Rationalism

Las instituciones que forman licenciados en filosofía suelen exigir rigor metodológico en los trabajos finales de investigación (TFI), pero rara vez cuentan con instrumentos objetivos para evaluarlo. Este artículo propone una rúbrica de evaluación metodológica fundamentada en los cuatro componentes de la investigación filosófica descritos por Canale (2000): materia, objeto, principios de interpretación y funcionamiento. La propuesta responde a un vacío identificado empíricamente en un estudio previo, donde se constató que una institución de educación superior dominicana carecía de criterios explícitos (...) para evaluar el componente metodológico de sus tesinas de filosofía, pese a asignarle hasta un 40% de la calificación final. Se presenta la estructura de la rúbrica, sus fundamentos teóricos y recomendaciones para su implementación institucional. (shrink)

Este artículo argumenta que la pregunta "¿puede la filosofía ser científica?" está mal formulada porque confunde dos actividades distintas: filosofar, entendido como un ejercicio creativo de primer orden que produce pensamiento nuevo, e investigar sobre filosofía, un ejercicio reflexivo de segundo orden que estudia sistemáticamente ideas ya producidas. Se sostiene que la primera actividad no puede ni debe someterse al método científico sin perder su naturaleza, mientras que la segunda puede y debe aspirar a estándares de rigor metodológico equivalentes a (...) los de cualquier disciplina investigativa. El argumento se apoya en la propuesta de Fernando Canale sobre los cuatro componentes del método filosófico de investigación, en la tradición del debate entre filosofía científica y especulativa, y en evidencia empírica de un estudio sobre veinticinco trabajos finales de investigación de licenciatura en filosofía, cuyos resultados muestran que la ausencia de esta distinción conceptual se traduce en deficiencias metodológicas sistemáticas. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta un diagnóstico empírico sobre el rigor metodológico de los trabajos finales de investigación (TFI) de licenciatura en filosofía, a partir del análisis documental de veinticinco tesinas producidas entre 2010 y 2024 en una institución de educación superior dominicana, complementado con entrevistas a una autoridad académica y a un docente evaluador del área. Los resultados muestran una inconsistencia metodológica generalizada: la mayoría de los trabajos no explicita su paradigma epistemológico, no justifica la selección de su método ni de (...) sus técnicas, y carece de una estructura reconocible en el planteamiento del problema. Se concluye que estas deficiencias no obedecen a una supuesta incompatibilidad entre filosofía y rigor metodológico, sino a la ausencia de criterios institucionales claros para su elaboración y evaluación. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of work by drawing on existing theories of recognition, self-worth, motivation, and narcissism. Its aim is to clarify the conditions under which work tends toward self-verification and the conditions under which it approaches the practice of an ideal. Human beings are situated within society through recognition by others. Recognition is an important social resource that supports belonging, trust, role-taking, and cooperation. Yet when the foundation of self-worth is placed in recognition, work tends to move away (...) from the realization of an ideal and toward the replenishment of self-worth or the calming of anxiety. Achievement becomes a means of self-verification, and failure is experienced not merely as a practical problem to be improved but as a disturbance of one’s very sense of value. This paper understands this structure as the self-verification of work driven by the impulse for recognition. This impulse enters not only work itself but also efforts outside work, such as acquiring qualifications, studying, self-improvement, and striving for personal growth. Effort is often described in admirable terms. However, when effort is driven by urgency, anxiety, the gaze of others, and the need to confirm self-worth, the foundation of the self becomes increasingly dependent on external evaluation. The central thesis of this paper is that work close to an ideal requires a foundation of self before effort. By “foundation of self,” I mean a psychological ground on which one does not entrust self-worth entirely to external evaluation, but can receive one’s own existence, life, and activity by oneself and form a certain degree of satisfaction. The more this foundation is established, the more room a person has to include the benefit of others, fidelity to the object, and social value in the initial motive of work. Effort undertaken on that basis does not function as self-verification. It becomes the force by which an ideal is implemented in reality. This paper refers to self-determination theory, the theory of contingent self-worth, the self-concordance model, self-compassion theory, Winnicott’s capacity to be alone, Fromm’s theory of self-love, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, social comparison theory, and self-presentation theory. While these theories are used to explain relevant psychological mechanisms, this paper rearranges them as a theory of work. The paper also emphasizes life-practice in the formation of the foundation of self. Life-practice refers to the repeated activity of acting upon one’s own lived world and receiving the changes brought about by that action. Housework, walking, reading, caring for tools, and rest can be completed within one’s own field of experience before being connected to public display or reactions on social media. Whether one can enjoy such activities alone is an important indicator of the foundation of self. However, the more unstable one’s foundation of self is, the more likely one is to feel guilt about enjoying oneself by oneself. Although enjoying life-practice is necessary, that very enjoyment is often rejected as “meaningless,” “lazy,” or “mere self-satisfaction.” Here lies a trap that prevents the recovery of the foundation of self. Therefore, what is first required of a person who suffers from self-anxiety is not additional effort, but the suspension of the impulse toward effort. Instead of immediately converting anxiety and urgency into effort, one must cultivate the capacity to receive one’s own life and savor one’s own activity. Only after this does effort become effective as the practice of an ideal. Through this argument, the paper presents the logical order of work close to an ideal: foundation of self, room for the benefit of others, practice of an ideal, and finally, desperate effort. (shrink)

