Creating conditions that facilitate sociality and friendship is an important way to address loneliness. But it is not sufficient in itself, as shown by philosopher Anca Gheaus in a recent article. After highlighting the need for alternative ways to address chronic loneliness, Gheaus offers a promising approach: “[c]reating favourable conditions for the appreciation of solitude [:::]” (Gheaus, 2022, p. 242). In this article, I first expand Gheaus’ account by articulating different dimensions of solitude experiences. Second, I show how (...) cultivation of philosophic contemplation could enhance one’s ability to appreciate solitude. (shrink)

Although it might seem to elicit only a marginal interest for philosophical inquiry, in 20th century continental philosophy the experience of solitude and loneliness were shown to have unexpected importance and gravity. For philosophers such as M. Heidegger, H. Arendt, H.-G. Gadamer or P. Sloterdijk, solitude and loneliness are to be seen, on the one hand, as an ontological determination of our Being and, on the other, as a cause for some of the most worrisome problems of our (...) times such, as the birth of totalitarianism or the phenomenon of self-alienation wide-spread in the Western bureaucratic societies. But none of the philosophers dealing with these matters offers us a clear positive understanding of what solitude and loneliness actually are nor what the task of philosophy should be with regard to these experiences even though they give us to understand that philosophy has one. The present paper tarries upon this question, approaching it from the other end though an investigation of the status of alterity in Heidegger and Gadamer’s philosophy. (shrink)

Recent research has defended the surprising thesis that in many cases the search for truth is better off if the information exchanged between the members of an epistemic community is limited. This is what one may call the limited information thesis. There is, however, the possibility of an even more radical position than this: the thesis that any communication between peers has zero epistemic value and that the search for truth is better off if the truth-inquirer does not take into (...) consideration the truth-claims of her peers. This can be called the solitude thesis. The paper defends the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis with respect to metaphysical inquiry. The defense is facilitated by means of interpreting textual evidence found in Descartes’ essays Discourse on the Method, The Search for Truth and the Meditations on First Philosophy. (shrink)

“This is what democracy looks like.” An internet search of that phrase returns thousands of images of people assembled in public to convey a common political sentiment. This makes good sense. Without active citizens, democracy devolves into rule by elites or worse. Public collective action is essential to democracy. Although the images are inspiring, they also present a problem. In addition to being politically active, democratic citizens must be reflective. Their political advocacy must be informed by the perspectives of their (...) fellow citizens. The trouble is that indispensable modes of democratic participation can corrode citizens’ reflective capacities. The culprit is a dynamic called belief polarization. As we interact with our allies, we are exposed to forces that render us more radical in our beliefs and increasingly hostile to those who do not share them. What’s more, we are surrounded by triggers of political extremity and animosity. Thus, our ordinary activities encourage the attitude that democracy is possible only when everyone agrees. That’s a profoundly antidemocratic stance. Drawing on extensive research about polarization and partisanship, Robert Talisse argues that certain core democratic capacities can be cultivated only at a distance from the political fray. If we are to meet the responsibilities of democratic citizenship, we must occasionally step away from our allies and opponents alike. This can be achieved only in secluded settings where we can engage in civic reflection that is not prepackaged in the idiom of our political divides. (shrink)

The article attempts to substantiate the terminological and conceptual distinction between the phenomena of solitude and loneliness. Despite their fundamental differences, they are frequently conflated in both common language and academic discourse. Solitude is conceptualized as a positive and intentional state – an active choice made by an individual to step away from the distractions of the external world and engage in introspection, contemplation, and self-growth. In contrast, loneliness is presented as a negative emotional condition, which arises when (...) an individual feels disconnected, unfulfilled, or alienated, and often reflects a deeper inability or unwillingness to embrace solitude. Loneliness is the emotional discomfort that occurs when the human need for social interaction remains unmet, which may also stem from an internal conflict between the desire for connection and the incapacity to tolerate the solitude necessary to foster personal reflection and growth. Previous research has sought to differentiate between solitude as a source of creative inspiration, spiritual enlightenment, or emotional refuge, and solitude as a condition of social withdrawal or alienation. However, it has become increasingly apparent that loneliness often lurks beneath the surface of these various types of solitude, complicating the issue further and undermining the clarity of its terminology. This overlap between solitude and loneliness has introduced a degree of ambiguity, making it more difficult to establish clear boundaries between the two concepts. Given these challenges, the article advocates for a more unified and holistic conceptualization of solitude, positioning it as an essential and natural component of human existence. Rather than being viewed as a negative or avoidable experience, solitude should be understood as a necessary state that accompanies individuals on their path of personal development, self-realization, and intellectual exploration. (shrink)

