In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that the human mind is not bound inside the head but extends into body and environment.

For well over two decades, Andy Clark has been gleaning theoretical lessons from the leading edge of cognitive science, applying a combination of empirical savvy and philosophical instinct that few can match. Clark’s most recent book, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, brilliantly expands his oeuvre. It offers a well-informed and focused survey of research in the burgeoning field of situated cognition, a field that emphasizes the contribution of environmental and non-neural bodily structures to the production of (...) intelligent behavior. The situated research program, fledgling though it may be in some respects, has reached an age at which its philosophical stock can reasonably be taken; and Clark is just the person to take it. Supersizing the Mind consists of three main divisions. The first develops the case for the distinctively extended view of cognition, according to which the human mind or cognitive system literally comprises elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. The second responds to critics of the extended outlook: Frederick Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, Keith Butler, Brie Gertler, Rick Grush, and me, among others. The third major division evaluates nonextended strands in the situated program, in particular, those that emphasize the role of the non-neural body in cognition. (shrink)

This is a review of Andy Clark's book, Supersizing the Mind.

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Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: In my commentary, I try to examine whether, and how, the approach presented by Depraz, Gyemant & Desmidt lines up with Varela’s neurophenomenology. I focus on the neural and phenomenological dimensions, respectively, arguing that the end result is somewhat of a mixed bag: if it paves the way for (...) a fruitful expansion of the neuro-aspect, it seems to cast a dubious, perhaps even distortive, shadow on the phenomenological aspect. (shrink)

In Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Clark, 2008), Andy Clark bolsters his case for the extended mind thesis and casts a critical eye on some related views for which he has less enthusiasm. To these ends, the book canvasses a wide range of empirical results concerning the subtle manner in which the human organism and its environment interact in the production of intelligent behavior. This fascinating research notwithstanding, Supersizing does little to assuage my skepticism about (...) the hypotheses of extended cognition and extended mind. In particular, Supersizing fails to make the case for the extended view as a revolutionary thesis in the theoretical foundations of cognitive science. (shrink)

Précis of Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension (Oxford University Press, NY, 2008) Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9597-x Authors Andy Clark, Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD Scotland (UK) Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.

The annual cost of healthcare in the United States reached $2.5 trillion in 2009 (about 17.6% of GDP) with projections to 2019 of about $4.5 trillion (about 20% of likely GDP).

Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind begins as a manifesto in which the components of an embodied theory of mind are carefully moved into place, proceeds to a defense of these components from recent critical attacks, and ends with words of caution to those who would seek to extract too much from the embodied perspective. Readers unfamiliar with Clark's earlier works are likely to find the result dazzling -- an exciting, novel, and coherent conception of the mind that dares one (...) to abandon nearly every vestige of a comfortably Cartesian view of mind. Of course, philosophers of mind have, for the most part, already jettisoned the idea that minds are an ethereal sort of non-physical substance. We can now assert with no great temerity that Descartes was wrong about that. Even so, one might still agree with Descartes that minds are in some sense distinct from bodies. They are, as it were, in the head. Yet, if Clark's case for embodiment is on track, minds are not in the head. The supervenience base for a mind (and not simply mental content) can include pieces of the extracranial body and, indeed, objects in the world beyond. (shrink)

This essay critically reviews Andy Clark’s new book Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, in which he argues that there are circumstances in which the mind, properly considered, is found to supervene on not only the brain, but the body and the external environment as well. This review summarizes Clark’s major contributions to this viewpoint for the general reader, then raises a few critical points that help to contextualize Clark’s claims, aims, and methods, while highlighting the book’s (...) strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

