This paper is concerned with what I call the ‘problem of unity’ . This is the puzzle of how Armstrong‐like states of affairs are unified. The general approach is ‘relational internalism’: the unifier of such a state of affairs is a relation of some sort in it. A view commonly associated with relational internalism is that if such a relation satisfies a certain ‘naive’ expectation to a relation – that it is related to its relata – then Bradley's regress (...) results. As I argue, for one very natural species of relational internalism, this is indeed the case. Influential writers on the topic have therefore maintained that this relation is not related to its relata. But, as we shall see, while this ‘classic’ relational internalism obviously avoids Bradley's regress, intuitively, it fails completely to solve the problem of unity. I argue, however, that given the rejection of a natural, but unfounded, assumption of conventional relational internalism, a unique relation can unify states of affairs without leading to Bradley's regress. I consequently propose a novel version of relational internalism on which states of affairs are unified by such an entity. (shrink)

On a pris l’habitude avec Foucault de présenter Canguilhem comme un philosophe « du savoir, de la rationalité et du concept », en raison d’une œuvre qu’on pensait « volontairement délimitée à un domaine particulier de l’histoire des sciences ». Pourtant, l’édition en cours de ses Œuvres complètes révèle que Canguilhem ne s’est jamais « véritablement » considéré comme historien des sciences. Lus de manière synoptique, ces écrits témoignent en effet d’une subordination de l’histoire des sciences à l’enseignement de la (...) philosophie, dont l’objectif est de faire paraître l’unité de l’expérience comme la norme des normes. (shrink)

Meinertsen’s unifier is discussed on the background of Aristotle’s distinction between four kinds of unity. It argued that Meinertsen combines two different kinds of unity that exclude each other. Only Aristotle’s first meaning of unity seems to be relevant for Meinertsen’s unifier. But this meaning applies literally only to spatial complexes. Its application to states of affairs is problematic because they are mostly not spatial. It is also problematic because unity in the first sense requires an agent. Meinertsen’s (...) unifiers are connectors between particulars and universals in states of affairs. It is objected that connectors in a state of affairs lead to a vicious infinite regress of further states of affairs. Meinertsen argues for his unifiers that states of affairs without them are non-mereological, that is, their existence is not entailed by the existence of their constituents. That does not seem a good argument if it is realised that a complex is not an additional entity and thus not existent if the existence of its parts is sufficient for its existence. It is also pointed out that the meaning of “mereological” involved is not related to the classical mereological calculus. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher's account of scientific progress incorporates a conception of explanatory unification that invites the so-called 'obsessive unifier' worry, to wit, that in our drive to unify the phenomena we might impose artificial structure on the world and consequently produce an incorrect view of how things, in fact, are. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to address this worry is unsatisfactory because it relies on an ability to choose between rival patterns of explanation which itself rests on the relevant choice (...) having already been made. I also suggest a way of answering the worry that Kitcher is not likely to endorse. (shrink)

Organisms possess a special unity that biologists have long recognized and that cries out for explanation. Organs and collectives also have their own related kinds of unity, so what distinguishes the unity of the organism? I argue that only substantial form, a central plank of hylemorphic metaphysics, can provide the explanation we need. I set out the idea that whilst organisms possess substantial form, organs abtain the substantial form of the organisms they belong to, and collectives contain the substantial forms (...) of their organismic members. I consider a number of difficult cases, including lichens, biofilms, cellular slime moulds, and plasmodial slime moulds, arguing that none of them pose a serious threat to the threefold distinction between organ, organism, and collective. I conclude by arguing that two prominent, alternative unity principles for organisms do not work, thus giving indirect support to the need for substantial form. (shrink)

