Affirmative Action, Misc

In this article, we consider the integration of declared (civilly united or married) same-sex couples into the Catholic community and the possibility of blessing for said couples in light of the recent synod dynamics and the recent documents of the Catholic Church (e.g. Fiducia Supplicans). We propose three modes of integration within an “unchanged doctrine”: “pre-Amoris Laetitia”, “post-Amoris Laetitia”, and a middle way. What emerges from these modes is that the public blessing of same-sex couples generates coherence between traditional moral (...) doctrine and the concrete life of people living in “irregular” situations. The choice of the best mode should be the responsibility of the local Episcopal Conference. As long as there is no doctrinal change, it can adopt the solution it considers best for the care of the soul of the faithful in the historical, social, and cultural context in which it operates. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that philosophy departments at state universities may discount women’s applications. My argument rests on two premises: if the balance of merit-based reasons supports discounting one group relative to a second, then a state institution may discount the first group’s application and the balance of merit-based reasons supports philosophy departments at state universities discounting women’s applications relative to men’s applications. The latter premise was supported by three assumptions. First, if discounting the applications of one group relative (...) to a second is supported by at merit-based reasons and not opposed by an equally strong merit-based reasons, then discounting that group’s applications is supported by a balance of merit-based reasons. Second, discounting the application of women relative to men is supported by a merit-based reason or reasons. Third, discounting the application of women relative to men is not opposed by an equally strong merit-based reason or reasons. (shrink)

There are many grounds to object to tokenism, but that doesn’t mean we should always avoid being the token woman, argues Anca Gheaus.

Choice often proceeds in two stages: We construct a shortlist on the basis of limited and uncertain information about the options and then reduce this uncertainty by examining the shortlist in greater detail. The goal is to do well when making a final choice from the option set. I argue that we cannot realise this goal by constructing a ranking over the options at shortlisting stage which determines of each option whether it is more or less worthy of being included (...) in a shortlist. This is relevant to the 2010 UK Equality Act. The Act requires that shortlists be constructed on grounds of candidate rankings and affirmative action is only permissible for equally qualified candidates. This is misguided: Shortlisting candidates with lower expected qualifications but higher variance may raise the chance of finding an exceptionally strong candidate. If it does, then shortlisting such candidates would make eminent business sense and there is nothing unfair about it. This observation opens up room for including more underrepresented candidates with protected characteristics, as they are more likely to display greater variance in the selector’s credence functions at shortlisting stage. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement among both supporters and opponents that affirmative action either must not violate any principle of equal opportunity or procedural justice, or if it does, it may do so only given current extenuating circumstances. Many believe that affirmative action is morally problematic, only justified to the extent that it brings us closer to the time when we will no longer need it. In other words, those that support affirmative action believe it is acceptable in nonideal theory, but (...) not ideal theory. This paper argues that affirmative action is entirely compatible with equal opportunity and procedural justice and would be even in an ideal world. I defend a new analysis of Rawlsian procedural justice according to which it is permissible to interfere in the outcomes of procedures, and thus I show that affirmative action is not morally problematic in the way that many have supposed. (shrink)

Some may doubt whether the question of equality of opportunity applies to women anymore. In most Western countries every career is now, in theory, open to women. Firstly, while this may be true in Western countries, it is not true in others; there are still many careers barred to women outside the West. However, affirmative action is not a remedy where women are barred from given careers, for in such cases the principle of equality of opportunity has been rejected. Rather, (...) affirmative action is a measure for achieving equality of opportunity. (shrink)

In Grutter, preferential treatment was held to be Constitutional on the basis of the contribution of “diverse” students to the education of their classmates. An implicit assumption in this argument, at least given how schools such as Michigan have interpreted it, is that the contribution involves making it more likely that the other students adopt the beliefs (or perspective) of the minorities. Three beliefs seem relevant here: justice is concerned with equality, racial and ethnic minorities are currently treated unequally, and (...) the state has a mandate to combat this type of injustice. I argued that the first two beliefs are likely false and that in any case they are already well represented on campuses. If my arguments succeed, then this narrow experiential diversity argument is incapable of establishing the moral permissibility, let alone Constitutionality, of these programs. A broader consequentialist argument may avoid this objection but only at the extent of introducing Constitutionally irrelevant considerations. (shrink)

Slavery harmed the slaves but not their descendants since slavery brought about their existence. The descendants gain the slaves’ claims via inheritance. However, collecting the inheritance-based claim runs into a number of difficulties. First, every descendant usually has no more than a portion of the slave’s claim because the claim is often divided over generations. Second, there are epistemic difficulties involving the ownership of the claim since it is unlikely that a descendant of a slave several generations removed would have (...) retained the claim of inheritance given the loss of wealth and disinheritance that often characterizes families. There are also problems in determining the amount of inheritance. This is in part because of the problems of calculating in the effects of offsets, especially crime-related offsets, which are owed by a significant portion of the descendants. Even if this inheritance claim can be established with sufficient confidence certain entities may not be asked to pay it. The federal government does not owe compensation since as a historical matter it permitted but did not cause enslavement. The beneficiaries of slavery do not owe compensation since merely receiving the benefit of an unjust activity does not by itself generate a debt of compensation. When combined these problems constitute an overwhelming case against reparations. (shrink)

Among the most controversial issues in the United States is the question of whether public or private agencies should adopt preferential treatment programs or be required to pay reparations for slavery. Using a carefully reasoned philosophical approach, Stephen Kershnar argues that programs such as affirmative action and calls for slavery reparations are unjust for three reasons. First, the state has a duty to direct resources to those persons who, through their abilities, will benefit most from them. Second, he argues that, (...) in the case of slavery, past injustice-where both the victims and perpetrators are long dead-cannot ground current claims to compensation. As terrible as slavery was, those who claim a right to compensation today owe their existence to it, he reasons, and since the events that bring about a person's existence are normally thought to be beneficial, past injustices do not warrant compensation. Finally, even if past injustices were allowed to serve as the basis of compensation in the present, other variables prevent a reasonable estimation of the amount owed. (shrink)

