
As of April 2026[update], 62 nuclear power units are operational in mainland China, second globally to the United States, which has 94. The installed net power sits at 61.215 GW (gross power 65.965GW) of electricity, third after US's 96.9 GW, and France's 63.0 GW . [3] Nuclear power generates per year 450 TWh of electricity, ranked second globally),[4] which is 4.82% of the 2025 nation's total energy production in China.[5] There are over 39 further units under construction with a total power of 37.3 GW, ranked first for the 19th consecutive year.[6]
Nuclear power has been looked into as an alternative to coal due to increasing concerns about air quality, climate change and fossil fuel shortages.[7][8] China aims to generate 200 GW by 2035, produced by 150 additional reactors, at a cost of US$440 billion.[9][10] China has two major nuclear power companies, the China National Nuclear Corporation operating mainly in northeast China, and the China General Nuclear Power Group operating mainly in southeast China.[11]
China aims to maximize self-reliance on nuclear reactor technology manufacturing and design, although international cooperation and technology transfer are also encouraged. Advanced pressurized water reactors (PWR) such as the Hualong One, CAP-1000, CAP-1400 are the mainstream technology in the near future, and the Hualong One is also exported to Pakistan [12] and will be exported to Kazakhstan.[13][14] China plans to build as many as thirty nuclear power reactors in countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative by 2030.[15][16][17]
By 2050, fast neutron reactors are planned as the primary reactor type, with a planned 1400 GW capacity by 2100, and two CFR-600 units would be ready in 2026.[18][19][20] China was also the first country to operate a Generation IV reactor, the HTR-PM at Shidaowan in Shandong, a pebble-bed type high-temperature gas-cooled reactor. It was connected to the grid in December 2023, becoming the world's first Generation IV reactor to enter commercial operation.[21][22] China's Thorium Molten Salt Reactor project aims to utilize the thorium fuel cycle, including the TMSR-LF1 prototype operational since 2023.[23] China is involved in the development of nuclear fusion reactors through its participation in the ITER project. It also conducts domestic research through facilities such as the EAST Tokamak in Hefei,[24] as well as advance experimental projects including the Burning Plasma Experimental Superconducting Tokamak[25][26] and the CFETR, which aim to develop DEMO-class reactors with power output exceeding >1 GW.[27]
Nuclear research in China began during the 1950s, centered at the Institute of Atomic Energy, with assistance from the Soviet Union, and primarily to develop China's nuclear weapons. Following China's reform and opening up, the military nuclear industry shifted towards civilian power, with the first nuclear power plant, Qinshan-1, connecting to the grid in 1991. In the 21st century, China imported many gigawatt-class PWR reactor designs: the French EPR, Russian VVER-1000, and US AP1000.
History
editThis section needs expansion. You can help by adding missing information. (July 2010) |
1950–1958
editIn the Cold War, Beijing's initial motivation for developing nuclear power was largely driven by security concerns.[28] Between 1950 and 1958, Chinese nuclear power construction heavily relied on cooperation with the USSR.[29] The first initiative was launched with the establishment of the China-Soviet Union Nonferrous Metals and Rare Metals Corporation and the first central atomic research facility, the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing.[30] In February 1955, a chemical separation plant for the production of weapons-grade U-235 and plutonium was created with Soviet aid in Xinjiang and in April the Changchun Institute of Atomic Energy was established.[29] Several months later, on 29 April 1955, the Sino-Soviet Atomic Cooperation Treaty was signed.[31] The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) was also established in 1955. In addition to cooperation with the USSR, China began to learn nuclear technology by sending students to the USSR.[29] In December 1958, nuclear power development had become the top priority project in the Draft Twelve Year Plan for Development of Science and Technology.[29]
1959–1963
editThe second phase was characterized by the goal of being completely self-sufficient in nuclear power development.[29] In June 1959, the USSR officially ended any forms of nuclear aid to China, withdrawing Soviet technicians.[32] China suffered but continued nuclear power development through massive research and input. In order to rapidly strengthen its atomic energy industry, the Central Committee decided that China must dedicate further resources exclusively to nuclear-related activities.[33] Consequently, the Institute of Atomic Energy created branch institutes of research organizations in every province, major city, and autonomous region.[29] By the end of 1963, China had built more than forty chemical separation plants for the extraction of uranium and thorium.[29] In the year between 1961 and 1962, China accomplished significant achievements in nuclear development which consolidated future applications. From 1959 to 1963, a gaseous diffusion plant utilizing a large 300 MW reactor was under construction at Lanzhou.[34] It was estimated that the Chinese invested over $1.5 billion in the construction of this plant.[29]
1964 – 2012
edit
After the explosive progress in the 1950s, Chinese nuclear development slowed down, possibly because of the Cultural Revolution, so only one nuclear test took place in 1970.[29] On 8 February 1970, China issued its first nuclear power plan, and the 728 Institute (now known as Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute)[35] was established.
Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant, constructed in 1984, was the first independently designed and built nuclear power plant. It was successfully connected to the grid on 15 December 1991.[36][37] The reactor is of type CNP-300.[citation needed]
After the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, Beijing emphasized that it would not change its nuclear development policy, but would still explore a national emergency management strategy.[38]
One year after Chernobyl, China began construction on the Daya Bay nuclear plant, located between Shenzhen and Hong Kong.[39] Over 72% of Hong Kong residents surveyed opposed the plant, and more than one million residents signed a petition against the project. Despite this public protest, Beijing pushed forward with construction, with then-Minister of Nuclear Industry Jiang Xinxiong saying, "The government has not changed and will not change its decision to build a nuclear plant at Daya Bay," at a press conference in 1986.[40]
In 1991, China created the National Nuclear Accident Emergency Committee to plan and coordinate nationwide nuclear accident emergency preparations and rescue operations.[41]
Along with the reform and opening up, China continued to demand expansion of its electricity sector.[42] As part of China's tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), a key component of energy policy was to "guarantee energy security, optimize energy mix, improve energy efficiency, protect the ecological environment.”[42] By 2002, China had two operational nuclear power plants.[43]: 197
In 2007, the Hu Jintao administration set the goal of doubling the amount of nuclear energy in China's total installed capacity, which resulted in the major growth of business opportunities in China's nuclear power sector.[44]: 100–101
Immediately after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, Beijing froze all reactor approvals pending a safety review. By late 2012, the Chinese State Council approved the Nuclear Power Safety Plan and the Mid- and Long-Term Nuclear Development Plan, resuming reactor deployment as long as new projects met stricter Generation III safety standards.[45]
In 2012, Hu emphasized "the irreplaceable role of nuclear energy in ensuring energy security and climate change".[43]: 201
2013 – present
edit| Year | gigawatts |
|---|---|
| 2014 | |
| 2015 | |
| 2016 | |
| 2017 | |
| 2018 | |
| 2019 | |
| 2020 | |
| 2021 | |
| 2022 | |
| 2023 | |
| 2024 | |
| 2025 |
The nuclear safety plan of 2013 stated that beyond 2016, only Generation III plants would be started, and until then only a very few Generation II+ plants would be started.[47]
In 2014, China still planned to have 58 GW of capacity by 2020.[48] However, due to reevaluation following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan, few plants commenced construction after 2015, and this target was not met.[49]
In 2019, China had a new target of 200 GWe of nuclear generating capacity by 2035, which is 7.7% of the predicted total electricity generating capacity of 2600 GWe.[50] By the end of December 2020, the total number of nuclear power units in operation on the Chinese mainland reached 49, with a total installed capacity of 51 GWe, ranking third in the world in terms of installed capacity and second in the world in terms of power generation in 2020; with 16 nuclear power units under construction, the number of units under construction and installed capacity have ranked first in the world for many years.[36] By 2035, nuclear power is planned to account for 10% of electricity generation.[51]
As of 2020, China had 41 additional nuclear reactors planned and 168 proposed reactors under consideration.[43]: 197 China's under-construction reactors accounted for 27% of worldwide reactors under construction.[43]: 197 As of at least 2023, China's goals for nuclear power expansion are the most ambitious of any country.[43]: 197
In 2021, China's Environmental Protection and Resources Conservation Committee announced an action plan which emphasized the deployment and development of next-generation nuclear power technology to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.[53]