We give the first machine-checked contribution to an interpretive dispute in the history of philosophy: the forty- year disagreement between Jonathan Bennett and Michael Della Rocca over the demonstration of Proposition V of Spinoza’s Ethica Pars I. We formalise Ethica Pars I in Lean 4, encoding Bennett’s reading of Spinoza’s stated axioms as a typeclass and Della Rocca’s substantive Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as an extension class, so that the question what is derivable from which axioms? is decided by (...) the kernel. The derivation attempt yields a partial result, that substances sharing all attributes are identical, but does not reach the full “sharing-any-attribute implies identity” content of Proposition V; it thereby tracks Bennett’s own verdict that the demonstration “cannot yield more than the conclusion that two substances could not have all their attributes in common,” whereas Spinoza’s text concludes that they cannot share any attribute. A four-element counter-model that satisfies both axiom sets — Spinoza’s stated register A1–A7 with its definitional bridges, and the PSR extension — while falsifying Proposition V’s content establishes the irreducibility against this specific augmenta- tion; a second, three-element counter-model establishes the analogous result for axiom A15, a load-bearing universality clause for Proposition XIV. Each non-derivability claim is a meta-logical consequence of kernel consistency, witnessed by a kernel-checked model rather than by the absence of a found proof. The contribution is twofold: a concrete result, the first kernel-checked counter-model against Della Rocca’s PSR-substance reconstruction; and a method, the demote experiment, that replaces part of a prose dispute with a checkable discipline. Stronger PSR variants, and the broader Bennett-line claim against every charitable augmentation, remain open as mechanical projects. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of the reciprocity of Nature in Spinoza as a central yet underappreciated dimension of Spinoza’s relational metaphysics. Building on Ziporyn’s interpretation of Spinoza, the paper argues that any understanding of infinity and necessity is incomplete without Spinoza’s relational account of the reciprocity of God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). Through a close analysis of the Ethics, the Principles and Letter 32, the paper shows that for Spinoza all finite things are reciprocally determined by another singular (...) thing to exist in a certain way through the infinite, eternal and equal force [vis] of Nature by which each thing perseveres in existing. This reciprocal and omnipresent structure of the whole of Nature constitutes the engaged, phenomenological experience of Individuality: God or Nature does not respond purposively or personally, yet every movement and thought is necessarily met by reciprocal determinations within the immediacy of Nature itself. The paper concludes that Ziporyn’s account is strengthened by a relational metaphysics grounded not in intellectual contemplation of infinite Substance but rather in the active and embodied immersion in the infinite encounters of Nature’s reciprocity. (shrink)

This paper reveals a long-concealed truth: for two thousand years, no publicly available commentary has truly understood the original meaning of the Zhou Yi (known in the West as the I Ching) and the classics of Chinese source culture. The fundamental reason lies in the complete misalignment between the Confucian “human-centered” cognitive coordinate system and the “theocentric” coordinate system of source culture. Source culture takes “God is absolutely egoistic” as its primary axiom, the unity of “Nature-Capacity-Law” (xìng-néng-fǎ) as its analytical (...) framework, and a “decentralized sacred governance mechanism based on the will of natural law” as its ultimate blueprint. Confucianism, by contrast, takes “benevolence, righteousness, self-restraint, and the restoration of rites” as its starting point, with “altruism, selflessness, and hierarchy” as its positive directions. The two coordinate systems are incommensurable; interpreting source culture through the Confucian lens is like using Newtonian mechanics to interpret quantum physics – the output is inevitably gibberish. This paper argues that the reawakening of source culture constitutes a fundamental cognitive revolution – a paradigm shift in human consciousness comparable to the invention of writing or the rise of modern science. Unlike previous revolutions that extended human physical capacity or information processing, this revolution reshapes the very cognitive coordinates through which humanity understands itself, its relationship with the divine, and the foundations of social order. It shifts from the human-centered to the theocentric, from the denial of self-interest to its recognition as a divine endowment, and from moral exhortation to the self-organizing governance of natural law. As the paper states, “No amount of human ink and paper can fully describe the goodness of the self-driven, decentralized sacred governance mechanism of natural law will.” The paper calls upon researchers in Chinese studies worldwide to abandon superstitions about prestigious titles such as “eminent Confucian scholars,” “masters of national studies,” and “philosophers,” to switch their cognitive coordinate systems, to return to the original meanings of Chinese characters and the field of hexagram images, and to face the original meaning of source culture with common-sense honesty. It argues that understanding source culture requires no profound erudition, but only two things: the recognition of the primary axiom that “God is absolutely egoistic,” and the mastery of the cognitive framework of the unity of “Nature-Capacity-Law.”. (shrink)

Cognition evolves cyclically through Art, Philosophy, and Science. All three are surprisingly continuous—both historically and in their persistence—yet remain indefinable. A traditionally upside-down view of syntactic success conceals the true foundation. The word “truth” is merely a syntactic “0.” Nevertheless, the truth of syntactic truth has ontological roots, though it tends to abandon them. In pursuit of unreasonably convenient algorithmicity, even the master of cognition is reduced to a spell-checker. Against that spell, a tablet is attached.

The Gageian Epistemic Model (GEM) proposes a structural dissolution of the Agrippa Trilemma by positing the five premises of the PIE Syllogism (P1-P5) as the mandatory architecture for warranted belief. This paper addresses two primary classes of structural objections: 1) the claim that Premise 1 (Subjective State) is operationally vacuous, failing to halt the Infinite Regress, and 2) the claim that Premise 5 (External Reliability) merely restates the problem of Circularity. This defense argues that P1 functions as a self-vindicating, non-inferential (...) precondition—a structural, not informational, foundation—and that P5 constitutes a necessary, constrained circularity that defines the maximal boundary of human warrant. The GEM is thus confirmed as a robust framework that successfully addresses the Trilemma by shifting the grounds of debate from metaphysical truth to structural necessity. (shrink)

