This report draws on lessons learned from observations made at seven case study sites, all of which permit economic activities, especially recreation, that are not harmful to the biological values and natural functions of the area. There is now a need to translate these experiences into policy instruments. The guidelines, summarized in some 20 pages, offer sound and well-documented advice on how to proceed.

This handbook provides information on the business case for biodiversity, as well as current biodiversity issues for business, and guidance on corporate biodiversity strategies. The current status of the debate is illustrated by specific case stories, thus providing an opportunity for companies to highlight their renewed commitment to an issue of high importance. The accompanying CD-ROM provides additional biodiversity resources, including extended case studies and lists of the key institutions and sources of information that can help build a company’s capacity (...) for integrating biodiversity into business practice. (shrink)

The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and No¨e’s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. (...) To remain properly enactivist it must be purged of such commitments and indeed all commitment to mediating knowledge: it must embrace a more radical enactivism. (shrink)

The proliferation of multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) over the past years has sparked an intense debate on the political role of corporations in the governance of global business conduct. To gain a better understanding of corporate political behavior in multistakeholder governance, this article investigates how firms construct a political identity when participating in MSIs. Based on an in-depth case study of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh—an MSI established after the collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory complex (...) in 2013 to improve working conditions in the Bangladeshi garment industry—we introduce the construct of a political CSR (corporate social responsibility) identity (PCSRI) and explore how firms construct their PCSRIs in MSIs. Employing a qualitative, inductive theory-building method, we analyze interviews and archival data to develop a framework that elucidates how companies construct their PCSRIs within a continuum ranging from conservative to progressive. We show that constructing a PCSRI involves enacting specific, yet interrelated, political strategies that are themselves shaped by several forces over time. This article contributes to the literature by providing a political perspective on organizational identity construction that extends the emerging integrative perspective in political corporate social responsibility (PCSR) research. We suggest that MSIs should be conceptualized as inherently political governance mechanisms that are driven by multidirectional and dynamic political processes of identity construction. Our study shows that corporate political engagement in MSIs is a more nuanced and complex phenomenon than presently theorized. (shrink)

Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...) least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospects of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defense of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem. (shrink)

It is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms of human enhancement. In this paper, I argue that this widespread belief is incorrect. Using Cohen’s evaluative conservatism as my starting point, I argue that there are strong conservative reasons to prioritise the development of biomedical enhancements. In particular, I suggest that biomedical enhancement may be essential if we are to maintain our current evaluative equilibrium (i.e. the set of values that undergird and permeate (...) our current political, economic, and personal lives) against the threats to that equilibrium posed by external, non-biomedical forms of enhancement. I defend this view against modest conservatives who insist that biomedical enhancements pose a greater risk to our current evaluative equilibrium, and against those who see no principled distinction between the forms of human enhancement. (shrink)

Predictive Processing (PP) framework construes perception and action (and perhaps other cognitive phenomena) as a matter of minimizing prediction error, i.e. the mismatch between the sensory input and sensory predictions generated by a hierarchically organized statistical model. There is a question of how PP fits into the debate between traditional, neurocentric and representation-heavy approaches in cognitive science and those approaches that see cognition as embodied, environmentally embedded, extended and (largely) representation-free. In the present paper, I aim to investigate and clarify (...) the cognitivist or ‘conservative’ reading of PP. I argue that the conservative commitments of PP can be divided into three distinct categories: (1) representationalism, (2) inferentialism, and (3) internalism. I show how these commitments and their relations should be understood and argue for an interpretation of each that is both non-trivial and largely ecumenical towards the 4E literature. Conservative PP is as progressive as conservatism gets. (shrink)

We study the notion of conservative translation between logics introduced by (Feitosa & D’Ottaviano2001). We show that classical propositional logic (CPC) is universal in the sense that every finitary consequence relation over a countable set of formulas can be conservatively translated into CPC. The translation is computable if the consequence relation is decidable. More generally, we show that one can take instead of CPC a broad class of logics (extensions of a certain fragment of full Lambek calculus FL) including (...) most nonclassical logics studied in the literature, hence in a sense, (almost) any two reasonable deductive systems can be conservatively translated into each other. We also provide some counterexamples, in particular the paraconsistent logic LP is not universal. (shrink)