In 2024, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation think tank stated that globally, China leads or matches in commercial nuclear power technology, and is likely 10 to 15 years ahead in Generation IV reactor technology.[54][55]
Between 2015 and 2024, China built 37 reactors with an average time from first concrete to grid connection of 6.3 years (beating the global average of 9.4 years). China also recorded the fastest build time in that period at just 4.1 years.[56]
As of 2025, China is the world's largest investor in nuclear energy, with 29 reactors currently under construction. This represents nearly half of all nuclear reactors being built globally.[57] China is projected to surpass the United States as the world's leading producer of nuclear energy in the coming years.[58] This expansion is consistent with the country's stated climate strategy. In terms of total prospective capacity, China leads with nearly 125 GWe in announced and under-construction projects, almost four times that of second-place Russia.[59]
Safety and regulation
edit
The National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), under the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), is the licensing and regulatory body which also maintains international agreements regarding safety. It was set up in 1984 and reports to the State Council directly. In relation to the AP1000, NNSA works closely with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. China has been a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1984.[51]
China has requested and hosted 12 Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions from IAEA teams as of October 2011, and each plant generally has one external safety review each year, either OSART, WANO peer review, or CNEA peer review (with the Research Institute for Nuclear Power Operations).[60]
Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan, China announced on 16 March 2011, that all nuclear plant approvals were being frozen, and that "full safety checks" of existing reactors would be conducted.[61][62] Although Zhang Lijun, Vice Minister of Environmental Protection, has indicated that China's overall nuclear energy strategy would continue,[62] some commentators have suggested that additional safety-related costs and public opinion could cause a rethink in favor of an expanded renewable energy program.[62][63]
China's current methods for storing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are only sustainable until the mid-2020s, and a policy to handle SNF needs to be developed.[64]
In 2007, China's National Nuclear Safety Administration authorized three state-owned enterprises to own and operate nuclear power plants: the China National Nuclear Corporation, the China General Nuclear Power Group, and State Power Investment Corporation.[43]: 201-202
In 2017, new laws strengthened the powers of the National Nuclear Safety Administration, creating new "institutional mechanisms", a clearer "division of labour" and more disclosure of information.[65]
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi made his first official visit in May 2023, signing several agreements with China's nuclear regulator, the China Atomic Energy Authority. Grossi said "China is one of the IAEA’s most important partners and a global leader in nuclear energy".[51]
Reactor technologies
editImported technology
editCANDU reactors
editIn 1998 construction of two AECL 728 MW CANDU-6 reactors at Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant started. The first went online in 2002, the second in 2003. CANDU reactors can use low-grade reprocessed uranium from conventional reactors as fuel, thereby reducing China's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel.[66]
VVER
edit
Russia's Atomstroyexport was the general contractor and equipment provider for the Tianwan AES-91 power plants using the V-428 version of the well-proven VVER-1000 reactor with a 1060 MWe capacity. Construction started in 1999. Two further Tianwan units started in 2012, using the same version of the VVER-1000 reactor.
On 7 March 2019, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and Atomstroyexport signed the detailed contract for the construction of four VVER-1200s, two each at the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant and the Xudabao Nuclear Power Plant. Construction was scheduled to begin in May 2021, and commercial operation of all the units is expected between 2026 and 2028.[67]
EPR
editAP1000 / CAP1000
edit
The Westinghouse AP1000 was planned to be the main basis of China's move to Generation III technology. In July 2018, the first of four AP1000 reactors was connected to the grid.[68]
Following Westinghouse's bankruptcy in 2017, it was decided in 2019 to build the Hualong One rather than the AP1000 at Zhangzhou.[69]
As of 2023[update], the construction of six CAP1000 was approved by the State Council: Haiyang 3 & 4, Lianjiang 1 & 2, and Sanmen 3 & 4.[70][71] Construction of Sanmen 3 officially started in June 2022, and of Haiyang 3 in July 2022.
Chinese developments
editCNP / ACP series
editThe CNP Generation II nuclear reactors (and Generation III successor ACP) were a series of nuclear reactors developed by China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), and are predecessors of the more current Hualong One design.
The CNP series of Generation II reactors started with the CNP-300 pressurized water reactor, which was the first reactor design developed domestically in China. The first unit began operation at Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant in 1991.
A larger version of the reactor, the CNP-600 was developed based on both the CNP-300[72] and the M310 reactor design used in Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant.[73][74] It was installed at Changjiang Nuclear Power Plant, with two units operational from 2015 and 2016, respectively. A Generation III ACP-600 successor was also developed, but none were built.
A three-loop, 1000-MW version of the CNP reactor, the CNP-1000, was under development since the 1990s with the help of vendors Westinghouse and Framatome (now AREVA). 4 units of the CNP-1000 were later built at Fuqing Nuclear Power Plant. Further work on the CNP-1000 was stopped in favour of the ACP-1000.
In 2013, China announced that it had independently developed the Generation III ACP-1000, with Chinese authorities claiming full intellectual property rights over the design. As a result of the success of the Hualong One project, no ACP-1000 reactors have been built to date. CNNC had originally planned to use the ACP-1000 in Fuqing reactors 5 and 6 but switched over to the Hualong One.[75]
CPR-1000 / ACPR-1000
editThe CPR-1000 was a Generation II reactor developed by China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN). It is the most numerous reactor type in China, with 22 units operational. This reactor type is a Chinese development of the French 900 MWe three cooling loop design imported in the 1990s, with most of the components now built in China. Intellectual property rights are retained by Areva, which affects CPR-1000 overseas sales potential.[7]
China's first CPR-1000 nuclear power plant, Ling Ao-3, was connected to the grid on 15 July 2010.[76] The design has been progressively built with increasing levels of Chinese components. Shu Guogang, GM of China Guangdong Nuclear Power Project, said, "We built 55 percent of Ling Ao Phase 2, 70 percent of Hongyanhe, 80 percent of Ningde and 90 percent of Yangjiang Station."[citation needed]
In 2010, the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation announced the ACPR1000 design, a further design evolution of the CPR-1000 to a Generation III level, which would also replace components subject to intellectual-property restrictions. CGNPC aimed to be able to independently market the ACPR1000 for export by 2013.[77] A number of ACPR1000 are under construction in China, but for export, this design was superseded by the Hualong One.
Hualong One
edit
Red line − active systems
Green line − passive systems
IRWST − in-containment refuelling water storage tank
Hualong One is jointly developed by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), based on the three-loop ACP1000 of CNNC and ACPR1000 of CGN, which in turn are based on the French M310.[79]
Since 2011, CNNC has been progressively merging its ACP-1000 nuclear power station design[citation needed] with the CGN ACPR-1000 design, while allowing some differences, under the direction of the Chinese nuclear regulator. Both are three-loop designs originally based on the same French M310 design used in Daya Bay with 157 fuel assemblies, but went through different development processes (CNNC's ACP-1000 has a more domestic design with 177 fuel assemblies, while CGN's ACPR-1000 is a closer copy with 157 fuel assemblies).[60] In early 2014, it was announced that the merged design was transitioning from preliminary design to detailed design. Power output will be 1150 MWe, with a 60-year design life, and will use a combination of passive and active safety systems with a double containment. CNNC's 177 fuel assembly design was retained.
After the merger, both companies retain their own supply chain and their versions of the Hualong One will differ slightly (units built by CGN will retain some features from the ACPR1000) but the design is considered to be standardised. Some 85% of its components will be made domestically.[80]
The Hualong One power output will be 1170 MWe gross, 1090 MWe net, with a 60-year design life, and would use a combination of passive and active safety systems with a double containment.[78] It has a 177 assembly core design with an 18-month refuelling cycle. The power plant's utilisation rate is as high as 90%. CNNC has said its active and passive safety systems, double-layer containment and other technologies meet the highest international safety standards.[81]
The Hualong One is now largely seen as the replacement for all previous Chinese nuclear reactor designs, and has been exported overseas.