The Pyrrhonian Skeptic’s Agrippa Trilemma asserts that any knowledge claim is doomed to infinite regress, arbitrary dogmatism, or circular reasoning. This paper argues that the Trilemma is an axiomatic consequence of the historical reliance on the problematic Justified True Belief (JTB) definition and the failure to rigorously define the necessary structure of conscious inquiry. This paper introduces the Gageian Epistemic Model ( GEM ), a descriptive meta-epistemology that formalizes the mandatory procedure of conscious warrant into the PIE Syllogism ( P1-P5 (...) ). The GEM offers a unique, structural response to the Trilemma: the infinite regress is terminated by the self-vindicating, structurally mandated axiom, P1: The Axiom of Subjective State ( S ). Arbitrariness is overcome by demonstrating the structural necessity of P3 (the Goal of resolution), and circularity is controlled by establishing two distinct, warranted standards for belief. The GEM formalizes all warranted belief across two categories: Intrinsic Knowledge as Justified Coherent Belief ( JCB ), warranted by internal coherence via P4, and Extrinsic Knowledge as Justified Reliable Belief ( JRB ), warranted by external predictive success via P5. This axiomatic procedure provides the foundational justification for the methodology of modern science and mathematics, proving it is the only structurally defensible path available to a conscious agent. (shrink)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is the canonical expression of the idea of reality as fundamentally rational or intelligible, such that there is always a sufficient ground or explanation for everything about which such questions can be asked. In this essay, I argue that recent attempts to rehabilitate the PSR, despite their many virtues, have not gone far enough in emphasizing the centrality of this principle within all areas of philosophy - both theoretical and practical. Thus, I hope to (...) show that to fully appreciate the significance of the PSR, we need to attend to the role it plays in reasoning of both a theoretical and a practical sort. As we will see, this point is especially important from a Kantian perspective, where it is practical, and not theoretical reason that is the home of our deepest and most substantive commitment to a version of the PSR. Thus, for a Kantian, to understand the nature of our commitment to the PSR, we need to consider this question first and foremost from a practical perspective - or perhaps ultimately from a point of view that somehow transcends the practical-theoretical distinction itself. (shrink)

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it's true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...) explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

Rationalists like Bealer (1999), BonJour (1998), and Plantinga (1993) hold there are conscious intuitions that supply a priori justification. Peacocke (2021) and Marasoiu (2020) point out that this raises a Problem of Arbitrariness: Why are beliefs justified by rational intuitions a priori, if rational intuitions are phenomenally conscious experiences, when other beliefs justified by experience are not a priori? I point out that the real issue for rationalists isn’t whether intuitions supply ‘a priori’ knowledge or justification, but whether they supply (...) knowledge or justification for necessary synthetic propositions. Such knowledge is what rationalists, but traditionally not empiricists, are really after. In answering the Problem of Arbitrariness by highlighting the necessary synthetic, these rationalists should commit to non-sensory or irreducibly cognitive phenomenology. For conscious intuitions that have merely sensory phenomenology cannot (re)present and justify the necessary synthetic propositions that rationalists are after. But these rationalists say such intuitions have some phenomenology. So their only recourse is to believe in non-sensory, cognitive phenomenology. I then offer reasons for such rationalists to prefer an acquaintance model of rational intuition: it explains why cognitive phenomenology must be present in experiential justification of the necessary synthetic, and differentiates phenomenal rationalism from recent versions of empiricism, which also accept justification of the necessary synthetic. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess John McDowell's paper "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" (2009) (AMG) and its theory of epistemological openness to the world. I trace its motivations back to Kantian, Sellarsian and Aristotelean roots. I argue that McDowell subscribes to a kind of Holistic Theory of Rationality (HTR). To explain the HTR, I will analyze the Sellarsian notions of the "Manifest Image," the "Myth of the Given" and the "logical space of reasons." I argue that the holistic nature (...) of McDowell's theory gives it particular properties that put it in need of conservatism, because all the elements of the theory "hang together" - i.e. cohere - in a dangerous fashion. I argue that McDowell cannot afford big changes without upsetting the apple-cart. With this in mind, I shall assess the merits and demerits of AMG, and its modified theory of perceptual content, as an attempted conservative reform of HTR. I want to argue that, taken independently, AMG is a good and important change, but taken holistically it is non-conservative, and disruptive, of the McDowellian picture. Thus, if we wish to proceed with the McDowellian path, we are led to a choice between rejecting the local reform (and retreating back to an earlier version) or demanding further explanations of its global implications. (shrink)

This article presents a visualist theory of design that contrasts with the instrumental rationalism that dominates the philosophy of design. My critique of rationalism is based on two omnipresent and paradigmatic phenomena in design: the variety of forms for one single function and the variety of uses of one form. Instrumental rationalism defines design as a coherent line that runs from a rational goal to the proper means and proper use of an object. Therefore, this philosophy values design according to (...) its efficiency. However, the diverse aesthetic forms of design objects and the creative ways that users engage with them. do not follow the instrumental rational plan, but rather aesthetic motivations and design’s visual affordance. I argue that the variety of forms of design objects and emergent uses are often more substantial than rationality in the constitution of design. Claiming that these encounters are innate to our essence and ontology as visual beings, I offer a visualist anti-rationalist theory of design and human nature. Keywords: instrumental rationalism, form, affordance, emergent properties, Visualism. (shrink)

Many philosophers have found in Hume’s skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding the materials for an argument that generalizes from induction to other domains, like our beliefs in the external world, other minds, and the past. This chapter offers a novel reconstruction of that argument and identifies the principles that are responsible for its capacity to generalize beyond induction. Next, it presents a classical reading of Hume’s skeptical solution and shows that Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory is close in (...) spirit to it. After that, it develops two objections to entitlement theory: it relies on the truth of deeply contingent propositions that are not a priori rational, and it does not manage to redefine the concept of epistemic rationality while offering an effective anti-skeptical response. The chapter concludes with a constructive suggestion: some passages that support a non-classical reading of Hume’s positive views on induction offer the materials to reject the steps of the skeptical argument that cause trouble for entitlement theory. (shrink)