This chapter explores a so-far neglected way of avoiding the bads of loneliness: by learning to value solitude, where that is understood as a state of ‘keeping oneself company’, as J. David Velleman puts it. Unlike loneliness, solitude need not involve any deprivation, whether subjective or objective. This chapter considers the various goods to which solitude is constitutive or instrumental, with a focus on the promise that proper valuing of solitude holds for combating loneliness. The overall (...) argument is this: If loneliness significantly detracts from individual wellbeing, and if the ability to value solitude protects against loneliness, then such an ability is obviously valuable to human flourishing. If, further, loneliness raises concerns of justice, then supporting people’s ability to value solitude is a way to implement a desideratum of justice. Individuals can cultivate their ability to value solitude, an ability that others can promote or hinder. (shrink)

Luis Villoro, with Max Scheler’s phenomenology of sympathy as a point of departure, proposes that communion, not solitude, is the natural state of being. Solitary consciousness, he argues, is unsatisfied in its solitude and seeks, constantly and perpetually, Absolute Transcendence, which Villoro finds in the form of the human other, which he calls the “you.” Having established an early distinction between the “you” and the non-human “other,” between “tú” and “él” (the latter of which refers to the mute (...) things that constitute our circumstance or circum-stare), Villoro suggests that it is the “tú” which calls on one’s solitary Ego and demands recognition; but it is also this “tú,” or “you,” which, once approached, speaks to one, engaging in a dialogue that is the ultimate basis of community. Readers will find in Villoro’s treatment echoes of both Scheler and Martin Buber, especially with the latter’s distinction between the “I” and the “thou.”. (shrink)

Based on Levinas’ insight, I explore the paradox of materiality that enables the beginning of freedom for the existent but at the same time ensnares individuals in the contingency and temporality of materiality. In the digital era, humans, seemingly liberated from their accidental and temporal bodies through virtual reality or the attempt to become cyborgs, continue to grapple with profound solitude. In their attempts to avoid the inevitable return of solitude, individuals tend to adopt various avatars in virtual (...) realms, inadvertently finding themselves even more solitary. This pursuit leads to a sense of nihilism, ultimately resulting in a loss of meaning. Drawing on Levinas’s understanding of solitude and openness to the unknown, Nietzsche’s concept of active nihilism, and Haraway’s cyborg fictional imagination, I argue that education should not only guide individuals back to their own bodies with attentiveness but also help them embrace their inescapable solitude by cultivating negative capability. (shrink)

What makes solitude a positive experience? What distinguishes experiences of solitude from experiences of loneliness? We review some of the literature on the benefits of solitude, focusing on freedom, creativity, and spirituality. Then, we argue that the relationship between agent and environment is an important factor in determining the quality of experiences of solitude. In particular, we find that solitude may support a person’s sense of agency, expanding the possibilities for action that a person has, (...) and creating the conditions for authenticity. We describe a phenomenology of solitude, based on a study that explores the nature of experiences of loneliness and solitude in a religious community. One finding is that solitude is characterised by presence, whereas loneliness is characterised by absence. Another finding is that solitude can contribute to a sense of empowerment that enables agents to pursue and achieve the goals they find valuable. (shrink)

This essay proposes a phenomenological progression from solitude to empathy, mapped through the works of Henry David Thoreau, Clarice Lispector, Iris Murdoch, and Edith Stein. Utilizing Freya Mathews’ concept of conatus and relational cosmophysicism as an ontological ground, the author argues that presence is not a static achievement but a shifting configuration of conative unfolding. The trajectory moves from the "undisturbed" presence of Thoreau to the temporal and linguistic fractures in Lispector’s Água Viva, through the corrective discipline of Murdochian (...) attention, and finally to the irreducible limit of the Other in Stein’s theory of empathy. By examining the inherent failure of language to capture the "living present" or the "irreducible other," the essay concludes that the movement from solitude to empathy is not a resolution of the self, but a deepening of the relational complexity and an acceptance of the constitutive limits of human understanding and naming. (shrink)