Hualong Two
editCAP1400 (Guohe One)
editIn September 2020, China's State Power Investment Corporation launched a design based on the Westinghouse AP1000 for more widespread deployment consideration. It was given the name Guohe One.[84]
As of 2026[update], the only two CAP-1400 reactor operation are in Shidaowan II-1&II-2.[85] There are also plans for 4 additional CAP-1400 reactor in Bailong Unit 3-6.[86]
In February 2019, the Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research & Design Institute announced that it had begun the conceptual design process for the CAP1700.[87]
The CAP1400 project may extend to a larger, three-loop CAP-2100 design if the passive cooling system can be scaled to that level.[88]
Generation IV reactors
edit
China is developing several generation IV reactor designs.
HTR-PM (high-temperature gas-cooled reactor)
editIn December 2023, China’s HTR-PM, a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor at Shidao Bay, entered commercial operation.[89] HTR-PM is a small modular reactor which connects two helium-cooled reactor modules to a single steam turbine, outputting energy and super-heated steam. These reactors are inherently safe as they demonstrate “walk-away” behavior. Emergency tests conducted in proved the reactors could cool down naturally without human intervention or backup core-cooling systems. This was the first successful demonstration of this inherent-safety behavior in a commercial reactor.[90] In 2024, the state energy firm Huaneng connected HTR-PM to a local steam heating network, replacing ~3,700 tonnes of coal per heating season.[91]
The HTR-PM is a descendant of the AVR reactor, and it is partly based on the earlier Chinese HTR-10 reactor.
CFR-600 (sodium-cooled fast reactor)
editAt 17:00 on December 15, 2014, China's first sodium-cooled fast-neutron reactor—the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR)—reached 100% power for the first time. By 17:00 on December 18, it had successfully completed 72 hours of stable operation at full power, marking the point at which its key process parameters and safety performance indicators met design requirements.[92] Regarding the commercial application of sodium-cooled fast-neutron reactors, the CFR-600 unit—China's demonstration fast reactor—is currently under construction at the Xiapu Nuclear Power Plant.[93]
Thorium-based Molten Salt Reactor
editThe Thorium-based Molten Salt experimental Reactor TMSR-LF1 located in Wuwei, Gansu, was originally scheduled to commence trial operations at the end of September 2021; it represents a form of thorium-fueled power generation.[94] On August 2, 2022, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the PRC issued a public notice titled "Notice on Approving the "Commissioning Outline for the 2 MWt Liquid-Fueled Thorium-Based Molten Salt Experimental Reactor" (Version 1.3)." This notice indicated that the reactor was currently in its commissioning phase].[95]
ACP100 small modular reactor
editIn July 2019, China National Nuclear Corporation announced it would start building a demonstration ACP100 small modular reactor (SMR) on the north-west side of the existing Changjiang Nuclear Power Plant by the end of the year.[96] Design of the ACP100 started in 2010 and it was the first SMR project to pass an independent safety assessment by International Atomic Energy Agency in 2016. It is also referred to as Linglong One and is a fully integrated reactor module with an internal coolant system, with a 2-year refuelling interval, producing 385 MWt and about 125 MWe, and incorporates passive safety features, and can be installed underground.[97][98]
Fusion Reactor Technology
editOn January 20, 2025, the Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST)—located in Hefei, Anhui Province, China—announced that it had set a new world record by sustaining a plasma at temperatures exceeding 100 million degrees Celsius for 1,066 seconds (nearly 18 minutes). Chinese researchers stated that this long-duration, steady-state, high-confinement operation represents a crucial step toward validating the conditions required for continuous fusion burning. As the world's first fully superconducting tokamak device, EAST has conducted over 100,000 experiments since achieving its first plasma discharge in 2006, gradually extending its pulse duration from a few seconds to the current record [99]. Following the adoption of a full-tungsten wall structure, the device broke through the "Greenwald Density Limit" in January 2026; its plasma density far exceeded the previously accepted theoretical limit, reaching between 1.3 and 1.65 times that limit[100]. Nearby, civil construction for the Burning Plasma Experimental Superconducting Tokamak (BEST)—the world's first demonstration facility for fusion power generation—neared completion in April 2026. A key component—the Dewar base (the largest vacuum component in China's fusion sector, weighing approximately 6,700 tons)—has already been installed. The facility is scheduled for completion by the end of 2027, at which point it will commence deuterium-tritium (D-T) fusion experiments, with the ultimate goal of achieving actual electricity generation using fusion energy before 2030.
China is also actively preparing for the China Fusion Engineering Test Reactor (CFETR), a facility designed to serve as a bridge between ITER-class experimental devices and future fusion demonstration power plants. The comprehensive research platform supporting the CFETR—the Comprehensive Research Facility for Fusion Reactor Key Systems (CRAFT), located in Anhui province—has now entered the final stages of construction. Several key subsystems have been approved, and installation work is currently underway; the primary objective is to test superconducting magnets and plasma heating systems for the future CFETR. The facility is expected to be fully completed this year, establishing itself as a dedicated platform for validating the technologies and components required for the CFETR. Publicly available fusion development roadmaps indicate that construction of the CFETR is expected to commence in the late 2020s, with the goal of transitioning from generating several hundred megawatts of fusion power to demonstration-scale operation during the 2030s. [99]
Concurrently, China is advancing a hybrid fusion-fission concept project for a high-temperature superconducting reactor, dubbed "Spark." Planned for construction on Yaohu Science Park in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, this project integrates a high-temperature superconducting tokamak device with a surrounding subcritical fission blanket, aiming to achieve a net electrical output of approximately 100 megawatts and an energy gain factor (Q-value) exceeding 30. Current plans call for construction to begin toward the end of the current decade; Chinese media project that, should development proceed as scheduled, the facility will become operational around 2030 or 2031. [99]
On February 2, 2026, Energy Singularity—a private fusion energy startup based in Shanghai—successfully unveiled the *Honghuang 70*. This high-temperature superconducting(HTS) tokamak was constructed using a supply chain entirely localized within China. Featuring a D-shaped magnet with a major radius of 70 centimeters and a central field strength of 1 Tesla, the device was built utilizing HTS magnets fabricated from rare-earth barium copper oxides(REBCO). It successfully surpassed the 20-Tesla magnetic field strength record previously held by Commonwealth Fusion Systems (SPARC)—a startup spun out of MIT—becoming the first device globally to reach 21.7 Teslas and establishing a record for plasma operation duration of 1,337 seconds [101]. An enlarged version, the *Honghuang 170*—scheduled for completion in 2027—will feature a D-shaped magnet with a major radius of 150 centimeters and a central field strength of 10 Teslas, with the objective of achieving net power (Q > 2), and ultimately greater than 10[102].
As of March 2026, China possesses 11 fusion devices: 8 tokamaks, and one each of the reversed-field pinch, stellarator, and field-reversed configuration types. [103]
- Magnetic Confinement
- China Tokamak No. 1[104]
- China Tokamak New No. 1[105]
- China Tokamak No. 2
- China Tokamak No. 3
- Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak
- China Fusion Engineering Test Reactor (Under construction)
Nuclear power plants
edit
Most nuclear power plants in China are located on the coast and generally use seawater for cooling in a direct once-through cycle. In 2009, The New York Times reported that China was placing many of its nuclear plants near large cities, and there was a concern that tens of millions of people could be exposed to radiation in the event of an accident.[11] China's neighboring Daya Bay and Lingao nuclear plants have around 28 million people within a 75-kilometre radius that covers Hong Kong.[106]
Future projects
editFollowing the Fukushima accident and consequent pause in approvals for new plants, the target adopted by the State Council in October 2012 became 60 GWe by 2020, with 30 GWe under construction. In 2015, the target for nuclear capacity on line in 2030 was 150 GWe, providing almost 10% of electricity, and 240 GWe in 2050 providing 15%.
However, from 2016 to 2018, there was a further hiatus in the new build programme, with no new approvals for at least two years, causing the programme to slow sharply. Delays in the Chinese builds of AP1000 and EPR reactors, together with the bankruptcy in the U.S. of Westinghouse, the designer of the AP1000, have created uncertainties about the future direction. Also, some regions of China now have excess generation capacity, and it has become less certain to what extent electricity prices can economically sustain nuclear new build while the Chinese government is gradually liberalising the generation sector.[107][108]
In 2018, a Nuclear Engineering International journal analysis suggests a below-plan capacity of 90 GWe is plausible for 2030.[109] As of 2025[update], China had 68 GW of operational nuclear power, with 34 GW under construction, and 147 proposed. (see Table below)
Bloomberg News reported that the 2020 National People's Congress supported future building of 6 to 8 reactors a year, which Bloomberg considered likely to be dominated by the domestic Hualong One design.[110] In 2019, China had a new target of 200 GWe of nuclear generating capacity by 2035, which is 7.7% out of predicted total electricity generating capacity of 2600 GWe.[50]
The role of the IPPs
editThe first major successful profitable commercial project was the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant, which is 25% owned by CLP Group of Hong Kong and exports 70% of its electricity to Hong Kong. Such imports supply 20% of Hong Kong's electricity.