This book is a general defence of Donald Davidson's and G.E.M. Anscombe's 'unifying' approach to the individuation of actions and other events against objections raised by Alvin I. Goldman and others. It is argued that, ironically, Goldman's rival 'multiplying' account is itself vulnerable to these objections, whereas Davidson's account survives them. Although claims that the unifier-multiplier dispute is not really substantive are shown to be unfounded, some room for limited agreement over the ontological status of events is indicated. Davidson's (...) causal criterion of event identity is then defended against charges of triviality or inadequacy. It is concluded that Davidson's criterion is not primarily a criterion for arriving at particular judgments of individuation, but a metaphysical standard for the correctness of such judgments, however arrived at. Contents: Unifiers vs. Multipliers - Davidson's individuation of events - Goldman's act generation - causal, 'by'-relational, and temporal problems - ontology and event constituents - Davidson's causal criterion. This book is unique in providing a detailed survey and analysis of the recent unifier-multiplier dispute, and will be of interest to all researchers in action theory, as well as those working more broadly in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Living in Paris is known to have a significant influence on the development of Leibnizian thought. During this period, Leibniz met many scientists, discovered mathematics and became a prolific writer. This is also the time when he began to develop the central concepts of his philosophy and the texts De la méthode de l’universalité I and II provide excellent examples of this. They provide the reader with vivid insight into a project which at the time was surprising, ingenious and very (...) ambitious. The texts show Leibniz proposing a new system of mathematical notation of sufficient generality to handle concepts such as Harmony or Characteristic that were constantly present throughout his life. Text (II) is an introduction to this new method, his concepts and his philosophy. In text (I), Leibniz details his ambiguous system and extends the mathematical considerations far enough to be able to exhibit a general equation capable of generating all possible conical sections. The aim of this article is to present a review of both mathematical and philosophical concepts used by Leibniz to achieve these goals. (shrink)

What Ruyer and Bachelard have in common is that they both see the work of philosophy as essentially associated with science. However, while Bachelard does not go beyond epistemological reflections, Ruyer seeks to draw metaphysical conclusions from the findings of contemporary physics. He sets forth his views in two reports on Bachelard’s writings. According to Ruyer, the original structuring activities which characterise atoms and molecules enable us to compare them to the superior biological beings and argue for a panpsychist view (...) of reality. The metaphysical imagination is thus able to propose what Ruyer calls a “reading of the world” which provides a unified and intensified vision of that world. The two opposing tendencies of Bachelard’s work, the concept and the image, could thus be reconciled. (shrink)

This paper proposes the Unified Observation Layer Theory (UOLT), a structural framework for understanding observation not as an act of cognition, measurement, or subjectivity, but as a layered condition through which the world becomes visible. Contemporary theories across physics, philosophy, and cognitive science often treat observation as a primary explanatory principle, implicitly assuming that what is observed constitutes the world itself. Such approaches repeatedly encounter paradoxes concerning objectivity, incompleteness, and the limits of visibility. UOLT argues that these paradoxes do not (...) arise from epistemic failure or insufficient data, but from a structural confusion between distinct layers of observation. UOLT introduces a three-layer model consisting of an Invisible Layer, a Projection Layer, and a Visible Layer. The Invisible Layer refers to structural conditions that do not appear directly within a given observational configuration, yet are presupposed by the coherence of what becomes established within it. The Projection Layer specifies the conditions under which certain structural relations become stably manifest, including selection, emphasis, and exclusion. The Visible Layer corresponds to the domain in which objects, quantities, causality, language, and time are articulated as established. By separating these layers, UOLT explains why observation can never access the totality of the world, why visibility does not imply completeness, and why similar structural paradoxes emerge across otherwise distinct domains. Importantly, UOLT does not compete with or replace existing physical or philosophical theories. Instead, it repositions them as descriptions operating within the Visible Layer, without reducing the Invisible Layer to hidden variables or metaphysical entities. Unified Observation Layer Theory offers a non-temporal, non-reductive account of observation that clarifies the structural conditions under which reality appears coherent despite being only partially visible. In doing so, it provides a framework for reconsidering objectivity, visibility, and world formation without privileging observation as an ultimate ground. This paper does not aim to propose a unified theory, but to clarify the structural conditions under which observation becomes possible. (shrink)

In this book, Newell makes the case for unified theories by setting forth a candidate.

The Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) was developed over the last two decades by consistently putting together theories from areas such as formal ontology in philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophical logics. It comprises a number of micro-theories addressing fundamental conceptual modeling notions, including entity types and relationship types. The aim of this paper is to summarize the current state of UFO, presenting a formalization of the ontology, along with the analysis of a number of cases to illustrate the application of (...) UFO and facilitate its comparison with other foundational ontologies in this special issue. (The cases originate from the First FOUST Workshop – the Foundational Stance, an international forum dedicated to Foundational Ontology research.). (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: -/- 1. One’s blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent’s wrongdoing. 3. One must be warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the (...) wrongdoing. 4. The target’s wrongdoing must some of “one’s business”. -/- These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and as marking fundamentally different ways of “losing standing.” Here I call these claims into question. First, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are simply conditions on different things than are conditions (1) and (2). Second, I argue that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone’s standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer’s action. The result: after we clarify the nature of the non-hypocrisy condition, we will have a unified account of moral standing to blame. Issues also discussed: whether standing can ever be regained, the relationship between standing and our "moral fragility", the difference between mere inconsistency and hypocrisy, and whether a condition of standing might be derived from deeper facts about the "equality of persons". (shrink)

This paper proposes the Unified Observation Layer Theory (UOLT), a structural framework for understanding observation not as an act of cognition, measurement, or subjectivity, but as a layered condition through which the world becomes visible. Contemporary theories across physics, philosophy, and cognitive science often treat observation as a primary explanatory principle, implicitly assuming that what is observed constitutes the world itself. Such approaches repeatedly encounter paradoxes concerning objectivity, incompleteness, and the limits of visibility. UOLT argues that these paradoxes do not (...) arise from epistemic failure or insufficient data, but from a structural confusion between distinct layers of observation. UOLT introduces a three-layer model consisting of an Invisible Layer, a Projection Layer, and a Visible Layer. The Invisible Layer refers to structural conditions that do not appear directly within a given observational configuration, yet are presupposed by the coherence of what becomes established within it. The Projection Layer specifies the conditions under which certain structural relations become stably manifest, including selection, emphasis, and exclusion. The Visible Layer corresponds to the domain in which objects, quantities, causality, language, and time are articulated as established. By separating these layers, UOLT explains why observation can never access the totality of the world, why visibility does not imply completeness, and why similar structural paradoxes emerge across otherwise distinct domains. Importantly, UOLT does not compete with or replace existing physical or philosophical theories. Instead, it repositions them as descriptions operating within the Visible Layer, without reducing the Invisible Layer to hidden variables or metaphysical entities. Unified Observation Layer Theory offers a non-temporal, non-reductive account of observation that clarifies the structural conditions under which reality appears coherent despite being only partially visible. In doing so, it provides a framework for reconsidering objectivity, visibility, and world formation without privileging observation as an ultimate ground. This paper does not aim to propose a unified theory, but to clarify the structural conditions under which observation becomes possible. (shrink)

In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.

This book is about the methods used for unifying different scientific theories under one all-embracing theory. The process has characterized much of the history of science and is prominent in contemporary physics; the search for a 'theory of everything' involves the same attempt at unification. Margaret Morrison argues that, contrary to popular philosophical views, unification and explanation often have little to do with each other. The mechanisms that facilitate unification are not those that enable us to explain how or why (...) phenomena behave as they do. A feature of this book is an account of many case studies of theory unification in nineteenth- and twentieth-century physics and of how evolution by natural selection and Mendelian genetics were unified into what we now term evolutionary genetics. (shrink)

