The connection between whole and part is intimate: not only can we share the same space, but I’m incapable of leaving my parts behind; settle the nonmereological facts and you thereby settle what is a part of what; wholes don’t seem to be an additional ontological commitment over their parts. Composition as identity promises to explain this intimacy. But it threatens to make the connection too intimate, for surely the parts could have made a different whole and the (...) whole have had different parts. In this paper I attempt to offer an account of parthood that is intimate enough but not too intimate: the parts generate the whole, but they are not themselves the whole. (shrink)

This book presents the first complete overview of part-whole relations in Proclus’ Neoplatonic philosophy, with a theoretical framework based not only on the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, but also on the arguments of influential modern scholars of mereology.

Whole Brain Emulation has been championed as the most promising, well-defined route to achieving both human-level artificial intelligence and superintelligence. It has even been touted as a viable route to achieving immortality through brain uploading. WBE is not a fringe theory: the doctrine of Computationalism in philosophy of mind lends credence to the in-principle feasibility of the idea, and the standing of the Human Connectome Project makes it appear to be feasible in practice. Computationalism is a popular, independently plausible (...) theory, and Connectomics a well-funded empirical research program, so optimism about WBE is understandable. However, this optimism may be misplaced. This article argues that WBE is, at best, no more compelling than any of the other far-flung routes to achieving superintelligence. Similarly skeptical conclusions are found regarding immortality. The essay concludes with some positive considerations in favor of the Biological Theory of consciousness, as well as morals about the limits of Computationalism in both artificial intelligence and the philosophy of mind more generally. (shrink)

A taxonomy of part‐whole or meronymic relations is developed to explain the ordinary English‐speaker's use of the term “part of” and its cognates. The resulting classification yields six types of meronymic relations: 1. component‐integral object (pedal‐bike), 2. member‐collection (ship‐fleet), 3. portion‐mass (slice‐pie), 4. stuff‐object (steel‐car), 5. feature‐activity (paying‐shopping), and 6. place‐area (Everglades‐Florida). Meronymic relations ore further distinguished from other inclusion relations, such as spatial inclusion, and class inclusion, and from several other semantic relations: attribution, attachment, and ownership. This taxonomy (...) is then used to explain cases of apparent intransitivity in merological syllogisms, and standard form syllogisms whose premises express different inclusion relations. The data suggest that intransitivities arise due to equivocations between different types of semantic relations. These results are then explained by means of the relation element theory which accounts for the character and behavior of semantic relations in terms of more primitive relational elements. The inferential phenomena observed are then explained by means of a single principle of element matching. (shrink)

As innovations in the field of vascular composite allotransplantation (VCA) progress, whole-eye transplantation (WET) is poised to transition from non-human mammalian models to living human recipients. Present treatment options for vision loss are generally considered suboptimal, and attendant concerns ranging from aesthetics and prosthesis maintenance to social stigma may be mitigated by WET. Potential benefits to WET recipients may also include partial vision restoration, psychosocial benefits related to identity and social integration, improvements in physical comfort and function, and reduced (...) surgical risk associated with a biologic eye compared to a prosthesis. Perioperative and postoperative risks of WET are expected to be comparable to those of facial transplantation (FT), and may be similarly mitigated by immunosuppressive protocols, adequate psychosocial support, and a thorough selection process for both the recipient and donor. To minimize the risks associated with immunosuppressive medications, the first attempts in human recipients will likely be performed in conjunction with a FT. If first-in-human attempts at combined FT-WET prove successful and the biologic eye survives, this opens the door for further advancement in the field of vision restoration by means of a viable surgical option. This analysis integrates recent innovations in WET research with the existing discourse on the ethics of surgical innovation and offers preliminary guidance to VCA programs considering undertaking WET in human recipients. (shrink)

This book uses mathematical models of language to explain why there are certain gaps in language: things that we might expect to be able to say but can't. For instance, why can we say I ran for five minutes but not *I ran to the store for five minutes? Why is five pounds of books acceptable, but *five pounds of book not acceptable? What prevents us from saying *sixty degrees of water to express the temperature of the water in a (...) swimming pool when sixty inches of water can express its depth? And why can we not say *all the ants in my kitchen are numerous? The constraints on these constructions involve concepts that are generally studied separately: aspect, plural and mass reference, measurement, and distributivity. In this book, Lucas Champollion provides a unified perspective on these domains, connects them formally within the framework of algebraic semantics and mereology, and uses this connection to transfer insights across unrelated bodies of literature and formulate a single constraint that explains each of the judgments above. (shrink)

Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the only independent concrete object. The paper argues that, pace its proponents, Priority monism is in conflict with the dependence of any whole on any of its parts: if the cosmos does not depend on its parts, neither does any smaller composite.

