different opinions have emerged on the subject. Some scholars argue that those who do not have the capacity to do ijtihād should do taqlīd, while others argue that every legal person (mukallaf) should do ijtihād in their religious affairs according to their own capabilities and act according to the conclusions reached. While those who argue that taqlīd is necessary for a Muslim who does not have the proficiency in ijtihad claim that a Muslim should adhere to a madhhab in his religious-practical life, another group argues -based on the legal maxim “Ammī does not have a madhhab. His sect is that of the mufti he consults”- that a Muslim may act upon the consultation of the scholar he wants to follow. In this study, the issue related to the situation of the Muslim who does not have competence to do ijtihād has been examined. In this context, the nature of taqlīd is emphasized and scholars’ opinions regarding opinions about the taqlīd of the layperson (ʿāmmī) are addressed. (shrink)

Polygyny, the marriage of a man with more than one woman at the same time is a well-known practiced in human history. Islamic law accepts the institution of polygyny as a substitute provision if it fulfills the certain conditions and reasons, -and limited the maximum number of wives to four. Although polygyny is mubah (permissible) in Islamic law, it is not an absolute right that every man can use arbitrarily. Thus in Islamic law, the legitimacy of polygyny has been attributed (...) to the presence of two basic conditions: the observance of justice among co-wives and providing maintnance. However, the observance of these conditions that is left to the mercy of men leads to the exploitation of the right for practicing to polygyny and victimization of the first spouse. Therefore, inserting some restrictions for using this right has come to the agenda from time to time in Islamic legal history. The first legal arrangements concerning the restriction of the polygyny (taaddud al-zawjāt) in the history of Islamic law were indirectly made with the Family Law Decree of 1917 which was prepared in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire. Among the late Islamic jurists, the issue of the limitation of polygyny by public authority in Islamic law continues to be discussed. The civil laws of contemporary Muslim countries contain different regulations on the issue. In this article, the restriction of polygyny by the public authority in Islamic family law will be focused on.Summary: Polygyny, the marriage of a man with more than one woman at the same time is a well-known practiced in human history. Islamic law accepts the institution of polygyny as a substitute provision if it fulfills the certain conditions and reasons, and limited the maximum number of wives to four. Thus, relevant verses in the Qur’an (al-Nisa 4/3, 129) and the Prophet’s own practice (al-Ahzab 33/50, 51, 59 al-Tahrim 66 / 3-5) show that it is legitimate for a man to marry more than one woman (up to four) at the same time in Islamic law. Although polygyny is legally permissible (mubah) in Islamic law it is not an absolute right that every man can arbitrarily use. Thus in Islamic law, the legitimacy of polygyny has been attributed to the presence of two basic conditions: the observance of justice among co-wives and providing maintenance. On the other hand, there may be some exceptional circumstances permitting polygyny in Islamic law. For example, when female population is much more than male in the society and when a, woman is can not fulfill her family duties due to her cureless illness, polygyny is permitted in Islamic law.As it can be understood from the explanations above, polygyny in Islamic law is not a general and mandatory provision that should be applied by every man who has legal capacity to marry. On the contrary, it is an exceptional provision that is justified if there are certain conditions and justifications. According to this; polygyny is a moral and legal institution that is made up of mutual consent based on individual and social conditions and needs in Islamic law. Therefore, men do not have to marry a second woman on their current wives, as well as women have the right to say “no” to marry a married man as a second wife.When the conditions and rationales indicated in the relevant verses and doctrine are evaluated together, it can be said that in order to be able to legitimize the polygyny in Islamic law, there must be three basic conditions:(1) Observing justice among spouses, (2) Having sufficient financial power to provide maintenance for spouses, (3) Existence of individual or social need or necessity.Therefore, in order to prevent the exploitation of polygyny, which is justified under certain conditions and justifications in Islamic law, the above-mentioned conditions must be fulfilled. Otherwise, polygyny can cause some problems, unrest and injustice for individual, family and society. Hence, in the presence of certain conditions and justifications, polygyny accepted in Islamic law as a moral and legal institution aiming the elimination of individual and social arbitration.Although the legitimacy of polygyny in Islamic law depends on the existence of certain conditions and special circumstances, it is a known fact that they are not always observed in practice. It can be said that the right of polygyny is a subject of abuse in practice. Therefore, the limitation of polygyny by the public authority has come to the fore in Islamic legal history. Today, control of the public authority and inserting some restrictions of polygyny continue to be discussed among the Islamic jurists. In the past, it is possible to say that the control of the exercising of this right has been done relatively by society (social environment). However, nowadays, since the society cannot perform the control mechanism, it is brought up by the state (public authority) on behalf of the society.Among the contemporary Islamic jurists regarding the supervision or limitation of polygyny by the public authority; there are two approaches: “those who accept” and “those who do not accept” such restrictions.Islamic jurists, who accept that public authority is allowed to intervene in polygyny, grounded their views on two perspectives: The first is that the polygyny is legally permissible and the public authority has the authority to limit the permissible (mubah) in Islamic law. The second is that polygyny is restricted with the conditions in the Qur’anic verses such as “husband’s observation supervision of justice among his wives” and “having the power for ensuring the livelihood (nafaqa) of his wives” and it is more appropriate for the benefit of society and the purpose of the legislator (Shari’) to be subject to the control of the public authority whether these conditions are present or not. Islamic jurists, who do not agree that the public authority has the right to intervene in polygyny grounded their views on two perspectives as well: First, polygyny is a legitimate right mentioned in the verses in Islamic law and there is no definite proof that this can be prohibited or restricted by the public authority. Secondly, it is contrary to the verses to prohibit or limit the right that the Qur’an makes legitimate (free).Thus, it is possible to say that the opinion which accepts that the public authority has to limit polygyny is more accurate in terms today’s social conditions. Namely, polygyny is linked to two basic conditions: ”husband’s observance of justice among his wives and having the power to provide maintenance for his wives. Therefore, supervision of the public authority on checking the existence of these conditions is more appropriate for the purpose of the legislator (Shari legitimizing polygyny and social benefit.In fact, the Ottoman Family Law Decree of 1917 indirectly limited the right of the husband to marry more than one woman, giving the woman right to stipulate a condition in her marriage contract that her husband not to marry a second woman. In the 1924 Draft of Family Law Decree, which was prepared after the repeal of the Family Law Decree of 1917, but not enacted, it was proposed that the application of polygyny should be presented to the approval judge.In today’-s Muslim countries, there are three different practices: namely “completely prohibiting polygyny”, ”releasing polygyny” and “giving the court the right to monitor the existence of necessary conditions “. In countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Indonesia, Malaysia (and Pakistan), the validity of polygyny depends on the permission and supervision of the judiciary. Some of these countries which have accepted judicial review have given the judicial control for the requirement of justice, some of them the conditions of justice and maintenance some of them for the conditions of justice, maintenance and a legitimate justification.In sum, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant verses, polygyny in Islamic law is legitimately permissible (mubah). However, the public authority has the right and authority to limit the mubah in Islamic law in the case of the elimination of damage and the necessity of the public interest. On the other hand, the public authority has the right and authority to enact the law in Islamic law by preferring one of the existing ijtihads that meet the needs of the society and conforms to the conditions of the age.According to this, when the public authority made a statutory regulation that links the use of right of polygyny to the permission of the judge, this regulation is binding on society.Therefore, in the event of such a legal arrangement, it is possible for the public authority to allow the men who comply with the conditions and not to allow the ones who are not to comply with the conditions after conducting the necessary investigation. As a matter of fact, now Family Laws of many Muslim countries now include such legal arrangements. It is also worth mentioning here that there may be a necessity for a man to marry more than one woman (up to four) at the same time in terms of social benefits, when the population of male and female in a society is excessively disproportionate. In such circumstances, it is also possible that the public authority encourages, or even mandates, the marriage of men who have fulfilled the conditions to more than one woman. (shrink)