A month ago, I bought an iPhone. The iPhone has already taken over some of the central functions of my brain. It has replaced part of my memory, storing phone numbers and addresses that I once would have taxed my brain with. It harbors my desires: I call up a memo with the names of my favorite dishes when I need to order at a local restaurant. I use it to calculate, when I need to figure out bills and tips. (...) It is a tremendous resource in an argument, with Google ever present to help settle disputes. I make plans with it, using its calendar to help determine what I can and can’t do in the coming months. I even daydream on the iPhone, idly calling up words and images when my concentration slips. Friends joke that I should get the iPhone implanted into my brain. But if Andy Clark is right, all this would do is speed up the processing, and free up my hands. The iPhone is part of my mind already. Clark is a connoisseur of the myriad ways in which the mind relies on the world to get its work done. The first part of this marvelous book explores some of these ways: the extension of our bodies, the extension of our senses, and crucially, the use of language as a tool to extend our thought. The second part of the book defends the thesis that in at least some of these cases, the world is not serving as a mere instrument for the mind. Rather, the relevant parts of the world have become parts of my mind. My iPhone is not my tool, or at least it is not wholly my tool. Parts of it have become parts of me. This is the thesis of the extended mind: when parts of the environment are coupled to the brain in the right way, they become parts of the mind. The thesis has a long history: I am told that there are hints of it in Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. But no-one has done as much to give life to the idea as Andy Clark. In a series of important books and articles—Being There, Natural-Born Cyborgs, “Magic words: How language augments human computation”, and many others—he has explored the many ways in which the boundaries between mind and world are far more flexible than one might have thought.. (shrink)

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Finding the Mind Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9598-9 Authors Andy Clark, Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD Scotland, UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.

Upshot: The “Extended Mind Thesis‘ claims that cognitive processes are situated, embodied and goal-oriented actions that unfold in real world interactions with the immediate environment, cultural tools and other persons. The body and the “outside‘ world, undoubtedly, have a crucial influence, driving human beings’ cognitive processes. In his book, Andy Clark goes slightly further by claiming that the mind is often extended into the body and the world.

We propose that Vaesen's target article (a) underestimates the role of language in humans' cognitive toolkit and thereby (b) overestimates the proposed cognitive discontinuity between chimps and humans. We provide examples of labeling, numerical computation, executive control, and the relation between language and body, concluding that language plays a crucial role in.

© The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Clark is usually among the first in philosophy to ride a new and important wave on the frontiers of cognitive science research. His Microcognition and Associative Engines chronicled connectionism, Being There explored embodied cognition, Natural Born Cyborgs deals with BCIs and environmental and technological scaffolding, and Supersizing the Mind is an extended argument for extended minds. Clark's (...) latest, showcases his new enthusiasm about predictive coding, a computational framework for understanding cognition that is generating more excitement and controversy across diverse areas of cognitive science than an offshore wind at Maverick’s does among the boarding elite....Clark is a master at taking complex ideas in cognitive science and conveying them in less technical fashion to a wide audience, doing so with panache and wit.... (shrink)

We aim to move the externalism and self-knowledge debate forward by exploring two novel sceptical challenges to the prospects of self-knowledge of a paradigmatic sort, both of which result from ways in which our thought content, cognitive processes and cognitive successes depend crucially on our external environments. In particular, it is shown how arguments from extended cognition (e.g., Clark A, Chalmers D. Analysis 58:7–19 (1998); Clark A. Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008)) (...) and situationism (e.g., Alfano M. The Philosophical Quarterly 62:223–249 (2012), Alfano M. Expanding the situationist challenge to reliabilism about inference. In Fairweather A (ed) Virtue epistemology naturalized, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 103–122 (2014); Doris JM. Noûs 32:504–530 (1998), Doris JM. Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2002); Harman G. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 99:315–331 (1999), Harman G. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:223–226 (2000)) pose hitherto unexplored challenges to the prospects of self-knowledge as it is traditionally conceived. It is shown, however, that, suitably understood, these apparent challenges in fact only demonstrate two ways in which our cognitive lives can be dependent on our environment. As such, rather than undermining our prospects for attaining self-knowledge, they instead illustrate how self-knowledge can be extended and expanded. (shrink)

After a brief summary of Andy Clark’s book,Supersizing the Mind(2008) I address Clark’s approach to language which I argue to be inadequate. Clark is criticized for reifying language, thus neglecting that it is an interpersonal activity, not a stable system of symbols. With a starting point in language as a social phenomenon, I suggest an ecological approach to the extended mind hypothesis, arguing against Clark’s assumption that the extended mind is necessarily brain-centered.