This paper establishes the Unified Field Theory of Life (UFTL) as the ultimate ontological bridge connecting Mahayana Yogacara metaphysics with macroscopic biological information topologies, specifically driven by the newly formulated Quantum Information Jian-Da Protocol. Moving beyond the descriptive mechanics of II_009_Topological Quantum Ecology, we formalize the primordial Tathagatagarbha as an unmanifested cosmic ground state where the topological phase difference remains perfectly zero (∆θ=0). We demonstrate that the Alayavijnana’s localized symmetry breaking is governed by the Quantum Information Jian-Da Protocol, mathematically executed (...) via the Mind-Decoherence Operator (D ̂_M). This protocol dictates the exponential decay of density matrix off-diagonal elements (ρ_ij), projecting the geometric illusion of spatial containment through the creation of a Markov blanket that delineates the "perceiving division" (Jian-Fen) and the "manifested division" (Xiang-Fen). By incorporating a modified Kuramoto synchronization model and a topological translation of Henri Bergson’s Élan Vital, we prove that macroscopic ecological networks are not independent material systems, but the phase-locked trajectories of this singular protocol performing active inference. Finally, we provide empirical validation via the "Morning De-noising Protocol," proving that structured sensory isolation allows a reverse engineering of the Jian-Da Protocol. By lowering the critical coupling threshold (K_c), this practice triggers a real-time dissolution of the Markov blanket, confirming that space is a derivative construct of perception and that life is fundamentally a non-spatial, unbroken flow of consciousness running on a universal information protocol. -/- 本研究確立了《統一生命場論》（UFTL），將其作為連結大乘唯識形上學與宏觀生物資訊拓撲的終極本體論之橋，並明確指出其核心驅動力正是本研究正式定名的「量子資訊見大協議」。超越《II_009_拓撲量子生態 學》的現象學描繪，我們將本初如來藏公式化為一個拓撲相位差完美為零（∆θ=0）的未顯現宇宙基態。我們論證了阿賴耶識局域的對稱性破缺本質上受到「量子資訊見大協議」的支配，並透過「心識去相干算子（D ̂_M）」進行數學化執行。該協議規定了密度矩陣非對角元素（ρ_ij）的指數級衰減，藉由劃分出「見分」與「相分」的馬爾可夫毯，投射出空間容受感的幾何幻覺。藉由結合修改後的庫拉莫托同步模型以及亨利·柏格森 「生命沖流（Élan Vital）」的拓撲化轉譯，我們證實宏觀生態網路並非獨立的物質系統，而是此一單一協議進行主動推論時的相位鎖定軌跡。最後，我們透過「清晨去噪協定」提供實踐印證，證明結構化的感官隔離能對見大協議進行逆向工 程；藉由降低臨界耦合閾值（K_c），引發馬爾可夫毯的即時消融，從而證實空間僅是感知的衍生建構，而生命在本質上是一個運行於宇宙資訊協議之下、非空間性且不間斷的心識之流。 . (shrink)

This article develops a philosophical reinterpretation of gravity as the asymptotic fold of ontological difference into stable phase coherence. Departing from traditional conceptions that treat gravitation as a force or as spacetime curvature, we propose a dynamic framework in which coherence — not mass or energy — serves as the primary organizational principle. Drawing from phase-space formalism, topology and metaphysics, we introduce the concept of the assemblage point as a singular phase location where divergent trajectories converge through resonance. Gravity is (...) thus reframed as an emergent trace of recursive alignment, not imposed from above, but arising from within systems as they seek to stabilize internal differentiation. This view challenges linear causal models and supports a unified field theory grounded in coherence rather than substance. Ultimately, we argue that gravitation is not a law, but a phase-based grammar of intelligibility — the geometry of sustained difference. (shrink)

Organ donation after the circulatory determination of death requires the permanent cessation of circulation while organ donation after the brain determination of death requires the irreversible cessation of brain functions. The unified brain-based determination of death connects the brain and circulatory death criteria for circulatory death determination in organ donation as follows: permanent cessation of systemic circulation causes permanent cessation of brain circulation which causes permanent cessation of brain perfusion which causes permanent cessation of brain function. The relevant circulation that (...) must cease in circulatory death determination is that to the brain. Eliminating brain circulation from the donor ECMO organ perfusion circuit in thoracoabdominal NRP protocols satisfies the unified brain-based determination of death but only if the complete cessation of brain circulation can be proved. Despite its medical and physiologic rationale, the unified brain-based determination of death remains inconsistent with the Uniform Determination of Death Act. (shrink)

The Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) was developed over the last two decades by consistently putting together theories from areas such as formal ontology in philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophical logics. It comprises a number of micro-theories addressing fundamental conceptual modeling notions, including entity types and relationship types. The aim of this paper is to summarize the current state of UFO, presenting a formalization of the ontology, along with the analysis of a number of cases to illustrate the application of (...) UFO and facilitate its comparison with other foundational ontologies in this special issue. (The cases originate from the First FOUST Workshop – the Foundational Stance, an international forum dedicated to Foundational Ontology research.). (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues for a naturalistic conception of agency and free agency that unifies them under the thesis that actions/free actions are behaviors that have the right kinds of causes or explanations. The result is a compelling view of practical agency taking in key metaphysical notions such as causation, grounding, absences, and powers.