Due to the current shifting regional paradigms in the Middle East brought on by the series of popular uprisings known as the Arab Spring, this article focuses on the issue of minority rights within modern Islamic theorizing. Evaluating the writings of Islamic intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan, Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im and Rashid Al-Ghannushi, the article finds that there are indeed constructs available within modern Islamic theorizing that can help resolve current minority problems within Arab societies, albeit with the addition of (...) human rights discourse on citizenship and multiculturalism. Noting that minority–majority relations are a global problem, as seen through case studies of the United States and Europe, human rights discourse, cultural relativism and religion are explored, concluding that Islamic theorizing is a blend of the three. Turning to usul al fiqh, it is concluded that traditional Islamic approaches to minority rights fail to incorporate anything but religious minorities and those religious minorities are second-class citizens under shariah interpretation. The rise of the Ottoman millet system eventually helped shape the collective identity for minority groups, but it still placed sole emphasis on religious minorities and treated all minorities as unequal subjects under the sultanate. Building on the constructs of modern Islamic theorizing and expanding to include the concepts of multiculturalism and territorial citizenship, this article asserts that for minority–majority struggle to be solved, modernist Islamic theorists must transcend the traditional Islamic minority paradigm and instead promulgate citizenship as a basis for equality in society, applying new ijtihad for a fresh, integrative interpretation of minorities within Islam and the civil state. (shrink)

