This chapter is the first to look seriously at Armstrong on conation. A principal focus of this chapter is the so-called content specification or grain problem for the content of desires. Anyone who has read stories about the cunning way genies in bottles make life bad for their masters in granting wishes will be familiar with the problem. The canonical expression of a desire almost without exception leaves open that the proposition expressed could be made true without your getting (...) what you want. The chapter explores the strategy of specifying the content of a desire as a kind of conditional: your desire has something like a conditional content, with the antecedent of that conditional involving the conditions under which the consequent is desirable. It compares Lycan’s own preferred version of this strategy with others and finds resources in Armstrong’s account of conative states to solve the problem. (shrink)

There is no subject to which the writers of ethical textbooks have devoted more attention than that of the relations between pleasure and desire, and yet it is surprising how little agreement their efforts have produced in philosophical circles. This failure seems to me to be chiefly due to the fact that the question is only one among the many problems of conation, and can only be discussed in that context. In consequence, there remains a very wide gap between (...) what psychologists have to say about the analysis of conation and what ethical writers have to say about the problems of moral psychology. 1 My object in writing this article is to help to bring this deplorable state of affairs to an end by expounding a theory of the relations between pleasure and desire, which is based upon a careful analysis of the facts of conation. (shrink)

This study explores the development of moral identity and value systems among entry-level media workers during the formative period of emerging adulthood. Thematic analysis of extensive “life story” structured interviews with newly minted graduates of five journalism and communications programs in the United States (N = 65) focused on responses to specific interview queries regarding ethical challenges. Key themes of challenges involved autonomous agency, transparency/honesty, fairness/justice, ethical cues and modeling, and professional norms and expectations. The analysis suggests patterns in participants’ (...) reliance on a mixture of past experiences, college lessons, and moral principles. These patterns also suggest participants reflected varying levels of moral self-efficacy. (shrink)

Individuals from diverse disciplines, including neurology, physiology, psychology, mathematics, and engineering have contributed to this volume.

The emphasis Socrates puts on caring and other conative psychological conditions in Plato’s Apology is striking insofar as Plato’s Socrates is generally represented as an intellectualist about motivation and virtue. One might expect, accordingly, the representations of good and bad behaviour in his speeches would be characterized more in cognitive than in conative terms. The argument of this paper is that we can better understand Socrates’ conception of moral psychology – and also his views about moral culpability – by attending (...) carefully to the way he explains his side of the case in the Apology. Our argument shows that the attribution of motivational intellectualism to Socrates can be sustained, but not in the way scholars have historically understood it. We show that a different conception of how Socrates understood the relationship between conation and cognition is necessary. (shrink)

Upshot: Douglas Robinson argues for a revision of the extended mind theory that incorporates intersubjectivity and qualia. Robinson argues that “material extendedness” is less important than accounting for the subjective experience of what he terms “body-becoming-mind,” and that this experience, rather than mere computational equivalence between intra- and transcranial cognition, is the strongest argument in favour of the EMT.

This paper aims to drive home an idea that is emphasized by a long tradition of critics and artists, but neglected by philosophers in the last 50 years, at least: the idea that art is often revelatory of the world and of ourselves only to the extent that it creates our world and our ways of living in it. I aim to revive the idea of art as poesis: not only as the product of making, but as the making of (...) ourselves and our world. In spite of Humean assumptions that put a wedge between revelation and creation, cognition and conation, knowledge and responsiveness, I argue that the two are inseparable in many great artworks; they are not even two, but a single dimension of art: often, art reveals the world by creating it. I substantiate this approach to art by drawing on, and closely engaging with a number of works by critics and artists, such as Harold Bloom, William Shakespeare, Virginia Woolf, Susan Sontag, Oscar Wilde, Pier Paolo Pasolini, Jean Stafford, and James Baldwin. Taking seriously the approach to art that they recommend, I argue, puts pressure on extant defenses of aesthetic cognitivism. While I motivate and accept aesthetic cognitivism’s core commitment to viewing artworks as embodying modes of knowledge, the heart of the paper raises the concern that the creative-revelatory (bi-directional) dimension of art is insufficiently treated by contemporary aesthetic cognitivists. I argue that this shortcoming lies in underlying mistaken assumptions about (1) the place of art in our lives, (2) the nature and variety of human knowledge, and (3) human nature and life. I conclude, paraphrasing Nelson Goodman, that “we are too timid” if we fail to acknowledge and philosophically account for this creative-revelatory role of art in our lives. (shrink)

