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The interpretation and justification of the subjective bayesian approach to statistical inference
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):25-38 (1978)
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References found in this work
Slightly more realistic personal probability.Ian Hacking - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):311-325.
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