Among the Muslims the most common sect is Ḥanafī. It is mentioned in the Ḥanafī sect that there are a line of students who transfer the principles of the sect from generation to generation. In order for the Islamic conquests that started simultaneously in the Eastern and Western lands to be permanent, people were sent to teach Islamic morality, worship and fiqh that encompass daily life. From the 2nd century (A.H.) the sectarianization process that started in the centers such as (...) Kufa, Medina and Damascus has naturally spread to the geography of the West. Many jurists who were educated in the madrasas in the East transferred this education to the newly conquered lands in the West, thus contributing to the fact that sectarianization began in the East and West at the same time. During this period, the views of many mujtahids, including Abū Ḥanīfa and his students, began to enter this geography again through his students. In this article, the most important person who introduced the Ḥanafī sect in the Andalusian region and transferred Abu Ḥanifa's ijtihads, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Farrūkh's life, his scientific personality, his contributions to the spread of the sect and the reasons for the Ḥanafī sect to find supporters in the region will be followed by a short course and the history of the sect will be tried to uncover in the history of Andalusia.Summary: Among the Muslims the most common sect is Ḥanafī. It is not a coincidence that the Ḥanafī sect spread more than other sects and found supporters. Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) is the most senior among the imams of four leading sects. He experienced about commercial and everyday life, had loyal students. This is because he discussed with his students before deciding on a ruling.Islamic conquests in the east and west started at the same time. Experts teaching Islamic morality were sent to conquered places. In this way, both morality and Islamic law, which encompasses worship and daily life, were also taught. Since the implementation of justice was considered as the main duty of the state, legal affairs were dynamic and systematically organized. For this purpose, both in the Medina and the newly conquered lands, various issues such as, management, use, distribution, non-muslim marriage, trade and so on emerged. These issues were carried out with the "kadi" establishment, which is like today's ministry of justice.In the Hijri 2nd century, Fiqh schools produced practical solutions to matters of process and worship in centers such as, Iraq, Medina and Damascus. These schools completed the sectarianization process after a century. Many Islamic jurists who took madrasah education in the east taught these training in the west. They pioneered the development of this sectarianization process both in the east and the west at the same time.The Islamic jurisprudence solved the problems that emerged with the conquest process that began in Andalusia, primarily through the independent jurisprudence, kadi and muftis in the region. After 710 A.C., the Ḥanafī sect reached Andalusia. After the death of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abu Yusuf became the chief justice. Later, the views of Abū Ḥanīfa gained importance. Abu Yusuf appointed the judges who knew the Ḥanafī sect. Abū Ḥanīfa's students, like a gold mine, embraced the views of their teachers. These jurisprudences were adopted by the supporters. Imam Muhammad was the first to write the case law of Abū Ḥanīfa. The views and thoughts of Abū Ḥanīfa, which were published by Imam Muhammad, spread throughout Iraq, Damascus, Iran and Khorasan. Later these thoughts reached North Africa that was under the control of Aghlabid (A.C. 800-909).In the same era, ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh passed to the way 6500 km to learn western sciences. The purpose of Farrūkh is to write the views of his teacher, Abū Ḥanīfa. In this way, he returned to Andalusia by writing ten thousand subjects. Beginning from 767 A.C., Ḥanafī sect gradually began to form in this region. He served as a judge voluntarily, although he did not serve as the official judge. Therefore, it contributed greatly to the spread of this sect in the west. The Mālikī sect, which due to from the animosity of Umayyad (A.C. 661-750) and Abbasids (A.C. 750-1258), came to the forefront. Abdullah b. Ferrûh was not as famous as the other disciples of Abū Ḥanīfa.Although Ḥanafīism spread in the west, it was in the foreground in the eastern geographies. Scholars such as Qadi Ayyad (d. 544/1149), Ibn Farḥūn (d. 799/1397), Muhammad Abū Zahra (d. 1974) and Hintātī state that this sect was effective for a short time in the west. On the other hand, Maqdisī (d. 380/999) states that Ḥanafī existed in Andalusia until the second half of the third century A.C. and was at least as widespread as Mālikīism. Orientalist Lévi Provençal (d. 1956) says that Ḥanafī sect did not reach to Andalusia. However, it can be understood from the above statements that this view is not real. In addition, according to the student hierarchy described in the article, it is understood that the Ḥanafī sect maintained its existence in this region for a while. In Andalusia, the views of the sect from the 8th to the 13th centuries known, recognized and followed by experts and the public. Because this sect was not official, its books were not in demand. For this reason, the basic works belonging to the sect were not reproduced.It is not true that the Ḥanafī sect never came to Andalusia or did not stay for a long time. ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh, who studied at Abū Ḥanīfa for 5 years, introduced Ḥanafī sect in Andalusia. Then his students continued this teaching. In this study, the life, mastery and students of ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh, who made important contributions for the first time in teaching Ḥanafīsm's to Andalusia, have been brought together. This information is summarized in terms of Ḥanafīsm's entry into Andalusia, the reasons for acceptance in social life and the duration of the sect in the region. (shrink)