Mereonominalism, holonominalism, and part-whole realism represent competing views on the metaphysics of parts and wholes. Mereonominalism claims that what parts exist is a function of the concepts we use in describing composite wholes. Holonominalism claims that what composite wholes exist is a function of the concepts we use in describing things that can qualify as parts. Part-whole realism claims that parts and wholes exist independent of our concepts. I argue that all three views face problems, but that the (...) problem facing part-whole realism can be solved by adopting a version of hylomorphism that takes its cue from Aristotle’s account of form. (shrink)

Although death statutes permitting physicians to declare brain death are relatively uniform throughout the United States, academic debate persists over the equivalency of human death and brain death. Alan Shewmon showed that the formerly accepted integration rationale was conceptually incomplete by showing that brain-dead patients demonstrated a degree of integration. We provide a more complete rationale for the equivalency of human death and brain death by defending a deeper understanding of the organism as a whole and by using a (...) novel strategy with shared objectives to justify death determination criteria. Our OaaW account describes different types of OaaW, defining human death as the loss of status as a human OaaW. We defend human death as similar to nonhuman death in terms of wakefulness, but also distinct in terms of the sui generis properties, particularly conscious awareness. We thereby defend the equivalency of brain death and human death using a resulting neurocentric rationale. (shrink)

What is the relation between parts taken together and the whole that they compose? The recent literature appears to be dominated by two different answers to this question, which are normally thought of as being incompatible. According to the first, parts taken together are identical to the whole that they compose. According to the second, the whole is grounded in its parts. The aim of this paper is to make some theoretical room for the view according to (...) which parts ground the whole they compose while being, at the same time, identical to it. (shrink)

Background In the highly technical and time-pressured environment of the operating room (OR), patients may risk becoming physically present yet experientially absent and ontologically overlooked. “Experiential absence” refers to the loss of the patient’s subjectivity when their voice and awareness are silenced under anesthesia, while “ontological absence” refers to the erosion of their recognition as a person of inherent moral worth. Drapes, protocols, and clinical shorthand can unintentionally reinforce this absence. While such detachment supports surgical focus, it raises pressing ethical (...) questions. Methods This paper undertakes a philosophical reflection drawing on René Descartes’ Meditations and Carl Rogers’ humanistic psychology. Primary texts from both authors are engaged to examine how Cartesian dualism has shaped depersonalizing tendencies in biomedicine, and how Rogers’ principles of empathy, authenticity, and unconditional positive regard can reframe ethical care in surgery. Results Three interrelated dimensions are identified. First, the paper distinguishes between necessary clinical objectivity and harmful detachment, arguing that the latter undermines ethical regard. Second, it reconceptualizes the anesthetized patient as morally present despite unconsciousness, emphasizing that vulnerability under anesthesia heightens the ethical duty of care. Third, it reframes the surgical team as a therapeutic environment, where interpersonal respect and psychological safety influence how patient dignity is upheld. Conclusions Integrating Rogers’ philosophy into the OR does not compromise technical precision but deepens it with moral clarity. By recognizing both the experiential silence and the ontological presence of the anesthetized patient, surgical teams can align technical excellence with ethical responsibility. This perspective expands patient-centered care into a more robust person-centered ethic, positioning surgery not only as a technical intervention but also as a profoundly moral encounter. (shrink)

In its October 2001 issue, this journal published a series of articles questioning the Whole-Brain-based definition of death. Much of the concern focused on whether somatic integration - a commonly understood basis for the whole-brain death view - can survive the brain's death. The present article accepts that there are insurmountable problems with whole-brain death views, but challenges the assumption that loss of somatic integration is the proper basis for pronouncing death. It examines three major themes. First, (...) it accepts the claim of the "disaggregators" that some behaviors traditionally associated with death can be unbundled, but argues that other behaviors (including organ procurement) must continue to be associated. Second, it rejects the claims of the "somaticists," that the integration of the body is critical, arguing instead for equating death with the irreversible loss of "embodied consciousness," that is, the loss of integration of bodily and mental function. Third, it defends higher-brain views against the charge that they are necessarily "mentalist," that is, that they equate death with losing some mental function such as consciousness or personhood. It argues, instead, for the integration of bodily and mental function as the critical feature of human life and that its irreversible loss constitutes death. (shrink)

