The Far Reach of the Iran War: Food Insecurity from North Africa to the Sahel
Within weeks of the Strait of Hormuz closure, fertilizer prices began to rise sharply. Tanker traffic through the strait, which handles one-third of the global fertilizer trade, fell by 90%. Across North Africa the impacts are multiplying, and this is having ripple effects for the Sahel in the south, adding to food price inflation, migration pressures, and the erosion of state legitimacy. The situation underscores how food security is a governance issue compounded by geopolitical crisis.
The war with the US and Israel has intensified pressure on the Iranian economy, but it has not represented a fundamentally new shock. The key question is not whether pressure exists, but whether it can be made decisive.
Operation Epic Fury has created a dramatic opportunity in Lebanon that the US cannot afford to miss. Sustained leadership and support for the Lebanese Armed Forces can result in real disarmament, eliminating Hizballah as an Iranian proxy, and dealing Tehran another massive defeat that would further undermine the Iranian regime and help bring about its collapse.
How Iran, China, and Russia Use the Shadow Fleet to Evade US Sanctions
Crude oil legally sanctioned by the United States and its allies today makes up an estimated 18% of global tanker capacity, or 6-7% of total unrefined petroleum flows — shares that have been growing. Increased pressure on Russian exports and US intervention in Venezuela have further constrained Russian flows and temporarily removed Venezuela, the smallest sanctioned producer, from the market. Iranian exports, however, remain largely untouched.
Syria’s Path Toward Stabilization — and How the US Can Help
After more than 50 years of brutal dictatorial rule and 13 years of civil conflict, the first year of Syria’s transition has been complex, imperfect, and fraught with difficulties. However, despite some significant challenges, Syria is clearly stabilizing. To sustain this progress, the United States must remain engaged.
New Questions on the International Stabilization Force for Gaza
In November 2025, the United States sought and obtained approval for a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2803) endorsing the formation of a Board of Peace (BoP) and International Stabilization Force (ISF) to support the implementation of the 20-point peace plan agreed to by Israel and Hamas the previous month. The ISF’s stated role is to help secure and demilitarize the Gaza Strip, primarily by facilitating the decommissioning of weapons, protecting civilians, and training and advising burgeoning Palestinian police forces. In the intervening months, however, progress on standing up the ISF has stalled, and conflicting messaging from US officials provides more questions than answers.
The US Commerce Department announced on November 19, 2025, that it had authorized the export of advanced American semiconductor chips to HUMAIN of Saudi Arabia and G42 of the United Arab Emirates. The approval enables both companies to purchase up to 35,000 Blackwell chips (GB300s). This sale is a core component of a broader “Compute Diplomacy” approach under the second administration of President Donald J. Trump, which was solidified following his May 2025 visit to the Gulf, where a series of multibillion-dollar artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure agreements were signed.
The United States plans to submit a resolution on Gaza to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by the end of November. Reportedly, thelatest draftendorses President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, recognizes the Board of Peace (BoP) as a “transitional governance administration,” and authorizes the BoP to establish an International Stabilization Force (ISF). The UN resolution is a first stepto achieving buy-in from potential ISF contributors. In turn, a viable ISF will be one key to moving beyond the cease-fire to securing the 20-point plan’s envisioned Hamas disarmament, further Israeli military withdrawal, and a path to Palestinian governance. The US faces several dilemmas as it seeks to transition from cease-fire to stabilization and beyond.
On November 18, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Salman (MBS) is scheduled to make his first trip to Washington since 2018. President Donald Trump has doubled down on the Gulf from the outset of his second term, making Riyadh his first planned overseas trip and reorienting ties around major artificial intelligence (AI) and investment deals. MBS’s visit will test whether both sides can translate ambitious pledges into concrete outcomes. Significant upgrades in defense and security are expected, with movement possible on semiconductor sales and nuclear cooperation. Behind the ambitions, harder questions about Saudi-Israeli normalization and alignment in a rapidly changing region loom as important Oval Office topics.
The October 2025 cease-fire and hostage-release deal that ended the Israel-Hamas conflict marks the beginning of a complicated post-war phase. The agreement has created important opportunities to advance stability in the Middle East and build a lasting and sustainable peace marked by enhanced regional security and integration, but there are considerable risks to manage. Achieving these goals will require coordinated international action along multiple lines of effort: security, rule of law, recovery and reconstruction, responsive governance, and steady and focused diplomacy to build confidence among key parties.