Historically, philosophers, artists, and spiritual leaders have extolled the benefits of solitude; currently, advice on how to achieve solitude is the subject of many popular books and articles. Seldom, however, has solitude been studied by psychologists, who have focused instead on the negative experiences associated with being alone, particularly loneliness. Solitude, in contrast to loneliness, is often a positive state—one that may be sought rather than avoided. In this article, we examine some of the benefits that (...) have been attributed to solitude—namely, freedom, creativity, intimacy, and spirituality. In subsequent sections, we consider the environmental settings and personality characteristics conducive to solitude, how time spent alone is experienced differently across the life span, and the potential dangers related to the attractiveness of solitude. We conclude with a brief discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of solitude. (shrink)

Christian solitude -- Bounded solitude in Augustine's Confessions -- The humanist tradition : Petrarch, Montaigne, and Gibbon -- Rousseau's myth of solitude in reveries of the solitary walker -- Thoreau at Walden : soliloquizing and talking to all the universe at the same time -- Twentieth-century varieties of solitary experience -- Thomas Merton and solitude : the door to solitude opens only from the inside -- Solitude, writing, and fathers in Paul Auster's The invention (...) of solitude -- Conclusion: The value of solitude. (shrink)

Five philosophical meditations on the conflict between personality and society.

Two terms, solitude and common, were chosen in order to develop some reflections on the articulation between difference and sameness in Lacan’s teaching and to tease out some political implications therefrom. In this context, an analysis of the collective experience of transmission such as is practiced and theorized in Lacan’s École de la cause enables a critical evaluation of the so-called Lacanian left.

Adrian Paul Iliescu, Solitude and the Birth of Modernity Ed. Cris, Bucuresti, 1999, 120 p.

The following reflections are intended as a preliminary to a more extended and in-depth series of case studies, focused analyses of actual artworks, and the issues arising from their particularity within what will be described here as a Heideggerian post-aesthetic aesthetics. The essay is not written from the perspective of a professional or academic philosopher or of a practising artist (even though I am one), neither fields of which have sufficiently engaged with the existential and aesthetic predicament sketched out below. (...) Thus, the attraction of both Heidegger and Blanchot is not just related to their well-known discussions of inbetween-ness, but, more essentially, to the peculiarly in-between location of their own thought and trajectory of thinking: Heidegger from "out of" philosophy "drawn" towards art; Blanchot from within the space ofliterature towards the exteriority of ontological thinking. The intention is to identify similarities and differences in their thought, but this is only perceived as relevant to the extent that it allows an initial reassessment of a de-subjectivized existential and aesthetic mode of thinking that has been largely abandoned by academic philosophy and art practice alike (albeit for very different reasons). If nothing else, the hope is that a different voice might be heard in the clamorous exchange between philosopher and artists, one that is sensitive to the complex predicament of the artist in a post-Heidegerrian world, and which above all remains faithful to the project of the artist and the artwork in the face of the philosophical valorization of "Art". Las siguientes reflexiones se presentan como preliminares a una serie de estudios de caso mas extensos y profundos, analisis focalizados de obras de artes reales, y los temas que surgen de sus particularidades dentro de lo que se describira aqui como una estetica heideggeriana post-estetica. El ensayo no esta escrito desde la perspectiva de un filosofo profesional o academico ni de un artista operante (aunque yo lo soy), ninguno de cuyos campos se ha comprometido suficientemente con el dilema bosquejado mas adelante. Asi pues, la atraccion de Heidegger y Blanchot no solo tiene que ver con sus bien conocidas discusiones sobre la inbetween-ness, sino, mas esencialmente, con la ubicacion particularmente in-between de su propio pensamiento y trayectoria del pensar: Heidegger desde "fuera de" la filosofia "sacado" hacia el arte; Blanchot desde dentro del espacio de la literatura hacia la exterioridad del pensar ontologico. La intencion es identificar similitudes y diferencias en su pensamiento, pero esto solo es percibido como relevante en la medida en que permite una reevaluacion de un modo de pensar existencial y estetico des-subjetivado, que ha sido ampliamente abando-nado por la filosofia academica y la practica del arte (aunque por razones distintas). Sin mas pretensiones, la esperanza es que se pueda escuchar una voz diferente en el intercambio clamoroso entre el filosofo y los artistas; voz que es sensible al complejo dilema del artista en un mundo post-heideggeriano, y que sobre todo permanece fiel al proyecto del artista y a la obra de arte frente a la valorizacion filosofica del "Arte". (shrink)