It is well known in the usûl al-fiqh (fundamental principles of Islamic law) that the Mukallaf (accountable person) is either a Mujtahid or a Muqallid. Mujtahid is a title given to the Islamic jurist who has the ability to arrive at rulings; thus, he is required to practice Ijtihad. While Muqallid is the person who has no ability to conduct such activities; thus, he is required to follow the Mujtahids. Taqlid (conformity of one person to the ijtihad of (...) another) of the four Imams has been common among Muslims since the fourth century of the hijri, their madhhabs including its origins and branches have been well established, and many scholars and laypersons have followed them since that era till the time being. The second considers that restricting imitation (Taqlid) to these schools of thought has caused the stagnation of Islamic jurisprudence and its inability to keep pace with the times. The research dealt with these two points of view and followed the method of comparison and analysis. The two points of view on the issue were presented and discussed, and then the implications in contemporary reality were explained. The research used books written in the science of jurisprudence in general and in the section of Juristic Interpretation and Imitation in particular, in addition to books written in the history of jurisprudence. The research reached several results, most notably are as follow: 1) the need to adhere to the four schools of thought (Madhhabs) in all actions and fatwas and not to depart from them except for necessity and need, 2) these Madhhabs represent the jurisprudential identity of the Sunnis group, it should not be underestimated, and that it is sufficient to meet most of the needs of the age. It is not correct to describe the commitment to it as inertia. The call for liberation from the jurisdiction of the four schools of thought resulted in corruption, the most important of which is the lack of discipline in fatwas and providing fatwas with abnormal sayings. (shrink)

The application of the death penalty for perpetrators of riddah by fuqaha is a problematic violation of human rights. This is because there is no good reason to show that the punishment for riddah is the death penalty. The existence of the hadith which is considered to be the legitimacy of riddah punishment turns out to be very different from the reality of its application in the history of Islamic criminal law. This article aims to answer academic anxiety about the (...) death penalty for perpetrators of riddah as a result of the ijtihad of fuqaha as well as to confirm the construction of its historical reality in state life. This article finds that some verses of the Qur’an and the hadith which are used as legal basis by fuqaha are only understood textually and treated as absolute theological verses and hadiths, but not based on historical evidence. The history of the application of criminal punishment during the time of the Prophet shows that there is no application of the death penalty to the perpetrators of riddah, except riddah which is followed by criminal acts. So it is not solely because of the act of riddah itself, but because of a greater crime against Islam. The implementation of the death penalty for the perpetrators of riddah which is based on textual interpretation of the hadith, thus has the potential to conflict with the principles of human rights and religious freedom which have been regulated in the Qur’an. Contribution: This study enriches perspectives on the meaning of riddah as one of the strategic issues in Islam and shows that a new interpretation of riddah has become an important idea to promote a peaceful and inclusive society and provide access to justice for all. (shrink)

In the recent decades, many Muslim intellectuals have devoted their intellectual efforts to reconstructing the jurisprudence through a new interpretation of Islam in order to solve the problem of human rights. While they have mostly tried to find a solution based on Ijtihad in derivation of Shari’a, Mahmoud Mohammad Taha and Mohsen Kadivar have asked for structural Ijtihad, presenting reversed and rational abrogation theories. In the current article, the researcher aims to focus on three main questions: Why do (...) they believe that traditional jurisprudence and Ijtihad in derivatives are not able to solve the conflict between Islam and human rights? What are the most important governing principles in the corrective theory of each thinker, and how can their proposed theories lead to the reconciliation of Islam and human rights? And finally, what are the most fundamental principles and common features that lie in the theory of the two thinkers? (shrink)

Drawing on fiqh al-aqalliyyat, this article introduces a Muslim minorities curriculum and negotiates the notion of diasporicity as a process that signifies a community’s readiness to respond to its own cultural, religious and literacy practices. More specifically, first, I propose a Muslim minorities curriculum that is informed by diasporicity and fiqh al-aqalliyyat. Second, the article makes a distinction between diaspora and diasporicity. In what ways can diasporicity itself be conceptualized to advance Muslim education and what are the pedagogical implications? Third, (...) it identifies what I call dialectical constructs within fiqh al-aqalliyyat that are conducive to diasporicity, namely, qiyas, ijtihad, istihsan, and taysir. Additionally, this article explores contingency as an overlooked philosophical and pedagogical dimension, which advances intercultural and critical thinking skills. It conceptualizes a Muslim education that is attuned to the “curriculum-as-lived”; hence it develops an educational theory that validates diasporicity. (shrink)