Asia’s livestock sectors are scaling up, supersizing and intensifying to meet soaring demand for high value animal sourced foods (ASF). This soaring growth in AFS consumerism in Asia is changing ‘foodways’ rapidly and bringing into focus the impacts of Asia’s ‘livestock revolution’ on future generations and local or smallholder farmers, animal welfare and the environment. This discussion considers the evolving storyline in Asia through the lenses of narrative ethics to reveal underlying values and responsibilities, and concerns, costs and opportunities. (...) Consequently, I suggest that policy makers across Asia and morally able citizens take up a conception of the public trust doctrine (PTD), namely, a public trust emphasis (PTE) for animal agriculture as a pivotal platform to mitigate the current impacts of the tragedy of plenty and to guide the future trajectory of animal agriculture. PTE can be an ethical catalyst to (re)invigorate or (re)seed fairness and social justice in the food chain. In helping policy makers and the public across Asia think about animal welfare and environmental sustainability specifically and PTE generally in more concrete terms, I recommend operationalizing social justice and risk issues into familiar ethical categories: Safety, Quality, Security, Humaneness and Sustainability. These categories form the basis of some of our basic or common ethical commitments about our contemporary food system and relationship to food and to each other and in turn generate action-guiding principles (namely, Responsibility-Responsiveness, Innovation-Partnership, Respect, Resilience/Stewardship, Diversity-interdependence), which subsequently can motivate a framework for both shared ethical governance, and ethically inspired business models. (shrink)

Riassunto : Tra le più recenti riflessioni sulla mente umana, il quadro teorico della “mente estesa” ci dipinge come dei cyborg naturali provvisti di menti “superdotate”, ottenute grazie alla capacità di sfruttare le risorse tecnologiche e ambientali in modo integrato a nostro vantaggio. In questo articolo si ripercorre la genesi teorica di questo modello a partire dalle critiche alla scienza cognitiva classica, basata sul modello delle computazioni su rappresentazioni, e in particolare all’individualismo metodologico. Successivamente, si analizza il principale argomento filosofico (...) fornito a sostegno della mente estesa, fondato sulla plausibilità del concetto di “credenza disposizionale estesa”. Vengono poi discussi i principali aspetti problematici rilevati nel modello e proposte alcune repliche. Si conclude evidenziando che il principale merito del modello consiste nella proposta di una visione integrata della mente umana, tra biologia, cultura e tecnologia. Parole chiave : Mente estesa; Fallacia causale-costitutiva; Criterio del cognitivo; Cyborg naturale; Credenza disposizionale The Extended Mind Hypothesis: An Anthropology of Natural Cyborgs: The “extended mind” framework depicts humans as natural-born cyborgs equipped with supersized minds, thanks to their ability to exploit technological and environmental resources in special and integrated ways. In this paper, the historical background of the extended mind model will be outlined – starting with the criticisms to classical cognitive science, particularly to methodological individualism. Then, the main philosophical argument given in favour of extended mind, based on the plausibility of the notion of extended dispositional belief, will be presented and thoroughly discussed. Many of the problematic aspects of the extended mind model – namely the problem of criteria, the causal-constitution fallacy and the mark of the cognitive – will be considered. Our conclusion is that, despite its several theoretical difficulties, the model has the main advantage of proposing a vision of the human mind in which biology, culture and technology are integrated. Keywords : Extended Mind; Causal-constitution Fallacy; Mark of the Cognitive; Natural Cyborg; Dispositional Belief. (shrink)