This fictionalized script traces the contours of the conversation that seeks to fathom the crisis unleashed by the outbreak and global spread of the coronavirus and the ensuing anxieties created in our current social living. The scenario of deepened isolation of the self from the other is considered, and it is proposed that isolation, while an unavoidable requirement, does not mean it is some mental lassitude but rather may be seen as an enthusiastic concern toward recovering physical and mental wellbeing (...) of the larger communities concerned to control the possible avenues of transmission of the contagion. The conversation meanders around the issue of quarantine, its attraction or otherwise, and who benefits from this restriction, its effects on one’s mental constitution, etc. Philosophers have been known to isolate themselves in other contexts and situations give us a taste of what is to come in the dialogue to resist the calamity of the coronavirus and its grim effects that engulf the entire humanity. (shrink)

Para Antonio Machado, la soledad del solipsismo moderno es la verdadera enfermedad de la cultura occidental. Solo hay ser humano por todas partes. La humanidad está sola, sin nada fuera de ella misma. Cree bastarse a sí misma. La salvación del ser humano reside en su conciencia de finitud. Solo el reconocimiento de su insuficiencia puede liberarle del solipsismo. Solo una soledad con conciencia de alteridad puede llevar al ser humano a buscar a Dios como único complementario que puede quitarle (...) la soledad. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous relions la solitude à la souffrance chez Kierkegaard. Nous montrons que la pensée existentielle est un travail de distance, précisément un jeu de dissimulation dont la signification réside dans la capacité à sauvegarder le silence. Le secret de intériorité est intraduisible dans l’extériorité du langage, ce qui isole et fait souffrir, mais ouvre le passage vers le religieux. Dieu seul peut voir les efforts de l’existant dissimulant dialectiquement sa souffrance dans la différence entre l’infini et (...) le fini. Pour illustrer cette thèse, nous approfondissons les cas où Kierkegaard présente la souffrance en recourant à des figures d’exception — des marqueurs de solitude — comme Abraham, Job et le quidam. Nous relisons l’« Histoire de la souffrance » des Stades et le Post-scriptum pour mieux saisir les liens entre la souffrance et la solitude — une idée qui se trouve justifiée dans le Point de vue explicatif — de celui qui se veut, finalement, seul devant Dieu. (shrink)

L’article offre une discussion de l’affirmation qui ouvrait en 1977 les Fragments d’un discours amoureux de Roland Barthes, selon laquelle le discours amoureux se trouvait dans une condition d’extrême solitude. Afin de comprendre cette affirmation, on commence par un aperçu des caractéristiques du discours amoureux, pour montrer en quelle mesure son incohérence et sa fragmentation lui sont constitutives. Ensuite, on analyse le projet barthésien de restituer une dignité à ce discours et à l’expérience qu’il véhicule — de le soustraire (...) à sa solitude. Pour conclure, on montre pourquoi certaines attaques moralisatrices contemporaines contre l’instabilité de l’expérience amoureuse actuelle, au lieu d’offrir un espace d’écoute au discours amoureux, finissent souvent par le réduire encore au silence. (shrink)

In this article, I consider two interpretations of Spinoza's account of the good life in recent literature, which I call the social activist model and the solitary intellectualist model, in order to shed light on his underexamined views on solitude within this context. The former model has gained more support than the latter due to Spinoza's criticism of the solitary life and the importance he ascribes to friendship and living cooperatively with others within his corpus. While I recognize its (...) strengths, I am skeptical as to whether the social activist model appreciates the complexity of Spinoza's account of the good life in the Ethics. For even though Spinoza clearly values friendship, he has a largely pessimistic view of those he calls ordinary people, which bears on the possibility of friendship between the philosopher and ordinary people. Furthermore, intuitive knowledge is unlike reason in that it concerns an asocial and intellectual insight beyond an identification with humanity and imaginative dimensions of ordinary life. It is, thus, conducive to what psychologists James Averill and Louise Sundararajan have called authentic solitude to the extent that it brings about a metaphysical awareness of our ontological status as finite modes of God. Although neither of the aforementioned models offers an entirely accurate representation of Spinoza's understanding of freedom in the Ethics, considering them enables us simultaneously to appreciate the complexity of Spinoza's thought and recognize a problematic tension within it. This tension is due to the gap between, on the one hand, his pessimistic view of ordinary people and his intellectualist portrayal of the philosopher who becomes disconnected from ordinary people as she increases her knowledge of the eternal, and his insistence on the shareability of knowledge and the importance he ascribes to the task of bringing ordinary people to enlightenment, on the other. (shrink)

