This is first English edition of Ethical Concepts and Problems (1971) by the great Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905-81). Løgstrup presents key elements of his ethical and political thinking, on topics from duty, responsibility, will, and choice to cultural policy, democracy, and the right of resistance.

Medical-legal partnerships connect legal advocates to healthcare providers and settings. Maintaining effectiveness of medical-legal partnerships and consistently identifying opportunities for innovation and adaptation takes intentionality and effort. In this paper, we discuss ways in which our use of data and quality improvement methods have facilitated advocacy at both patient (client) and population levels as we collectively pursue better, more equitable outcomes.

Sascha Fink refines and evaluates a view known as “acid empiricism”. As an empiricism, it holds that all knowledge of the world is derived from experience. And as an acid empiricism, it holds that knowledge of the world may be derived from psychedelic experience. Not only is acid empiricism implicit in many psychedelic writings and common in the psychedelic community, Fink contends, it may also explain the recently documented shift towards specific metaphysical positions (e.g., anti-naturalism or panpsychism). Criticising (...) acid empiricists’ propensity for metaphysical conclusions, Fink endorses a more skeptical stance that still has epistemic benefits by challenging basic presuppositions of our everyday views of the world. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the concept of duty, which Løgstrup connects to thinkers such as Kant, Nowell-Smith, and the Stoics, and which he sees as originating from the different kinds of relationships human beings are in with each other, e.g. friendships, marriage, parent–child, employer–worker, etc. Løgstrup argues against Kant that his crude opposition between inclination and duty cannot accommodate the sovereign expressions of life; the latter are more fundamental than duty and duty only enters into the relationship when the sovereign (...) expressions of life somehow fail to be realized. (shrink)

Begrüssung und Einführung, von H. Gehrig.--Bewusstseinsanalytik und Weltproblem, von E. Fink.--Die Zeitanalyse in der Phänomenologie und in der klassischen Tradition, von L. Landgrebe.--Einige Reflexionen über den geschichtlichen Ort der Phänomenologie, von M. Müller.--Der gegenwärtige Stand der Arbeiten am Nachlass Edmund Husserls, von H. L. Van Breda.--Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage, von M. Heidegger.--Personalia.

Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this paper, I argue that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it (...) also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state. (shrink)

Løgstrup firstly argues that the differences between the estate-based society of Luther’s time and our modern society mean that we cannot simply apply Luther to today’s problems. Løgstrup turns to specific political issues: state funding of culture, the influence of non-governmental organizations and pressure groups, and the rules of diplomacy in foreign policy. One particular problem related to Luther concerns the right of resistance, since Luther and the Reformers clearly forbade rebellion. But today, due to the structure of power in (...) democracies, we not only have a right of resistance, but a duty to resist oppressors. Løgstrup discusses the problem of how to maintain high standards (e.g. in education and culture) in a democratic society, because democracy involves the risk that the knowledge of experts will be set aside by the will of the uninformed many. Løgstrup also discusses democracy’s risk of becoming a utopian trust in progress and development. (shrink)

The first problem discussed in this chapter is whether politics and ethics are somehow related or if they are to be treated as completely separate areas. This leads Løgstrup to discuss the golden rule which he sees as a tool for connecting politics and ethics through the _reversal of roles_ it involves. There are two separate pitfalls here, which involve either seeing the golden rule as a mere rule of reciprocity, or indulging in _Schwärmerei_, i.e. indulging in an overly optimistic (...) conception of human good-hearted nature. This then again leads to a discussion of how the _good_ Samaritan actually acts in a loving way out there on the road, whereas a _political_ Samaritan could be conceived of as someone who tries to transpose love into the field of politics. (shrink)

The book begins by setting up what Løgstrup calls the main traditions of Western ethics: teleology and deontology. The teleological tradition is the oldest, originating in Plato and Aristotle, but it also includes Utilitarianism along with early twentieth-century thinkers such as Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. The central proponent of the deontological tradition is Kant, but it also includes Kierkegaard. Also, Løgstrup very briefly introduces a third, ontological, tradition with reference to Luther’s idea of natural law, and which is based (...) on the fundamental conditions of our human existence. This tradition is further described in the subsequent chapters of the book. (shrink)

This very short chapter distinguishes between the three closely related concepts choice, decision, and resolution. In choices, we are the masters of the situation and are able to choose as we prefer. In the decision situation there is no possibility for indifference; whatever we do or refrain from doing alters our life. Finally, resolution differs from choice in that it requires deliberation, where a choice can be made in an instant.

Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by (...) replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide- with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires – even in cases where we expect a precise answer. (shrink)

Løgstrup gives a phenomenological account of the will, which holds that to will something is not to have a freedom of choice but rather to already have chosen, meaning that the will is always already engaged. The idea of a free will thus rests on a misconception of the concept of the will. This leads Løgstrup to discuss Kant’s conception of the good will, and he considers the discussion between Luther and Erasmus, where Løgstrup sides with Luther: human beings do (...) not have a free will to choose the good, but rather the human will is bound to the self and therefore a will to do evil. Løgstrup examines the concept of will found in Descartes’s fourth meditation, before he turns to a discussion of the concept of will in Kierkegaard and the notion of ‘freedom of existence’. Finally is the problem of determinism and indeterminism. (shrink)

In ‘The Ethical Demand and the Norms’, Løgstrup addresses the problem concerning relativity in ethics. He makes the claim that ethics involves both an unchanging and a relative and changeable element; the moral rules vary from time to time and in different cultures, whereas the fundamental element that one should be concerned for the well-being of the other is absolute and unchangeable. This leads Løgstrup to discuss the problem as to whether the Ten Commandments still hold good today, as they (...) can reasonably be seen as part of the historical and thus relative moral rules of ethics rather than its unchangeable basis. (shrink)

In this chapter, ‘Norm and Spontaneity’, Løgstrup starts by drawing a distinction between _morality_ (rules and norms which can be applied and utilized) and the _sovereign expressions of life_ (which cannot be applied or utilized, but can only be realized in the concrete situation). He then goes on to discuss conflicts between duty and temptation and also the possibility of situations where there is a conflict of duties, drawing in Kant and Joseph Conrad’s _The Secret Sharer_ in the discussion.

Løgstrup introduces two key ethical concepts: the _ethical demand_ and the _sovereign expressions of life_. Løgstrup argues that we know the truth of the commandment to love the neighbour not only from Jesus’s proclamation, but also from the basic conditions of our existence. He goes on to introduce the sovereign expressions of life, such as trust and compassion. These phenomena are part of human existence and enable life to flourish. Løgstrup suggests that only when these possibilities for the flourishing of (...) life are prevented from being realized does the ethical demand arise that one now ought to do out of duty what one failed to do out of spontaneity. This leads him to discuss Nietzsche, agreeing with Nietzsche’s anthropological claims regarding human egoism, but criticizing him for not recognizing that this is due to our distortion of the sovereign expressions of life, which he illustrates with our distortion of trust. (shrink)

This very short chapter discusses the concept of responsibility. Responsibility is connected with concrete situations and relations in which we are placed. Løgstrup also discusses the difference between responsibility and duty through their opposites: irresponsibility and neglecting one’s duty. Referring to Luther, Løgstrup describes ‘responsibility’ as a two-sided relation involving a person who is responsible for someone while being held responsible by a third party.

This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a pattern of attitudes is structurally irrational if and only if that pattern guarantees that one has at least one attitude one ought not to have. I argue that this ought-violation view comes with three indispensable theoretical commitments. These commitments concern various relationships between normative permissions and oughts that govern beliefs and intentions, and (...) they may appear plausible when viewed in isolation. However, once they are collectively conjoined, they imply oughts that are incompatible with the ought-violation view of structural irrationality. In particular, on the ought-violation view, these oughts entail that you are necessarily structurally irrational whenever [you intend to p] and [you believe that it is not the case that you ought to p]. However, since you can rationally intend things that you believe to be normatively optional (e.g. merely permitted or supererogatory), the ought-violation view faces the following dilemma: it must either deny one of its essential commitments or accept as irrational a set of attitudes that are clearly not. Either way suffices to show that the ought-violation view cannot serve as a correct analysis of structural irrationality. (shrink)

