This book provides the first comprehensive theoretical and doctrinal treatment of the law of mitigation in any common law jurisdiction. Mitigation determines how a claimant’s own response to a breach affects the damages they can recover. It responds to the basic argument: ‘although I did wrong, you made things worse’. It applies to all claims for compensation, regardless of the claimant’s cause of action and irrespective of the defendant’s level of fault (if any). The book’s main argument is that the (...) twin principles of choice and abnormality, which underlie ‘commonsense’ causal reasoning, also explain how judges approach questions of mitigation. Contrary to the conventional view, the rules of mitigation apply symmetrically to benefits as well as harms. If the claimant makes a choice not to replicate their ‘no-breach’ position in the usual way then damages will be assessed counterfactually as if they had done so, for better or worse. The book also explains the relation between mitigation and other damages doctrines including the market rule, intervening acts by the claimant, betterment, remoteness, and contributory negligence. The book’s arguments have broader implications for our understanding of the legal concepts of causation, choice, and loss, and call for a re-evaluation of existing theories of damages. (shrink)

This chapter critiques the orthodox account of the rule of mitigation known as the ‘avoided loss rule’. First, it considers the application of the rule. It argues that the leading texts on damages correctly focus on the ‘directness’ of the claimant’s conduct in relation to the breach; however, they fail to specify how this directness test is applied by the courts. Second, the chapter considers the effect on damages where the avoided loss rule applies. It argues that the rule can (...) result in an award of damages greater than the claimant’s factual loss, yet this effect is in tension with the conventional ‘loss-based’ understanding of damages. The orthodox account of the avoided loss rule also incorrectly treats the claimant’s actual conduct as simply ‘ignored’ in the assessment of damages, when really it involves substituting steps that the claimant did not in fact take, resulting in a counterfactual assessment of the claimant’s breach position. (shrink)

This chapter lays the foundations of the book’s main argument, that mitigation is explained as an aspect of causation. First, it demonstrates the extent of judicial support for this explanation. Second, it shows how legal scholars have tended to resist the proposition that mitigation is explained by causal principles, on the basis that judicial references to causation are too vague and indeterminate. Third, it develops the causal explanation by drawing on two ‘commonsense’ principles of causation identified by Hart and Honoré (...) in Causation in the Law, and later refined empirically by experimental psychologists. These are the principles of choice and abnormality. It is argued that these principles open the way to a more precise causal theory that can be used to explain judicial reasoning and decisions on mitigation. (shrink)

This chapter restates the law of mitigation as it applies to the cases conventionally discussed under the rubric of ‘avoidable loss’. First, it argues that the reasonableness test conceals two distinct rules: the replication rule and the exceptionality rule, as introduced in Chapter 6. It shows how these rules apply to the claimant’s attempts at repair, replacement, extrication, and post-breach negotiations with the defendant. Second, the chapter shows that the effect of the replication and exceptionality rules is that the claimant’s (...) breach position is assessed counterfactually as if they had taken steps to replicate their no-breach position in the usual way. Where these rules do not apply, the claimant will recover for their factual loss. Finally, the chapter addresses the procedural issues of burden of proof and whether (and when) mitigation raises questions of fact or law. (shrink)

This chapter draws out some implications and open questions raised by the book’s account of mitigation, taking a broader perspective aimed at private law theorists. The reflections are organized according to four key concepts: causation; choice; rights; and loss. On causation, the discussion focuses on the nature and scope of the choice and abnormality principles identified in the law of mitigation. On choice, it is argued that the literature on the moral significance of choice could be used to further delineate (...) the boundaries of mitigation. On rights and loss, the chapter seeks to how the new account of mitigation relates to existing general theories of damages, and concludes by proposing a ‘new loss-based theory’ with mitigation at its heart. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the so-called ‘market rule’ of damages is best explained as an aspect of mitigation, and more specifically, as an application of the replication rule. The market rule is conventionally expressed as the rule that where there is an available market for substitute performance, the claimant’s damages will be assessed by reference to that market value, rather than what actually happened. First, the chapter debunks arguments that this rule is incompatible with mitigation: this is so only on (...) the orthodox understanding of mitigation, not the new account put forward in this book. The chapter then sets out the circumstances under which the market rule will apply, emphasizing the importance of the claimant’s choice not to resort to the market. Finally, it explains the effect of the market rule as a counterfactual assessment of the claimant’s breach position, as if the claimant had resorted to the market. (shrink)