Pétrarque a goûté la solitude et l’a prônée. L’a-t-il pour autant pensée comme telle et pour elle-même? Il sera permis d’en douter car elle n’est point la fin qu’il se fixe, condition qu’elle est pour lui de la vie solitaire, elle-même condition de la vie heureuse. Nous travaillerons alors à montrer de quelle solitude il est question quand la question de la vie solitaire est abordée par l’auteur, cela puisqu’il en est assurément de multiples. L’exercice littéraire d’une apologie (...) de la vie solitaire devant céder le pas à une analyse philosophique de la solitude, restera à savoir comment la définir : absence à soi-même ou excès de soi en soi? (shrink)

In the present article, we will examine the concept of creation as gift in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The aim is to demonstrate that solitude is the creative act, and that creation, being a solitary endeavor, results in a gift that, when offered, forges a special kind of bond which the philosopher classifies as great love, the ultimate expression of which is the idea of friendship as Mitfreude. We will therefore show how the offering of a gift implies a (...) connection with the self-affirmative task of “fidelity to the earth” and to oneself, reversing the ancient premises of the morality of compassion to express joy as the festive criterion that em bodies the task imposed by the present: the overcoming of man and the attainment of the Übermensch. (shrink)

Certain strands of modern literature and philosophy have laid pronounced emphasis upon the impossibility of sharing the experience of dying: in the face of death, all social bonds dissolve and the human being finds himself in the deepest and most inescapable of solitudes. Greek myth, however, depicts stories in which death is physically shared by two individuals, or magically transferred from one individual to another: such stories provide a fascinating starting point for comparing ancient and modern views on the same (...) problem, or, rather, for exploring ancient perspectives on a modern problem. This article takes as its premise the idea that ‘death’ as an abstract notion is a human construct, and argues that feelings and questions associated with death, such as that of its inexorable power to isolate the dying person psychologically from the rest of mankind, are not intrinsic to the phenomenon, but instead determined by culture. (shrink)

In so far as the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tzu are life-philosophies, they are philosophies of solitude. My aim in the following pages is to explain and defend this claim, clarifying the distinctive kind of solitude that is taught by Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu.

Pas d'expérience plus immédiate ni plus évidente que celle d'être un moi, mais rien de plus énigmatique que sa réalité. Jamais son intensité et son inconsistance ne sont aussi manifestes que dans la solitude. C'est elle que ne cessent de décrire les journaux intimes de Maine de Biran, d'Amiel, de Kafka et de Pessoa. Il suffisait à l'analyse de prendre appui sur leur témoignage pour élucider les divers statuts du moi et caractériser la crise de son identité. Quel hiatus (...) entre ce que chacun sent de soi et ce qu'en imaginent les autres! Son obstination à explorer ce hiatus fait aussi de Simenon le romancier des solitudes. Nulle part aussi pathétiquement qu'en son œuvre ne s'opposent la clandestinité de l'ego et les jeux de la représentation. (shrink)

From the twentieth century into the twenty-first, psychoanalysis and deconstruction have challenged, and continue to challenge, our conceptions of subjectivity and selfhood. This book argues that taking forward this heritage we must retrace the subject and the self as undergoing perpetual auto-deconstruction, through the lens of solitude.

The essay examines solitude not as fate, sacrifice or passion, but as an experience that is actively initiated, that is perceived ambivalently, sometimes painfully, but also sensually, and that functions as context as well as occasion for the practice of cultural techniques – talking (to oneself), reading, writing, drawing or painting. Solitude techniques are analysed as “technologies of the self” (Michel Foucault) and “techniques of the body” (Marcel Mauss), as strategies for self-perception and “internal policy” (Paul Valéry). The (...) history of these self-techniques as solitude techniques is unfolded using examples from Stoic philosophy and early Christian theology. An emphasis is placed on self-doubling or splitting techniques: those who are alone with themselves also see themselves as more or less resilient objects that can be strengthened against the influences of other voices and people. Among the techniques of solitude is, above all, the quest for suitable places that are often – desert, sea, mountain peak, etc. – characterised not only by being devoid of humans, but also by a kind of uniformity. In this way, they resemble writing or drawing surfaces on which meanings can be brought to light through sketches or graphic characters. (shrink)