Habit is an integral concept for body studies, a hybrid concept and one that has provided the bedrock across the humanities for considering the interrelationships between movement and stasis, being and becoming, and process and fixity. Habits are seen to provide relay points between what is taken to be inside and outside, disrupting any clear and distinct boundary between nature and culture, self and other, the psychological and social, and even mind and matter. Habit thus discloses a paradox. It takes (...) up a unique position in affect modulation, which encompasses both regulation (in the form of discipline) and also extends the body’s potential for engaging the new, change and creativity. In order to understand the basis of the ambivalent duality governing understandings of habit it is argued that a genealogical approach to this question is necessary. This will be located within the recent ‘turn to affect’ and histories of conation within the psychological sciences, particularly taking the writings of William McDougall as a focus. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the ethics of nationalism as a justified partiality toward one's own nation and conationals versus that of those outside the nation. Familial partiality is used as a point of comparison, if only to justify national partiality as distinctly familial. One way to do so is by assessing the special relations each individual has with each other within familial and national groups. On the one hand, family groups have the advantage of close contact. On the other, a nation's (...) citizens can mobilize themselves in order to produce benefits for all. Both aspects consider the rights of the members of their group. Their partiality is justified when it produces significant benefits. In this respect, national partiality is not equivalent to familial partiality, but neither is it as constrained as it is generally thought to be. (shrink)

In Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of representational mind: perception. Focusing on its form, function, and underlying capacities, as indicated in the sciences of perception, Burge provides an account of the representational content and formal representational structure of perceptual states, and develops a formal semantics for them. The account is elaborated by an explanation of how the representational form is embedded in an iconic format. These structures are then situated in (...) current theoretical accounts of the processing of perceptual representations, with an emphasis on the formation of perceptual categorizations. An exploration of the relationship between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-clarifies the distinction between perceiving, with its associated capacities, and thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing on a broad range of historical and contemporary research, rather than relying on introspection or ordinary talk about perception, Perception: First Form of Mind is a scientifically rigorous and agenda-setting work in the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires (...) and evaluative judgements and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons. (shrink)

According to the conativist the truth of our beliefs about personal identity are determined by our conations. But if our conations determined the truth of our survival beliefs, then our survival beliefs should not be sensitive to what philosophers say, about which account of personal identity is the correct one. There ought be no motivation for individuals to change their conations in response to other people’s differing beliefs about survival. In fact, however, preliminary evidence suggests that this isn’t so. On (...) being told that experts, or the majority of experts, have a view about personal identity which differs from their own, many individuals change their conations. In this paper we consider what impact this finding would have, were it firmly established, and argue that it would motivate a refinement of conativism, a refinement that, we think, is in any case preferable. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide an overview of the conceptual terrain of what we call conative accounts of personal identity. These are views according to which the same-person relation in some sense depends on a range of broadly conative phenomena, especially desires, behaviours and conventions. We distinguish views along three dimensions: what role the conations play, what kinds of conations play that role, and whether the conations that play that role are public or private. We then offer a more detailed (...) consideration of direct private conativism—the version of conativism that we favour—before considering how conativists ought respond to a general worry, according to which any conativist view will lead us to be radically pluralist about persons. (shrink)

Currently, anomalous lived temporality is not included in the main diagnostic criteria or standard symptom checklists. In this article, we present the Transdiagnostic Assessment of Temporal Experience, a structured interview that can be used by researchers and clinicians without a comprehensive phenomenological background to explore abnormal time experiences in persons with abnormal mental conditions regardless of their diagnosis. When extensive data gathered by this scale are available, it will be possible to delineate well-defined anomalous lived temporality profiles for each psychopathological (...) disorder. This instrument may also prove useful for clinicians by providing a more refined assessment of relevant psychopathological symptoms and an in-depth understanding of the patient’s abnormal behaviour as related to specific types of time experience. In the first part of the article, we provide a brief overview of the phenomenological concept of temporality, including pre-phenomenal and phenomenal time, synthesis, conation and synchronization, and of abnormal time experiences in persons affected by psychopathological conditions. In the following part, we describe the basic structure of the interview that comprises seven categories corresponding to the abnormal features of lived temporality: anomalies of synchrony, of time structure, of implicit time flow, of explicit time flow, and anomalous experiences of the past, the present and the future. The paper also includes a section on administration and scoring of the TATE scale, the complete interview and a Likert table for quantifying the frequency, intensity and interference with daily life of the phenomena explored. (shrink)