Eugen Fink repense Nietzsche à la fois à partir de toute la tradition philosophique et en direction d'une pensée neuve et métaphilosophique. Hegel, Marx, Husserl et Heidegger accompagnent discrètement cette tentative d'interprétation ouvrante. Remontant jusqu'à la pensée poétique d'Héraclite et anticipant le proche et le lointain avenir, Fink fait surgir l'intuition centrale du penseur de la mort de Dieu et de la volonté de puissance, du nihilisme et du retour éternel du même. Car Nietzsche qui essaie de dépasser (...) la philosophie et la métaphysique, vise à montrer que tout sens est intérieur au monde, le monde lui-même n'ayant pas de sens, puisqu'il se déploie comme jeu. (shrink)

Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain experiences necessarily or only contingently unpleasant? Here, I sketch how to answer such questions concerning intra-phenomenal metaphysics using the example of pain and unpleasantness. Arguments for a symmetrical metaphysical independence of phenomenal pain and unpleasant affect are presented, rejecting a composite view like the IASP definition and dimensional views. The motivating intuition of these views is explained by common binding mechanisms in consciousness and characterized (...) as fallacious if generalized. There are, however, underlying commonalities between pain perception and unpleasant affect, e.g. formal content or evolutionary ancestry. (shrink)

Within the debate concerning reason and rationality, instrumental incoherence was for a long time conceived of as the paradigm of irrationality. However, with the emergence of the so-called ‘bootstrapping objection’ and the debate concerning the ‘scope’ of rational requirements, the innocuous status of the normative significance of (instrumental) coherence became subject to. This led to a paradigmatic shift in how to understand the relationship between rational requirements and normativity. While there now exists considerable doubt that rational requirements are normative, it (...) is commonly agreed that one’s normative point of view is a key feature of one’s rationality. Here the question is not only if one can hold a particular normative judgement and still be rational; what is significant too is whether your normative outlook coheres appropriately with your motivation. In fact, it is now commonly agreed that rationality requires us to intend to make the world fit with our first-personal ought beliefs. Enkrasia (i.e. coherence between your normative views and your motivation) is thus seen as a rational ideal and as a source of rational requirements. Nevertheless, many elementary questions regarding the application, content, and significance of an enkrasia-requirement remain unanswered, or subject to debate. This special issue on ‘The Nature of the Enkratic Requirement of Rationality’ aims to answer some of these fundamental questions. (shrink)

Geleltwort, von L. Landgrebe.--Geschichte und Ünderliefreung, von G. Miyake.--Wahrhelt und Schn̈heit, von K. H. Volkmann-Schluck,--Georg Büchner: Das endlose Drama, von . G. Baumann.--Die Lehre von der Vergangenheit der Kunst, von, J. Patǒcka.--Der Sinn der künstlerischen Revolte, von D. Pejović.--Das problem der Konkretisierung der Transzendentalität, von E. Heintel.--Ontologische Erfahrung. von J. Lohmann.--Philosophie in Orient und Okzident, von S. Moser.--.

Suppose rationality requires you to A if you believe you ought to A. Suppose you believe that you ought to A. How can you satisfy this requirement? One way seems obvious. You can satisfy this requirement by A-ing. But can you also satisfy it by stopping to believe that you ought to A? Recently, it has been argued that this second option is not a genuine way of satisfying the above requirement. Conditional requirements of rationality do not have two ‘symmetric’, (...) but only one ‘asymmetric’ satisfaction condition. This paper explores the consequences of this argument for a theory of the requirements of rationality. I seek to show that thisview conflicts with another powerful intuition about the requirements of rationality, i.e. ‘rational consistency’: if rationality requires you to X, then it is not the case that rationality requires you to not-X. I shall conclude that ‘asymmetric’ satisfying is based on a misleading intuition, for which we should not sacrifice ‘rational consistency’. (shrink)

This study defends the view that Plato’s account of meaning and truth does not depend on strong Platonism. Strong Platonism is based, among other things, on the assumption that basic entities are pure and cannot mix with anything. In a semantic theory, such entities provide stability of reference to single terms and so keep the danger of fluctuating meanings at bay. Unfortunately, strong Platonism pays a heavy price for this stability in that it cannot explain how terms can be combined (...) into sentences and how statements can be true if truth consists in correspondence between the statement and how things really are. The book under review offers an account of a more restricted ontology. By doing so, it... (shrink)