This chapter restates the law of mitigation as it applies to the cases conventionally discussed under the rubric of ‘avoided loss’. First, it argues that the British Westinghouse test for determining when benefits are taken into account in the assessment of damages reflects the application of the replication rule, as introduced in Chapter 6. Second, it shows that where this rule applies, loss is assessed on a counterfactual basis as if the claimant had taken steps to replicate, ignoring any benefits (...) actually received as a result of not replicating. By contrast, where the replication rule does not apply, the claimant will only recover for their factual loss. Finally, the chapter discusses two other types of case which are also sometimes referred to as examples of recovery for ‘avoided loss’, but which are distinct from the replication rule. (shrink)

This chapter summarizes the new account of mitigation that is developed in subsequent chapters. First, it outlines how mitigation can be explained using the commonsense principles of causation identified in Chapter 5. Second, it restates the law of mitigation in terms of two rules: the ‘replication rule’ and the ‘exceptionality rule’, each of which reflect the causal significance of the claimant’s choice to depart from the normal response to breach. Third, it sketches briefly how the law of mitigation, so described, (...) might be normatively justified. The final section of the chapter compares the new account of mitigation with the orthodox account outlined in Chapter 1, to clarify how the replication and exceptionality rules relate to and differ from the conventional understanding of the avoidable and avoided loss rules. (shrink)

This chapter critiques some existing theories that have been put forward to explain the law of mitigation. First, it clarifies what is meant by an ‘explanation’ of a legal doctrine, and the criteria for assessing this type of theory. The chapter then considers several existing explanations of mitigation that have been put forward by legal scholars, including the promotion of economic efficiency, self-reliance, or co-operation, the theory that mitigation is an aspect of remoteness, and the theory that mitigation responds to (...) demands of fairness. The chapter also assesses the argument that mitigation may be explained by a combination of these principles. In conclusion, the chapter rejects all of these existing explanations, leaving the causal explanation which is addressed in the next chapter. (shrink)

This chapter outlines the orthodox account of the law of mitigation. First, it sets mitigation in context as part of the conventional ‘loss-based’ understanding of the law of damages. Second, it briefly outlines the historical development of mitigation, tracing its evolution from the earliest authorities to the current orthodoxy. Third, it describes the orthodox account of mitigation in more detail, outlining its division into three rules: the avoidable loss rule; the reasonable attempts rule; and the avoided loss rule. The chapter (...) argues that, applying the broader conventional understanding of the law of damages, the reasonable attempts rule and the ‘first limb’ of the avoided loss rule are both redundant. The orthodox account of mitigation can therefore be expressed more concisely as comprising just two rules: the avoidable loss rule and (the exception to) the avoided loss rule. (shrink)

This chapter addresses three puzzles that arise under the orthodox account of mitigation, explaining in each case how they are resolved by the new account of mitigation developed in this book. First, the conventional language of the ‘duty’ to mitigate, which persists despite routinely being disclaimed as inaccurate by judges. Second, the universal and homogenous application of mitigation to every assessment of loss, which is inconsistent with policy-based explanations of the doctrine such as self-reliance or prevention of waste. Third, the (...) restricted temporal scope of mitigation—applying only after breach—which is hard to square with the focus on whether the claimant acted reasonably. The chapter argues that each of these features of the law of mitigation makes more sense once mitigation is understood as an aspect of causation, triggered by the claimant’s choice to respond abnormally to the breach. (shrink)

This chapter examines the relationship between mitigation and various other doctrines in the law of damages that may be related to or overlapping with it. It argues that the doctrines of intervening acts by the claimant and betterment are both part of the law of mitigation, properly understood, since they entail applications of the replication and exceptionality rules. By contrast, remoteness is distinct from mitigation since it has major differences in scope and application, and—unlike mitigation—is a true limitation on damages. (...) Contributory negligence and mitigation can overlap. Their effects are incompatible, and the better view is that mitigation will have primacy. Finally, the chapter argues that the so-called White & Carter limitation is also distinct from mitigation, since it serves to restrict the availability of the action for the agreed sum rather than as a tool for assessing damages. (shrink)