The appearance of chronic brain dead patients who can undergo puberty and gestate pregnancies has shaken the confidence that brain death determination once enjoyed. Based on the bio-philosophical concept of loss of integration, whole brain death became the accepted standard with the widespread implementation of the Uniform Determination of Death Act. Unfortunately, the clinical criteria do not actually test the whole brain. Retrospective data shows that roughly half of these chronic brain dead patients have persistent hypothalamic functioning and (...) are therefore not whole brain dead. The Uniform Law Commission sought to change the determination of brain death to align with the current clinical criteria. Rather than gerrymandering death determination, the criteria for brain death should be strengthened. Such a change could respect the intrinsic human dignity of the patient and promote prudential certitude. (shrink)

A clever argument purports to show that we can directly perceive the emotions of others: (1) some emotional expressions are parts of the emotions they express; (2) perceiving a part of something is sufficient for perceiving the whole; (3) therefore, perceiving some emotional expressions is sufficient for perceiving the emotions they express. My aim in this paper is to assess the extent to which contemporary psychological theories of emotion support the first premise of this argument.

Notwithstanding these wise pronouncements, my project here is to characterize the biological phenomenon of death of the higher animal species, such as vertebrates. My claim is that the formulation of “whole- brain death ” provides the most congruent map for our correct understanding of the concept of death. This essay builds upon the foundation my colleagues and I have laid since 1981 to characterize the concept of death and refine when this event occurs. Although our society's well-accepted program of (...) multiple organ procurement for transplantation requires the organ donor first to be dead, the concept of brain death is not merely a social contrivance to permit us to obtain the benefits of organ procurement. Rather, the concept of whole- brain death stands independently as the most accurate biological representation of the demise of the human organism. (shrink)

According to quality theories of love, love is fitting by virtue of properties of the loved person. Despite their immediate plausibility, quality theories have met with many objections. Here I focus on two that strike at the heart of what makes the quality theory an appealing account of love, specifically, the theory’s ability to accommodate the fact that loving someone is a way of valuing them for who they are. The fungibility objection and the problem of love’s object maintain that (...) if a person is loved on the basis of their qualities, they are not valued in the right kind of way. I propose a new kind of quality theory which both answers these objections and is independently well-motivated. Specifically, I argue that to love a person as a whole, one must value them as an organic unity. (shrink)

A number of contemporary metaphysicians find Aristotle’s hylomorphism a promising and yet wanting account of what there is, and have engaged in ‘reconditioning’ it into a sound metaphysics (e.g. Jaworski 2016, Koons 2014, Rea 2011, among others). Jonathan Lowe’s four-category ontology aligns with this way of thinking, notwithstanding its explicit rejection of the notion of matter that is typically attributed to Aristotle. This chapter offers a taxonomy of the most recent versions of hylomorphism that have been developed in the literature, (...) and locates Lowe’s views within it. It further addresses the question of whether Aristotle’s hylomorphism does in fact need the ‘reconditioning’ it has recently received in the literature; the chapter argues for a negative answer. It finally focuses on the thorny issue of matter: here the questions addressed are: what Aristotle meant by ‘matter’; how many kinds of matter did he introduce into his system; and how does his system compare to Lowe’s matterless four-category ontology. As a version of hylomorphism, Lowe’s ontology is more Aristotelian than Lowe believed. (shrink)

Towards the beginning of her essay ‘Philosophical Plumbing’ (in Utopias, Dolphins and Computers (1996)), Mary Midgley writes that “We think as whole people, not as disembodied minds, not as computers”. In this chapter, my aim is to emphasise the significance of this remark – and the philosophical methodology that comes with it – to Midgley’s conception of philosophical inquiry in general, to her views on how we ought (and ought not) to approach moral philosophy specifically. In doing so, I (...) show the significance of Midgley’s place within the wider context of twentieth century British philosophy and connect her to the work of Susan Stebbing and Dorothy Emmet. (shrink)

Many biologists and philosophers have worried that importing models of reasoning from the physical sciences obscures our understanding of reasoning in the life sciences. In this paper we discuss one example that partially validates this concern: part-whole reductive explanations. Biology and physics tend to incorporate different models of temporality in part-whole reductive explanations. This results from differential emphases on compositional and causal facets of reductive explanations, which have not been distinguished reliably in prior philosophical analyses. Keeping these two (...) facets distinct facilitates the identifi cation of two further aspects of reductive explanation: intrinsicality and fundamentality. Our account provides resources for discriminating between different types of reductive explanation and suggests a new approach to comprehending similarities and differences in the explanatory reasoning found in biology and physics. (shrink)