There is tension between commonly held views concerning phenomenal imagery on the one hand and our first-person epistemic access to it on the other. This tension is evident in many individual issues and experiments in philosophy and psychology (e.g. inattentional and change blindness, the speckled hen, dream coloration, visual periphery). To dissolve it, we can give up either (i) that we lack full introspective access to the phenomenal properties of our imagistic experiences, or (ii) that phenomenal imagery is fully determined, (...) or (iii) that phenomenal imagery does not exist. Which option is preferable? I explore the feasibility of option (ii) in more details by distinguishing between di erent kinds of indeterminacy. One of the most often proclaimed versions of indeterminacy is tied to Representationalism. However, I argue that in this context, Representationalism appears to be the least satisfying option, for which I give ten reasons. By abduction, we should reject Representationalism in favour of (i) or (iii)—the most parsimonious option being eliminativism, and the most conservative being the rejection of privileged access. The decision between these two, however, should be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on which is most adequate given the data. I illustrate this with the comparison between visual agnosia and Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. (shrink)

1) vgl.,,50phistes" 248c4 - 253c3 und 254b7-257aI2. 2) Heidegger, Brief über den "Humanismus"; s. in "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit", Bern 1947,5.53. 3) 5. Diels "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker"6, Berlin 1951; Parmenides B l. 4) Reinhardt "Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie", Bonn 1916, 5.32 ff.; zu dem Verhältnis der beiden "Teile" des Gedichts ist u.a. zu vergleichen: Fränkel "Parmenidesstudien" (Götting. Nachr. 1930, 5.153 ff.), Abschnitt IV und V; Calogero, 5tudi sull' Eleatismo, Rom 1932; Riezler "Par­ menides", Frankfurt 1934 (dazu (...) die Rezension von Gadamer in "Gnomon" XII 1936,5.77 ff.); Jaeger "Die Theologie der frühen griechischen Denker", 5tutt­ gart 1953,5.123 f.. 5) B 8,1 '"!J.6~o~ i3't;,~ t-'"ü'&?~ o~?,Io AeL7tE'Tct,L w~, e,O'''n~.. ~., 6) B 8,2... "t"lXu··nJI Il zm. (shrink)

We will begin our theoretical discussion of desire with the basics. Lacan states right at the outset that desire is “riveted to a certain linguistic function—that is, to a certain relationship between the subject and the signifying system” (S6, p. 5). In other words, what he refers to as desire is not what we find in the animal kingdom, even though we loosely say that the cat wants to go out or that the dog wants its bone. Wanting in the (...) animal kingdom is not the same as wanting in the human realm. Human wants are colored, structured, and indeed skewed (i.e., distorted) by language. (Here we might say that Lacan is incorporating the “articulated” nature of Freud’s Wunsch into his term désir.). (shrink)