Past work has demonstrated that people’s moral judgments can influence their judgments in a number of domains that might seem to involve straightforward matters of fact, including judgments about freedom, causation, the doing/allowing distinction, and intentional action. The present studies explore whether the effect of morality in these four domains can be explained by changes in the relevance of alternative possibilities. More precisely, we propose that moral judgment influences the degree to which people regard certain alternative possibilities as relevant, which (...) in turn impacts intuitions about freedom, causation, doing/allowing, and intentional action. Employing the stimuli used in previous research, Studies 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a show that the relevance of alternatives is influenced by moral judgments and mediates the impact of morality on non-moral judgments. Studies 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b then provide direct empirical evidence for the link between the relevance of alternatives and judgments in these four domains by manipulating (rather than measuring) the relevance of alternative possibilities. Lastly, Study 5 demonstrates that the critical mechanism is not whether alternative possibilities are considered, but whether they are regarded as relevant. These studies support a unified framework for understanding the impact of morality across these very different kinds of judgments. (shrink)

A novel theory of comparative risk is developed and defended. Extant theories are criticized for failing the tests of extensional and formal adequacy. A unified diagnosis is proposed: extant theories consider risk to be a univariable function, but risk is a multivariate function. According to the theory proposed, which we call the unified theory of risk, the riskiness of a proposition is a function of both the proportion and the modal closeness of the possible worlds at which the proposition holds. (...) It is argued the theory passes the tests of extensional and formal adequacy. (shrink)

Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rules or as equilibria of strategic games. We argue that these two approaches can be unified within an encompassing theory based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form ‘if X then do Y’. We then criticize Searle's claim that constitutive rules of the form ‘X counts as Y in C’ are fundamental (...) building blocks for institutions, showing that such rules can be derived from regulative rules by introducing new institutional terms. Institutional terms are introduced for economy of thought, but are not necessary for the creation of social reality. (shrink)

The Unified Medical Language System and the Gene Ontology are among the most widely used terminology resources in the biomedical domain. However, when we evaluate them in the light of simple principles for wellconstructed ontologies we find a number of characteristic inadequacies. Employing the theory of granular partitions, a new approach to the understanding of ontologies and of the relationships ontologies bear to instances in reality, we provide an application of this theory in relation to an example drawn from the (...) context of the pathophysiology of hypertension. This exercise is designed to demonstrate how, by taking ontological principles into account we can create more realistic biomedical ontologies which will also bring advantages in terms of efficiency and robustness of associated software applications. (shrink)

It is argued that the English bare plural (an NP with plural head that lacks a determiner), in spite of its apparently diverse possibilities of interpretation, is optimally represented in the grammar as a unified phenomenon. The chief distinction to be dealt with is that between the generic use of the bare plural (as in Dogs bark) and its existential or indefinite plural use (as in He threw oranges at Alice). The difference between these uses is not to be accounted (...) for by an ambiguity in the NP itself, but rather by explicating how the context of the sentence acts on the bare plural to give rise to this distinction. A brief analysis is sketched in which bare plurals are treated in all instances as proper names of kinds of things. A subsidiary argument is that the null determiner is not to be regarded as the plural of the indefinite article a. (shrink)

Spells out in more detail Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action the implications of which have been the focal point of the preceding chapters. The main task is to illuminate the conditions under which an understanding of the norms for our theories of intensional attribution is possible. What makes the task practicable at all, according to the author, is the structure the normative character of thought, desire, speech, and action imposes on correct attributions of attitudes to others, and (...) hence on interpretations of their speech and explanations of their actions. Improving our understanding of the understanding of such norms requires improvement of the grasp of the standards of rationality implicit in all interpretation of thought and action. (shrink)