What kind of activity are non-human animals capable of? A venerable tradition insists that lack of language confines them to ‘mere behaviour’. This article engages with this ‘lingualism’ by developing a positive, bottom-up case for the possibility of animal agency. Higher animals cannot just act, they can act intelligently, rationally, intentionally and for reasons. In developing this case I draw on the interplay of behaviour, cognition and conation, the unduly neglected notion of intelligence and its connection to rationality, the (...) need to recognize that reasons are objective conditions, and the difference between the ability to act for reasons and the capacity to reflect on reasons. (shrink)

The feeling of being alive points to an intricate connection between the organic process of life and foundational subjective experience, or between life and experience (Leben and Erleben). Based on this premise, I argue that self-experience cannot be understood as an internal mental space or a “self-model” that could be produced and localized in the brain, but rather that it is a manifestation of the life of the organism as a whole. I first examine in detail the phenomenology of the (...) feeling of life, distinguishing between two components: vitality (basic vital feelings) and conation (drive, urge, desire). Furthermore, I demonstrate the foundations of both components in self-regulating processes that maintain the homeostasis of the entire organism. The sufficient basis of self-awareness cannot then be found in individual “neural correlates of consciousness,” but only in the self-organization and life process of the organism in its relationship to the environment. The feeling of being alive is then shown to be the fundamental form of self-awareness, both from a phenomenological and a biological point of view. Finally, the paper explores the psychopathology of the feeling of being alive, taking the examples of depression and Cotard syndrome. (shrink)

It is argued that trust is a performative kind and that the evaluative normativity of trust is a special case of the evaluative normativity of performances generally. The view is shown to have advantages over competitor views, e.g., according to which good trusting is principally a matter of good believing (e.g., Hieronymi, 2008; McMyler, 2011), or good affect (e.g., Baier, 1986; Jones, 1996), or good conation (e.g., Holton, 1994). Moreover, the view can be easily extended to explain good (and (...) bad) distrust, where the latter is understood as aimed (narrow-scoped) forbearance from trusting. The overarching framework—which assimilates the evaluative norms of trusting (and distrusting) to performance-theoretic norms—supplies us with an entirely new lens to view traditional philosophical problems about what is involved in trusting and distrusting well and badly, and thus, places our capacity to make progress on problems in this area on a new footing. (shrink)

I argue that denial plays a central but insufficiently recognized role in addiction. The puzzle inherent in addiction is why drug use persists despite negative consequences. The orthodox conception of addiction resolves this puzzle by appeal to compulsion; but there is increasing evidence that addicts are not compelled to use but retain choice and control over their consumption in many circumstances. Denial offers an alternative explanation: there is no puzzle as to why drug use persists despite negative consequences if these (...) consequences are not straightforwardly known. I describe the nature of the causal knowledge that one's drug use is causing negative consequences; map the conceptual landscape of denial and explain how it can block such knowledge; and explore some of the processes and mechanisms that have been studied by philosophy and the cognitive sciences and which may underpin denial in addiction, including well-established information-processing biases, motivational influences on belief formation and self-deception, and cognitive deficits with respect to insight and self-awareness. I conclude by suggesting that addiction is as much a disorder of cognition as a disorder of conation. (shrink)

This book offers a novel account of Aquinas's theory of the human act. It argues that Aquinas takes a human act to be a composite of two power-exercises, where one relates to the other as form to matter. The formal component is an act of the will, and the material component is a power-exercise caused by the will, which Aquinas refers to as the 'commanded act.' The book also argues that Aquinas conceptualizes the act of free choice as a hylomorphic (...) composite: it is, materially, an act of the will, but it inherits a form from reason. As the book aims to show, the core idea of Aquinas's hylomorphic action theory is that the exercise of one power can structure the exercise of another power, and this provides a helpful way to think of the presence of cognition in conation and of intention in bodily movement. (shrink)