Edmund Burke, long considered modern conservatism's founding father, is also widely believed to be an opponent of empire. However, Daniel O'Neill turns that latter belief on its head. This fresh and innovative book shows that Burke was a passionate supporter and staunch defender of the British Empire in the eighteenth century, whether in the New World, India, or Ireland. Moreover--and against a growing body of contemporary scholarship that rejects the very notion that Burke was an exemplar of conservatism--O'Neill demonstrates that (...) Burke's defense of empire was in fact ideologically consistent with his conservative opposition to the French Revolution. Burke's logic of empire relied on two opposing but complementary theoretical strategies: Ornamentalism, which stressed cultural similarities between "civilized" societies, as he understood them, and Orientalism, which stressed the putative cultural differences distinguishing "savage" societies from their "civilized" counterparts. This incisive book also shows that Burke's argument had lasting implications, as his development of these two justifications for empire prefigured later intellectual defenses of British imperialism"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Conservatism, as a political movement, is familiar. Conservatism as a philosophy, however, remains obscure. Attaining its modern form in reaction to the French Revolution, conservatism has been an intellectual-as well as a moral and political force for two centuries.

In his recent _Beyond Humanity?_ (2011), Allen Buchanan takes issue with a slew of arguments against human enhancement put forward by prominent conservatives. This chapter discusses his treatment of the conservative line of argument against human enhancement ‘from biological and social harmony’ (Buchanan 2011, pp. 161–2). It identifies a version of this line of argument that has more going for it than Buchanan allows. It does not argue that it is strong enough to warrant the banning of the use (...) of all human enhancement technologies, as many conservatives (and some liberals) urge, but argues that it gives us reason to be cautious about the widespread adoption of some possible human enhancements. The chapter also shows that there is nothing distinctively conservative about this line of argument. It deserves to be taken seriously by both liberals and conservatives. (shrink)

Most causal discovery algorithms in the literature exploit an assumption usually referred to as the Causal Faithfulness or Stability Condition. In this paper, we highlight two components of the condition used in constraint-based algorithms, which we call “Adjacency-Faithfulness” and “Orientation- Faithfulness.” We point out that assuming Adjacency-Faithfulness is true, it is possible to test the validity of Orientation- Faithfulness. Motivated by this observation, we explore the consequence of making only the Adjacency-Faithfulness assumption. We show that the familiar PC algorithm has (...) to be modified to be correct under the weaker, Adjacency-Faithfulness assumption. The modified algorithm, called Conservative PC (CPC), checks whether Orientation- Faithfulness holds in the orientation phase, and if not, avoids drawing certain causal conclusions the PC algorithm would draw. Howtion: ever, if the stronger, standard causal Faith-. (shrink)

This text is a polemic against the 2023 article by Sergey N. Gradirovsky who wrote about the present-day relevance of Immanuel Kant’s concept of enlightenment and challenged the idea of the modern human being as a child who needs an external guardian or guide to control his behaviour. In my polemic with Gradirovksy I point out that in addition to “self-incurred immaturity” Kant writes about the historical “immaturity” of savage or backward peoples. I also argue that for Kant “maturity” carries (...) not only biological but also socio-historical connotations. I show that in the modern world Kant’s idea of the social or even historical maturity of the modern human acquires serious problematisation which was shown to be possible and inevitable in the article “What Is Enlightenment?” (1784) and its notion of the historicity of enlightenment, i.e. the very strategy of modernity is possible only when humankind reaches a certain historical age. Using as a point of departure the ideas of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, I maintain that the Kant­ian conception of enlightenment is at once ironic and tragic. It is ironic because it does not rule out that its main thesis on the historical maturity of the human being may turn out to be wrong. It is tragic because its main thrust is “heroisation of the present”, i.e. a readi­ness to resist the temptation of being absorbed by the future, which takes on added relevance in view of the virtualisation of reality. (shrink)

This introduction to biological conservation assesses the value judgments at the heart of conservation. The author elaborates on such questions as: how much habitat does an endangered species require?; does this particular species deserve to be saved?; who will pay for its upkeep?; and much more.