The method of intuition, the view that the best philosophical perspective will maintain as many of our intuitions as possible, is one of the pillars of analytic philosophy. Unfortunately, the reliance on intuition by analytic philosophers has created conditions such that the biases of those who do philosophy, predominantly those of hegemonic identities, are accepted as a basis for philosophical knowledge. This problem can be solved by rejecting intuition as a basis for philosophical knowledge and instead relying on a methodology (...) derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (shrink)

In a recent article for Salvage, China Miéville responds to several of our earlier pieces in Jacobin Magazine and elsewhere. One target of Miéville’s criticism is our rationalist brand of Marxism, indebted as it is to the Radical Enlightenment legacy. He casts our differences in starkly theological terms; Ours is described as a “cataphatic” (i.e., orthodox, discursive, rationalist) Marxism while he prefers the “apophatic” (i.e., open, mystical, humble) alternative. These are real philosophical differences, and Miéville does a service to Marxist (...) discourse in illuminating such a critical and productive demarcation. -/- Miéville’s fundamental distinctions are correct. We do believe that knowledge is fundamental to politics, and that action unguided by reason is no action at all, but mere reaction. Nonetheless, if we are to justifiably choose between the “apophatic” and “cataphatic” worldviews, it will be necessary to clearly outline the essential elements of each in a schematic manner. (shrink)

Landon Frim and Harrison Fluss’s following article, “Reason is Red: Why Marxism Needs Philosophy” is a response to Aaron Jaffe’s, “Marxism, Spinoza, and the ‘Radical’ Enlightenment.' -/- It’s not that activism is of second-rate import. It’s that something as important as intervening in the world, and affecting people’s lives, requires sound justification. If we are committed to “the idea” of communism, then we’re also committed to its practical realization and all of the real-world consequences that this entails. Being serious about (...) ideas means confronting their flesh-and-blood impacts when they come to fruition. Intellectual maturity, then, demands an accounting of our political ideals. We have to care that we are right and that our enemies are wrong. And this means something more than being on the “right side” of a particular issue; it means knowing that your politics are grounded in an accurate conception of reality and of what is objectively good for human beings. (shrink)

Focusing on Descartes’ conclusion in the second Meditation that bodies are strictly perceived through the intellect alone, I contextualize, outline, and elucidate Descartes’ first two Meditations. I begin with a summary of key themes from the first Meditation and outline the reasons for Descartes’ radical doubt. I then provide a detailed explication of Descartes’ argumentitive journey in the second meditation, wherein Descartes arrives at the hypothesis that he is a thinking thing, and demonstrates the plausibility of this hypothesis by scrutinizing (...) a piece of wax until he is able to clearly and distinctly perceive it. I elaborate on Descartes’ conclusion that bodies are perceived through the intellect alone by discussing how abstraction can be used to understand any external body clearly and distinctly, before explaining the overall significance of the conclusion as an affirmation of Descartes’ existence, which gives him profound knowledge of the self. (shrink)

According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may (...) be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts. In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i.e., argumentative strategies). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil, and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods. While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular. As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence. (shrink)

This piece is a comment on Quilty-Dunn, Jake, Nicolas Porot, and Eric Mandelbaum. 2023. “The Best Game in Town: The Reemergence of the Language-of-Thought Hypothesis across the Cognitive Sciences.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46: e261. -/- The target article signal boosts important ongoing work across the cognitive sciences. However, its theoretical claims, generative value, and purported contributions are – where not simply restatements of arguments extensively explored elsewhere – imprecise, noncommittal, and underdeveloped to a degree that makes them difficult to (...) evaluate. The article's apparent force results from engaging with straw rather than steel opponents. (shrink)

This dissertation articulates our human capacity to judge as a capacity for knowledge, specifically for empirical knowledge, and for knowledge of itself as such. I interpret and draw on the account of such knowledge presented by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, situate this account historically, and relate it to relevant contemporary debates. The first chapter motivates my project by assessing the insights and shortcomings of Cartesian epistemology. I argue that while Descartes draws on the essential self-consciousness of judgement to show (...) that the cogito is knowledge, he fails, by his own standards, to secure this status for any judgement beyond the cogito. I conclude that self-consciousness alone is empty, but that, since we can judge beyond the cogito, judgement can be given content from elsewhere. The next chapter evaluates the empiricist doctrine that operations of the senses by themselves give content to judgement and can vindicate it as empirical knowledge. I contend that Kant deepens Hume’s finding, that empiricism fails to enable us to explain empirical knowledge, into the more radical insight that empiricism fails to enable us to understand the senses as providing any content. I conclude that the senses alone are blind and that our account of empirical knowledge must privilege neither sensory givenness nor intellectual self-consciousness. The third chapter contrasts two readings of Kant on the cooperation between sensibility and understanding in empirical knowledge. I argue, against many Kantians, that the Transcendental Deduction shows that instead of understanding this cooperation compositionally – so that operations of sensibility are intelligible independently of acts of the understanding – we must conceive of it hylomorphically – so that the operations of sensibility and understanding constitute the mutually dependent matter and form of empirical knowing respectively. The final chapter substantiates this hylomorphism by explicating the form of knowledge as synthesis. Following Kant, I argue that inference is a species of synthesis and provide a synthetic explanation of inference. The resulting account simultaneously illustrates synthesis, addresses a prominent contemporary problem regarding the nature of inference, and explains how our capacity to know provides not just isolated glimpses of empirical reality, but a unified conception of it. (shrink)

In the 16th century, western science made a great leap. Meanwhile, in China, the development of textual criticism (including scholars Gu Yanwu 1613-1682, Dai Zhen 1724-1777, Duan Yucai 1735-1815, Wang Niansun 1744-1832) also facilitated the development of scientific factors (Hu Shi 1967).This paper argues that Qian-Jia scholars爷work represented a new era of traditional research that the value of scholarships and intellectual work (starting from Gu Yanwu 1613-1682, Dai Zhen 1724-1777, Duan Yucai 1735-1815, Wang Niansun 1744-1832, etc.) is essentially based on (...) what they created and believed, overtly or overtly, the principle of logic certainty—a newly developed indigenous rationalism in the Chinese intellectual history. (shrink)

The first article in this issue attempts to refute the concept of Altruism and calls it akin to Selfishness. The arguments are logically set in the way like that of Spinoza’s method of demonstration, with Axioms, Definitions, Propositions and Notes: so as to make them exact and precise. Interestingly, the writer introduces a new concept of Credit and through various other original propositions and examples rebuts the altruistic nature which is generally ascribed to humans.