This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationals (Miller); (3) democratic deliberation requires communicational transparency, possible in turn only within a shared national public (...) culture (Miller, Barry); and (4) the economic viability of specifically industrialized liberal democracies requires a single national culture (Gellner). I argue that all four arguments fail: At best, a shared cultural nation may reduce some of the costs liberal democratic societies must incur; at worst, cultural nationalist policies ironically undermine social integration. The failure of these cultural nationalist arguments clears the way for a normative theory of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts. (shrink)

The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.

Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies (...) of the metaphysical foundations of modem science—a problem Rolston never directly confronts. The modern scientific world view is obsolete. A post-modem scientific world view provides for a range of potential values in nature actualizable upon interaction with consciousness. The bestthat a modem scientific world view can provide are subject-generated—though not necessarily subject-centered—values in nature. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the resources Thomas Aquinas provides for enquiries concerning the psychological abilities of nonhuman animals. I first look to Aquinas’s account of divine, angelic, human, and nonhuman animal naming, to help us articulate the contours of a ‘critical anthropocentrism’ that aims to steer clear of the mistakes of a na¨ıve anthropocentrism and misconceived avowals to entirely eschew anthropocentrism. I then address the need for our critical anthropocentrism both to reject the mental-physical dichotomy endorsed by ‘folk psychology’ (...) and to articulate a more adequate ‘commonsense psychology’ that acknowledges most embodied animal behavior is observable psychological behavior. Next, I argue that we can develop Aquinas’s doctrine of estimation and conation to formulate an account of nonhuman animal action that more adequately characterizes the purposeful behaviors of nonhuman animals. To do so, we first need to recognize a wider range of nonhuman animal behaviors that are captured by Aquinas’s ‘estimative sense’, and that all of these behaviors are specified by a finite variety of particular goods confined to the animals’ environmental niches. But we also need to supplement Aquinas’s account of human and nonhuman animal agency by exploring the ontogeny and ecology of how humans and other animals become attuned to affordances within these different environmental niches. I argue that we should look to Aquinas’s account of nonhuman animal capacities in ST I-II 6-17 for subtle insights that can expand our understanding of how nonhuman animals engage in purposeful behavior by exercising analogous nonrational and imperfectly voluntary forms of intention, deliberation, choice, execution, and enjoyment. I conclude with an outline for how future enquiry can seek to explain the nonrational purposeful problem-solving competencies of chimps, canines, corvids, cetaceans, cephalopods, and other nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...) decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function. (shrink)

The mathematical practice of proving theorems seems clearly to result in improved mathematical understanding; the aim of proving, and reproving, theorems in mathematics is better understanding. And yet, as is by now well known, fully formalized mathematical proofs are usually unintelligible; they do not advance our mathematical understanding. How, then, should we understand the relationship between proving theorems and advancing our mathematical understanding? I argue that, first, we need a different notion of (formal) proof, one that does not take form (...) to be opposed to con­tent. Eighteenth century algebraic proof provides an example of fully rigorous and fully contentful mathematical proof, and in this case one can see how mathematical proof might provide mathematical understanding. The task is to extrapolate the insights gained from this case to the sort of deductive reasoning from concepts that has been the norm in mathematical practice since the nineteenth century. (shrink)

There is evidence that mental illness is partly socially constituted: diagnoses are historically “transient” (Hacking, _Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the sciences of memory_. Princeton University Press, 1998a; _Mad travelers_. University of Virginia, 1998b) and culturally variable (Toh, _Nature Reviews Psychology_, _1_(2), 72–86, 2022). However, this view risks pernicious relativism. On most social constitution views, mental illness is what (some suitably expert part of) society takes it to be. But this has morally abhorrent implications, e.g., it legitimizes many spurious (...) and harmful diagnoses (like “drapetomania”) and makes mental illness a matter of fashion rather than an objective challenge. This paper defends a conception of mental illness according to which it is partly socially constituted, yet which avoids such pernicious relativism: mental illness consists in an objective inability - a deficit in the skilled metacognitive self-regulation required to be rationally interpretable by one’s community, including oneself. Such reasons responsiveness requires skilled regulation of cognition, conation, and behavior, such that they respect relevant interpretive norms. Because such norms vary culturally, such skills are partly socially constituted. (shrink)