In order to access the capital needed to meet the 2020 target of 80GW, China has begun to grant equity in nuclear projects to China's Big Five power corporations:
- Huaneng Group,
- Huadian Group – Fujian Fuqing nuclear power project II and III
- Datang Group,
- China Power Investment Group – Jiangxi Pengze Nuclear
- Guodian Group
Like the two nuclear companies China National Nuclear Corporation and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG) the Big Five are State-owned "Central Enterprises" (中央企业) administered by SASAC. However, unlike the two nuclear companies, they have listed subsidiaries in Hong Kong and a broad portfolio of thermal, hydro and wind.
Summary of nuclear power plants
editCompared to other nations, China possesses a relatively young fleet of nuclear power units; as of 2026, the average age of these units is less than 12 years—with approximately 50% of the plants being under 10 years old—whereas the global average stands at 32 years. In contrast, the average age of the 92 reactors in the United States exceeds 42 years; globally, 67% of currently operational nuclear power plants have been in service for over 30 years.
| Nuclear power plant | operational reactors | reactors under construction | reactors planned | total | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| units | net capacity (MW) | units | net capacity (MW) | units | net capacity (MW) | units | net capacity (MW) | |
| Bailong | — | 2 | 2,200 | 4 | 6,000 | 6 | 8,200 | |
| Changjiang | 2 | 1,202 | 3 | 2,400 | — | 5 | 3,602 | |
| Daya Bay (Dayawan) | 2 | 1,888 | — | — | 2 | 1,888 | ||
| Fangchenggang | 4 | 4,000 | — | 2 | 2,200 | 6 | 6,200 | |
| Fangjiashan | 2 | 2,024 | — | — | 2 | 2,024 | ||
| Fuqing | 6 | 6,000 | — | — | 6 | 6,000 | ||
| Haiyang | 2 | 2,300 | 2 | 2,200 | 2 | 2,200 | 6 | 6,700 |
| Hongyanhe | 6 | 6,366 | — | — | 6 | 6,366 | ||
| Jinqimen | — | 2 | 2,252 | 4 | 4504 | 6 | 6,756 | |
| Lianjiang | — | 2 | 2,448 | 4 | 4,640 | 6 | 7,088 | |
| Ling Ao | 4 | 3,914 | — | — | 4 | 3,914 | ||
| Lufeng (Shanwei) | — | 4 | 4,400 | 2 | 2,200 | 6 | 6,600 | |
| Ningde | 4 | 4,072 | 2 | 2,036 | — | 6 | 6,108 | |
| Pengze | — | — | 2 | 2,200 | 2 | 2,200 | ||
| Qinshan | 7 | 4,110 | — | — | 7 | 4,110 | ||
| San'ao | 1 | 1,126 | 3 | 3,378 | — | 4 | 4,504 | |
| Sanmen | 2 | 2,314 | 2 | 2,326 | 2 | 2,000 | 6 | 6,640 |
| Shidao Bay (Shidaowan) | 3 | 3200 | 3 | 3668 | — | 5 | 5268 | |
| Taishan | 2 | 3,320 | — | — | 2 | 3,320 | ||
| Taipingling | 1 | 1116 | 3 | 3,648 | — | 4 | 4,764 | |
| Tianwan | 6 | 6,080 | 2 | 2,200 | — | 8 | 8,280 | |
| Wuwei | 1 | 2 | 1 | 10 | — | 2 | 12 | |
| Xianning | — | — | 2 | 2,200 | 2 | 2,200 | ||
| Xiapu | — | 2 | 1,000 | 3 | 3,300 | 5 | 4,300 | |
| Xudabao | — | 4 | 4,400 | — | 4 | 4,400 | ||
| Yangjiang | 6 | 6,120 | — | — | 6 | 6,120 | ||
| Zhangzhou | 2 | 2,424 | 2 | 2,424 | 2 | 2,200 | 6 | 6,600 |
| Zhaoyuan | — | 2 | 2,400 | 4 | 4,800 | 6 | 7,200 | |
| Total | 62 | 59,978 | 39 | 38,738 | 11 | 39,140 | 112 | 124,108 |
Where multiple reactors are operational/under construction/planned at a given site, the capacity given is to be understood for all reactors at this site applicable to the given column, not a per reactor figure.
Fuel cycle
editChina faces a situation characterized by high demand for uranium resources, low domestic production, and heavy reliance on external sources. A single Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) nuclear power plant with an installed capacity of 1 GWe consumes approximately 160 to 200 tons of natural uranium annually, amounting to roughly 10,000 tons over its 60-year operational lifespan. In 2024, China's demand for natural uranium is estimated to range between 13,000 and 14,000 tons; by 2030, as installed capacity reaches 110 GWe, this demand is projected to climb to over 30,000 tons. As of 2024, China's proven uranium reserves stand at only 350,000 tons, accounting for a mere 6% of the global total. By 2026, the country is expected to have 28 uranium mines in various stages—production, pilot operation, or construction.[114] In 2024, China's domestic production of natural uranium amounted to 1,700–1,800 tons; this figure is projected to expand to 6,000–7,000 tons by 2030. Consequently, the remaining 70% to 90% of demand is met through imports: approximately 60% is imported from Kazakhstan, 30% from Namibia, and the remainder primarily from Canada, Russia, Uzbekistan, and other nations. Since 2020, annual uranium imports have ranged from 13,000 to 19,000 tons.[115] Concurrently, China has been actively pursuing the extraction of uranium from seawater. The total uranium content in seawater is estimated to reach 4.5 billion tons—a figure 1,000 times greater than that of traditional terrestrial uranium ore deposits—though seawater contains only 3.3 milligrams of uranium per ton. In 2023, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) established a seawater uranium extraction platform in the waters off Changjiang County, Hainan Province, deploying eight floating collection grids, each measuring 8 by 8 meters.[116] By 2025, the project successfully achieved the extraction of kilogram-scale uranium products, meeting its scheduled target.[117] Uranium enrichment constitutes the most strategically critical technological stage within the nuclear fuel cycle. Its core process is isotope separation—specifically, purifying uranium-235 from its natural abundance of 0.7% to either a civilian-grade concentration of 3–5% or a weapons-grade concentration of 90%. China's uranium enrichment capabilities are spearheaded by the China Atomic Energy Industry Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of the CNNC; this entity also provides services related to nuclear fuel imports, nuclear-grade zirconium materials, and the transportation and processing of spent nuclear fuel. [118] As of 2023, two uranium purification and conversion production bases—one in the north and one in the south—have been established. These facilities possess an annual production capacity of 1,400 tons of uranium for PWR fuel assemblies and 200 tons of uranium for HWR fuel assemblies. [119]
Fuel removed from a reactor is referred to as spent fuel. China has adopted a policy of a closed nuclear fuel cycle and reprocessing, which entails either in-reactor or off-reactor storage of spent fuel, followed by its transport for recycling and eventual utilization in Fast Reactors. In 2020, China's annual output of spent fuel amounted to 1,298 tons, bringing the cumulative total to 8,718 tons; by 2030, it is projected that nearly 2,637 tons of spent fuel will be generated annually. Spent fuel storage is categorized into wet storage and dry storage: wet storage primarily involves storing spent fuel assemblies in water pools located within nuclear power plants, while dry storage entails placing the spent fuel inside containers constructed from concrete or metal. [120] [121] Dry storage facilities for spent fuel at the Daya Bay, Qinshan, and Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant were officially commissioned prior to 2023. The volume of spent fuel requiring off-site transport and processing nationwide now approaches 1,000 tons annually; consequently, the transport of spent fuel—utilizing both imported and domestically manufactured transport casks via road, sea/waterway, and rail (specifically using the D15B-type 100-ton-class dedicated railcars for spent fuel transport packages)—has become a routine and normalized operation. [119] Furthermore, the *Administrative Measures for the Transport of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Plants* has been promulgated and is scheduled to take effect on October 1, 2025. [122]
As of March 2026, China has a total of seven operational facilities for low-level radioactive waste and twelve operational facilities for general radioactive waste. [123] China is evaluating the construction of a high level waste (HLW) repository in the Gobi Desert.[124] Located near the city of Jiuquan in Gansu Province, the Beishan Underground Research Laboratory will feature a spiral ramp, three vertical shafts, and horizontal disposal galleries. Two experimental platforms for nuclear technology will be constructed at depths of 280 meters and 560 meters, respectively. Led by CNNC, the project was approved in 2019, and construction at the Beishan site commenced in June 2021; work is currently underway, with 7,000 meters of the planned 13.4-kilometer tunnel system already excavated via TBM.[125] The Longhe Disposal Facility—situated in the sparsely populated, arid northwestern Gobi region—was completed in July 2022. In April 2025, it received both construction and operating licenses from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of PRC. With a planned capacity reaching one million cubic meters, the facility is capable of meeting the disposal requirements for the solid radioactive waste generated over a century of operation by China's hundreds of nuclear power units.[126]
When fast neutron reactors are utilized within a closed fuel cycle, a single kilogram of nuclear waste can be recycled multiple times—until all the uranium has been consumed and the toxic actinides, which would otherwise remain radioactive for thousands of years, have been fully incinerated. The final residue amounts to approximately 30 grams of waste, the radioactivity of which will persist for 200 to 300 years.[127] China's first sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor—the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR)—began operations in 2014. Currently under construction and commissioning at the Xiapu Nuclear Power Plant, the CFR-600 (demonstration Unit 1 and 2) represents the commercial application of sodium-cooled fast reactor technology; it will utilize Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel extracted from spent nuclear fuel and is expected to commence commercial operations around 2026. By "breeding" new fuel from Uranium-238 which can not be used in PWR & HWR, fast reactors can increase the utilization efficiency of natural uranium by more than 60 times.
