This paper sketches an account of reparative justice for climate refugees, focusing on total land loss due to sea-level rise. I begin by outlining the harm of this loss in terms of self-determination and cultural heritage. I then consider, first, who is owed these reparations? Second, who should pay such reparations? Third, in what form should the reparations be paid? I end with thoughts on the project of reparative justice more generally, arguing that such obligations do not depend upon a (...) perfect account of how reparations might be fulfilled; we simply have an obligation to shoot the arrow as close to the target as we can. (shrink)

In the current framework of international protection, refugees almost invariably live in states where they hold no formal political status: they cannot vote, they cannot run for office, and they mu...

For all the young women and girls sitting in philosophy class wondering where the women are, this is the book for you. This collection of 21 chapters, each on a prominent woman in philosophy, looks at the impact that women have had on the field throughout history. From Hypatia to Angela Davis, The Philosopher Queens will be a guide to these badass women and how their amazing ideas have changed the world. This book is written both for newcomers to philosophy, (...) as well as all those professors who know that they could still learn a thing or two. This book is also for those many people who have told us that there are no great women philosophers. Please pledge, read this book and then feel free to get back to us. (shrink)

Temporariness has become the norm in contemporary refugee protection. Many refugees face extended periods of time waiting for permanent status, either in camps or living among citizens in their state of asylum. Whilst this practice of keeping refugees waiting is of benefit to states, I argue that not only is it harmful to refugees but it also constitutes an injustice. First, I outline the prevalence of temporary assistance in the refugee protection regime. Second, I outline the orthodox view on temporary (...) refugee protection – it is acceptable as long as it is not indefinite. I then spend the remainder of the article considering four arguments against temporary refugee protection: the plan argument, the reciprocity argument, the domination argument, and the compounding injustice argument. I contend that the first two arguments, which already feature in the literature, merely show that temporary protection is harmful to refugees. My own arguments on domination and compounding injustice show, instead, that giving refugees temporary protection constitutes an injustice. The domination argument allows us to critique the current practice of temporary refugee protection, whereas the compounding injustice argument shows that temporariness in any form constitutes an injustice. (shrink)

Most academics in philosophy departments accept that the discipline needs to change for the better. In this piece, Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting offer several proposals for how to make philosophy a more inclusive place for everyone.

It is often said that Greek civilization underwent a transition from myth to reason. But what does this assertion mean? Is it true? Were the Greeks special in having evolved our sort of reason, or is that a mirage? In this book, some of the world's leading experts on ancient Greek myth, religion, philosophy, and history reconsider these fundamental issues.

Asylum seekers are rarely treated with respect. This is perhaps especially true of institutions that adjudicate the extension of refugee status. In asylum interviews, those seeking refuge are sometimes asked to reveal deeply upsetting stories of their persecution while facing hostility and distrust from their interviewers. I argue that this arises from a failure to properly balance respect with fairness. A maximally fair scheme may not promote respect because ‘fairness-first’ systems require extensive information to make their judgements. A maximally respectful (...) system might be unfair: without any questioning, some may free-ride on the trust of others. This article argues that we often place too much emphasis on fairness to the detriment of respect, with a particular focus on the asylum interview. First, I outline the limited discussion of asylum interviews in political philosophy. Second, I consider striking a ‘dynamic balance’ between fairness and respect, as set out by Jonathan Wolff. Third, I argue that a highly idealised version of contemporary asylum interviews puts fairness first at the cost of respect. This fairness-first model leads to respect deficits in how asylum seekers are treated. Finally, I consider what a respectful asylum determination system might look like, offering three possible routes: civility, humility, and abolition. (shrink)