The orthodox view in analytical film theory is that the difference between fiction and nonfiction is anchored in communicative practice. Whereas the creator of nonfiction can be seen as asserting something as true, the creator of fiction merely asks of its spectators that they imagine the work’s content. This could be labelled an intention-response theory of the difference between fiction and nonfiction. While watching Supersize Me I am as a spectator very much aware of director Morgan Spurlock making an argument (...) about the state of affairs in the real world, and I assess the truth-value of this argument. While watching Avatar I imagine that there is a population of humanoids, the Na’vi, on the planet Pandora, fighting for survival: I assess what is fictional (true in the fiction). -/- However, when it comes to truth claims the difference between the many varieties of fiction and nonfiction is not as straightforward as this. For example, one may argue that the spectator can and commonly does perceive even a prototypical fiction film such as Avatar as laying claims to truth in the sense that she may read the film allegorically, and search for the filmmaker’s agenda. Is not Avatar a critique of Western imperialism, and our non-environmental lifestyle, for example? It is not fully accurate to claim that fiction film does not make truth claims – there are several ways in which fiction films are taken as asserting something that the spectator is asked to believe. -/- Among the many difficult issues this counterargument raises, I will concentrate on only one here, namely on the case of social realism in fiction. Social realism arguably asserts that something is true in our actual world and asks its spectators to believe this – although works of social realism are also classified as fiction. The solution is not to dismiss the basic theory, but to make finer distinctions. I argue that one difference between prototypical nonfiction and social realist fiction is that nonfiction asserts that its contents (characters and events) are true as tokens, e.g., this person experienced this. As fiction, a work of social realism calls for imagining. However, such a work also asserts that its contents are true as types, e.g., these types of persons experience these types of events. -/- I argue that this can explain what the difference is between the truth claims made in the nonfictional The Corner and The Wire as social realist fiction, respectively. Creator David Simon emphasizes that The Wire’s portrayal of Baltimore city life is true, and is to be taken as making assertions about American inner city decay. The background for the show is found in Simons and co-author Ed Burns’s nonfiction book The Corner, written after extensive ethnographic observation of a group of drug dealers in Baltimore. Their intention to assert something as true is reflected in the academic reception of the series, in which it is celebrated for its authenticity and realism. Studying the style, narration and content of The Wire carefully further illustrates how these truth-telling intentions are communicated to the spectator. Its documentary-like style mimics observational nonfiction film, and its cyclical narrative structure, focused on an ensemble cast of characters typically marginalized in mainstream popular culture by virtue of status and ethnicity, is typical of works of social realism. The spectator picks up on these clues and expects a certain accuracy and authenticity in the type representations in The Wire, although she is aware that the depictions of these token characters and these token events are not true, but only to be imagined. -/- In conclusion, the theory presented in this paper may not be able to neatly categorize any given film as either fiction or nonfiction, as some nonfiction films make type claims and some fictions make token claims. I do not claim that the difference between type and token claims is sufficient for categorizing any given work as either fiction or nonfiction. More work is needed in order to categorize and describe the various types of fiction and nonfiction, paying special attention to the particular blend of imagining and belief prescribed by each, as evident in what the creators say about their intentions, textual features of the work itself, and critical reception. However, difficult borderline cases such as social realism in fiction do not collapse the distinction between fiction and nonfiction, as demarcated by the intention-response theory. Rather, such difficult cases should compel us to investigate more closely the communicative intentions and conventions at work. In the case of social realism, it is still correct to say that the spectator merely imagines that these fictional characters experience various events; however, she also perceives a double invitation to believe that these events and experiences are typical, and as such representative, of a larger group about which the work intends to assert something as true. (shrink)

Where does the cognitive system begin and end? Intracranialists maintain that the cognitive system is entirely identifiable with the biological central nervous system. Transcranialists, on the other hand, suggest that the cognitive system can extend beyond the biological CNS. In the second division of Supersizing the Mind, Clark defends the transcranial account against various objections. Of interest for this paper is Clark’s response to what he calls “asymmetry arguments.”Asymmetry arguments can be summarized as follows: subtract the props and aids, (...) and the organism may create replacements. But subtract the organism, and all cognitive activity ceases. Although I am sympathetic to Clark’s overall project, I find his response to the asymmetry arguments inadequate in light of his responses to other objections. For this reason, I maintain that Clark’s response requires revision. By adopting a process metaphysics and appealing to mereological dependencies, I believe that Clark can provide a substantive response to asymmetry arguments that is consistent with his overall theory. This paper unfolds as follows: after summarizing Clark’s response to the asymmetry objection in, I will argue that his response is unsuccessful in. My argument hinges on the claim that Clark does not take into account the full intent of Rupert’s asymmetry argument. In I modify Clark’s response by appealing to mereology and the asymmetrical dependencies found therein. I conclude in that this modification provides Clark with an adequate response to the asymmetry argument and is consistent with his overall transcranialist account. The further question of whether this account assists Clark in responding to other intracranialist objections is beyond the scope of this paper. (shrink)

Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from supports in (...) that the former have been “recruited,” i.e. they are either artifacts, or, products of evolution. I argue against this proposal. There are counter examples to the claim that “Teleological” EC is either necessary or sufficient for cognition. Teleological EC conflates different types of scientific projects, and inherits content externalism’s alienation from historically impartial cognitive science. (shrink)

This chapter presents some concluding thoughts. It argues that work on embodiment, action, and cognitive extension likewise invites us to view mind and cognition in a new and illuminating manner. The human mind emerges at the productive interface of brain, body, and social and material world. Unravelling the workings of these embodied, embedded, and sometimes extended minds requires an unusual mix of neuroscience, computational, dynamical, and information-theoretic understandings, ‘brute’ physiology, ecological sensitivity, and attention to the stacked designer cocoons in which (...) we grow, work, think, and act. (shrink)