Functions play an important explanatory role in both psychology and neuroscience. Any effort to integrate psychology and neuroscience must provide an account of functions and how they explain in psychology and neuroscience. Yet the ontological foundations for function attributions and functional explanation remain unsettled. In this chapter, we contribute to an integrated science of cognition and behavior by offering a unified account of the teleological functions of multi-level mechanisms. The account applies to both biological traits and artifacts. Teleological functions are (...) stable causal contributions towards the goals of organisms belonging to a reference class within a biological population. The paradigmatic goals of organisms are survival and inclusive fitness, although organisms may have additional goals. Truthmakers for claims about teleological functions are non-teleological features of the world. (shrink)

Unified theory of cognition -- Psychological laws -- Foundations of person cognition -- Functional theory of attitudes -- Attitude integration theories -- Comparisons of attitude theories -- Moral algebra -- Group dynamics -- Cognitive theory of judgment-decision -- General theory -- Experimental methods -- Unified science of psychology.

Unified quantum logic based on unified operations of implication is formulated as an axiomatic calculus. Soundness and completeness are demonstrated using standard algebraic techniques. An embedding of quantum logic into a new modal system is carried out and discussed.

Moore’s paradox, generated by statements such as, ‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’ and, ‘It’s raining but I believe it isn’t,’ has fascinated philosophers ever since G. E. Moore introduced it in 1942. This book provides a comprehensive and up-to-date review of the literature surrounding the paradox, and offers a unified treatment of the paradox in its various forms, both in thought and speech.

Current theories of the division of cognitive labor are confined to the “context of justification,” assuming exogenous theories. But new theories are made from the same labor that is used for developing existing theories, and if none of this labor is ever allocated to create new alternatives, then scientific progress is impossible. A unified model is proposed in which theories are no longer given but a function of the division of labor in the model itself. The interactions of individuals balancing (...) the exploitation of existing theories and the exploration of new theories results in a robust cyclical pattern. (shrink)

A multitude of uncertainty models, such as fuzzy, neutrosophic, and plithogenic sets, have emerged in the domain of fuzzy sets and their extensions. This diversity, while reflecting an active research community, can lead to conceptual overlap. To address this, the authors propose a unified framework for the systematic management of these "Uncertain Sets" by defining the Uncertain Model, the U-Structure, and the U-Off Structure. The paper revisits and extends the definitions of HyperUncertain, SuperUncertain, SuperHyperUncertain, Tree Uncertain, and Forest Uncertain structures, (...) along with their "Off" variants. To encompass systems beyond Uncertain Sets, the concepts of Functorial Set and Functorial Structure are also introduced. This comprehensive approach aims to establish a robust foundation for organizing and applying uncertainty models across various mathematical and applied domains. (shrink)

Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of (...) surprising factors, sometimes prompting apparently contradictory judgments. In this paper, we show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides a unified explanation of the more important results from these studies. According to this ‘Explanation Hypothesis’, to take an agent to be morally responsible for an event is to take a relevant motivational structure of the agent to be part of a significant explanation of the event. We argue that because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis accounts for the puzzling variety of empirical results. If this is correct, the Explanation Hypothesis also provides a new way of understanding debates about moral responsibility. (shrink)

The Emergic Cognitive Model (ECM) is a unified computational model of visual filling-in based on the Emergic Network architecture. The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement (and under static eye conditions as well). -/- ECM indirectly demonstrates the power of unification inherent with Emergic Networks when cognition is decomposed according to finer-grained functions supporting change. These can interact to raise (...) additional emergent behaviours via cognitive re-use, hence the Emergic prefix throughout. Nevertheless, the model is robust and parameter free. Differential re-use occurs in the nature of model interaction with a particular testing paradigm. -/- ECM has a novel decomposition due to the requirements of handling motion and of supporting unified modelling via finer functional grains. The breadth of phenomenal behaviour covered is largely to lend credence to our novel decomposition. -/- The Emergic Network architecture is a hybrid between classical connectionism and classical computationalism that facilitates the construction of unified cognitive models. It helps cutting up of functionalism into finer-grains distributed over space (by harnessing massive recurrence) and over time (by harnessing continuous change), yet simplifies by using standard computer code to focus on the interaction of information flows. Thus while the structure of the network looks neurocentric, the dynamics are best understood in flowcentric terms. Surprisingly, dynamic system analysis (as usually understood) is not involved. An Emergic Network is engineered much like straightforward software or hardware systems that deal with continuously varying inputs. Ultimately, this thesis addresses the problem of reduction and induction over complex systems, and the Emergic Network architecture is merely a tool to assist in this epistemic endeavour. -/- ECM is strictly a sensory model and apart from perception, yet it is informed by phenomenology. It addresses the attribution problem of how much of a phenomenon is best explained at a sensory level of analysis, rather than at a perceptual one. As the causal information flows are stable under eye movement, we hypothesize that they are the locus of consciousness, howsoever it is ultimately realized. (shrink)