A philosophical anthropology of solitude is presented through the art, literature and music of and around Modernism, Postmodernism. It is presented as an insight into both Modernism and Postmodernism. These movements portrayed and contributed to the lonely alienated worlds of the early-to-mid twentieth century. Culture and society together developed forms of loneliness that were centred on individualist, alienated, guilt and shame, to which a response may be appropriately silent or humorous, living or dead, and sometimes a lewd masochism. Even (...) those who rejected Modernism and Postmodernism help describe – either positively or apophatically – the distinctive forms of lonely solitude in those movements. (shrink)

As interest in aesthetic experience evolved in the eighteenth century, discussions of the sublime located two opposed accounts of its place and use. Ferguson traces these two positions - the Burkean empiricist account and the Kantian formalist one - to argue that they had significance of aesthetics, including recent deconstructive and New Historicist criticism.

Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s opponents. (...) We outline one such non-Dualist view, suggest how to resolve the dispute, respond to some objections, and argue that ours is but one of many views that survive Unger’s challenge. All these views are incompatible with microphysicalism. So Unger’s discussion does contain an insight: if you are the only conscious subject in your chair, then microphsyicalism is false. Unger’s mistake was to infer Substance Dualism from this; for microphysicalism is not the only alternative to Dualism. (shrink)

The attempts at dialogue, in the 1950s and 1960s, between the journalist Sergio Zavoli and the cloistered nun Maria Teresa offer us the opportunity to dwell on the connections between experiences such as solitude, dialogue, silence, listening. Phenomena on which philosophers such as Aristotle and Hume shed light. In Hume, the Aristotelian philía, based on utility and/or pleasure and/or virtue, is accompanied and almost replaced by that linked to joy and the need to share. And involuntary solitude becomes (...) a painful condition and a torment of the body and soul, a real misfortune. What happens, however, when solitude is voluntary, for example aimed at listening to God? In reality, as the life of Sister Maria Teresa shows, there can be an intimate and fruitful tension between silent conversation with God and interhuman dialogue. She seeks and loves men in God for a long time, then slowly learns to seek and love God in men. Here, among other things, André Neher's intuition is confirmed, according to which dialogue is nourished by both silences and words, sometimes accompanied by a meta-silence dimension, which transcends both. At a certain point, Sister Maria Teresa feels a sort of vertigo: the silence of the cloister is too silent, that isolation risks translating into arid solitude, that silence, more silent than any noise and any silence, becomes an abyss, a chasm, a limit. (shrink)

Loneliness, social isolation, aloneness, and solitude are frequently used interchangeably but are actually different. Loneliness is particularly salient now, due to the international restrictions on social activities imposed as a result of COVID-19, which brought loneliness into open discussion worldwide. The article highlights loneliness as a multidimensional construct and reviews its impact on cognitive, behavioral and affective functioning. In doing so, particular attention is given to loneliness as it manifests through the various life stages, as well as how personal (...) predisposition and contextual factors may exacerbate it. in this article we also review solitude, and a clear distinction between loneliness and solitude is established. Finally, we conclude by addressing the global claims of loneliness during the pandemic and its implications. We offer a point of view which may assist in coping with it. (shrink)

In this paper I address the problem of the pejorativisation of solitude in philosophical discourse. By the pejorativisation of solitude I mean giving it a negative meaning. I show that the tendency to the pejorativisation of solitude in philosophy was initiated by Aristotle. He saw solitude as contrary to human nature. This nature is supposed to determine people to form organised communities with others. Only through them the individual is able to survive and thrive. In (...) class='Hi'>solitude, one quickly learns how inautarkic is and suffers because of it. Thomas Hobbes was one of the first philosophers to challenge Aristotle’s approach. He argued that man strives for community with others not as a result of a supposedly social nature, but because as a child one is dependent and helpless, and as an adult one expects benefits or honours from others. My thesis is that the pejorativisation of solitude is responsible for its negative stereotyping, the formation of prejudices against it and the learned helplessness syndrome, which makes us vulnerable to solitude. (shrink)