The reception of Kant began in Croatia at the turn of the 19th century with the writings of J.B. Horváth, whose textbooks were in use at that time in Croatia and Hungary. Unlike Horváth's decidedly negative attitude toward Kant, Šimun Čučić (Simeon Chuchich), in his systematic work Philosophia Critice Elaborata (1815), adopted some aspects of Kantian philosophy. This includes, for example, the formalistic conception of logic, Kantian apriorism and subjectivism, the formalistic approach to the moral law, and the like. However, (...) since these elements were incorporated into a schoolbook type of text, they could not always be consistently implemented. The beginning of the reception of Kant in Croatia coincided with the revival of Croatian national self-awareness. -- Die Kantrezeption setzte in Kroatien an der Wende zum 19. Jahrhundert ein mit den Schriften J. B. Horváths, dessen Lehrbuecher in Kroatien und Ungarn damals in Gebrauch waren. Im Unterschied zu Horváth's ausgeschprochen negativer Einstellung zu Kant hat Šimun Čučić in seinem systematischen Werk Philosophia critice elaborata (1815) einige Aspekte der Kantischen Philosophie uebernommen. Dies betrifft z.B. die formalistische Auffassung der Logik, die Uebernahme des kantianischen Apriorismus und Subjektivismus, die formalistische Auffassungsweise des moralischen Gesetzes und dgl. Da nun diese Momente in ein schulmaeßig konzipiertes Buch aufgenommen wurden, konnten sie nicht immer konsequent durchgefuehrt werden. Der Beginn der Kantrezeption in Kroatien koinzidierte mit der Wiedererweckung des kroatischen nationalen Selbsbewußtseins. (shrink)

This article offers an analysis of the problem of Augustine’s rationalism, by paying particular attention to his Dialogi, in which the Ciceronian and Christian ideal of the search for truth (quaerere veritatem) emerges as a life-long project. It shows how in Augustine’s thought the overcoming of Manichaeism has to be understood as a liberation from an ‘experience of madness’, or ‘perverse logic’, produced by an imagination unable to rise to pure rationality, in contrast with the ideal of order typical of (...) classical education, and in particular of the rhetorics, based on Cicero, which Augustine had learned in African schools. (shrink)

The following contribution aims at presenting a reading of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a kind of idealism within the Kantian and post-Kantian traditions. The goal is to argue that Wittgenstein’s position shares substantial theoretical and methodological grounds with Hegel’s idealism. The main concepts pertaining to the later Wittgenstein’s position are analyzed and understood as a form of idealism. After defending the reading against anti-idealist interpretations we argue that the kind of idealism presented clashes with central tenets of the Kantian position. (...) These points of departure are then shown to cover in a substantial manner the same kind of criticism Hegel raised against Kant. In the last section, an interpretation of central concepts of the Hegelian position is offered in order to dissolve any fundamental incompatibility with Wittgenstein’s idealism. (shrink)

Los más diversos teóricos de la modernidad suelen presentar este período como un proceso continuo de desarrollo tecnológico y económico, progreso en las artes y las ciencias, expansión de la democracia y racionalización de las instituciones y las costumbres. Sin embargo, persisten las contradicciones del capitalismo, el colapso de la civilización es inminente y el Pueblo no vive ni ha vivido en la modernidad tal y como sus teóricos la describen. Esto es tanto más cierto en nuestro país, habitado por (...) una suerte de magdaleniense o pre-Tartessos lleno de cacharritos con iconos, llamadas, avisos, avatares, tamagotchies, móviles y juegos online integrados sin la menor discrepancia sobre una capa de rituales del año de la polka, fetiches, incienso, lágrimas, sangre, joyas, ofrendas, sacrificios, reliquias de miembros de santos y matriarcas fenicio-neolíticas devenidas madres de Cristo al tiempo que supporters del equipo de fútbol local. El ultrarracionalismo se presenta como un nuevo método y movimiento filosófico cuya voluntad es afrontar los desafíos del futuro sin dejar de hacer justicia a esta auténtica marejada de lo grotesco. (shrink)

Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 4, Page 431-445, July 2022.

How should we understand good philosophical inquiry? Ernest Sosa has argued that the key to answering this question lies with virtue-based epistemology. According to virtue-based epistemology, competences are prior to epistemic justification. More precisely, a subject is justified in having some type of belief only because she could have a belief of that type by exercising her competences. Virtue epistemology is well positioned to explain why, in forming false philosophical beliefs, agents are often less rational than it is possible to (...) be. False philosophical beliefs are often unjustified—and the agent is thereby less rational for having them—precisely because these beliefs could not be formed by exercising competences. But, virtue epistemology is not well positioned to explain why, in failing to form some true philosophical beliefs, agents are less rational than it is possible to be. In cases where agents fall short by failing to believe philosophical truths, the problem is not that they believe things they shouldn’t, but that they lack beliefs they ought to have. We argue that Timothy Williamson's recent critique of the a priori/a posteriori distinction falls prey to similar problem cases. Williamson fails to see that a type of belief might be a priori justified if and only if, even without any special confirming experiences, agents fall short by failing to have this type of belief. We conclude that there are types of beliefs that are deeply a priori justified for any agent regardless of what epistemic competences the agent has. However, we also point out that this view has a problem of its own: it appears to make the acquisition of a priori knowledge too easy. We end by suggesting that a move back towards virtue-based epistemology is necessary. But in order for this move to be effective, epistemic competences will have to be understood very differently than in the reliabilist tradition. (shrink)