Among the most controversial issues in the United States is the question of whether public or private agencies should adopt preferential treatment programs or be required to pay reparations for slavery. Using a carefully reasoned philosophical approach, Stephen Kershnar argues that programs such as affirmative action and calls for slavery reparations are unjust for three reasons. First, the state has a duty to direct resources to those persons who, through their abilities, will benefit most from them. Second, he argues that, (...) in the case of slavery, past injustice-where both the victims and perpetrators are long dead-cannot ground current claims to compensation. As terrible as slavery was, those who claim a right to compensation today owe their existence to it, he reasons, and since the events that bring about a person's existence are normally thought to be beneficial, past injustices do not warrant compensation. Finally, even if past injustices were allowed to serve as the basis of compensation in the present, other variables prevent a reasonable estimation of the amount owed. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for the following thesis: racial and ethic groups differ in their per capita intrinsic moral value. My argument rests on the notion that autonomy is a ground for intrinsic moral value and the notion that there are individual and group differences in autonomy. I then argue that the implications of this per capita difference between racial and ethnic groups are in some cases significant in that they are relevant to both public policy and private action.

In this paper, I argue that it is morally permissible and should be legally permissible for state and private professional schools to discriminate against women. By professional schools, I mean law, medical, and business schools. More specifically, I argue that such schools may discount womens applications to the degree that they are likely to produce less than male counterparts. The argument differs with regard to state and private institutions because of the greater moral elbowroom that private institutions have. The argument (...) for state professional schools depends on the purpose of state professional programs. If the purpose of these programs is to provide professional services to citizens, and I argue that it is, then the state professional schools are permitted to do such discounting. My argument also supports the stronger claim that state schools have an obligation to do so, but I will focus on the weaker claim. Given their wider choice of goals, private schools are also permitted to discount womens applications, but they are not obligated to do so. In this paper, then, I provide an argument for the moral permissibility of such discounting. (shrink)

In two recent cases, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306. and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244., the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause permitted state schools to use race-sensitive admissions in order to obtain the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The diversity-based argument for race-sensitive admissions, scholarships, awards, and other opportunities at universities should have been rejected because it does not consider the full range of costs and benefits and because the more narrow (...) educational effects probably weigh against such programs. However, this does not suggest that applicants' race, ethnicity, and gender should be ignored. Rather the same consideration that led to the defeat of the diversity argument, i.e., reasoning capacity, supports the consideration of demographic factors. However, attention to such factors further undermines the consequentialist case for affirmative action. (shrink)

The most qualified applicant is the one who has the propensity to maximally satisfy the employer’s preferences. An applicant’s propensity is a function of her willingness to work hard together with the relevant capacity or potentiality to do the tasks constituting a job. Given this account of the most qualified applicant, there is only a weak duty, if any, to hire persons based on their being the most qualified. Such a duty is not justified by reference to rights, desert, fairness, (...) or the maximization of welfare. However, such a duty may come about via promises made by the employer or the employee who does the hiring. These results suggest that anti-discrimination laws cannot be justified based on merit, although other justifications might still be available. (shrink)

Slavery harmed the slaves but not their descendants since slavery brought about their existence. The descendants gain the slaves’ claims via inheritance. However, collecting the inheritance-based claim runs into a number of difficulties. First, every descendant usually has no more than a portion of the slave’s claim because the claim is often divided over generations. Second, there are epistemic difficulties involving the ownership of the claim since it is unlikely that a descendant of a slave several generations removed would have (...) retained the claim of inheritance given the loss of wealth and disinheritance that often characterizes families. There are also problems in determining the amount of inheritance. This is in part because of the problems of calculating in the effects of offsets, especially crime-related offsets, which are owed by a significant portion of the descendants. Even if this inheritance claim can be established with sufficient confidence certain entities may not be asked to pay it. The federal government does not owe compensation since as a historical matter it permitted but did not cause enslavement. The beneficiaries of slavery do not owe compensation since merely receiving the benefit of an unjust activity does not by itself generate a debt of compensation. When combined these problems constitute an overwhelming case against reparations. (shrink)

The compensatory‐justice justification of affirmative action requires a comparison of the actual world in which the injured person lives with a relevantly similar possible world in which this person lives but where the unjust injuring act never occurred, in order to identify the degree of harm brought about by the unjust injurious act. The problem is that some unjust injuring acts, particularly acts of slavery, led to intercourse and the later creation of the ancestors of many members of minority groups. (...) Hence, there is no possible world in which these individuals exist and in which the injustice, e.g., slavery, did not occur. As a result, the counterfactual test does not allow us to measure or even understand the existence of a compensatable injury to these persons. I provide an inheritance‐based account of compensation that escapes this. (shrink)

We should adopt the following principle with regard to compensatory justice. (1) If an unjust act benefits an innocent person and there is no reasonable way to assess the amount of damages to the victim, then compensatory justice does not require that the innocent beneficiary pay compensation for those damages. We cannot reasonably assess the amount of damages to current racial minorities that have resulted from past discriminatory acts. Problems arise in determining the identity of the injured parties, the identity (...) of the injuring agents and injuring acts (and omissions), and the degree of injury that directly resulted from these acts (or omissions). Since such compensable damages cannot be accurately estimated and since white male applicants are innocent beneficiaries of past discriminatory acts, the value of compensatory justice does not justify strong affirmative action programs. (shrink)