Starting in about the 2010s, China has been making serious efforts towards nuclear reprocessing.[128] While those plants are ostensibly civilian in nature, there is concern as to the Dual Use applicability of the technology[129] with media articles headlined "China nuclear reprocessing to create stockpiles of weapons-level materials: Experts"[130][131][132] China has also pioneered the use of a reprocessed uranium / depleted uranium mixture "natural uranium equivalent" in its Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors at Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant.[133] Unlike the similar "DUPIC" process ("direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU") pioneered in South Korea, this process separately recovers the reactor grade plutonium for other uses, fueling the heavy water reactor with the uranium content of the spent fuel alone.[134] In 2010, the CNNC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the French company Orano to define the framework of their cooperation (specifically delineating the respective scopes of work for Orano and CNNC), as well as a letter of intent to construct a large-scale reprocessing and recycling facility with an annual processing capacity of 800 tons; however, progress on this project has been stalled. The processes and technologies employed at China's large-scale reprocessing and recycling facility are modeled after those utilized at Orano's La Hague (UP3/UP2-800) and Melox plants. [135]
Nuclear Application
editChina's nuclear applications sector—typically referred to as applied nuclear technology or non-power civilian nuclear technology—is currently undergoing a critical transition from a phase of "rapid growth" to one of "high-quality, large-scale development," having already deeply penetrated the fields of medicine, industry, agriculture, and environmental protection [136] [137]. Multiple facilities—including neutron sources, synchrotron radiation light sources, and heavy-ion sources—have been established [138]; these include, but are not limited to, the following:
- Nuclear Medicine and Radiopharmaceuticals: Isotopes (such as Carbon-14, Cobalt-60, Mo-99, Iodine-131, and Lutetium-177) are being mass-produced and exported, facilitated by facilities such as the China Spallation Neutron Source(CSNS) (located in Dongguan, Guangdong), the synchrotron radiation source at the under-construction Southern Advanced Light Source, 75 MeV high-current cyclotrons, and the heavy-water reactors at the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant. The Leshan Medical Isotope Production Reactor (a solution reactor) in Sichuan is expected to be completed and commissioned by 2027. Furthermore, key alpha-emitting radionuclides—such as Lead-212, Actinium-225 (²²⁵Ac), and Radium-223 (²²³Ra)—are achieving Curie-level mass production via the China Spallation Neutron Source, thereby enabling the large-scale clinical application of radiopharmaceuticals, targeted therapies, and interventional treatments for cancerous tumors. Domestically developed heavy medical equipment—including proton therapy systems, PET-CT scanners, PET-MR scanners, and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) devices—has entered the commercial operational phase. The R&D of high-end nuclear medical equipment—such as proton therapy, heavy-ion therapy, Boron Neutron Capture Therapy (BNCT), and FLASH radiotherapy—has advanced to the clinical translation and clustering stage; consequently, China has emerged as a major global destination for cancer patients seeking "advanced radionuclide therapies" (e.g., BNCT and Targeted Alpha Therapy [TAT]).
- Industrial Applications: In the realm of non-destructive testing, security inspection systems (such as those provided by Nuctech) command the majority of the global market. Furthermore, China ranks among the world leaders in the scale of its radiation processing and electron-beam wastewater treatment operations. Facilities such as the China Spallation Neutron Source and the High Energy Photon Source (HEPS in Beijing) are providing critical support for the R&D of advanced equipment and novel materials across various sectors, including new energy, high-end manufacturing, aerospace, advanced materials science, and quantum science.
- Diversified Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Nuclear hydrogen production—integrated with High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTR-PM) technology—is currently undergoing industrial-scale validation; nuclear heating has already been implemented at multiple nuclear power plants and is being actively promoted through initiatives such as "Warm Nuclear No. 1" and small modular heating reactors; and nuclear waste heat is being utilized for seawater desalination.
- Agricultural Breeding:Through the application of space breeding and nuclear radiation breeding techniques, hundreds of new high-yield and disease-resistant crop varieties—including wheat and rice—have been successfully developed.
Companies
editChina's domestic market for uranium is highly concentrated because Chinese policy identifies uranium as a strategic resource and only select companies are authorized to mine it.[43]: 201 The country's civilian nuclear industry and its mining industry are largely concentrated in China General Nuclear Power Group and China National Nuclear Corporation, two state-owned enterprise that report to the State Council.[43]: 201
China National Nuclear Corporation was founded in 1988 as a state-owned enterprise supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), and was constituted from the former Ministry of Nuclear Industry.[43]: 202 It is the only exporter of Chinese nuclear power plants.[43]: 202
China General Nuclear Power Group was founded in 1994 as the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group and changed to its current name in 2013.[43]: 202 It is also supervised by SASAC.[43]: 202 Its headquarters are in Shenzhen.[43]: 202 As of 2017, China General Nuclear Power Group manages 20 reactors.[43]: 202
Research
edit
In January 2011, the Chinese Academy of Sciences began the TMSR research and development project to create reactors which, among other advances, will be air-cooled. A small prototype reactor of this type, the TMSR-LF1, was planned[139] to be sited in Gansu province,[140] in an industrial park in Minqin County.[141] A ten-year operating license was issued in June 2023.[142] Criticality was first achieved in October of that same year. In June 2024, full power (2MWt) operation was achieved, and in October, it operated at full power for 10 days with thorium in the molten salt; Protactinium-233 was detected, indicating successful nuclear breeding.[143]
In February 2019, China's State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) signed a cooperation agreement with the Baishan municipal government in Jilin province for the Baishan Nuclear Energy Heating Demonstration Project, which would use a China National Nuclear Corporation DHR-400 (District Heating Reactor 400 MWt).[144][145]
Public opposition
editChina experienced civil protests over its ambitious plans to build more nuclear power plants following the Fukushima nuclear disaster. There has been an "inter-provincial squabble" over a nuclear power plant being built near the southern bank of the Yangtze River. The plant in the centre of the controversy is located in Pengze county in Jiangxi, and across the river the government of Wangjiang county in Anhui wants the project shelved.[146]
More than 1,000 people protested in Jiangmen City Hall in July 2013 to demand that authorities abandon a planned uranium-processing facility that was designed as a major supplier to nuclear power stations. The Heshan Nuclear Power Industry Park was to be equipped with facilities for uranium conversion and enrichment as well as the manufacturing of fuel pellets, rods and finished assemblies. Protesters feared the plant would adversely affect their health, and the health of future generations. As the weekend protest continued, Chinese officials announced the state-run project's cancellation.[147]
By 2014, concerns about public opposition caused Chinese regulators to develop public and media support programmes, and developers to begin outreach programmes including site tours and visitor centres.[148]
In 2020, Bloomberg News reported that public opposition had stopped nuclear power construction on inland river sites, and caused the cancellation of a nuclear fuel plant in Guangdong in 2013.[110]
See also
editReferences
edit- ↑ "全国核电运行情况(2025年1-12月)" [National nuclear power statistics, Year 2025]. 中国核能行业协会 (in Chinese (China)).