Discovering laws of nature was a way to worship a law-giving God, during the Scientific Revolution. So why should we consider it worthwhile now, in our own more secularized science? For historical perspective, I examine two competing early modern theological traditions that related laws of nature to different divine attributes, and their secular legacy in views ranging from Kant and Nietzsche to Humean and ‘governing’ accounts in recent analytic metaphysics. Tracing these branching offshoots of ethically charged God-concepts sheds light on (...) how our ethical ideals and ideas of natural order can still be valuably integrated. Early modern intellectualists valued the law-governed order of nature as a sign of divine Reason. In turn, Reason traditionally ascribed to God has now been partly reclaimed for humans, reframing the value of natural order anthropocentrically, in terms of the value of our own intelligence. Alternatively, Reason may be reclaimed for nature itself, as in an ‘objective’ idealism or metaphysical rationalism. However, beyond divine Reason, an influential voluntarist tradition in theology stressed a connection between laws of nature and God’s Power or free Will. Tracking how divine Power has been reinvested in human beings provides a broader context for instrumentalism and related lineages of empiricism. But secularization can also transfer Power from God to the impersonal natural world. In this light, current scientific interest in lawlike order may also reflect the inherent value of brute necessity or inhuman causal power in nature: this is a deeper way to reject anthropocentrism and to show our respect for the environment. (shrink)

In the accepted view, the basic disposition of believers is one of absolute obedience, humility, and lack of critique, doubt, or, indeed, defiance of God. Only through such a disposition do believers convey their absolute faith and establish the appropriate hierarchy between God and humans. This article challenges this view and argues that, in mainstream rabbinic tradition, the believer is not required to renounce his or her moral autonomy and certainly not his or her understanding of God and the world. (...) Indeed, faith rests on such understanding; moreover, human autonomy is the mechanism through which humans convey God’s goodness and perfection. Their questions and criticism are part of a persistent effort to close the evident gap between their assumptions about God’s goodness and the flawed imperfect reality. The analysis focuses on rabbinic tradition but its implications go beyond it, presenting a model of a life of faith that compels subjects, as believers, to preserve their constitutive foundations as rational autonomous creatures. (shrink)

On peut inscrire les travaux de Engel dans le sillage rationaliste des Pères de la philosophie analytique, mais après le tournant naturaliste opéré par Quine. Ce sont les diverses bonnes raisons, exposées de manière non systématique par Engel, d’associer naturalisme et rationalisme que je souhaite présenter tout en cherchant à identifier la difficulté constitutive de ce programme qui ne reçoit pas de solution complète: la normativité épistémique ne semble ni éliminable, ni correctement intégrée à ce programme.

For well over a century the dominant narrative covering the major thinkers and themes of early modern British philosophy has been that of “British Empiricism”, within which the great triumvirate of Locke-Berkeley-Hume are taken to be the dominant figures. Although it is now common to question this schema as a way of analyzing and understanding the period in question, it continues to command considerable authority and acceptance. (One likely reason for this is that no credible or plausible alternatives structures or (...) schemas of analysis have suggested themselves.) Be this as it may, the analysis of the rival systems of Clarke, Berkeley and Hume makes clear that this narrative, however deeply entrenched it may be, is wholly misleading and both distorts and obscures key themes and figures in the period in question. (shrink)

This paper will explore some of the issues and arguments and offer some critical reflection on the ideas and ways that people have proposed to overcome or uphold the dilemma or conflict between the existence of the God of classical theism and evil and the consequence of evil - suffering. I seek explanation of the plain fact of evil and suffering but I do not seek it in the arrogant belief that I can explain evil away. My Christian faith is (...) not meant to provide complete answers and understanding to all life’s vexing questions. The purpose of my faith is to become aware and share in the life of the infinite and unlimited creator God. My belief provides strength and wisdom to live all of life but does not provide the perfect philosophical apologetic. My faith leaves me with much unsolved mystery and perplexing puzzle, often my faith is accompanied by doubt and existential pain and anxiety. Evil is not a theoretical problem but an existential problem. In the face of evil we are challenged to examine who we are and what we value as well as seeking a deeper insight into the nature and purposes of God. (shrink)

Rationalists often argue that empiricism is incoherent and conclude, on that basis, that some knowledge is a priori. I contend that such arguments against empiricism cannot be parlayed into an argument in support of the a priori since rationalism is open to the same arguments. I go on to offer an alternative strategy. The leading idea is that, instead of offering a priori arguments against empiricism, rationalists should marshal empirical support for their position.

A review of Albert Casullo's "A Priori Justification" (Oxford University Press).

Laurence BonJour divides approaches to a priori justification into three kinds. Quine’s radical empiricism denies the existence of any special category of a priori justification; moderate empiricism attempts to explain a priori justification in terms of something like knowledge of meaning or grasp of concepts; and rationalism postulates an irreducible ‘rational insight’ into the nature of reality. The positions therefore form a familiar trio of eliminativism, reductionism and anti-reductionism concerning a priori justification. BonJour’s interesting and (in the present philosophical climate) (...) unusual project is to defend rationalism, the anti-reductionist position. Rationalism says that we have an ability to ‘directly or intuitively see or grasp or apprehend … a necessary fact about the nature or structure of reality’ (pp. 15-16). ‘An apparent rational insight,’ he says, ‘purports to be nothing less than a direct insight into the necessary character of reality’ (p. 107). Two clarifications will help to mark out the distinctive character of this view: first, that rational insight is fallible; and second, that although BonJour carefully distinguishes the concepts of necessity and apriority, he none the less claims that rational insight yields a priori knowledge of necessary truths only. On his view, the contingent a priori does not exist, although empirical necessities do... (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue against empiricist positions which claim that empirical evidence can be sufficient to defeasibly justify aesthetic judgements, or judgements about the adequacy of aesthetic judgements, or sceptical judgements about someone's capacity to form adequate aesthetic judgements. First, empirical evidence provides neither inferential, nor non-inferential justification for aesthetic opinions. Second, while empirical evidence may tell us how we do respond aesthetically to artworks, it cannot tell us how we should respond to them. And, third, empirical insights into (...) the irrationality of many of our aesthetic judgements do not warrant the sceptical conclusion that we ought to refrain from forming aesthetic opinions. As a consequence of these limitations to aesthetic empiricism, we should endorse the rationalist position that aesthetic criticism is largely a matter of reasoning and, moreover, a collective undertaking. (shrink)