I try to understand the ordeal of solitude by beginning with Marc Augé’s usage on transitional sites as a provocation, which leads us to rethink solitude as a condition of subjectivity and its various inflections, most conventionally as loneliness and, in sociology, as fragmentation, anonymity, alienation, privatization and the various opinions that link it to the deprivation of separation that longs for connection, or, more fundamentally in Simmel, as the ontological view of the tragedy of human limitation. Instead (...) of restricting us to sites, Augé’s provocation suggests that if solitude is one of a family of such usages related to the experience of being alone or apart in such a space, we might then examine ways in which it is oriented to as a condition that can vary according to extremes, say, in the way Arendt and others have contrasted the pain of loneliness with the creativity of solitude. In linking solitude to transitional sites, Augé suggests that there is something about the experience of the in-between, whether of time or space, that illuminates solitude and that makes any relationship to it a potential ordeal. I test the notion by asking how the ordeal pertains to language itself and the intermediacy of a human subject in linguistic space. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show the relevance of loneliness in Nietzsche’s life, making the precision of distinguishing between the words solitude (Vereinsamung), loneliness (Einsamkeit) and isolation (Isolation). A series of works, letters and unpublished manuscripts by the German philosopher will be analyzed, with the purpose of emphasizing the need for a differentiation during the translation of the author into Spanish, incorporating corrections to the already known editions, also reinforcing this argument with a selection of comments from (...) specialists who emphasize the relevance that loneliness was a crucial element for Nietzsche in his works. (shrink)

Spinoza is widely understood to criticize the role that fear plays in political life. Yet, in the Political Treatise, he maintains that everyone desires civil order due to a basic and universal fear of solitude. This chapter argues that Spinoza represents the fear of solitude as both a civilizing passion and as an affect that needs to be amplified and encouraged. The turbulence of social and political life makes solitude attractive, but isolation undermines the conditions of human (...) power. Although it may seem uncontroversial to understand isolation as something to avoid in political life, this chapter argues that Spinoza deflates the appeal of la vita solitaria even for philosophers and those seeking ethical perfection. (shrink)

Criminal sentencing has grown into an increasingly interactive process featuring a multiplicity of potential actors—prosecution, defence, the individual convicted of the crime, probation officers and case workers, victims or their families, the police, community representatives, community workers, and even academics. The philosophical foundations of sentencing scholarship, however, regularly assume a model of judicial solitude in which sentencing judges are separate and apart from other actors. This article suggests the need to take sentencing’s interactivity and its politics seriously and draws (...) on democratic theory to address this gap. Accordingly, it argues that listening—as conceived of by deliberative democrats—is essential to a relational ethic that ensures both the legitimacy and quality of sentencing decisions, particularly in cases involving marginalized communities. In doing so, it turns to judicial practice and highlights both the need and possibilities for listening to be taken up as an explicit feature of judicial ethics. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

“How can I, who am thinking about the entire, centerless universe, be anything so specific as this: this measly creature existing in a tiny morsel of space and time?” This metaphysically self-deprecating question, posed by Thomas Nagel, holds an insight into the nature of personhood and the ordinary ways we value it, in others and in ourselves. I articulate that insight and apply it to the phenomena of friendship, companionship, sexuality, solitude, and love. Although love comes in many forms, (...) I say, it always involves a sense of wonder at a finite creature thinking infinite thoughts. (shrink)

Loneliness and solitude have similar attributes to individuals, but there is a critical variance between the two regarding the impact on the individual. Loneliness is an unpleasant feeling in a broad sense, while according to some philosophers, solitude is regarded as a joyful necessity when one establishes a deep relationship with the outside world. This article aims to develop a sensible account of the difference between solitude and loneliness by looking at some insightful philosophical viewpoints. Importantly, this (...) article aims to explain the dimensions in which solitude is a positive phenomenon. I will analyze the role of solitude in eliminating loneliness from two aspects: self-consciousness and self-knowledge construction. (shrink)

The brief study that follows is an attempt to understand the experience of loneliness as it gives its first signs in Friedrich Nietzsche’s 3rd Extemporaneous Consideration, trying to delineate it, not as a simple concept, but in close connection with another nietzschean conceptual figure, the free spirit, as regards his becoming himself. As a critical category, the free spirit (though not formally appearing in this Nietzsche writing as it will be in Human, too Human) is confronted all the time with (...) the powerful injunctions of culture, which insist on swallowing it in a way of a uniforming, leveling and paralyzing gregarious life, removing all possibility of any loneliness and, consequently, the freedom to create oneself that the idea of becoming, of becoming implies. (shrink)