We address the question whether there is an explanation for the fact that as Fodor put it the micro-level “converges on stable macro-level properties”, and whether there are lessons from this explanation for other issues in the vicinity. We argue that stability in large systems can be understood in terms of statistical limit theorems. In the thermodynamic limit of infinite system size N → ∞ systems will have strictly stable macroscopic properties in the sense that transitions between different macroscopic phases (...) of matter (if there are any) will not occur in finite time. Indeed stability in this sense is a consequence of the absence of fluctuations, as (large) fluctuations would be required to induce such macroscopic transformations. These properties can be understood in terms of coarse-grained descriptions, and the statistical limit theorems for independent or weakly dependent random variable describing the behaviour averages and the statistics of fluctuations in the large system limit. We argue that RNG analyses applied to off-critical systems can provide a rationalization for the applicability of these limit theorems. Furthermore we discuss some related issues as, for example, the role of the infinite-system idealization. (shrink)

This paper presents a theory of situated part structures involving the notion of an integrated and not just a part-of relation. The theory is applied in particular to the semantics of the modifiers 'whole' and 'individual', as in 'the whole collection' and 'the individual students'. The adnominal modifiers 'whole' and 'individual' have been entirely been ignored in the linguistic and philosophical literature, even though they pose significant challenges for standard views of reference, of the semantics of referential (...) NPs, and for ontology (the exception being medieval philosophy of language where 'whole' has received significant attention). 'Whole' strikingly displays two opposite readings: 'The whole collection is expensive' can mean - 'as a whole' or 'every part'. The paper proposes that the two readings be traced to two different conceptions of part structures of objects: one according to which the parts of an objects are just the material parts and another, Aristotelian conception according to which the parts of an object include properties of form. (shrink)

This article is a preliminary draft for initiating and commencing a new pioneer dimension of expression. To deal with higher-dimensional data or information flowing in this modern era of information technology and artificial intelligence, some innovative super algebraic structures are essential to be formulated. In this paper, we have introduced such matrices that have multiple layers and clusters of layers to portray multi-dimensional data or massively dispersed information of the plithogenic universe made up of numerous subjects their attributes, and sub-attributes. (...) For grasping that field of parallel information, events, and realities flowing from the micro to the macro level of universes, we have constructed hypersoft and hyper-super-soft matrices in a Plithogenic Fuzzy environment. These Matrices classify the non-physical attributes by accumulating the physical subjects and further sort the physical subjects by accumulating their non-physical attributes. We presented themasPlithogenicAttributiveSubjectivelyWholeHyper-Super-Soft-Matrix(PASWHSS-Matrix)andPlithogenic Subjective Attributively Whole-Hyper-Super-Soft-Matrix (PSAWHSS-Matrix). Several types of views and level-layers of these matrices are described. In addition, some local aggregation operators for Plithogenic Fuzzy Hypersoft Set (PPFHS-Set) are developed. Finally, few applications of these matrices and operators are used as numerical examples of COVID-19 data structures. (shrink)

Alan Shewmons article, The brain and somatic integration: Insights into the standard biological rationale for equating brain death with death (2001), strikes at the heart of the standard justification for whole brain death criteria. The standard justification, which I call the standard paradigm, holds that the permanent loss of the functions of the entire brain marks the end of the integrative unity of the body. In my response to Shewmons article, I first offer a brief summary of the standard (...) paradigm and cite recent work by advocates of whole brain criteria who tenaciously cling to the standard paradigm despite increasing evidence showing that it has significant weaknesses. Second, I address Shewmons case against the standard paradigm, arguing that he is successful in showing that whole brain dead patients have integrated organic unity. Finally, I discuss some minor problems with Shewmons article, along with suggestions for further elaboration. (shrink)

This study shows that an important number of late medieval, Renaissance and early modern authors postulated the same teleological principle in order to argue both for and against the existence of the vacuum. That postulate, which I call the “principle of subordination,” holds that in order to preserve the good of nature, the particular and specific natures must be subordinated to the common and universal nature. In other words, in order to preserve nature as a whole, the individual tendencies (...) of bodies must be subordinated to the general tendency of nature. Throughout the wide range of cases addressed in this study, a continuity is observed in the rationales underlying the discussions about the existence of the vacuum. All of them, tacitly or not, ascribed to nature the teleological principle of subordination, mostly by interpreting traditional experimental instances. Although this continuity is clearly recognizable, variations in nuances and details are also present, owing to the various contexts within which each response to the question of the existence of a vacuum emerged. (shrink)