- 1 2 3 4 "全国年度统计公报" [National yearly statistics]. www.stats.gov.cn (in Chinese (China)).
- ↑ Archived stats from IAEA PRIS:
Nuclear Capacity (GWe) Year USA France China 2018 99 63 43 2019 98 63 46 2020 97 61 47 2021 96 61 50 2022 95 61 52 2023 96 61 53 2024 97 61 54 2025 97 63 59 - ↑ Archived stats from IAEA PRIS:
Nuclear Generation (TWh) Year USA France China 2017 805 379 247 2018 807 393 287 2019 809 382 330 2020 790 380 366 2021 787 361 407 2022 772 279 418 2023 775 320 433 2024 782 362 451 - ↑ "全国核电运行情况 (2025年1-12月)" [National nuclear power statistics, Year 2025]. National Bureau of Statistics of China.
- ↑ "在建核电机组" [Nuclear power units under construction]. Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People's Republic of China.
- 1 2 "Nuclear Power in China". World Nuclear Association. 2 July 2010. Archived from the original on 12 February 2013. Retrieved 18 July 2010.
- ↑ "宁德核电站在福鼎开工" [Construction began for Ningde Nuclear Power Plant in Fuding, Fujian.]. 福建之窗. Fjnews.66163.com. 7 March 2008. Archived from the original on 7 July 2011. Retrieved 24 September 2013.
- ↑ Murtaugh, Dan; Krystal, Chia (2 November 2021). "China's Climate Goals Hinge on a $440 Billion Nuclear Buildout". Bloomberg. Retrieved 31 July 2022.
- ↑ "China's Climate Goals Hinge on a $440 Billion Nuclear Buildout". Bloomberg.com. Retrieved 5 November 2021.
- 1 2 Keith Bradsher (15 December 2009). "Nuclear Power Expansion in China Stirs Concerns". New York Times. Archived from the original on 19 July 2016. Retrieved 21 January 2010.
- ↑ "Second Pakistani Hualong One unit passes final acceptance". 22 April 2025. Retrieved 23 April 2026.
- ↑ "Chinese firms join forces to market Hualong One abroad". World Nuclear News. 31 December 2015. Archived from the original on 6 February 2016. Retrieved 6 February 2016.
- ↑ "Hualong One joint venture officially launched". World Nuclear News. 17 March 2016. Archived from the original on 18 March 2016. Retrieved 17 March 2016.
- ↑ "The trade war we want China to win: China's nuclear exports can challenge Russian dominance". Atlantic Council. 26 February 2020. Retrieved 30 September 2021.
- ↑ "China could build 30 'Belt and Road' nuclear reactors by 2030: official". Reuters. 20 June 2019. Retrieved 30 September 2021.
- ↑ Turner, Ben (23 July 2021). "China to activate world's first 'clean' nuclear reactor in September". livescience.com. Retrieved 30 September 2021.
- ↑ Brook, Barry (27 November 2011). "Summary of China's fast reactor programme". Brave New Climate. Archived from the original on 20 April 2016. Retrieved 13 April 2016.
- ↑ "Fast Reactor Technology Development for Sustainable Supply of Nuclear Energy in China – China International Nuclear Symposium November 23–25, 2010, Beijing" (PDF). XU MI – China Institute of Atomic Energy. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 September 2016.
- ↑ "PACIFIC NUCLEAR COUNCIL (PNC) – 2nd Quarter 2015 Meeting – Thursday, April 23, 2015 – Beijing, China- Meeting Minutes (Final)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 April 2016.
- ↑ "China's HTR-PM reactor achieves first criticality: New Nuclear - World Nuclear News". www.world-nuclear-news.org. 13 September 2021.
- ↑ "Dual criticality for Chinese demonstration HTR-PM : New Nuclear - World Nuclear News". www.world-nuclear-news.org. 12 November 2021.
- ↑ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, 20 March 2011, Safe nuclear does exist, and China is leading the way with thorium Archived 25 March 2018 at the Wayback Machine, Telegraph UK
- ↑ "China to build world's first "artificial sun" experimental device". People's Daily Online. 21 January 2006. Archived from the original on 5 June 2011. Retrieved 22 March 2011.
- ↑ Na, CHEN (19 January 2026). "China Accelerates Nuclear Fusion Engineering, Targeting Power Generation Demonstration by 2030". CAS. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- ↑ ORF, DARREN (9 May 2025). "China's Next-Gen Fusion Reactor Could Achieve First Plasma in Just 2 Years". popularmechanics. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- ↑ Li, Jiangang; Wan, Yuanxi (1 February 2019). "Present State of Chinese Magnetic Fusion Development and Future Plans". Journal of Fusion Energy. 38 (1): 113–124. doi:10.1007/s10894-018-0165-2. ISSN 1572-9591. S2CID 254650020.
- ↑ Chari, P. R. (1978). "China's Nuclear Posture: An Evaluation". Asian Survey. 18 (8): 817–828. doi:10.2307/2643560. ISSN 0004-4687. JSTOR 2643560.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Minor, Michael S. (1976). "China's Nuclear Development Program". Asian Survey. 16 (6): 571–579. doi:10.2307/2643520. ISSN 0004-4687. JSTOR 2643520.
- ↑ "Milstone". China Institute of Atomic Energy. Retrieved 17 February 2022.
- ↑ "Russian-Chinese Science and Technology Diplomacy and Practice". China Institute of International Studies. Retrieved 17 February 2022.
- ↑ "Letter to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Not Giving China Samples of Nuclear Weapons and Technical Information". Wilson Center.
- ↑ "Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Decision With Respect To Several Issues Concerning Strengthening Atomic Energy Industrial Infrastructure". Wilson Center.
- ↑ Albright, David. "Chinese Military Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories" (PDF). Institute for Science and International Security.
- ↑ "Institute Profile". Archived from the original on 16 February 2015. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
- 1 2 "China Nuclear Power". Shanghai Nuclear Office.
- ↑ Daogang Lu (North China Electric Power University) (May 2010). "The Current Status of Chinese Nuclear Power Industry and Its Future". e-Journal of Advanced Maintenance. 2 (1). Japan Society of Maintenology. Archived from the original on 22 July 2011. Retrieved 14 August 2010.
- ↑ "Full text of China's Nuclear Emergency Preparedness". english.www.gov.cn. Retrieved 16 December 2025.
- ↑ "Daya Bay 1 - World Nuclear Association". world-nuclear.org. Retrieved 16 December 2025.
- ↑ Mann, Jim (22 September 1986). "China to Build Nuclear Power Plant Despite Hong Kong Safety Fears". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 16 December 2025.
- ↑ "Full text of China's Nuclear Emergency Preparedness". english.www.gov.cn. Retrieved 16 December 2025.
- 1 2 Kadak, Andrew C. (2006). "Nuclear Power: "Made in China"". The Brown Journal of World Affairs. 13 (1): 77–90. ISSN 1080-0786. JSTOR 24590645.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Massot, Pascale (2024). China's Vulnerability Paradox: How the World's Largest Consumer Transformed Global Commodity Markets. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-777140-2.
- ↑ Leutert, Wendy (2024). China's State-Owned Enterprises: Leadership, Reform, and Internationalization. Business and Public Policy Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009486576. ISBN 978-1-009-48654-5.