This chapter critiques the orthodox account of the rule of mitigation known as the ‘avoidable loss rule’. First, it examines when the rule applies. The rule is conventionally thought to be triggered where the claimant failed to act ‘reasonably’ in response to the breach. However, the leading texts fail to specify how this reasonableness criterion applies; instead, they conclude that its application is a question of fact, effectively relying on a ‘case-by-case’ approach. Second, the chapter examines the effect on damages (...) where the avoidable loss rule applies. The leading texts have sometimes described mitigation as an all-or-nothing rule, or they have adopted the ‘guillotine heuristic’, which assumes that mitigation simply chops off recovery for part of the harm actually suffered by the claimant. The chapter demonstrates that instead the avoidable loss rule results in a counterfactual assessment of the claimant’s conduct. (shrink)

People with Scrupulosity have rigorous, obsessive moral beliefs that lead to extreme and compulsive moral acts. These fascinating outliers raise profound questions about human nature, mental illness, moral belief, responsibility, and psychiatric treatment. Clean Hands? Uses a range of case studies to examine this condition and its philosophical implications.

Various theorists contend that we may live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers in turn argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both sets of arguments. First, we argue that if either panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then the only way to live in a simulation may be as brains-in-vats, in which case it is unlikely that (...) we live in a simulation. We then argue that if panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then viable simulation hypotheses are substantially sceptical scenarios. We conclude that the nature of consciousness has wide-ranging implications for simulation arguments. (shrink)

'ith the rise of naturalism in the art of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance there developed an extensive and diverse literature about art which helped to explain, justify, and shape its new aims. In this book, David Summers provides an original investigation of the philosophical and psychological notions invoked in this new theory and criticism. From a thorough examination of the sources, he shows how the medieval language of mental discourse derived from an understanding of classical thought. (...) 'Some of the most striking observations in this impressive book involve stepping outside the history of ideas to ground these theories in a more general social history.' -- British Journal of Aesthetics 'This brilliant, stimulating study in the history of ideas should become indispensible for renaissance art historians, and for philosophers interested in the history of the philosophy of mind and in what might be called thepre-history' of aesthetics.' -- ChoiceWith the rise of naturalism in the art of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance there developed an extensive and diverse literature about art which helped to explain. (shrink)

Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. I consider two benefits of rationalization, once we realize that rationalization is sincere. It allows us to work out, under practical pressure of rational consistency, which are (...) good reasons to act on. Rationalization also prompts us to establish meaningful patterns out of merely permissible options. (shrink)

It will be useful to consider briefly how the ideas surrounding “form” work in practice. Such ideas rapidly developed to a high stage of sophistication, subtlety, and complexity, but they did not, I believe, stray from the foundations I have tried to indicate for them. Let us consider the example of Wilhelm Worringer, who, like Alois Riegl, found it preferable to discuss ornament rather than images because ornament is a purer expression of form and therefore provides a less encumbered view (...) into form’s spiritual meaning. Concerning interlace ornament of the first millennium in Northern Europe, Worringer wrote that it is “impossible to mistake the restless life contained in this tangle of lines”; it is “the decisive formula for the whole medieval North.” The “need for empathy of this inharmonious people” requires the “uncanny pathos which attaches to the animation of the inorganic”; the “inner disharmony and unclarity of these peoples … could have borne no clearer fruit.”4 Here forms—mostly lines and edges and their relations—are compared to a natural outgrowth, a fruit, and are interpreted in such a way as to permit the characterization of all peoples among whom artifacts with such forms were made and used. The range of formal style becomes coextensive with the range of the deep principles of the worldview of races, nations, and epochs.It is not necessary to follow the ideas of form and expression to quite the hypertrophied consequences Worringer did, although many authors have done so and many more have done so less systematically. The important thing for my purposes is the pattern of inference from form to historical statements and conclusion. 4. Wilhelm Worringer,ion and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, trans. Michael Bullock , p. 77. David Summers is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of the History of Art at the University of Virginia. The author of Michelangelo and the Language of Art and The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics , he is currently writing a book to be titled The Defect of Distance: Toward a University History of Art. (shrink)

Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. This is troubling for views of moral progress according to which moral progress proceeds from our engagement with our own and others’ reasons. I consider an account (...) of rationalization, based on Robert Audi’s, to make clear that rationalization, unlike simple lying, can be sincere. Because it can be sincere, and because we also have a desire to be consistent with ourselves, I argue that rationalization sets us up for becoming better people over time, and that a similar case can be made to explain how moral progress among groups of people can proceed via rationalization. (shrink)

Truth is a fundamental objective of adjudicative processes; ideally, substantive as distinct from formal legal truth. But problems of evidence, for example, may frustrate finding of substantive truth; other values may lead to exclusions of probative evidence, e.g., for the sake of fairness. Jury nullification and jury equity. Limits of time, and definitiveness of decision, require allocation of burden of proof. Degree of truth-formality is variable within a system and across systems.

Patients with Scrupulosity, a form of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder with moral or religious obsessions and/or compulsions, appear to make moral judgments that are stricter or more stringent than others’ moral judgments. However, this chapter explains why those with Scrupulosity are making systematically _distorted_ moral judgments. First, it describes Scrupulosity as a distinctive form of OCD that characteristically exhibits three features: perfectionism, moral thought-action fusion, and chronic doubt. These features, which individually are compatible with genuine moral judgments, are the expression of underlying (...) anxiety and thus lead to judgments that are distorted in at least three ways: (1) Anxiety narrows one’s attention to a small, self-focused range of factors that will best soothe one’s anxiety, at the expense of other factors that may be morally more important. (2) Anxiety leads one to focus on some factors that are not morally relevant. (3) Anxiety makes one’s judgments inflexible. (shrink)

The question ‘ What is addiction?’ seems to ask for a clinical or biological answer. The research on addiction has progressed much faster in biology and neuroscience than our philosophical understanding of that research.1 Therefore, it can be tempting to look to the relevant psychology or neuroscience to answer our philosophical questions, which ends up treating addiction entirely as a psychological or neurological matter. However, many of our questions about addiction are not fundamentally biological or neurological questions. Here, I suggest (...) that an answer to one question about addiction, the question of what addiction is, turns on the decidedly more philosophical. (shrink)

Drawing on a ritual approach to microsociology, I explain how and why aesthetic and moral practices inform each other and evolve as they do. I continue to develop a theory of aesthetic engagement, specifying how it generates the emotional sensibilities that inform moral practices. Examining aesthetic engagement and emotional sensibilities focuses our theoretical attention on our capacity to find our moral bearings, even in unfamiliar or challenging conditions. To develop this perspective, I draw on Bargheer’s Moral Entanglements and a volume (...) on bird watching’s therapeutic value, Bird Therapy. These two works provide insight into the micro-emotional dynamics through which nature-based practices generate aesthetic power. I conclude by discussing the implications of aesthetic and moral practices for theorizing cognition and culture. In particular, I argue that an aesthetic practice approach to perceiving and knowing about the world does not fit neatly into the dual processing frameworks currently popular in Cultural Sociology. (shrink)

This book addresses three major questions about law and legal systems: (1) What are the defining and organizing forms of legal institutions, legal rules, interpretive methodologies, and other legal phenomena? (2) How does frontal and systematic focus on these forms advance understanding of such phenomena? (3) What credit should the functions of forms have when such phenomena serve policy and related purposes, rule of law values, and fundamental political values such as democracy, liberty, and justice? This is the first book (...) that seeks to offer general answers to these questions and thus gives form in the law its due. The answers not only provide articulate conversancy with the subject but also reveal insights into the nature of law itself, the oldest and foremost problem in legal theory and allied subjects. (shrink)

Robert S. Summers is a distinguished legal theorist whose work has had significant influence in Europe as well as the United States. The study of form and substance in law, the theme of this collection, marks many of his most distinctive contributions to law and legal philosophy over four decades.

Notes on Criticism in Legal Philosophy ROBERT S. SUMMERS I. INTRODUCTION Legal philosophers criticize and evaluate as well as originate and expound. ...