This paper presents completeness and conservative extension results for the boolean extensions of the relevant logic T of Ticket Entailment, and for the contractionless relevant logics TW and RW. Some surprising results are shown for adding the sentential constant t to these boolean relevant logics; specifically, the boolean extensions with t are conservative of the boolean extensions without t, but not of the original logics with t. The special treatment required for the semantic normality of T is also (...) shown along the way. (shrink)

In this chapter, we argue for a phenomenal conservative perspective on religious epistemology and attempt to answer some common criticisms of this perspective.

J. C. Nyiri has argued in a series of papers that Ludwig Wittgenstein is a conservative philosopher. In ‘Wittgenstein 1929-31: The Turning Back’ Nyiri cites Wittgenstein’s admiration for Grillparzer as well as overtly philosophical passages from On Certainty in support of that thesis. I argue, in opposition to Nyiri, that we should separate Wittgenstein’s political remarks from his philosophical remarks and that nothing Wittgenstein says in his philosophical work obviously implies a conservative viewpoint, or any other kind of (...) political viewpoint. In his philosophical work Wittgenstein was concerned with untangling conceptual confusions rather than with putting forward a political viewpoint and the two kinds of activities are quite different. There is, however, some evidence of elements of conservatism in the stances that Wittgenstein took on political issues although there is also some evidence of sympathy for left-wing views, particularly during the ‘late’ period of Wittgenstein’s work after he returned to philosophy at the end of the 1920s. Wittgenstein’s philosophical work cannot be claimed by people of any particular political persuasion as their own but it can be used to untangle philosophical problems in the work of a great variety of political philosophies. (shrink)

In 1850, Tsar Nicholas I decreed that university philosophy teaching be restricted to logic and empirical psychology, allowing only Orthodox theologians to teach these subjects and excluding university professors from teaching philosophical courses. This article explores the context behind this decree, demonstrating that it mirrored Catholic Austrian practices aimed at reducing the influence of Protestant German Idealism. Through archival analysis, we reveal that Adam Fischer (1797–1861), a philosophy professor at the University of St. Petersburg with Austrian descent, intertwined ideologically driven (...) arguments with a new understanding of psychology as a part of philosophy. The archival evidence indicates that the initial draft of the decree did not aim to remove university philosophers. Instead, the ban, initiated by Tsar Nicholas I, became an unforeseen challenge for the administrative system. This study highlights the political and intellectual dynamics that influenced the development of philosophical education in Russia. (shrink)

Standard formulations of supervenience treat what is fixed by the base as a point-valued higher-level property. This presupposition becomes strained in scientific contexts in which laws constrain outcomes by fixing stable chance profiles—conditional probability measures—rather than single results. I propose stochastic supervenience as a conservative extension of deterministic supervenience: relative to a background set of laws $$\:L$$, base states determine a law-like kernel from $$\:B$$ to $$\:\varDelta\:\left(A\right)$$. To distinguish this framework from mere probabilistic correlation, I impose constraints ensuring that (...) the kernel is invariant across $$\:L$$ -worlds, non-degenerate, constant on $$\:L$$ -indiscernible base states, and subject to anti-trivialization conditions. Crucially, these conditions block “mere relabeling” reconstructions that render the dependence symmetric, and exclude treating non-Dirac structure as ignorance over $$\:L$$ -silent refinements. Deterministic supervenience is recovered as the Dirac boundary case, and I show that the dependence structure is preserved under coarse-graining when non-degeneracy is maintained. To connect the metaphysical proposal to scientific practice without reducing it to model-fitting, I introduce a compact diagnostic toolkit—normalized mutual information, a divergence spectrum with permutation baselines, body-tail comparisons for graded distributional multiple realization, and effective information under uniform interventions—to characterize the strength, structure, and intervention-salience of distributional dependence. The resulting framework preserves physicalist priority while making room for the law-governed uncertainty ubiquitous in the special sciences. (shrink)

The logic CE (for "Classical E") results from adding Boolean negation to Anderson and Belnap's logic E. This paper shows that CE is not a conservative extension of E.