- ↑ "China moves to strengthen nuclear safety standards and moderate the pace of its nuclear power development". www.nrdc.org. 23 December 2012. Retrieved 16 December 2025.
- ↑ "Nuclear Power in China". World Nuclear Association. 2 October 2025.
- ↑ Yun Zhou (31 July 2013). "China: The next few years are crucial for nuclear industry growth". Ux Consulting. Nuclear Engineering International. Archived from the original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 8 August 2013.
- ↑ "Start-up nearing for Chinese units". World Nuclear News. 25 March 2014. Archived from the original on 3 April 2014. Retrieved 31 March 2014.
- ↑ "Can China Meet Its Nuclear Power Goals?". Archived from the original on 22 May 2018. Retrieved 21 May 2018.
- 1 2 "China's nuclear power output jumps 18% year on year". World Nuclear News. 24 February 2020.
- 1 2 3 "Agreements signed during first official visit to China by IAEA's Grossi". Nuclear Engineering International. 25 May 2023. Retrieved 28 May 2023.
- ↑ "Global Nuclear Power Tracker". Global Energy Monitor.
- ↑ "【Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030】-National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) People's Republic of China". en.ndrc.gov.cn. 27 October 2021. Retrieved 7 October 2025.
- ↑ "China's nuclear innovation unlocked". Nuclear Engineering International. 17 October 2024. Retrieved 21 October 2024.
- ↑ Atkinson, Robert D. (16 September 2024). "China Is Rapidly Becoming a Leading Innovator in Advanced Industries". Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Retrieved 21 October 2024.
- ↑ "World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025". World Nuclear Industry Status Report. 26 November 2025. p. 63. Retrieved 16 December 2025.
- ↑ "PRIS - Reactor status reports - Under Construction - By Country". pris.iaea.org. 13 October 2025. Retrieved 14 October 2025.
- ↑ Lee, George; Saric, Dejana; Sohan, Misha (25 September 2025). "The New Nuclear Age: Why the World Is Rethinking Atomic Power". Goldman Sachs.
- ↑ "Global Nuclear Power Tracker". Global Energy Monitor. Retrieved 7 October 2025.
- 1 2 "Nuclear Power in China". World Nuclear Association. October 2013. Archived from the original on 3 November 2013. Retrieved 25 October 2013.
- ↑ "China freezes nuclear plant approvals". CNN. 16 March 2011. Archived from the original on 28 June 2011. Retrieved 28 May 2023.
- 1 2 3 Will China's nuclear nerves fuel a boom in green energy? Archived 21 March 2011 at the Wayback Machine Channel 4, published 17 March 2011. Retrieved 17 March 2011
- ↑ China’s Nuclear Energy Program Post-Fukushima Archived 18 March 2011 at the Wayback Machine China Bystander, published 16 March 2011. Retrieved 17 March 2011
- ↑ Rob Forrest (2 June 2014). "China's Nuclear Program and Spent Fuel Storage" (PDF). CISAC, Stanford University. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 December 2014. Retrieved 14 December 2014.
- ↑ Stanway, David (1 September 2017). "China's legislature passes nuclear safety law". Reuters. Archived from the original on 1 September 2017. Retrieved 1 September 2017.
- ↑ "Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Station". Archived from the original on 22 June 2017. Retrieved 21 June 2017.
- ↑ "AtomStroyExport unveils schedule for China projects". World Nuclear News. 3 April 2019. Archived from the original on 3 April 2019. Retrieved 3 April 2019.
- ↑ "First AP1000 unit begins generating power". Archived from the original on 10 July 2018. Retrieved 11 July 2018.
- ↑ "Permits issued for construction of new Chinese plant". World Nuclear News. 15 October 2019. Archived from the original on 15 October 2019. Retrieved 15 October 2019.
- ↑ "China approves construction of six new reactors". www.world-nuclear-news.org. Retrieved 23 April 2022.
- ↑ "Approval for four new reactors in south China". www.world-nuclear-news.org. Retrieved 20 September 2022.
- ↑ Biello, David (29 March 2011). "China forges ahead with nuclear energy". Nature. doi:10.1038/news.2011.194. Retrieved 28 May 2018.
- ↑ "China's commercial reactors" (PDF). Nuclear Engineering International. Retrieved 29 May 2018.
- ↑ (IAEA), International Atomic Energy Agency. "- Nuclear Power – IAEA". www.iaea.org. Retrieved 29 May 2018.
- ↑ "Chinese reactor design evolution - Nuclear Engineering International".
- ↑ "First power at China's Ling Ao". Nuclear Engineering International. 16 July 2010. Archived from the original on 13 June 2011. Retrieved 17 July 2010.
- ↑ "China prepares to export reactors". World Nuclear News. 25 November 2010. Archived from the original on 30 December 2010. Retrieved 18 December 2010.
- 1 2 Ji Xing; Daiyong Song; Yuxiang Wu (March 2016). "HPR1000: Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor with Active and Passive Safety". Engineering. 2 (1): 79–87. Bibcode:2016Engin...2...79X. doi:10.1016/J.ENG.2016.01.017.
- ↑ "Nuclear Power in China - World Nuclear Association". world-nuclear.org. Retrieved 8 November 2025.
- ↑ "Chinese reactor design passes safety review - World Nuclear News".
- ↑ "China to begin construction of Hualong Two in 2024 - Nuclear Engineering International". 15 April 2021.
- ↑ "China to begin construction of Hualong Two in 2024". Nuclear Engineering International. 15 April 2021. Retrieved 2 February 2022.
- ↑ Xu, Muyu; Singh, Shivani (14 April 2021). "China to start building Hualong Two nuclear reactor in 2024". Reuters. Retrieved 28 May 2023 – via nasdaq.com.
- ↑ "China launches CAP1400 reactor design". World Nuclear News. 29 September 2020. Retrieved 29 September 2020.
- ↑ "Current status operational NPPs". spi.mee.gov.cn. 1 November 2025. Retrieved 1 November 2025.
- ↑ "China begins construction of two new nuclear power units". World Nuclear News. 5 January 2026. Retrieved 6 January 2026.
- ↑ "上海核工院召开专家技术咨询会". 上海核电办公室.
- ↑ "Advanced Nuclear Power Reactors". World Nuclear News. 21 November 2025. Retrieved 7 March 2026.
- ↑ "China's demonstration HTR-PM enters commercial operation". World Nuclear News. 6 December 2023. Retrieved 16 December 2025.
- ↑ Li, Han, ed. (6 December 2023). "Chinese HTR-PM Demo Begins Commercial Operation". Tsinghua University.
- ↑ "HTR-PM heating project commissioned". World Nuclear News. 2 April 2024. Retrieved 16 December 2025.
- ↑ "我国首座钠冷快中子反应堆满功率运行72小时 全面掌握快堆核心技术". 观察者网 (in Chinese (China)). 19 December 2014. Archived from the original on 14 November 2021. Retrieved 14 November 2021.
- ↑ "高温堆、快堆、压水堆,福建霞浦将并存多堆型核电项目". 网易. 15 June 2017. Archived from the original on 11 February 2018. Retrieved 13 July 2017.
- ↑ "世界首台第四代核反应堆,甘肃武威钍基熔盐堆即将发电,有四大颠覆性优势". 腾讯网. Archived from the original on 14 November 2021. Retrieved 14 November 2021.
- ↑ "关于批准《2MWt液态燃料钍基熔盐实验堆调试大纲》(V1.3版)的通知". www.mee.gov.cn (in Chinese (China)). 2 August 2022. Archived from the original on 6 October 2022. Retrieved 6 October 2022.
- ↑ "CNNC launches demonstration SMR project". World Nuclear News. 22 July 2019. Archived from the original on 22 July 2019. Retrieved 22 July 2019.
- ↑ "Specific Design Consideration of ACP100 for Application in the Middle East and North Africa Region" (PDF). CNNC. 2 October 2017. Retrieved 22 July 2019.
- ↑ "China approves construction of demonstration ACP100 – Nuclear Engineering International". www.neimagazine.com. 8 June 2021. Retrieved 28 October 2021.
- 1 2 3 "China's Advanced Nuclear Efforts Are Pushing Frontiers". powermag.com. 2 March 2026. Retrieved 11 May 2026.