Straipsnyje svarstomas laiko išsišakojimo į tris modusus (praeities dabartis, dabarties dabartis ir ateities dabartis) klausimas, kuris aktualus klasikinėje filosofijoje (Augustinas, Leibnicas, Bergsonas), fenomenologijoje (Husserlis, Merleau-Ponty), literatūroje (Borgesas, Proustas), struktūruojamas kino mene ir modernaus kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje tiriamos kelios šio laiko išsišakojimo įvaizdinimo ir jo filosofinio reflektavimo trajektorijos: Tarkovskio įvaizdintas laikas, apokaliptinis laikas bei jo virsmas į laiko kristalus (les cristaux des temps) Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijoje.

The issue of the whole–part relationship has been a contentious subject in Indian philosophical discourse since its early stages. Generally speaking, there are two leading positions concerning the nature of the whole, from which the issue of the whole–part relationship stems. First is the reductionist position, which contends that the whole is nothing more than the parts put in a certain order; hence, the part is more fundamental than the whole, since the whole can (...) be reduced to the parts that constitute it. Second, there is the essentialist position, advocating that the essence of the whole cannot be simply reduced to the parts, since we do not find the whole in any of the parts; hence, the whole is more primary than the part. Most Indian Buddhists subscribe to the first position, whereas Hindu realists adhere to the second. When Buddhism spread to China, however, the issue took an interesting turn in the hands of Chinese Buddhists. In this article, I will examine this turn by investigating two representative Buddhist positions on the issue of whole and part. One is found in the Abhidharma literature, the early Buddhist philosophical treatises, wherein the core Buddhist notion of an tman (wu wob ), no-self, is explained by appealing to this relationship. As we will see, the whole–part relationship discussed there is distinctively reductionist. Another major deliberation on the whole–part issue is found in the literature produced by the Chinese Huayan Buddhist school, wherein the reductionist approach is nowhere to be seen. In fact, the Huayan philosophers tried as hard as they could to fend off any reductionist mode of thinking regarding the whole–part relationship. Be that as it may, their position in no way corresponds to the essentialist stance. This article investigates the unique Huayan theory of part and whole, thereby offering a possible way out of the reductionism–essentialism dilemma. (shrink)

Research supporting social and emotional learning in schools demonstrates numerous benefits for students, including increased academic achievement and social and emotional competencies. However, research supporting the adoption of SEL lacks a clear conception of ethical competence. This lack of clarity is problematic for two reasons. First, it contributes to the conflation of social, emotional, and ethical competencies. Second, as a result, insufficient attention is paid to the related, yet distinct, ends of social-emotional and ethical education. While supporting SEL we critique (...) the assumption of uniformity between social-emotional and ethical literacy and argue for the significance of educational programming to support ethical competencies alongside or within SEL, including educating children to develop an autonomous ethical orientation. Doing so would advance the efforts of educators to provide an education for the whole child. (shrink)

This paper identifies a problem that Aristotle revealed and that Heidegger’s own insights, into the diverse forms that the Being of entities takes, exacerbated: the problem is whether there is sense to the idea of ‘Being in general’—‘Being as a whole’—and this is a problem because there not being such sense threatens the very possibility of the discipline of ontology. The paper proposes that Heidegger envisaged the project which a completed Being and Time would have carried out as an (...) attempt to solve this problem. The project considers what the subject who intends ‘Being as a whole’ would have to be like; crucially this requires reflection on what it would be for that subject itself to be a whole; and we find such reflection in Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity. By looking in particular at his notions of ‘guilt’ and ‘Being-towards-death’, and the role that they play in identifying an ‘ecstatic’ form of temporality, we can identify a ‘horizon’ against which the authentic can be seen as ‘being-a-whole’ and as living in the light of an understanding of what might indeed be called ‘Being as a whole’. (shrink)