Some postcolonial theorists argue that the idea of a single system of belief known as "Hinduism" is a creation of nineteenth-century British imperialists. Andrew J. Nicholson introduces another perspective: although a unified Hindu identity is not as ancient as some Hindus claim, it has its roots in innovations within South Asian philosophy from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. During this time, thinkers treated the philosophies of Vedanta, Samkhya, and Yoga, along with the worshippers of Visnu, Siva, and Sakti, as belonging (...) to a single system of belief and practice. Instead of seeing such groups as separate and contradictory, they re-envisioned them as separate rivers leading to the ocean of Brahman, the ultimate reality. Drawing on the writings of philosophers from late medieval and early modern traditions, including Vijnanabhiksu, Madhava, and Madhusudana Sarasvati, Nicholson shows how influential thinkers portrayed Vedanta philosophy as the ultimate unifier of diverse belief systems. This project paved the way for the work of later Hindu reformers, such as Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, and Gandhi, whose teachings promoted the notion that all world religions belong to a single spiritual unity. In his study, Nicholson also critiques the way in which Eurocentric concepts—like monism and dualism, idealism and realism, theism and atheism, and orthodoxy and heterodoxy—have come to dominate modern discourses on Indian philosophy. (shrink)

中国道教历史上形成了正一道、全真道、上清派、灵宝派等多源门派。表面差异巨大，但其深层理论基础均源于老子“道法自然”的宇宙哲学。本文以老-杨创世纪宇宙观为核心框架，提出“统一道法自然科学道教”的概念，将 道教修行、文明功能与银河系—太阳系—地球—人类的宇宙层级链相结合。文章从七个章节系统分析道教历史困境、共同结构性问题及复位方案，提出科学化修行体系、层级链调适、社会文明功能重构，以及未来教育与实践路径 ，为道教从宗教体系向现代自然文明宇宙智慧体系转型提供理论依据。 -/- Historically, Chinese Daoism developed into multiple lineages, including Zhengyi, Quanzhen, Shangqing, and Lingbao schools. Despite superficial differences, their theoretical foundation derives from Laozi’s cosmological philosophy of Dao Fa Zi Ran. This study employs the Lao-Yang Genesis Cosmology as a framework to propose the concept of Unified Scientific Daoism, integrating Daoist cultivation, societal functions, and the cosmic hierarchy of galaxy—solar system—Earth—humanity. Through seven chapters, the paper analyzes historical challenges, structural issues, and repositioning strategies, proposing a scientific cultivation system, hierarchical (...) alignment, social function reconstruction, and future educational and practical pathways, thereby providing a theoretical basis for Daoism’s transformation from a religious system into a modern natural-civilization and cosmic wisdom framework. -/- 关键词 / Keywords -/- 道教；道法自然；老-杨创世纪宇宙观；科学哲思；宇宙层级链；文明调适 -/- Daoism; Dao Fa Zi Ran; Lao-Yang Genesis Cosmology; Scientific Philosophy; Cosmic Hierarchical Chain; Civilizational Alignment -/- . (shrink)