On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (...) (1986, 1988, 1996) and Lewis (1996) have recently affirmed the a priori infallibility of some category (ii) propositions. In this paper, I take aim at rationalist infallibilism by calling into question the a priori infallibility of both analytic and synthetic propositions. The upshot will be twofold: first, rationalist infallibilism unsurprisingly emerges as a defective epistemological doctrine, and second, more importantly, the case for the a priori infallibility of one or both categories of propositions turns out to lack cogency. (shrink)

Aproximaciones a la escuela francesa de epistemología Los problemas que dominan a la epistemología pueden contextualizarse históricamente como una forma de racionalidad filosófica. La filosofía se ha presentado a lo largo de la historia como un discurso en el que sus diversos componentes (metafísica, ontología, gnoseología, ética, lógica, etc.) se mostraron unidos en el molde de la ?unidad del saber?. En este marco unitario alguna de las formas del saber filosófico detenta usualmente una posición dominante. El énfasis colocado en la (...) unidad del saber filosófico, o en ?la unidad del pensamiento humano?, es una herencia que el pensamiento filosófico recibe de sus raíces mítico-teológicas. Dicha visión se vio sometida, en la historia de la filosofía, a un proceso de secularización por el cual la instancia dominante pasó de la teología a la metafísica y de ésta a la teoría del conocimiento. Entre los siglos XIX y XX, este proceso atestiguó un cambio ulterior, colocando a la epistemología como instancia dominante de la racionalidad filosófica. La sucesión debe verse como una consecuencia de la funcionalización social de los dispositivos de creencias (ideología), lo que provoca que los mismos se conviertan, en determinado momento, en un obstáculo para la producción de nuevos conocimientos. De esta manera, los nuevos conocimientos, para desarrollarse, se ven forzados a provocar reestructuraciones en el campo filosófico, ya sea mediante el reemplazo de la instancia dominante, la incorporación o creación de nuevas formas de saber filosófico -tal el caso de la epistemología-, o de la marginalización relativa de otras. Se trata de en un proceso complejo (que no es ni lineal, ni biunívoco), en el que cabe no obstante discernir un esquema de la sucesión temporal de las formas filosóficas que dominan la pretendida ?unidad del pensamiento humano? (filosofía). El que acabamos de describir es un proceso lento de sustitución y reemplazo en el tipo de garantías que se le exige elaborar a la filosofía. Algunos momentos, como el ocaso de las garantías de la fe, acaecido con el surgimiento de la filosofía moderna, podrían parecer a primera vista contrajemplos para esta concepción de la evolución del saber filosófico. Podría creerse, en efecto, que con la constitución de esferas autónomas de discurso (teología, ciencia, filosofía), del discurso filosófico se desgajó en un discurso de una naturaleza diferente: la ciencia. Sin embargo, una mirada más atenta revela un paisaje diferente, puesto que esta transformación estuvo acompañada, primero, por la aparición de una nueva instancia dominante de la unificación del conocimiento filosófico. Se trata de la búsqueda de una nueva clase de garantías, las del origen y el fundamento del conocimiento, es decir, las de la gnoseología o teoría del conocimiento, en el interior de la cual se verificó finalmente un nuevo desplazamiento, con la constitución, a fines del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX, de la ?filosofía de la ciencia? o epistemología. Este modelo para la conceptualización del desarrollo del discurso filosófico tiene la ventaja de permitirnos pensar la relación que la epistemología guarda con la instancia de saber filosófico dominante en el seno de la cual se desarrolla: la de la gnoseología. A partir de las relaciones que la epistemología guarda con la temática de las garantías del conocimiento podemos apresar, en un esquema heurístico que será complejizado de diversos modos en este libro, la diferencia entre las tesis características de la epistemología anglosajona y de la epistemología francesa. De acuerdo con en este esquema heurístico, el rasgo más característico de la epistemología anglosajona es su sujeción, en la mayor parte de su desarrollo, a la teoría del conocimiento, lo que se revela en la persistencia de algunos aspectos de la filosofía de la representación y en la reproducción de la oposición idealista entre sujeto y objeto como dos polos cuya armonía debería establecerse, filosóficamente, en términos de la verdad. En su lugar, la epistemología francesa se propuso el estudio de los mecanismos de producción de los conocimientos. La epistemología, desde esta perspectiva, ya no fue vista primordialmente como el estudio de los fundamentos del conocimiento científico, sino como la teoría de las condiciones y las formas de la práctica científica y la historia de esta práctica, tal como aparece en las distintas ciencias concretas. Expresado de otra manera, el contraste se podría establecer mediante la observación de que mientras los anglosajones hacen filosofía de la ciencia como una extensión de la lógica, los franceses la hacen como una extensión de la historia de la ciencia, es decir, encontrando en la historia el laboratorio del epistemólogo. Ahora bien, según veremos, el campo de la epistemología francesa ha cobijado una buena cantidad de debates que tienen que ver primordialmente con dos tendencias en tensión: la que enfatiza la autonomía de lo epistemológico y aquella que destaca la determinación social del pensamiento. Los trabajos de este libro esperan problematizar este y otros ejes, explorando las perspectivas de los ?clásicos? de la escuela francesa en epistemología (Bachelard, Canguilhem, Althusser, Foucault, etc.), las relaciones entre los mismos y los diálogos que cabe establecer entre estos y otras corrientes de pensamiento. ÍNDICE: La ruptura epistemológica, de Bachelard a Balibar y Pêcheux, Pedro Karczmarczyk La ruptura epistemológica según Bachelard, Althusser y Badiou, Carlos Gassmann Visitaciones Derrideanas, Jazmín Anahí Acosta Epistemología sin sujeto cognoscente. Superación, disolución o sujeción de la subjetividad en Popper, Wittgenstein y Foucault, Silvia Rivera; La torsión política del concepto de verdad en Michel Foucault, Manuel Cuervo Sola Canguilhem y Foucault. De la norma biológica a la norma política, Andrea Torrano Psicología e ideología: Foucault, Canguilhem y Althusser, Matías Abeijón . (shrink)