In the literature on refugeehood in political theory, there has been a recent turn towards what have been called “state system legitimacy” views. These views derive an account of states’ obligations to refugees from a broader picture of the conditions for international legitimacy. This paper seeks to develop the state system legitimacy view of refugeehood by subjecting the most developed version of it—the account developed by David Owen—to critical scrutiny. We diagnose an ambiguity in Owen’s theory of refugeehood, in the (...) concept of political membership, and unpack the implications of this ambiguity for state system legitimacy views. First, we reconstruct the key aspects of Owen’s account of refugeehood and show how it represents an advance over competing theories. Then we discuss the methodological underpinnings of Owen’s account, showing the constraints and opportunities faced by state system legitimacy views. Next, we raise some problems for the conceptual distinctions that Owen develops between different types of refugee protection: asylum, sanctuary, and refuge. The underlying feature that leads to these problems is an ambiguity in the concept of political membership, which is at the core of Owen’s view of refugeehood. Finally, we distinguish two interpretations of political membership in the institution of refugeehood and chart out some possible ways forward for state system legitimacy views. The critique developed here is a sympathetic one, aimed at the further development of state system legitimacy views. (shrink)

This history of philosophy is a history of men. Or at least, that’s how it has been told over the past several hundred years. But, over the last few decades, we’ve begun to see more and more recognition of women philosophers and the huge impact that they have had on the course of our discipline. There have always been philosophers who happened to be women. Hypatia of Alexandria was known by her contemporaries simply as The Philosopher, and hundreds of young (...) men travelled from throughout the region to attend her public lectures. Philosophers who happen to be women, then, are nothing new. But our failure to recognise them as full contributors to the subject makes them appear to us as something of a surprise. A result of this is that women are often remembered as women first: they are seen more as women than they’re seen as philosophers. (shrink)

It is clear that philosophy has a “woman problem”. Despite the recent acceptance of this fact, it is less clear what ought to be done about it. In this paper, we argue that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely well-positioned to think through the marginalisation suffered by women and other minorities. We therefore interrogate two values that already undergird conversations about inclusion— representation and intersectionality—in order to think about the path ahead. We argue that, once we have done so, it (...) becomes clear that the slow pace of improvement over the last few decades is unacceptable and more radical steps need to be taken. First, we outline the current state of women in philosophy focusing on three areas: levels of employment, publishing, and sexual harassment. Then we turn to representation and intersectionality respectively. We conclude by arguing that many women and people of colour have been arguing for a more radically diverse philosophy for many years. What we are facing is a lack of ambition on the one hand and problem of attention on the other. (shrink)

To generalize about Aischylos is difficult; to generalize about Euripides is almost impossible; but to generalize about Sophokles is both possible and potentially rewarding. With Sophokles—or, rather, with the Sophokles of the seven fully extant tragedies—we can sense a mood, a use of language, and a style of play-making which are largely shared by all seven works. Of these characteristics it is surely the mood which contains the quintessence of Sophoklean tragedy. My aim in the first section of this paper (...) will be to open the way to an appreciation of that mood by following up one of the most important motifs in Sophokles: blindness. In the second section the scope of the enquiry will be widened: I shall show that, in using the blindness motif, Sophokles was drawing on a theme which was fundamental to a large number of mythical narratives told by Greeks from the time of Homer to that of Pausanias, and beyond. In the final section we shall return to Sophokles, placing him this time not against the background of the whole Greek mythical tradition but rather within the specific context of the fifth century B.C., and attempting to overhear the individual dramatic ‘voice’ used by him as he explored the implications of blindness. (shrink)

This paper examines an argument of Saul Kripke for the necessity of theoretical identification statements and defends it against a criticism of M. Perrick ("Are Kripke's Theoretical Identifications Necessary Truths?", Logique et Analyse, Volume 115, September 1986, pages 381-384). It is argued that Perrick's criticism rests on a fallacy of ambiguity. Formal modal logic is used to examine a number of plausible interpretations of Kripke's argument, and Perrick's error is shown to arise from confusion concerning the scope of the modal (...) necessity operator. (shrink)

This article explores the way in which the Yogavāsis t ha's account of causation as coincidence relates to its soteriological agenda and the view that the 'existence' of the world—deemed to be an illusion anyway—is a mere accident. Comparison is made to similar ideas about causality articulated by David Hume, who nonetheless stops short of drawing quite such radical metaphysical conclusions, in spite of his epistemological skepticism concerning the existence of external objects.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Book review: James Souter, Asylum as Reparation: Refuge and Responsibility for the Harms of Displacement. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

This chapter weaves together Trickster figures, emerging game formats and Learning, transformative theories, Exploration, explore relationships between these discourses and experiences. Tricksters are argued to have new twenty-first century Western Relevance. Augmented Reality, ARReality and Alternate Reality Games are described as Trickster tools. A Relationship, power between these tools and Learning, transformative is outlined.