This article discusses the issue of the emergence of the juristic schools (madhhabs) in the Islamic world, clarifying that the appearance of these schools was not the result of disputes or division among Muslims, but rather came as a natural response to their ever-renewing needs through the ages. For the leading scholars and imams exerted themselves in understanding the religious texts and established firm principles and foundations, which helped anchor and organize Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, the madhhabs became comprehensive intellectual schools (...) that enriched Islamic thought and contributed to preserving its legal heritage. Moreover, it is clear that these madhhabs played an essential role in unifying references, as they provided scholars with a strong source from which they organized fatwas and rulings, so it became possible for Muslims to return to them when seeking out the legal ruling on new issues. In addition to this, the flourishing of authorship in fiqh and the increase of debates among the followers of the schools contributed to deepening legal awareness and broadening the horizons of research. At the same time, it is necessary to point out some of the negative aspects that accompanied adherence to madhhabs, such as the spread of madhhab fanaticism at times, and the decline of the spirit of ijtihad and the closure of some minds to new emerging issues. Despite these phenomena, the presence of followed madhhabs remained a scholarly necessity, as they balanced the diversity accepted in Sharia with adherence to the principles, and preserved the intellectual and juristic unity of the ummah. Finally, the importance of the juristic schools emerges today more than ever, as they form a link between the heritage of the nation and its present, and provide a solid foundation from which contemporary scholars exert themselves to address new issues in a disciplined spirit that abides by the well-established rules of ijtihad. (shrink)

This paper by using the ijtihad paradigm of maqâshid al-syarî’ah of JasserAudah and the descriptive-analytical approach, would like to emphasize that the role of religion and economic welfare are two things that cannot be separated. Although in practice these two things often face obstacles, especially in the matter of diversity in religious life because of the superficial ijtihad paradigm of Islamic law. Based on the contemporary paradigm that seeks to provide new criteria in the conception of qath’i al-dlilalah (...) and dlanni al-dlilalah, it can be stated that the contemporary Islamic law paradigm that needs to be built must be based on the development of citizens’ welfare Muslims, but also must be the same as non-Muslims because of that we need to carry out financial and economic reforms ; protection of freedom of thought and freedom of religion is an important aspect that must be maintained to guarantee the peace and harmony of the nation’s life in the territory of Indonesia. Therefore, the religious and economic aspects must be prioritized for their protection and safety. (shrink)

The ijtihâd issues are among important problems of uṣûl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). Given al-beyân el-ijtihâd in the meaning of interpreting naṣṣ (text) and al-qiyâs el-jtihâd in the meaning of reaching a verdict of a new issue which is not determined by naṣṣ, it is possible to say that mujtahid (a jurist) is actively in the ijtihâd activity. Thus, the ijtihâd issues has been discussed in uṣûl al-fiqh since early period. The fact that Shâfi‘î refers to ijtihâd issues in his (...) works which have arrived the present day shows that there is a rich accumulation of knowledge about ijtihâd discussions in early period. After Shâfi‘î, the issues were discussed by scholars of Islamic legal theory. Among the Shâfi‘î (uṣûl al-fiqh) works which have arrived the present day, the first work that deals with ijtihâd issues in an ordered, systematic and detailed way is the work of al-Mâwerdî’s el-Ḥâvi’l-Kebîr. In this study, al-Mâwerdî discusses many issues in uṣûl al-fiqh, especially the definition of ijtihâd, its types, the relation between ijtihad and qıyâs, the qualities of mujtahid, iṣâbet (right) and ḫaṭâ’ (fault) in ijtihâd and the provision of ijtihâd. The debates on the ijtihâd issues in Shâfi‘î uṣûl al-fiqh before al-Mâverdî are important our subject. al-Mâwerdî’s view of uṣûl has a close relationship with the accumulation of uṣûl developed prior to him. al-Mâwerdî mentions the views of many scholars who have contributed the accumulation of the sect in the ijtihad issues, especially Shâfi‘î. He refers to the views of scholars from sects other than Shâfi‘î in the issues he discussed. From this point of view, it is certain that to determine the ijtihâd issues in al-Mâwerdî’s el-Ḥâvi’l-Kebîr will also help us to determine the framework and course of debates on ijtihâd in the classical period. (shrink)

The question of bias in methodology and terminology is a problem that faces researchers east, west, north and south; however, it faces Third World intellectuals with special keenness. For although they write in a cultural environment that has its own specific conceptual and cultural paradigms, they nevertheless encounter a foreign paradigm which attempts to impose itself upon their society and upon their very imagination and thoughts. When the term “developmental psychology” for instance is used in the West Arab scholars also (...) say “developmental psychology”, when “applied psychology” is mentioned they hurry to use the same term etc. Why not establish a new science with its own mechanisms, methodologies and points of reference to deal with epistemological biases and open up the gate of ijtihad with respect to them? This collection of papers aims to discover some of the biases latent in our terminology, methodologies, research tools, and conceptual principles, and to propose alternative ones marked by a greater degree of independence and neutrality. This is not to belittle the human value of the West’s creative contributions but to emphasize the danger of making it the ultimate point of reference and then trying to continuously play “catch up” with it. (shrink)