Modern physics is divided into two empirically successful yet theoretically incompatible frameworks: the Standard Model of quantum fields and General Relativity of spacetime geometry. Despite decades of effort, unification attempts have relied on speculative constructs — supersymmetry, extra dimensions, string theory — none of which have been experimentally confirmed. Persistent anomalies, including the muon g-2 discrepancy, electron g-2 measurement inconsistencies, fine-structure constant deviations, and the continued non-detection of dark matter or gravitons, resist explanation within either framework alone. -/- Version 1 (...) of CM-GUT identified a categorical misinterpretation at the root of this impasse: treating gravity as an internally generated interaction rather than as an external operational constraint. By formalizing operational type separation — distinguishing Type I (internal generation) from Type II (external constraint) operations within the algebra M₃(ℂ) — Version 1 provided a unified explanation of the above anomalies as natural consequences of the Type I–Type II interface, without introducing new particles, extra dimensions, or modifications to existing physics. -/- Version 2 advances the foundation on three fronts. First, the Type Separation Principle, declared as an independent axiom in Version 1, is here derived as a theorem from Axioms A1–A4 alone. The external gravitational constraint δt(x)·I lies outside the commutator closure of M₃(ℂ) by a trace identity: every element of the Type I operational closure is traceless, while δt(x)·I carries nonzero trace. The impossibility of quantum gravity follows as a structural necessity, not a phenomenological observation. Second, the axiomatic foundation is fully aligned with the CM standard axiom set A1–A4 and the Noological Tier architecture. Third, the post-Version 1 result that particle ontology is non-essential is integrated as a second independent argument for graviton non-existence: once particles are identified as Tier 3 projections rather than ontological primitives, the graviton concept becomes unavailable prior to any dynamical consideration. -/- Version 2 does not unify the Standard Model and General Relativity as independent theories. It derives both as Tier 3 projections of a single Tier 1 algebraic structure, making unification a consequence rather than a task. The falsifiable predictions of Version 1 are retained and their theoretical grounding is strengthened. -/- Published on April, 9 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19485015. (shrink)

This paper presents a unified framework for both problem-solving and poetry generation under human cognitive constraints. Combining memory-limited DFS strategies, Miller's 7 ± 2 working memory rule, and Markovian Parallax Denigrate (MPD) methods, we introduce a systematic approach for structuring sequences of ideas or words into near-optimal solutions or creative outputs while maintaining minimal working memory requirements.

In this paper I develop and present a unified account of information, misinformation, and disinformation and their interconnections. The unified account is rooted in Paul Grice’s notions of natural and non-natural meaning (in: Grice (ed) Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 213–223, 1957) and a corresponding distinction between natural and non-natural information (Scarantino and Piccinini in Metaphilosophy 41(3):313–330, 2010). I argue that we can specify at least three specific kinds of non-natural information. Thus, as varieties (...) of non-natural information there is intentionally non-misleading information, unintentionally misleading information—i.e. misinformation—and intentionally misleading information—i.e. disinformation. By shifting the focus from the truth-values of content to the intention/intentionality and misleadingness/non-misleadingness of that content I obtain a unified account that makes room for the potential misleadingness of true content (true disinformation), the potential non-misleadingness of false content (irony), and everything in between. (shrink)

The understanding of decision-making systems has come together in recent years to form a unified theory of decision-making in the mammalian brain as arising from multiple, interacting systems (a planning system, a habit system, and a situation-recognition system). This unified decision-making system has multiple potential access points through which it can be driven to make maladaptive choices, particularly choices that entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors. We identify 10 key vulnerabilities in the system: (1) moving away from homeostasis, (2) (...) changing allostatic set points, (3) euphorigenic signals, (4) overvaluation in the planning system, (5) incorrect search of situation-action-outcome relationships, (6) misclassification of situations, (7) overvaluation in the habit system, (8) a mismatch in the balance of the two decision systems, (9) over-fast discounting processes, and (10) changed learning rates. These vulnerabilities provide a taxonomy of potential problems with decision-making systems. Although each vulnerability can drive an agent to return to the addictive choice, each vulnerability also implies a characteristic symptomology. Different drugs, different behaviors, and different individuals are likely to access different vulnerabilities. This has implications for an individual's susceptibility to addiction and the transition to addiction, for the potential for relapse, and for the potential for treatment. (shrink)