Abstract

What makes someone a person—and what underlies their persistence over time? Philosophical debates about personal identity have long been divided between psychological and physical approaches, each seeking to ground identity in different mental or biological facts. Yet this familiar dichotomy has led to a theoretical impasse, with neither side securing decisive support. In response, a growing body of work proposes an alternative framework, holding that facts about personal identity depend, at least in part, on our person-directed attitudes and practices. This view is commonly known as conventionalism about personal identity. This volume presents the first comprehensive examination of this novel perspective. Bringing together some of the most influential philosophers in the field, these original essays explore conventionalism’s metaphysical and ethical dimensions, its relationship to neighbouring views, and the challenges it must address as it continues to gain prominence in the personal identity literature. Conventionalism About Personal Identity provides a timely and accessible guide to this increasingly influential approach. It will be of particular interest to scholars and advanced students of philosophy, especially those working on both traditional and emerging theories of personal identity.