The need for renewal felt in various fields with the Tanẓīmat, and the changes and modernization activities realized in accordance with it, and the nature and boundaries of these activities are important issues that determine the period's intellectual agenda. Some of the proposals for a solution to save the state are related to the renewal of religious thought. The bad situation in the Ottoman Empire stems from the way religion is understood, not from religion itself, and one of the names (...) that produce ideas about the necessity of changing this way of thinking is Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri. He believes that Fiqh and Exegeticsshould be based on the work of updating the content of Islamic Sciences within the framework of contemporary needs. Claiming that the basic need of society is not Science of Kalām but Catechism, Kadri claims that the attempt of the science of Kalām, regulated to respond to the needs of the age will not result in even will cause religious conflict among people. In this article, Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri'sintellectual background, his suggestions for the renewal of religious thought and his objection to the new Science of Kalām are discussed.Summary: What defines the history of late Ottoman period is the concept called change. There have been reform attempts in order to canalise the military, economic, socio-cultural change and transformation due to political turmoil starting from the end of the 16th century and beginning of the 17th century. Basic argument regarding these reforms finds its base on Qanūn al-Qadīm and the idea of returning to Sharia. Along with the Declaration of the Imperial Edict of Reorganization (Edict of Gulhane) the previous reforms which were made earlier changed dimension and westernization became a government policy. During the ongoing process, the change in terms of Westernization became a current issue within every segment of Ottoman society. Need for innovation in various areas, and therefore the change and modernization movements and accordingly these movements’ nature and boundries set the intellectual agenda of the era. Some of the suggestions are associated with renewal of the religious thought which are to keep the State from difficult situation it is in. Solutions proposed in this context creates a rich intellectual discussion environment within Western, Islamist, and Turkist intellectuals. Islamists in general terms are of the opinion that the difficult situation Ottoman is in does not stem from the religion itself but the way of understanding religion; and they are of the opinion that this way of thinking should be altered; when they bring about their suggestions, it is seen that the way of thinking is their starting point. What causes the Islamists fall apart within themselves is the nature of renawal. Islamist intellectuals, supporting the idea which is the content of islamic knowledge should be updated according the needs of era, suggest various ideas in terms of which dicipline should be in charge for the needs in question. While some intellectuals are of the opinion Kalām should be prioritised, some are of the opinion Fiqh and Exegetics should be prioritised. Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri, who wrote under the pseudonym of Shaykh Muḥsin-i Fānῑ ez-Ẓāhirῑ, is one of these intellectuals coming up with an idea. Kadri suggests a renawal in thinking based upon Fiqh and ExegeticsḤüseyin Kāẓım Kadriis one of the most prominent intellectuals of Constitutional Period. Working as a governor of an Ottoman province, deputy, and minister and engaging in journalism, Kadri compiles a series of work in religion, language and agriculture. All of his efforts are to find ways of saving Ottoman from its difficult situations. Thus, Kadri questions the quality of the knowledge which was brought about in religious thinking and proposes solutions. What lies under his solution is the need for a dicipline for society’ s practical problems. He bases his opinion on opposition to new theology movement. According to Kadri, ever since Kalām was codified, it has never been useful to Muslims, on the contrary it has impaired the Muslims. Renowation of Kalām creates nothing but problem. In his opinion, due to using Greek philosophy content and method, Kalām is not a dicipline authentic to Muslims, besides it is a harmful dicipline which aims to damage the essence of Islam.One of the reasons why Kalām is out of Islamic thinking tradition is because of the Mu'tazila wises are the founders of this dicipline. Kadri is of the opinion that the wises/intellectuals belonging to this school and their theories regarding to understand the existence do not contribute to the field of faith. Admitting the function of Ahl-al Sunnah school generated after the Mihna Period, Kadri states the insufficient side of that function. To him, hence the subjects such as substance (cevher) –accident (araz), hudûth-eternality, wujud (vücûd)-nothingness (adem) etc have been discussed but at that time the subject in question could not be renovated in regard to needs. Another criticism of Kadri raised against Kalām is he considers this field the reason why Muslims are divided. Especially during the times when Muslims need to be in unity and solidarity, Kadri is worried about new discursion which will occur due to the renovation of Kalām attempts. This concern of Kadri causes him to object Kalām with a pragmatic motive.Kalām which is called Usulu'd-Din is another reason why Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadriis against Kalām. In his opinion, theologians complicates the subjects such as amalgation and adjectives of Allah instead of making it clear with ijtihad. Kadri who considers offering proof in terms of faith as faithlessness is of the opinion that faith is not a matter of reason but a matter of sense which has no doubt among people. Criticising the struggle for the enquiry of faith, Kadri puts an emphasis on the significance of the reinterpretation of the principles, for example in the field of Fiqh which deals with the practical area and says it is the most prominent religious duty. He also criticises the imitation of the past and remarks the importance of reason in Fiqh. As an alternative to Ilm-i Kalām, he claims a new Catechism and adds, it is going to provide the religious knowledge people need. It is an ideological contrast of Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadrito think Kalām is the reason for all the misfortune Muslims encountered. This opposition causes him to ignore all the accumulation in Kalām field. Moreover, it is the reason why he makes emotional deductions conflicting with historical facts. Kalām plays a role just like the other fields who could not contribute to Islamic Thinking and its renovation process in accordance with the needs of time. However, it is not realistic and reasonable to think Kalām is the only one responsible. (shrink)