Can one both be an Aristotelian in ethics and a negativist, whereby the latter involves subscribing to the view that the good cannot be known in our social context but that ethical guidance is nonetheless possible in virtue of a pluralist conception of the bad (of which this context and human history provide us ample knowledge)? Moreover, is it possible to combine Aristotelianism with a thoroughly historical outlook? I have argued that such combinations are, indeed, possible, and that we can (...) find an example of them in Adorno's work. In this paper, I reply to three critics (Allen, Celikates and O'Connor) who cast doubt on this proposal. I also reply to other concerns they raise, regarding immanent critique, negativism, the role of social theory in Adorno's work, and the danger of being co-opted. I stress the holism of Adorno's position, and, amid some more deflationary moves, insist on the distinctiveness of the Aristotelian position that results. (shrink)

This article introduces the topic of body and commerce commodification as an effort to return sociological and anthropological thinking to a consideration of bodies as tangible, palpable and real material objects as well as semi-magical and symbolic representations. It argues for an enlarged conception of commodification as encompassing all monetized relations in which human bodies (whole or in divisible parts) are the token of economic exchanges that are often masked as something else love, pleasure, altruism, kindness.

Belonging to the Whole : Critical and ‘Heraclitical’ Notes on the Ideal of Cosmopolitanism.

Against the prevailing outcomes-based education and the instrumentalization of education, a movement has arisen towards holistic education. This aims to go beyond objective measurement of the outcomes of education in order to treat the student as a whole person. In this paper, we shall examine some strands of education in Japan which in some way or another feature the idea of the whole person. This includes the tradition of clinical pedagogy, which originated in Kyoto University, Yukichi Shitahodo’s educational (...) anthropology (Kyoiku-Ningengaku), Kuniyoshi Obara’s Zenjin Education (the education of the whole person) and holistic education. Notwithstanding the fact that such education is benevolent in intention, it can be miseducative in some respects. In the light of this, and with some reference to criticism of the idea of the whole person, we shall point to an alternative vision of education of the whole person following Cavell’s Emersonian moral perfectionism – a perfectionism that is thoroughly anti-foundationalist and that transcends self-entrapment in circulatory discourse on the whole. In critical dialogue between the rich traditions of Japanese thought and the critical voice of liberalism raised from within the West, we hope to find a more nuanced answer to the question of how being a whole might make sense. (shrink)

In her controversial paper, Anna Smajdor proposes that brain-dead people could be used as gestation units for prospective parents unable or unwilling to undertake the act themselves—what she terms whole body gestational donation (WBGD). She explores the ethical issues of such an idea and, comparing it with traditional organ donation, asserts that such deceased surrogacy could be a way of outsourcing pregnancy’s harms to a populace unable to be affected by them. She argues that if the prospect is unacceptable, (...) this may reveal some underlying problems with traditional cadaveric organ donation. Smajdor’s analysis, however, overlooks several problems arising from WBGD. This paper provides an account of those issues and argues that, in addition to WBGD being viscerally unpleasant, it is also ethically unviable. The paper starts by providing an account of WBGD before acknowledging its negative response within traditional and social media. After arguing that such cursory and gut reactions are insufficient to reject the proposal outright, this paper then provides three concerns regarding WBGD omitted by Smajdor: (i) the co-opting of life-saving organs for reproduction, (ii) the discrepancy between using cadaveric organs to save a life versus creating one, and (iii) the universalization of feminist concerns regarding reproductive body commodification. The paper concludes by tentatively agreeing with Smajdor that considering WBGD may help reveal vulnerable assumptions regarding organ donation and surrogacy, but that the significant ethical issues raised may prove insurmountable and make the intervention—thought experiment or otherwise—untenable. (shrink)

The much-anticipated anthology on Plato’s_Timaeus_—Plato’s singular dialogue on the creation of the universe, the nature of the physical world, and the place of persons in the cosmos—examining all dimensions of one of the most important books in Western Civilization: its philosophy, cosmology, science, and ethics, its literary aspects and reception. Contributions come from leading scholars in their respective fields, including Sir Anthony Leggett, 2003 Nobel Laureate for Physics. Parts of or earlier versions of these papers were first presented at the (...) _Timaeus_ Conference, held at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign in September of 2007._ To this day, Plato’s _Timaeus_ grounds the form of ethical and political thinking called Natural Law—the view that there are norms in nature that provide the patterns for our actions and ground the objectivity of human values. Beyond the intellectual content of the dialogue’s core, its literary frame is also the source of the myth of Atlantis, giving the West the concept of the “lost world.” From Platonic space to Presocratic vortices, from Philosopher-Kings to Craftsman-Gods and from modern physics to the myth of Atlantis, _One Book, The Whole Universe_ presents in one volume the most up-to-date and penetrating scholarship on Plato’s _Timaeus_ by some of the greatest minds alive today. Contributors__ _Ann Bergren Gábor Betegh Sean Carroll Alan Code Zina Giannopoulou Verity Harte Thomas Kjeller Johansen Charles H. Kahn Anthony J. Leggett Anthony A. Long Stephen Menn Richard D. Mohr Kathryn A. Morgan Alexander P.D. Mourelatos Ian Mueller Thomas M. Robinson Barbara M. Sattler Allan Silverman Jon Solomon Anthony Vidler Matthias Vorwerk Donald Zeyl. (shrink)

