Choice, Will, and Freedom

In Ethical Concepts and Problems. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 51-71 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Løgstrup gives a phenomenological account of the will, which holds that to will something is not to have a freedom of choice but rather to already have chosen, meaning that the will is always already engaged. The idea of a free will thus rests on a misconception of the concept of the will. This leads Løgstrup to discuss Kant’s conception of the good will, and he considers the discussion between Luther and Erasmus, where Løgstrup sides with Luther: human beings do not have a free will to choose the good, but rather the human will is bound to the self and therefore a will to do evil. Løgstrup examines the concept of will found in Descartes’s fourth meditation, before he turns to a discussion of the concept of will in Kierkegaard and the notion of ‘freedom of existence’. Finally is the problem of determinism and indeterminism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Learning from Luther.Robert Stern - 2019 - In The Radical Demand in Logstrup's Ethics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 308-329.
The Radical Demand in Logstrup's Ethics.Robert Stern - 2019 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Ethical Concepts and Problems.K. E. Løgstrup & Hans Fink (eds.) - 2020 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The natural causation of human freedom.Gardner Williams - 1958 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (June):529-531.

Analytics

Added to PP
2026-01-22

Downloads
24 (#1,740,056)

6 months
24 (#411,685)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references