In the last decade a body of literature has been written on the phenomenon of `Islamic Feminism,' which closely links it to a human rights discourse in Muslim countries. The term `Islamic Feminism' may seem a paradox, but by using Iran as a case study this article demonstrates that the idea of feminisms in Muslim societies, rather than being paradoxical, is actually a legitimate and potentially powerful force. In this paper Iranian feminists are categorized into four groups: Islamic state feminists, (...) Islamic non-state feminists, Muslim feminists and secular feminists. Each group is differentiated according to their interpretations of fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), their use of ijtihad (independent reasoning) and their relations to human rights and to the government. The novel concept of feminist dependency paradigm is also explored. The dependency paradigm investigates the multi-layered dependencies of the feminists to the state, to foreign funders, intellectuals, and to the family. (shrink)

لا شك أن إظهار الحقيقة من أهم الأشياء في تأسيس العدالة في المجتمعات الإنسانية، وأن البشرية وإن اختلفت فيما بينها في وضع الوسائل الموصلة إلى تحقيق العدالة شكليًا إلا أنها اتفقت في جوهرها. ومما يعترف به كل منصف أن الإسلام حرص كل الحرص في وضع الوسائل المثبتة للحقوق وعبَّر عنها بـ"البينة"، وهي كلمة مفتاحية تشمل كل ما يبين الحق، وشرحها النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم بـ"الشهود" و"اليمين" بالإضافة إلى الاستعانة من تجربة علم القيافة مع عدم منع إيجاد طرق أخرى لتحقيق (...) المقصد منها علمًا أن المقصد من إقامة البينة بشكل عام هو تأسيس العدل بين الناس، وأن شهادة الشهود وتوجيه اليمين إنما هما وسيلتان معروفتان منذ القدم للوصول إلى هذه الغاية السامية، وإذا كان هناك وسيلة أخرى من شأنها تحقق هذه الغاية يجب الأخذ بها امتثالًا لقول الصادق المصدوق: «الحكمة ضالة المؤمن فحيث وجدها فهو أحق بها». ومن هنا ناقش الفقهاء عبر القرون مشروعية الوسائل الأخرى مما يمكن التمسك بها في إثبات الحقوق وفصل النزاعات، وتحدثوا عن القرائن والأمارات وعلم القاضي وغير ذلك من وسائل الإثبات بلا جمود على ما وصل إليهم من أسلافهم. ومن الإمكانيات التي أتت بها التطورات العلمية في مجال الطب الشرعي البصمة الوراثية التي صارت لا تخطئ في التحقق في أشياء كثيرة منها الولادة البيولوجية. وقد درس الفقهاء المعاصرون هذا الموضوع الذي هو من صميم النوازل الفقهية باجتهادات فردية وجماعية، وكتبت فيها الرسائل الجامعية والبحوث والمقالات العلمية باللغات المختلفة إلا أن ما كتب بغير اللغة العربية بقيت في معظم الأحيان لا تستفاد منها كما يليق وإن أتى أصحابها فيها بما لا ينبغي الاستغناء عنها. وهذا ينطبق على البحوث المؤلفة باللغة التركية أيضًا، وقد أعدت في تركيا الرسائل الأكاديمية من طرف الشرعيين والقانونين في ذلك الموضوع، كما نشرت مقالات علمية في مجلات محكمة بكثرة، لكنها ظلت لا يستفيد منها إلا من يعرف هذه اللغة. والهدف من هذا البحث التعريف بهذه الأعمال العلمية وتقويمها وإشعار أهل العلم بوجودها. وتحقيقًا لهذه الغاية قمنا بتمهيد ذكرنا فيه نقاطًا ثلاثًا تطرقنا فيها إلى أهمية النسب في الشريعة الإسلامية وموقف القوانين الغربية منها، وطبيعة القانون التركي وعدم كون الشريعة مصدرًا من مصادر التشريع فيها، وتأثير ذلك على المسلم الذي يعيش تحت مظلته، وقرارات المجامع الفقهية في البصمة الوراثية. ثم قمنا بتعريف وتحليل الأعمال العلمية التي قام بها الباحثون الشرعيون والقانونيون في تركيا، وذكرنا أهم ما وصلت إليها تلك البحوث مع التعرض إلى الفتاوى الصادرة في ذلك من المؤسسات الإفتائية والتطبيقات القانونية. وختمنا البحث بذكر أهم النتائج التي وصلنا إليها. ولم ندخل في تفاصيل تعريف البصمة الوراثية والتطورات التي حققها الإنسان فيها وإيجابياتها وسلبياتها؛ لأنها أخذت حظها في الكتب المعنية بها. (shrink)