This collection of essays by leading international philosophers considers central themes in the ethics of Danish philosopher Knud Ejler Løgstrup (1905–1981). Løgstrup was a Lutheran theologian much influenced by phenomenology and by strong currents in Danish culture, to which he himself made important contributions. The essays in What Is Ethically Demanded? K. E. Løgstrup’s Philosophy of Moral Life are divided into four sections. The first section deals predominantly with Løgstrup’s relation to Kant and, through Kant, the system of morality in (...) general. The second section focuses on how Løgstrup stands in connection with Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Levinas. The third section considers issues in the development of Løgstrup’s ethics and how it relates to other aspects of his thought. The final section covers certain central themes in Løgstrup’s position, particularly his claims about trust and the unfulfillability of the ethical demand. The volume includes a previously untranslated early essay by Løgstrup, “The Anthropology of Kant’s Ethics,” which defines some of his basic ethical ideas in opposition to Kant’s. The book will appeal to philosophers and theologians with an interest in ethics and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The increasing digitalization in the field of psychological and educational testing opens up new opportunities to innovate assessments in many respects (e.g., new item formats, flexible test assembly, efficient data handling). In particular, computerized adaptive testing provides the opportunity to make tests more individualized and more efficient. The newly developed continuous calibration strategy (CCS) from Fink, Born, Spoden, and Frey (2018) makes it possible to construct computerized adaptive tests in application areas where separate calibration studies are not feasible. Due (...) to the goal of reporting on a common metric across test cycles, the equating is crucial for the CCS. The quality of the equating depends on the common items selected and the scale transformation method applied. Given the novelty of the CCS, the aim of the study was to evaluate different equating setups in the CCS and to derive practical recommendations. The impact of different equating setups on the precision of item parameter estimates and on the quality of the equating was examined in a Monte Carlo simulation, based on a fully crossed design with the factors common item difficulty distribution (bimodal, normal, uniform), scale transformation method (mean/mean, mean/sigma, Haebara, Stocking-Lord), and sample size per test cycle (50, 100, 300). The quality of the equating was operationalized by three criteria (proportion of feasible equatings, proportion of drifted items, and error of transformation constants). The precision of the item parameter estimates increased with increasing sample size per test cycle, but no substantial difference was found with respect to the common item difficulty distribution and the scale transformation method. With regard to the feasibility of the equatings, no differences were found for the different scale transformation methods. However, when using the moment methods (mean/mean, mean/sigma), quite extrem levels of error for the transformation constants A and B occurred. Among the characteristic curve method the performance of the Stocking-Lord method was slightly better than for the Haebara method. Thus, while no clear recommendation can be made with regard to the common item difficulty distribution, the characteristic curve methods turned out to be the most favorable scale transformation methods within the CCS. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore in _On Certainty,_ and argues that this critique is largely misunderstood, for two reasons. Firstly, Wittgenstein partly misrepresents Moore. Secondly, Wittgenstein is wrongly taken to be an internalist regarding justification for knowledge. Once we realize these two points, we can understand Wittgenstein’s critique properly as a grammatical argument in that Moore fails to see how the concepts of knowledge and certainty relate to those of justification and evidence. On this reading, we can also (...) understand that Moore and Wittgenstein were in more agreement than many people have thought, even though Moore was not able to exploit and express his philosophical insights properly. (shrink)

In this article, we offer a systematic description of intermedia relations across music, literature, the visual arts, and film. Beginning with some general reflections on materiality and medium in these diverse fields of art, we then offer various examples consisting of two media (e.g. music film, song, images in writing). We pursue the question if, and how, one of the two media may take priority over the other. In our conclusion, we deal with „intermedia relations in monomediality“. This section focuses (...) on artistic representations made in one medium, but based on reflections on another medium. For instance, this is the case when a novelist writes about a picture without having this picture reprinted in the text. (shrink)

It is common in cognitive science to ascribe psychological predicates to the brain, i.e. to assert that the brain sees, feels, thinks, etc. This has prompted philosophical debate. According to the Nonsense View, the relevant locutions of cognitive scientists are nonsensical or false (Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2007). According to the Literal View, they are literal truths and report the psychological properties of brains (Dennett 2007; Crane 2015; Figdor 2018). In this paper, I propose the Synecdoche View, according to which (...) cognitive scientists’ locutions are figurative, with ‘brain’ referring to the human being, such that ‘the brain thinks’ reports the thinking of the human being, not the thinking of the brain. I compare this view to the dominant views in the literature and argue that it is a plausible alternative. One consequence of this is that there is no reason to believe that the locutions of cognitive scientists indicate empirical support for the claim that brains possess psychological properties. (shrink)

As is well known, answer-set programs do not satisfy the replacement property in general, i.e., programs and that are equivalent may cease to be so when they are put in the context of some other program, i.e., and may have different answer sets. Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde thus introduced strong equivalence for context-independent equivalence, and proved that such equivalence holds between given programs and iff and are equivalent theories in the monotonic logic of here-and-there. In this article, we consider a (...) related question: given a program, does there exist some program from a certain class of programs such that and are equivalent under a given notion of equivalence? Furthermore, if the answer to this question is positive, how can we recast as an equivalent program from? In particular, we consider classes of programs that emerge by allowing disjunction and/or negation, and as equivalence notions we consider strong, uniform, and ordinary equivalence. Based on general model-theoretic properties and a novel form of canonical programs, we develop semantic characterisations for the existence of such a program, determine the computational complexity of checking existence, and provide rewriting rules for recasting. (shrink)