Dans les pays occidentaux, de nombreux nouveaux parents se sentent seuls et parfois impuissants avec leur nouveau-né. Ce sentiment peut être lié à un défaut d’étayage familial dans l’immédiat post-partum. Cet article présente, à partir d’une recherche universitaire plus large, un cas clinique approfondi dans lequel la distance familiale et géographique a été un facteur de vulnérabilité majeur. Ce cas montre les incidences multiples et intriquées d’un défaut d’étayage familial sur les processus intrapsychiques et intersubjectifs : dépression du post-partum chez (...) la mère qui persiste dans le temps, relations conjugales et parentales qui se dégradent progressivement, et sur les interactions précoces difficiles. Révéler l’existence de ce risque améliorera la compréhension des besoins des parents et des bébés après la naissance et permettrait d’envisager une adaptation plus fine des pratiques professionnelles et des programmes de santé publique et, à plus grande échelle, des politiques familiales. (shrink)

Si la solitude est peut-être d’abord l’expérience d’une scission fondamentale, venant rompre l’apparente indistinction primitive du moi, il y a aussi une aspiration à la solitude absolue, qui vise l’unité par-delà la dualité, qui cherche à dépasser la séparation du soi avec soi, à retrouver l’identité hégélienne du Je=Je, dont l’expression la plus haute est l’Un de la première hypothèse du Parménide de Platon. Unité du moi dans la contemplation de la nature, révélation de l’absolu en soi dans (...) la foi, voire dans l’extase mystique, dithyrambe dionysiaque dans le consentement à l’éternel retour du même, impersonnalité du Je dans la création de l’œuvre : que nous apprennent ces figures essentielles de la solitude? (shrink)

This paper explores the contextual value of solitude in learning; in so doing, it attempts to suggest an alternative method of instruction that is based on aesthetics as the reciprocal relationship between emotions and intellect, and between action and contemplation. Such an aesthetic education or method seeks to guide the student towards the attainment of her own life: to perfect, as much as possible, her human qualities in what she does by paying attention to the things of Beauty. The (...) method that the essay uses is both historical and interdisciplinary: it draws from theology, philosophy, the sciences and visual art; and, it is guided by an explanatory perspective that is constructive. (shrink)

In Machiavelli’s Prince there appears to be a link between Chap.IX on the civil principality and the hope for a unification of Italy by a new prince – a theme presented in the final Exhortation. In both sections, Machiavelli’s unusual lack of historical illustrations suggests the hypothesis that the civil principality and the new prince play a symbolic function. The reading here proposed argues that there is an ideal relation between Machiavelli’s Prince and the Discourses on Livy regarding the opportunity (...) of a regime change from popular principality to Republic. The possibility to switch from one form of government to the other is due to Machiavelli’s idealizations of the civil principality and the new prince. Accordingly, it is argued that Machiavelli’s method follows a strategy of mythologizing realism. In the civil principality the tension between the new prince and his people is not resolved, nor that between the plebs and the nobles. The paper concludes that Machiavelli emphasis on ‘the solitude’ of the prince is what ultimately justifies a transition from the civil principality to the Republic. (shrink)

Wilderness and wildness are not related isomorphically. Wildness is the broader category; all instances of wilderness express wildness while all instances of wildness do not express wilderness. There is more than a logical distinction between wildness and wilderness, and what begins as an analytic distinction ends as an ontological one. A more rhetorical representation of this confusion is captured by the notion of synecdoche, where, in this case, wilderness the narrower term is used for wildness the more expansive term. Although (...) this might seem obvious at first glance, I contend that the two concepts are often misused taken as synonyms thus equivocally, setting back the cause of conceptual clarity in environmental philosophy in general, and environmental restoration in particular. One notable outcome has been the unfortunate dichotomy between preservation and conservation resulting in policy choices that needlessly deny integrated alternatives by illicit exclusion. This paper will clarify this confusion by demonstrating instances where the two concepts have been systematically abused—conflated—and show how Henry David Thoreau saw them as importantly separable. Finally, a clearer understanding of the distinctions between the two concepts provides the basis for a viable program of restoration based on an ethics of place. (shrink)