The political right in the Western world appears to stand at something of a crossroads. With insurgent nativist and populist challengers either capturing established centre-right parties (as in the...

An application of diagrams for separating modes of theory development.

Hartry Field argues that conservative rather than true mathematical sentences facilitate deductions in nominalist (i.e., abstracta-free) science without prejudging its empirical outcomes. In this paper, I identify one branch of mathematics as nonconservative, for its indispensable role in enabling nominalist language about a fundamental scientific property, in a fictional scientific community. The fundamental property is electromagnetic reflectance, and the mathematics is Fourier analysis, which renders reflectance ascribable, and nominalist reflectance claims utterable, by this community. Using a recent characterization of (...) conservativeness by Kenneth Boyce, I argue that infinitudes can be rendered inherently mathematical and nonnominalizable in the fictional community, and that rendering infinitudes inherently mathematical for all real communities would yield a convincing counterexample to Fieldian conservativeness. © 2023 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved. (shrink)

Neo-Fregean logicists claim that Hume’s Principle (HP) may be taken as an implicit definition of cardinal number, true simply by fiat. A long-standing problem for neo-Fregean logicism is that HP is not deductively conservative over pure axiomatic second-order logic. This seems to preclude HP from being true by fiat. In this paper, we study Richard Kimberly Heck’s Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic (2FA), a variation on HP which has been thought to be deductively conservative over second-order logic. We show that (...) it isn’t. In fact, 2FA is not conservative over n-th order logic, for all $n \geq 2$. It follows that in the usual one-sorted setting, HP is not deductively Field-conservative over second- or higher-order logic. (shrink)

The philosophical literature would have us believe that the conservative view on abortion is based on the claim that the fetus is a person from the time of conception. Given the widespread acceptance of this analysis, it comes as something of a surprise to learn that it conflicts with a number of major arguments offered in support of the conservative view. I argue, in the present paper, that a careful examination of these inconsistencies establishes that the personhood analysis (...) is mistaken: the conservative view is based on the natural process of fetal development, not the personhood of the fetus. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an explosion of research on inquiry. However, there remains comparatively little work on the nature of group inquiry, which is surprising given that group inquiry is such a commonplace activity. According to this account, group inquiry cannot be explained using the standard approaches to theories of group action and belief, because these theories fail to explain the actions of large groups or the division of labor that large inquiries may require. If correct, it is a devastatingly (...) powerful objection to many accounts of group action. It is surely a requirement of any plausible theory of group action that it be able to explain commonplace actions, and it would be bizarre and problematic if standard theories of group action could not explain group inquiry. Therefore, if the standard views cannot serve as the theoretical foundation for group inquiry, we would be right to question whether these theories should be accepted. I argue that we don’t have to accept this consequence because the objection fails, and I provide an account of group inquiry based on one of these approaches to group action, showing that we already have the tools we need to explain group inquiry. I end by arguing that using the mainstream approaches to group action as part of an explanation of group inquiry has an advantage over other approaches: it provides an explanation of what groups are. (shrink)

Nicholas Agar argues that we should avoid certain ‘radical’ enhancement technologies. One reason for this is that they will alienate us from current sources of value by altering our evaluative outlooks. We should avoid this, even if enhancing will provide us with novel, objectively better sources of value. After noting the parallel between Agar’s views and G. A. Cohen’s work on the ‘conservative bias’, I explore Agar’s suggestion in relation to two kinds of radical enhancement: cognitive and anti-ageing. With (...) regard to both, there are reasons to doubt Agar’s empirical predictions about the severity of the evaluative changes we will undergo. Nonetheless, there is some force to the argument as applied to cognitive enhancement; in particular, radical cognitive enhancement may endanger our current valuable relationships with our loved ones. However, even if we find this a plausible worry for radical cognitive enhancement, it is not plausible for even radical anti-ageing enhancement, because the change Agar predicts will not affect our core motivations in the way that cognitive enhancement threatens to. (shrink)