Researchers have raised concerns about teachers’ ability to embed nature of science in their science instruction, a complicated situation that is certainly impacted by the availability of adequate resources to assist K-12 science teachers. In light of the implementation of the ideas from the Framework for K-12 Science Education and the Next Generation Science Standards in the USA, this study sought to identify and evaluate resources aimed at guiding NOS instruction. A search of the National Science Teachers Association database for (...) Next Generation Science Standards -aligned instructional resources resulted in an analytical sample of eight lessons. All materials accompanying these lessons were analyzed for their representations of 10 NOS aspects. The evaluation of these materials revealed a prevalence of implicit, naïve representations in the sample lessons. Examination of the connections to NOS in these lessons leads to a set of recommendations to improve the quantity and quality of NOS representations in future NGSS-aligned instructional resources. The analytical approach used and the issues raised about the presentation and treatment of NOS in precollege lessons are of interest to the broader science education community. (shrink)

The author presents a relatively formal theory of the rule of law which includes three basic components: conceptual, institutional and axiological. He then emphasizes the differences between a formal and a substantive theory of the rule of law and highlights the advantages and limits of the former. Finally, the author indicates the importance of this type of theory, namely the values it implies such as predictability, justified reliance, autonomous choice, minimization of disputes and legitimacy.**.

Morality after Calvin' examines the development of ethical thought in the Reformed tradition immediately following the death of Calvin. The book explores a previously unstudied work of Theodore Beza, the Cato Censorius Christianus (1591). When read in conjunction with the works and correspondence of Beza and his colleagues (Simon Goulart, Lambert Daneau, Peter Martyr Vermigli, among others), the poems of the Cato reveal the theoretical underpinnings of the disciplinary activity during the period. Kirk M. Summers shows how the moral (...) fervor of the latter half of the sixteenth century had its genesis in a well-formulated theology that viewed a Christian's sanctification as a process of restoration to an original order created by God. 00. (shrink)

The physical and relational structure of the biologic continuum (both internal and external to the organism) creates the information signature that is the basis for the origination of meaning in the living system. A meaning metric can be grounded in the significance of that information to the stability of the system during the process of adaptive reconciliation of divergences from the steady state condition. From this perspective, an information-theoretic formulation of the process for translating incident information into adaptive action is (...) proposed that can be practically used in defining and quantifying the meaning of that information for the living system. (shrink)

Can one explain both the resilience of the status quo and the possibility for resistance from a subordinate position? This paper aims to resolve these seemingly incompatible perspectives. By extending Randall Collins's interaction ritual theory, and synthesizing it with Norbert Wiley's model of the self, this paper suggests how the emotional dynamics between people and within the self can explain social inertia as well as the possibility for resistance and change. Diverging from literature on the sociology of emotions that has (...) been concerned with individual emotional processes, this paper considers the collective level in order to explore how movement action is motivated. The emotional dynamics of subordinate positioning that limit women's options in face-to-face interactions are examined, as are the social processes of developing feminist consciousness and a willingness to participate in resistance work. Pointing toward empirical applications, I conclude by suggesting conditions where resistance is likely. (shrink)

... four most important American legal theorists of the last hundred years. Of the others, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Roscoe Pound, and Karl N. Llewellyn, ...

Scrupulosity raises fascinating issues about the nature of moral judgment and about moral responsibility. After defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and discussing concrete case studies, we discuss three peculiar aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients: perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral thought-action fusion. We then consider whether mesh and reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility explain whether the scrupulous are morally responsible.

Introduction Ihe name of George Lewis first became known to me when I began to listen to traditional jazz bands, primarily Ken Colyer's, in England in the ...

Natural ecosystems provide important services upon which humans depend. Unfortunately, some people tend to believe that these services are provided by nature for free; therefore, the services have little or no value. One nearly forgotten ecosystem service is ecotherapy – the ability of interaction with nature to enhance healing and growth. While we do not pay for this service, its loss can result in a cost to humans resulting in slower recovery times, greater distress and reduced well-being. Losses in these (...) images of nature can diminish our basic happiness. Little is understood or, at least, appreciated concerning the potential ecotherapy benefits of the natural environment and its ecosystem services. The complex and interactive relationship of ecosystems, their services and human well-being is poorly acknowledged in the broad social, philosophical, psychological and economic well-being literature. In this article, we examine the role of nature and its ecosystem services in ecotherapy and its associated enhancement of recovery from physical and mental illness through a review of studies evaluating this ecosystem service-recovery connection. (shrink)