- ↑ "China fusion reactor breaks theoretical density limit". The Chemical Engineer. 12 January 2026. Retrieved 16 May 2026.
- ↑ "World's First Fully HTS Tokamak Sets Fusion Duration Record in Shanghai". www.yicaigloba.com. 1 April 2026. Retrieved 19 May 2026.
- ↑ https://energysingularity.cn/en/devices.html Device of Energy Singularity -- HH170
- ↑ https://nnsa.mee.gov.cn/ztzl/jgdxsjk/jbzz/ Chinese Fusion Devices (Facilities)
- ↑ "China Tokamak No. 1 Device". www.swip.ac.cn. Southwestern Institute of Physics. Archived from the original on 1 July 2024. Retrieved 1 July 2024.
- ↑ "China Tokamak New No. 1 Device". www.swip.ac.cn. Southwestern Institute of Physics. Archived from the original on 12 September 2024. Retrieved 1 July 2024.
- ↑ Declan Butler (21 April 2011). "Reactors, residents and risk". Nature. 472 (7344): 400–1. doi:10.1038/472400a. PMID 21525903. S2CID 4371109. Archived from the original on 24 April 2011. Retrieved 22 April 2011.
- ↑ Kidd, Steve (10 August 2017). "Nuclear in China – why the slowdown?". Nuclear Engineering International. Archived from the original on 30 December 2017. Retrieved 30 December 2017.
- ↑ David Stanway, Geert De Clercq (15 January 2018). "So close yet so far: China deal elusive for France's Areva". Times of Oman. Archived from the original on 13 February 2018. Retrieved 12 February 2018.
- ↑ Kidd, Steve (1 August 2018). "Nuclear in China – where is it heading now?". Nuclear Engineering International. Archived from the original on 15 September 2018. Retrieved 15 September 2018.
- 1 2 "China to Dominate Nuclear as Beijing Bets on Homegrown Reactors". Bloomberg News. 1 June 2020. Retrieved 4 June 2020.
- ↑ "China Nuclear Power | Chinese Nuclear Energy – World Nuclear Association". www.world-nuclear.org. Archived from the original on 8 February 2016. Retrieved 15 June 2018.
- ↑ International Atomic Energy Agency (2022). "Power Reactor Information System (PRIS): China, People's Republic of". IAEA. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
- ↑ https://nnsa.mee.gov.cn/ztzl/jgdxsjk/hdc/zjhdjz/ China nuclear power reactors under construction
- ↑ https://nnsa.mee.gov.cn/ztzl/jgdxsjk/yky/ 中国铀矿冶信息
- ↑ "中国铀业上市的全球核博弈". 维科网. 21 August 2025. Retrieved 1 May 2026.
- ↑ "我国最大海水提铀海试平台建成投运". 人民日报. 29 May 2023. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- ↑ "向工程化迈进!我国海水提铀实现公斤级铀产品提取". 中国核工业集团有限公司. 1 February 2026. Retrieved 1 May 2026.
- ↑ "中国原子能工业有限公司公司介绍". Retrieved 1 May 2026.
- 1 2 "积极安全有序发展核电". 新华网. 7 June 2023. Retrieved 1 May 2026.
- ↑ "我国乏燃料运输容器市场求". 中国核电信息网. 1 May 2023. Retrieved 1 May 2026.
- ↑ "积极应对增长:中国的乏燃料管理战略". iaea.org. 12 November 2019. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- ↑ "核电站乏燃料运输管理办法". 中华人民共和国司法部. 19 July 2025. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- ↑ 我国主要放废设施信息
- ↑ Tony Vince (8 March 2013). "Rock solid ambitions". Nuclear Engineering International. Archived from the original on 26 January 2016. Retrieved 9 March 2013.
- ↑ "北山地下实验室进展顺利 助力乏燃料与核废物安全处置研究". 中国核电网. 8 January 2026. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- ↑ "中国首座核电废物处置场可满足百年需求". 中国核电信息网. 25 April 2025. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- ↑ "当核废料成为资产,而不是负担". 中国核电信息网. 1 July 2024. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
- ↑ "China able to reprocess nuclear fuel". cbc. Associated Press. 3 January 2011. Retrieved 28 May 2023.
- ↑ "Pinpointing China's new plutonium reprocessing plant". 5 May 2020.
- ↑ "China nuclear reprocessing to create stockpiles of weapons-level materials: Experts". The Economic Times.
- ↑ "UPDATE 1-China nuclear reprocessing to create stockpiles of weapons-level materials -experts". Reuters. 25 March 2021.
- ↑ "China nuclear reprocessing to create stockpiles of weapons-level materials -experts". www.nasdaq.com.
- ↑ "Current Issues: New Uranium Conversion/Enrichment and Nuclear Fuel Plant Projects - Asia".
- ↑ "China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle - World Nuclear Association".
- ↑ "为核燃料循环全产业链创造价值". Orano China. Retrieved 6 May 2026.
- ↑ "中国核能行业协会发布《中国核技术应用产业发展报告(2025)》核心报告". 中国核电网. 30 December 2025. Retrieved 7 May 2026.
- ↑ "散裂中子源科学中心". 散裂中子源科学中心. Retrieved 7 May 2026.
- ↑ https://lssf.cas.cn/ 中国科学院重大科技基础设施共享服务平台设施展示
- ↑ Dai Zhimin; Zou Yang; Chen Kun (4 November 2016). "Thorium Molten Salt Reactors (TMSR) Development in China" (PDF). International Atomic Energy Agency. Archived (PDF) from the original on 8 July 2018. Retrieved 7 July 2018.
- ↑ "中科院与甘肃省签署钍基熔盐堆核能系统项目战略合作框架协议" [Chinese Academy of Sciences signs agreement with Gansu province for a framework for strategic collaboration on thorium-molten salt nuclear power projects]. Chinese Academy of Sciences. 10 November 2017. Archived from the original on 8 July 2018. Retrieved 7 July 2018.
- ↑ "甘肃省公示第四代核能钍基熔盐堆实验平台选址:拟落地武威 _ 东方财富网". finance.eastmoney.com. Retrieved 6 November 2022.
- ↑ "China's experimental molten salt reactor receives licence". Nuclear Engineering International. 20 June 2023. Retrieved 8 April 2024.
- ↑ Krepel, Jiri (22 January 2025). "Overview and Update of MSR Activities within GIF". Generation IV International Forum. Retrieved 27 February 2025.
At 11:08 on October 11, 2023, TMSR-LF1 achieved first criticality. At 12:10 on June 17, 2024, 2MWt full power operation was achieved. On October 8, 2024, TMSR-LF1 operated at full power for 10 days with thorium fuel, and Pa-233 was detected
- ↑ "China signs agreement for nuclear heating demonstration project". Nuclear Engineering International. 14 March 2019. Retrieved 18 March 2019.
- ↑ "CNNC completes design of district heating reactor". World Nuclear News. 7 September 2018. Archived from the original on 24 March 2019. Retrieved 18 March 2019.
- ↑ "China faces civic protests over new nuclear power plants". msn.com. 17 February 2012. Archived from the original on 28 September 2013. Retrieved 26 February 2012.
- ↑ Calum MacLeod (16 July 2013). "Protesters win environmental battle in China". USA Today. Archived from the original on 12 June 2015. Retrieved 6 September 2017.
- ↑ Lucy Hornby (26 May 2014). "People power holds key to China's nuclear plans". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 29 May 2014. Retrieved 26 May 2014.
External links
edit- Nuclear power in China – World Nuclear Association
- Maps of Nuclear Power Reactors: China
- Brief Overview of Chinese NPP Development, Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute, 23 June 2011
- Steve Kidd (1 May 2013). "Nuclear in China – now back on track?". Nuclear Engineering International.
- Caroline Peachey (22 May 2014). "Chinese reactor design evolution". Nuclear Engineering International. Retrieved 23 May 2014.
- M.V. Ramana, Eri Saikawa (December 2011). "Choosing a standard reactor: International competition and domestic politics in Chinese nuclear policy" (PDF). Energy. 36 (12). Elsevier: 6779–6789. Bibcode:2011Ene....36.6779R. doi:10.1016/j.energy.2011.10.022. Retrieved 11 October 2013.