It is hardly controversial to assert that recent work on Greek mythology is methodologically diverse. However, there is one body of writing which seems to have become a reference point against which scholars of many persuasions–not excluding orthodox positivist philologists and adherents of psychoanalysis–feel the need to define their own position. I mean structuralism. G.S. Kirk and, later, W. Burkert have conducted their dialogues with it; C. Segal and more unreconstructedly R. Caldwell have tried to accommodate Lévi-Strauss and Freud under (...) the same blanket; a glance at bibliographical citations in studies of tragedy over the last twenty years will show how J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet have moved from the periphery to the centre. The polemical attitudes being struck by M. Detienne and C. Calame are directly generated by over-confident structuralist attempts to map out the mental territory they claimed as their own. (shrink)

In 1878, amid a rapidly proliferating social interest in public health and cleanliness, a group of sanitary scientists and reformers founded the Parkes Museum of Hygiene in central London. Dirt and contagion knew no social boundaries, and the Parkes's founders conceived of the museum as a dynamic space for all classes to better themselves and their environments. They promoted sanitary science through a variety of initiatives: exhibits of scientific, medical and architectural paraphernalia; product endorsements; and lectures and certificated courses in (...) practical sanitation, food inspection and tropical hygiene. While the Parkes's programmes reified the era's hierarchies of class and gender, it also pursued a public-health mission that cut across these divisions. Set apart from the great cultural and scientific popular museums that dominated Victorian London, it exhibited a collection with little intrinsic value, and offered an education in hygiene designed to be imported into visitors’ homes and into urban spaces in the metropole and beyond. This essay explores the unique contributions of the Parkes Museum to late nineteenth-century sanitary science and to museum development, even as the growth of public-health policy rendered the museum obsolete. (shrink)

Developments in both Convention jurisprudence and the English courts since the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 have significantly extended the reach of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and thus the powers of the judges who administer that broadly-defined provision. Those developments include confirmation that article 8 operates horizontally between private citizens as well as in public law; extension of article 8 to issues of personal autonomy as well as to more narrowly understood issues of (...) privacy; increased emphasis on (judicially determined) proportionality and fair balance; and softening of the criteria for the engagement of article 8 in the first place. The English courts at the highest level have recognized that these developments require them to make decisions on issues of social or even moral priority, extending as far as critical scrutiny of criminal practice and sentencing. Recent cases in the House of Lords such as Countryside Alliance and R v G demonstrate a significant level of disagreement as to how those powers should be exercised, with the result that the outcome of future article 8 cases may depend on the judges’ personality and view of social priorities. (shrink)

_Patronizing the Public: American Philanthropy's Transformation of Culture, Communication, and the Humanities_ is the first detailed and comprehensive examination of how American philanthropic foundations have shaped numerous fields, including dance, drama, education, film, film-music, folklore, journalism, local history, museums, radio, television, as well as the performing arts and the humanities in general. Drawing on an impressive range of archival and secondary sources, the chapters in the volume give particular attention to the period from the late 1920s to the late 1970s, (...) a crucial time for the development of philanthropic practice. To this end, it examines how patterns and directions of funding have been based on complex negotiations involving philanthropic family members, elite networks, foundation trustees and officers, cultural workers, academics, state officials, corporate interests, and the general public. By addressing both the contours of philanthropic power as well as the processes through which that power has been enacted, it is hoped that this collection will reinforce and amplify the critical study of philanthropy's history. (shrink)

Many of the younger generation of intellectuals, highly critical of the increasing penetration of the market into every sphere of daily life, nevertheless bristle at the merest suggestion that Talking Heads, Bruce Springsteen or whoever else that manifests their irrefutably good taste be subject to the same critical attention. Rock music, it seems, in the United States at least, is one of those social phenomena most impermeable to critical discussion. Decidedly, my article (Telos 57) touched a raw nerve in Scudder. (...) The frenzied tone of his reply and the almost wilfully obtuse misreading of my arguments (never did I argue for a conspiracy of capitalist interests - quite the contrary) suggests that something is badly wrong. (shrink)