This article brings together mindfulness and habitus theory in relation to developing wise leaders. In particular, we present new insights about the intersection of time, subjective and intersubjective experience, and mindfulness that are relevant to developing embodied wisdom in leaders. We show that temporal competence is essential for shaping habitus and developing embodied wisdom. Further, and to extend theoretical understandings of mindfulness in leadership, we argue that temporal capabilities developed through mindfulness can foster embodied wisdom by creating a specific ‘wisdom (...) habitus’ that includes values and ethics. The system of dispositions that comprise one’s habitus is, however, largely unconscious and implicit and we discuss how mindfulness renders habitus, including ethical conation accessible to development for the bodily ability to act wisely. This article then establishes a framework that leadership development programs in business schools can adopt for understanding habitus and mindfulness to enable embodied wisdom to develop in leaders. Finally, we show that a mindfulness perspective offers valuable contributions to research on leadership. (shrink)

Environmental policy has a size bias. Small organisms, such as microorganisms, command less attention from environmentalists than larger organisms, such as birds and large mammals. A simple thought experiment involving microscopic polar bears and giant microorganisms illustrates the importance of size in environmental ethics. Given the positive correlation between body size and brain size, there is probably a basis for a size bias in environmental ethics using ethical frameworks based on conations. This paper examines the relevance of the size of (...) organisms in environmental ethics. It emphasizes the need to understand the theoretical reasons for the importance of size, and not to base a size bias merely on a subjective anthropocentric prejudice favouring large organisms. (shrink)

Contemporary just war theory usually addresses armed conflicts between two group agents, assuming that one is an aggressor and the other a defender. This paper discusses conflicts between two ethnonational groups, both of which include defenders (minimalists) and aggressors (maximalists). The normative questions that this essay addresses are two: (1) Are minimalists entitled to join their maximalist conationals in fighting the maximalists on the other side, and if so, in which circumstances? (2) If so, what should minimalists have aimed to (...) achieve by resorting to force and coercion? (shrink)

ABSTRACT David Miller has written extensively on the ethical value of the nation. A satisfactory response to Miller's ideas on nationalism requires an assessment of the whole range of his writings on the subject. After stating the outlines of Miller's conception of ‘nationality’, I evaluate the most important arguments for and against any attribution of ethical importance to the nation. Finally, I assess Miller's commitment to conational ethical priority in the context of duties of justributive justice. My main conclusions are (...) as follows. (i) Miller's conservative strategy of justification is unacceptable, and a critical strategy suggests several plausible arguments for valuing national attachments. These arguments are not conclusive, however, (ii) In so far as Miller's position depends on real historical connections between persons, it is susceptible to the objection from historical myth. (iii) Miller offers an unexpected and ultimately unsuccessful response to the claim that national sentiments are partial and hence biased, (iv) Miller provides no good reason to believe that the duties of distributive justice are owed in the first instance to conationals. (shrink)

Environmental ethics has almost exclusively been focused on multicellular organisms. However, because microorganisms form the base of the world’s food chains, allowing for the existence of all higher organisms, the complexities of the moral considerability of microorganisms deserve attention. Despite the impossible task of protecting individual microorganisms—the paradigmatic example of the limitations to a Schweitzerian “reverence for life”—microorganisms can be considered to have intrinsic value on the basis of conation, along with their enormous instrumental value. This intrinsic value even (...) manifests itself at the individual level, although in this case the ethic can only be regulative (an ethical principle). Biocentrism is the most appropriate ethical framework for microorganisms, and the most useful normative framework for implementing the preservation and conservation of microorganisms. This ethic has implications for how we deal with disease-causing microorganisms. (shrink)