Embodiment appears to matter for mind and cognition in three ways: spreading the load, self-structuring information, and supporting extended cognition. The three threads are joined by the supporting hypothesis of cognitive impartiality: Our problem-solving performances take shape according to some cost function or functions that, in the typical course of events, accord no special status or privilege to specific types of operation (motoric, perceptual, introspective) or modes of encoding (in the head or in the world). This chapter argues that these (...) appeals to embodiment, action, and cognitive extension are best understood as fully continuous with computational, representational, and information-theoretic approaches to understanding mind and cognition. In so doing, it attempts to display at least something of the likely shape of a mature science of the embodied mind. (shrink)

The EXTENDED model suggests that physical mechanisms of mind are simply not all in the head. This chapter examines a range of worries whose starting points concern real or apparent differences between what the brain accomplishes and what the other elements' problem-solving matrices provide.

Language can be viewed as a form of mind-transforming cognitive scaffolding: a persisting, though never stationary, symbolic edifice whose critical role in promoting thought and reason remains surprisingly ill-understood. This chapter examines three distinct but interlocking benefits of the linguistic scaffold. First, the simple act of labeling the world opens up a variety of new computational opportunities and supports the discovery of increasingly abstract patterns in nature. Second, encountering or recalling structured sentences supports the development of otherwise unattainable kinds of (...) expertise. Third, linguistic structures contribute to some of the most important yet conceptually complex of all human capacities: our ability to reflect on our own thoughts and characters and our limited but genuine capacity to control and guide the shape and contents of our own thinking. (shrink)

‘Strongly sensorimotor’ models of perception state that perceptual experience gains its content and character courtesy of an agent's implicit knowledge of the ways sensory stimulation will vary as a result of movement. Perceptual experience, on such accounts, is said to be enacted. This chapter argues that despite the important role of embodied action both in information pickup and in initially tuning the circuitry that supports perceptual awareness, strong sensorimotor models end up tying the contents and character of human experience too (...) closely to the fine details of human embodiment. In so doing, they fail to accommodate the substantial firewalls, disintegrations, and special-purpose streamings that form the massed strata of human cognition. (shrink)

This chapter examines the role of the biological brain. It considers a number of worries about recent appeals to embodiment, embedding, and cognitive extension—all of which take as their points of departure the incontrovertible fact that we are very smart indeed and the (only slightly more controvertible) fact that the brain is where the major smarts start. It addresses the question of whether work that stresses embodiment, embedding, distributed functional decompositions, and the well-groomed cognitive niche systematically distort the role of (...) the biological brain. It is argued that attention to embodied, embedded, and extended cognition provides the essential lens through which to appreciate the startling power and elegance of the neural machinery, observed at home in its proper ecological setting. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on some of the most fundamental ways in which appeals to the body, to the environment, and to embodied action may inform our vision and understanding of mind. The benefits enabled by the coevolution of morphology, materials, and control are considered. Related strategies of ‘ecological assembly’ in which embodied agents exploit the opportunities provided by dynamic loops, active sensing, and iterated bouts of environmental exploitation and intervention are discussed.

The EXTENDED model claims that human cognitive processing may at times loop into the environment surrounding the organism. In contrast, a more conservative view is that certain cognitive processes lean heavily on environmental structures and scaffoldings but do not thereby include those structures and scaffoldings themselves. This chapter argues that the conservative view threatens to obscure much that is of value and that a robust notion of cognitive extension thus earns its keep as part of the emerging picture of the (...) active embodied mind. To make this case, the chapter begins by sketching some general responses to the worries that motivate the more conservative view. It then presents some new examples and arguments that aim to flesh out the skeleton responses and to illuminate further the nature and importance of cognitive extension itself. (shrink)

This chapter argues that human minds and bodies are essentially open to episodes of deep and transformative restructuring in which new equipment (both physical and ‘mental’) can become quite literally incorporated into the thinking and acting systems that we identify as our minds and bodies. This theme is pursued with special attention to the negotiability of our own embodiment. Three grades of embodiment are discussed: mere embodiment, basic embodiment, and profound embodiment.

This chapter begins with a discussion of niche construction, which is defined as the activities, choices, and metabolic processes of organisms, through which they define, choose, modify, and partly create their own niches. The discussion then turns to human cognitive niche construction. Debates concerning ‘the extended mind’ and the BRAINBOUND vs EXTENDED models of the mind are considered.