Many types of part-whole relations have been proposed in the literature to aid the conceptual modeller to choose the most appropriate type, but many of those relations lack a formal specification to give clear and unambiguous semantics to them. To remedy this, a formal taxonomy of types of mereological and meronymic part-whole relations is presented that distinguishes between transitive and intransitive relations and the kind of entity types that are related. The demand to use it effectively brings afore (...) new requirements for automated reasoning over a hierarchy of relations. To ensure logically and ontologically correct inferencing over both the class and role hierarchy, the new reasoning service RBox compatibility for Description Logics reasoners is introduced. The proposed combination of formal semantics and the new reasoning service will improve the representation of the application domain when using part-whole relations in conceptual models and ontologies. (shrink)

John Henry Newman (1801-1890), quien ha ejercido una enorme influencia intelectual en el desarrollo de la teología católica en los siglos XIX y XX, es menos conocido por sus aportes a la filosofía. Indagando en su obra filosófica por antonomasia, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870), proponemos delinear la concepción newmaniana de inferencia, mostrando especialmente cómo el autor desarrolla una original propuesta acerca del funcionamiento implícito del razonamiento. A través del examen de nociones como la inferencia (...) informal, la inferencia natural y el sentido ilativo, pretendemos justificar que no son pocos los elementos por los que Newman puede ser considerado plenamente un filósofo, en cuanto contribuye ampliamente a una teoría del conocimiento que rehabilita una razón para la vida y existencialmente contextualizada. (shrink)

In Understanding the Whole Student, the authors contend that good education is, and must be, multicultural in order to gain a deeper perspective on issues under analysis in the classroom through the sharing and negotiating of many different cultural perspectives.

In Understanding the Whole Student, the authors contend that good education is, and must be, multicultural in order to gain a deeper perspective on issues under analysis in the classroom through the sharing and negotiating of many different cultural perspectives.

__Preparing Teachers to Educate Whole Students_ offers a wide-ranging comparative account of how innovative professional development programs in a number of countries guide and support teachers in their efforts to promote cognitive and socio-emotional growth in their students._ The book focuses on holistic educational outcomes in an effort to better serve students in the twenty-first century and examines seven programs in all—in Chile, China, Colombia, India, Mexico, the United States, and Singapore. Fernando M. Reimers, Connie K. Chung, and their (...) contributors focus on a pair of issues of great significance to educators throughout the world: the need to identify and promote a full range of competencies in students as they prepare for work and life in the twenty-first century, and the need to create and enhance professional development programs for teachers that will help them cultivate these competencies in their students. _Preparing Teachers to Educate Whole Students_ offers a unique and helpful contribution to our understanding of fundamental educational goals and the professional development programs for teachers that aim to further those goals. (shrink)

My article, “Whole-brain death and integration: Realigning the ontological concept with clinical diagnostic tests”.

Part-whole relations in representation raise a question about whether a larger system can be self-represented through the representational capacities of one of its parts. This paper develops a modest naturalistic account of that question by distinguishing direct subject-level self-representation from derivative system-level self-representation. Direct subject-level self-representation occurs when a conscious subject represents itself as itself, or represents features of its own embodied, cognitive, or experiential condition. Derivative system-level self-representation occurs when a subsystem generated within and sustained by a larger (...) system represents that larger system or significant aspects of it, so that the larger system exhibits a mediated form of self-representation through the subsystem. On this basis, the paper formulates a bridge principle connecting system, subsystem, and content-bearing representation. Applied to conscious organisms within the natural universe, the principle yields the thesis of local cosmic self-representation: the universe may be locally, partially, and derivatively self-represented through conscious subsystems that arise within it and represent the natural order to which they belong. The view does not defend panpsychism, strong cosmopsychism, theism, intelligent design, or global cosmic consciousness. Its aim is instead interpretive and metaphysical: to clarify how conscious representation can have part-whole significance without attributing mentality, agency, or subjectivity to the whole. (shrink)