Given the proliferation of commentarial works in the post-Ghazālian era of Islamic intellectual history, the close study of individual commentaries has recently become a key schol­arly concern. To take us beyond the necessarily generalizing categories presented by Dimitri Gutas when he first charted the territory of this genre, an approach is needed that involves narrow textual analysis without neglecting the broader context in which a work is authored. Among the works that were initially taken by Gutas as evidence of the (...) “mainstream Avicennism” of their authors is Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī’s (d. 631/1233) Kashf al-tamwīhāt fī sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, in which he sets out to critique Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 610/1210) commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s Pointers and Reminders. In this article, I study the work from three perspectives. Firstly, I consider the con­tents of the Kashf, in terms of both the scope and the nature of its interaction with al-Rāzī’s first-order commentary on the Ishārāt. Secondly, I calibrate the findings of my textual analysis with materials taken from the accounts of al-Āmidī’s biographers, showing that these sources are mutually interpre­tive. Thirdly, I analyze the Kashf from within the context of his broader corpus. Together, I argue, these three perspec­tives contribute to a more nuanced understanding of what it means to describe al-Āmidī’s Kashf as a work of Avicennism. (shrink)

Augustine’s discussion of our memoria of the liberal arts in Confessions X poses a series of challenging questions which are best tackled in the broader context of his ideas on teaching, learning, understanding and the acquisition of knowledge. The contents of the liberal arts are stored in our memory (a non-physical and non-spatial receptacle often meta­phorically depicted through spatial imagery) by themselves, and not through images (like the objects of sense-perception) or ‘notions’ (like the affections of the soul). When we (...) learn the disciplinae liberales, actually we do not absorb new information from our teachers, but we are triggered by their words to retrieve from the most remote ‘caves’ of our memory contents already present in a latent form since birth (I address the question of what exactly these con­tents might be). In the Confessions, unlike in earlier writings, Augustine cautiously eschews expressions which might suggest full-blown Platonic recollection of things known in previous lives and subsequently forgotten, and thus presuppose the pre-existence and reincarnation of the soul (not even the claim that cogitare is, literally, ‘re-collecting’ involves recalling forgotten knowledge). I argue that for Augustine divine illumination (as presented, e.g., in the De magistro and the De Trinitate) and recollection are not two rival and incompatible theo­ries, but two different and yet consistent sets of metaphors meant to illustrate the same family of ideas and intuitions (sometimes underdetermined in their details); I also explain why the illumination metaphor ultimately appears more appropriate. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists assume that mental imagery is a cognitive state, that it represents things as being a certain way. However, I argue that imagery is a conative state: it represents things as to be made a certain way. I challenge the traditional assumption by targeting an increasingly popular cognitive account that identifies mental imagery, such as inner speech, with predictions of sensory input. This predictive account faces both empirical and theoretical problems. The account not only fails to capture the (...) salience effects exhibited by mental imagery, it also cannot explain why subjects should not spend their lives minimizing prediction error by engaging in fantasy. These shortcomings highlight what I call the conative profile of imagery, which includes its salience, motivational, and performance effects. I argue that an alternative, conative view of imagery, according to which mental images are goal states, is best able to account for its conative profile. (shrink)

How do I become an optimist? Drawing on insights from philosophy and psychology, this paper highlights the intrinsic and instrumental value of optimism for human well-being. However, there is an epistemic paradox at the heart of optimism: assigning a high probability of success to one’s own endeavours does not seem rational if one knows such projects are likely to fail in general. Such an attitude is related to what psychologists call ‘positive illusions’. Drawing on Bovens (1999), who formulated and refuted (...) a decision-theoretical argument against hope, this tension is investigated. The analysis shows that optimism is not merely about positive thinking, but also encompasses an impulse to act (conation). As such, optimism motivates behaviour that may alter the relevant probabilities and even expand the space of possibilities. Hence, the apparent contradiction is resolved. The paper concludes that cultivating optimism is a practical process achieved through small, concrete steps toward desirable futures. (shrink)

It is a commonly accepted view that men think to live, and do not live to think, that conation, and not cognition, is the primary object of living. Impression, affect, and expression constitute the complete psychic process. The term philosophy, the love of wisdom, also suggests that man's thought has a practical and not a theoretical objective. In this connection, however, two errors must be avoided: on the one hand an exaltation of the intellect as in rationalism, and on (...) the other hand a depreciation of the intellect as in pragmatism. (shrink)