Dans un nombre croissant de domaines scientifiques - sciences de la nature, sciences humaines aussi bien que sciences des artefacts -, la simulation ne joue plus le rôle de succédané temporaire d'une théorie encore en gésine parce que non encore élaborée ; c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne joue plus systématiquement le rôle d'un modèle provisoire ou d'un schéma servant à condenser les mesures. C'est qu'elle n'a pas la nature d'un signe graphique, linguistique ou mathématique. Elle joue au contraire de plus en plus (...) le rôle d'une réplication détaillée du réel : elle est une intuition reconstruite avec justesse mais sans abstraction rationnelle et généralisante, donc sans transfiguration iconique. Une des limites de l'épistémologie dialectique de Bachelard tient à ce qu'elle ne donne pas les concepts pour penser assez distinctement ces pratiques contemporaines de simulation. C'est pourquoi l'A. propose de concevoir l'idée que la science contemporaine se développe non plus selon la seule dialectique matérialisme / rationalisme, mais selon la triade rationalisme/computationalisme/matérialisme. (shrink)

The fundamental premise of Trigg's book is that philosophy is an irreplaceable discipline, and Trigg seeks to defend it from the Scylla of scientism and the Charibdis of relativism. His bold tone will engage many readers in the challenges he discusses.

In this paper I illustrate what is reconstructive rationality, a notion that remains rather undetermined in Robert Brandom's work. I argue that theoretical and historical thinking are instances of reconstruction and should not be identified with it. I then explore a further instance of rational reconstruction, which Brandom calls “reconstructive metaphysics”, arguing that the demarcation between metaphysical and non-metaphysical theories has to be understood as a pragmatic one. Finally, I argue that Brandom’s reconstructive metaphysics is basically a pragmatist metaphysics. Here (...) I try to outline a pragmatist understanding of the concept of metaphysics in order to reconcile Brandom's more or less implicit attempt at metaphysical theorizing with his devotion to a pragmatist tradition that is resistant if not hostile to the very idea of metaphysics. Hence I come back to the question of how pragmatism has contributed to the understanding of “reconstructive rationality”, and argue that the latter is a notion of rationality which is needed by Brandom’s philosophy but which cannot find a clear place in the typology of the five forms of rationality that he introduces, being more akin to the core structure of rationality rather than a specific form of it. (shrink)

This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as “of” two different objects—in two different senses of the phrase ‘idea of’. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thus-and-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts for (...) the success of our proper methods of inquiry? For Descartes as well as Locke, the two kinds of “ofness” come apart as a result of strong rationalist commitments. However, I will suggest that even if we reject such commitments, we go wrong if we assume that a single kind of intentional directedness suffices to address both questions. (shrink)

Philosophy is the science of science; it is the analysis of the assumptions underlying empirical inquiry. Given that these assumptions cannot possibly be examined or even identified on the basis of empirical data, it follows that philosophy is a non-empirical discipline. And given that our linguistic and cultural practices cannot possibly be examined or even identified except on the basis of empirical data, it follows that philosophical questions are not linguistic questions and do not otherwise concern our conventions or our (...) cultural practices. This entails that philosophical truths are not tautologous or otherwise trivial. It also entails that empiricism is false and, therefore, that Platonism is correct. Given a clear understanding of why Platonism is correct and of what this implies, a number of shibboleths of contemporary analytic philosophy are speedily demolished and are no less speedily replaced with independently corroborated and intuitively plausible alternatives. New answers are given to age-old questions concerning scientific explanation, causal and logical dependence, linguistic meaning, personal identity, the structure of the psyche, and the nature of personal responsibility. Existing answers to these question are thoroughly considered and duly extended, modified, or replaced. Every technical term is defined; every philosophy-specific concept is explained; and the positions defended are consistent with commonsense, so far as their being consistent with the relevant data allows them to be. Therefore, this book is intelligible to philosophically minded laymen. At the same time, it is appropriate for advanced scholars, given that it defends original viewpoints and given also that, even though it discusses old viewpoints, it does so in new ways. Because it is clearly written, it is intelligible to neophytes; but it is not an introductory text and it is not a textbook. There are two appendices: the first, a thorough exposition of the rudiments of formal logic, along with the conceptual underpinnings of that discipline; the second, a definition and analytic discussion of each technical term that occurs in the text. Most of the chapters are followed by study-questions and by practice tests. (shrink)

In The Realm of Reason (2004), Christopher Peacocke develops a “generalized rationalism” concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be “entitled”, or justified, in forming a given belief. In the course of his discussion, Peacocke offers two arguments to the best explanation that aim to undermine scepticism and establish a justification for our belief in the reliability of sense perception, respectively. If sound, these ambitious arguments would answer some of the oldest and most vexing epistemological problems. In (...) this paper I will evaluate these arguments, concluding that they are inconclusive at best. Despite offering some interestingly original arguments, Peacocke gives us no reason to think that scepticism is false, and that perception is generally reliable. (shrink)