There are psychiatric conditions that resemble extreme moral character. Such is the case with Scrupulosity: a type of OCD in which the patient’s obsessions are religious and moral. Scrupulous patients may repeat prayers multiple times to ensure they have uttered the prayers sincerely, or they may feel excessive guilt for such things as looking at the naked bodies in an anatomy textbook. While a person with Antisocial Personality Disorder may appear to lack remorse and the ability to feel guilt, scrupulous (...) patients seem to have too much of it. Do they have a disorder? One could argue that the scrupulous agent is simply much more conscientious than the rest of us. If so, she is morally praiseworthy, not mentally ill. This chapter argues that Scrupulosity is, indeed a disorder, because OCD patients have a distorted view of what is important. (shrink)

My essay incorporates Irigaray's notion of the sensible transcendental, a dynamic attempt to reconstitute the body/mind dualism which founds Western thought, into a reading of the practice of European concert dance. I contend that Irigaray's efforts toward articulating a language of the body as active agent have much to offer analyses of dance practice, and develop this claim through a reading which reflects philosophically on the changing nature of my own dance activity.

En la medida en que se hace cada vez más evidente que la generalización de la lectura y la escritura en las sociedades de la información, la construcción mediática de identidades y la acción automática de los algoritmos de búsqueda como elementos restrictivos de la imagen del mundo constituyen elementos que afectan al desarrollo moral de individuos y comunidades, entendemos que las concepciones rectoras tanto de las acciones como de la comprensión que de sí tienen los individuos remiten a un (...) pensamiento acerca del sujeto, del lenguaje y del ser que difieren con respecto al funcionamiento real de nuestra cultura, aunque parecen resultar indispensables como señuelos que lo hacen posible. El propósito de este texto es apuntar algunas líneas de lectura que expliciten cómo el asunto del cuidado de sí dispone un conjunto de prácticas orientadas a la construcción de la individualidad que suponen una concepción del signo y de la enunciación que conducen a una alternativa con respecto al modo habitual en el que la subjetividad es comprendida en nuestra época. (shrink)

The effects of parent rewards on youth outcomes have been studied extensively; however, research has not systematically categorized parent rewards. Centralizing the analysis of rewards within a given study would help compare the prevalence of reward types at superordinate and subordinate levels. Moreover, it could reveal which level is the most effective for assessing cultural group similarities and differences in a globalizing world. Mother-child conversations between European-American (n = 51) and Hispanic-American (n = 44) dyads were transcribed. A content analysis (...) assessed material and social reward talk themes and created new subthemes. A series of 2 (culture) × 2 (gender) ANCOVAs assessed cultural differences in reward talk themes and subthemes. Results revealed the prevalence of certain reward subthemes, like praise, significantly differed by cultural group. In conclusion, investigations with different cultural groups should consider reward talk on a subordinate level rather than superordinate. (shrink)

How is it that thoroughly physical material beings such as ourselves can think, dream, feel, create and understand ideas, theories and concepts? How does mere matter give rise to all these non-material mental states, including consciousness itself? An answer to this central question of our existence is emerging at the busy intersection of neuroscience, psychology, artificial intelligence, and robotics.In this groundbreaking work, philosopher and cognitive scientist Andy Clark explores exciting new theories from these fields that reveal minds like ours (...) to be prediction machines - devices that have evolved to anticipate the incoming streams of sensory stimulation before they arrive. These predictions then initiate actions that structure our worlds and alter the very things we need to engage and predict. Clark takes us on a journey in discovering the circular causal flows and the self-structuring of the environment that define "the predictive brain." What emerges is a bold, new, cutting-edge vision that reveals the brain as our driving force in the daily surf through the waves of sensory stimulation. (shrink)

How does social organization persist? How does social organization transform? This article proposes that social scientists can begin to answer these questions by considering social organization as the intermittent construction and decay of patterned action, and social actors as centers of organization with the capacity to exert force within some social scene. From this perspective, contexts that shape the dynamics of both actors and scenes could be imagined as turbulent flows that push and pull action into temporary patterns. By viewing (...) social organization as temporary vortexes of involvement within turbulent flows of action, social scientists can focus their attention on the processes at play in the creation, stabilization, and collapse of social organization. Such a perspective corrects some of the limitations in network and field approaches for investigating the fluidity of social organization. Key Words: social organization • timing • stability • cycles • social patterns. (shrink)