Departing from a critical norm research perspective, the paper first sketches the need to unveil the Eurocentric and secular bias of International Relations (IR) as a discipline in general and its constructivist norm research program in particular. With regard to human rights norms, and religious freedom in particular, the dominant liberal-secular international human rights law understanding of religious freedom marginalizes religious, and especially, Islamic grounds and understandings of this truly global norm. Indeed, it demonstrates both, the dominant ideational perspective of (...) religious freedom as a Western human right grounded by Western-canonical thinkers, and the limits of accommodating religion and religious voices in IR. In contrast, and against the background of a post-secular IR, the paper seeks to unveil alternative and marginalized bodies of Islamic knowledge for the sake of a more comprehensive picture to be painted by IR. By reconstructing reformist Islamic thought and Islamic ideational perspectives and conceptualizations of religious freedom, the paper seeks to let these voices speak for themselves as truly genuine Islamic contributions to IR. The overall aim is threefold: to theoretically connect critical norm research and post-secular approaches with reformist Islamic thought by conceptualizingijtihadas religious norm contestation; to unveil the double marginalized character of critical Muslim voices in IR; and finally to paint a broader and more comprehensive picture of Islam and IR by revealing an alternative Islamic genealogy of universal religious freedom. (shrink)

Muslim physicians and Islamic jurists analyze the moral dimensions of biomedicine using different tools and processes. While the deliberations of these two classes of experts involve judgments about the deliverables of the other's respective fields, Islamic jurists and Muslim physicians rarely engage in discussions about the constructs and epistemic frameworks that motivate their analyses. The lack of dialogue creates gaps in knowledge and leads to imprecise guidance. In order to address these discursive and conceptual gaps we describe the sources of (...) knowledge and reasoning employed by Islamic jurists and clinicians to resolve the question of when a patient must seek healthcare. As we examine both the scriptural evidence and legal reasoning of jurists and the types of medical evidence used by clinicians to address the same question, we draw attention to the epistemic frameworks and constructs at play and identify how constructs from one field may sharpen the deliberative exercises of the other. Hence our work advances discourses at the intersection of Islam and medicine and offers building blocks for a comprehensive Islamic framework that fully integrates the deliverables of medical science within the deliberations of Islamic jurists. (shrink)

In Islam, the acquisition of knowledge is a form of worship. But human achievement must be exercised in conformity with God's will. Warnings against feelings of superiority often are coupled with the command to remain within the confines of God's laws and limits. Because of the fear of arrogance and disregard of the balance created by God, any new knowledge or discovery must be applied with careful consideration to maintaining balance in the creation. Knowledge must be applied to ascertain equity (...) and justice for all of humanity. Research in Islam must be linked to the broad ethical base set forth in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Whether embryonic stem cell research or cloning is ethically acceptable in Islam depends on the benefits derived from such applications. What is most important for the scholars is to adhere to the concepts of compassion, mercy, and benefit to everyone. (shrink)

Abstract: The discovery of DNA paternity tests has stirred a debate concerning the definition of paternity and whether the grounds for such a definition are legal or biological. According to the classical rules of Islamic law, paternity is established and negated on the basis of a valid marriage. Modern biomedical technology raises the question of whether paternity tests can be the sole basis for paternity, even independently of marriage. Although on the surface this technology seems to challenge the authority of (...) Islamic law in this area, the paper argues that classical Islamic rulings pertaining to paternity issues continue to hold higher authority even in cases of conflict with modern technology-based alternatives. Through closer analysis, the paper traces the emergence of a differentiation in the function of DNA tests between identity and paternity verification. While the former is accepted without reservation, the latter is approved only when it does not violate the rulings of Islamic law. (shrink)