Rapid advances in high throughput genomic technologies and next generation sequencing are making medical genomic research more readily accessible and affordable, including the sequencing of patient and control whole genomes and exomes in order to elucidate genetic factors underlying disease. Over the next five years, the Human Heredity and Health in Africa (H3Africa) Initiative, funded by the Wellcome Trust (United Kingdom) and the National Institutes of Health (United States of America), will contribute greatly towards sequencing of numerous African samples (...) for biomedical research. (shrink)

Deacon suggests the autogen as a minimal Kantian Whole where the parts exist for and by means of the whole. An Autogen is a “for whom” information is created. Semantics of information comes first, syntax later. There are no entailing laws for the emergence and evolution of new meanings, which likely happened long before template replication and the genetic code. The evolution of life and meaning are based on physics but rise creatively above physics.

. The notion that we are bound to desire the whole - i. e., that we rightfully aspire to exist as complete and undivided entities, Totalitäten - is familiar from Schiller’s Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen. My discussion aims to indicate (i) the logical peculiarity of this desire, (ii) its internal relation to post-Kantian concerns, (iii) the specific argument for its necessity given in Schiller’s Letters, (iv) the arguable limitations of Schiller’s account, (v) the alternative versions of it (...) (and critical views of Schiller) found in Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and (vi) the platonistic-formalist dimension of this development. Die Idee, dass wir dazu bestimmt sind, das Ganze zu begehren ‒ d. h., dass wir rechtmäßig danach streben, als vollendete und ungeteilte Wesen oder „Totalitäten“ zu existieren ‒ ist uns aus Schillers Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen vertraut. Das Ziel der Diskussion in diesem Beitrag ist, Folgendes zu erläutern: (i) die logische Eigentümlichkeit dieses Begehrens, (ii) seine innere Beziehung zu den Aufgaben der Nachkantianer, (iii) das in Schillers Briefen gelieferte Argument für die Notwendigkeit des Begehrens, (iv) die möglichen Grenzen von Schillers Theorie, (v) die alternativen Ausarbeitungen dieses Arguments (und kritischen Stellungnahmen zu Schiller) bei Fichte, Schelling und Hegel, und (vi) die platonistisch-formalistische Dimension dieser Entwicklung. (shrink)

A paper exploring what we can learn about part/whole by focusing on the differences in the existence conditions of fusions and ordinary things, rather than the differences in their persistence conditions.

My departed point is the assessment that plurality in broadest sense characterizing any post- (for example: post-modernity, post-metaphysical, etc.) context is first of all plurality of whole. We may speak about wholes, movement of whole, and lack of any universal whole. Part do not already belongs to whole implicitly granted and common of all other parts. Now we may speak of parts in another relation: non of parts as parts of some common of all parts (...) class='Hi'>whole, but parts of difference wholes, and at the same time without any universal whole common of all the wholes. The paper is devoted concretely to the influence of such a comprehension of whole upon some basic notion of physics (especially quantum mechanics and information, relativity) and mathematics, namely probability, set, movement,time. Their changes exert influence upon the fundamental pbilosophical concepts of being and time, knowledge and being-in-the-world. The new conception of fractal, and its meaning in philosophy points out, too. Constancy and always existing of whole is equivalent to Newton time, energy conservation law, local realism and ''hidden parameters" of any correlations, a union of sets exists always if the two sets are granted. (shrink)

This article critically examines the discourse of ‘bring your whole self to work’ within the diversity, equality, and inclusion (DEI) narratives of investment banks. While inclusion is often framed as essential for leveraging diversity, scholars argue that ‘whole self’ approaches risk individualising diversity and reinforcing systemic exclusions. Drawing on Foucault’s concepts of biopower, technologies of the self, and governance, this study explores how inclusion operates as a mechanism of organisational power, shaping subjectivities through corporate DEI statements. Using discourse (...) analysis of investment banks’ websites, the article identifies three subjectivities constructed through ‘whole self’ discourse: the whole self as a driver of productivity, the whole self shaped by wellness and mindset, and the whole self oriented towards personal growth. By interrogating the boundary conditions of inclusion, the article highlights the ethical implications of DEI discourse, questioning how organisations define acceptable identities and reinforcing the need for structurally inclusive practices that move beyond surface-level commitments. (shrink)