This chapter starts with a puzzle about how a semantic theory can both incorporate the high level of context sensitivity of ‘what is said’ (O1) and the ability speakers have to express the same claim/assertion/proposition across a wide range of contexts (O2). The problem is that these two observations seem to be at odds with one another, and any semantic theory that postulates O1 must do so in a way that respects O2. Various proposed solutions are considered including the denials (...) of O2, shared content, and absolute truth. These solutions are all shown to be unacceptable. A positive solution—Pluralistic Minimalism—is proposed. This option requires us to reject the idea that the variability of ‘what is said’ is relevant to semantics and the view that indirect reports report on semantic contents. (shrink)

Bystander information is information about others’ attitudes towards a text (i.e. about whether they agree or disagree with it). Social media platforms force bystander information upon us when we read posts thereon. What effect does this have on how we respond to what we read? The dominant view in the literature is that it changes our minds (the so-called “bandwagon effect”). Simplifying a little: if we see that most people agree (disagree) with what a post says, we are more likely (...) to agree (disagree) with what it says. This paper argues that we should take seriously a competitor view and care about the difference between it and the dominant view. The competitor view proposes that bystander information changes what a text seems to us to say: although bystander information may lead us to change what attitude we express toward a post, that’s not because we’ve changed our attitude toward any fixed content (i.e. fixed thing that the post says). This paper argues that, if this competitor view is correct, then social media is likely to be an especially hazardous place for the practice of sharing content. (shrink)

Speakers share content when they make the same assertion (claim, conjecture, proposal, etc). They also share content when they propose (entertain, discuss, etc.) the same hypothesis, theory, and thought. And again when they evaluate whether what each says (thinks, claims, suggests, etc.) is true, false, interesting, obscene, original or offensive. Content sharing, so understood, is the very foundation of communication. Relevance Theory (RT), however, implies that content sharing is impossible; or at least, we will argue as (...) much in what follows. (shrink)

Shared Content as Speaker MeaningCappelen and Lepore (2005; 2006; 2007) have recently emphasised the significance of a minimal notion of perfectly shared content for pragmatic theories. This paper argues for a similar notion, but assumes that a satisfactory defence cannot be achieved along the lines of the existing debate between Minimalism and Contextualism (e.g. Carston 2002, Recanati 2004). Rather, it is necessary to consistently distinguish two functional domains: the subjective processing domain and the interpersonal domain of (...) communication, each with its own kind of utterance meaning. I will argue that it is the mutually recognised content of the speaker's overt commitment that should be identified as ‘speaker meaning’. Diverging from the (post-) Gricean tradition, it is conventionally restricted (minimal), but genuinely pragmatic (speaker-dependent). Functional considerations show that it is, moreover, unnecessary to include further elements in ‘speaker meaning’. The distinction between two notions of utterance meaning with very different characteristics allows us to integrate the assumption of perfect sharing, which explains people's trust in communication, and the subjectivity of the hearer's inferences into a coherent and powerful model. (shrink)

Empathy is the combined ability to interpret the emotional states of others and experience resultant, related emotions. The relation between prefrontal electroencephalographic asymmetry and emotion in children is well known. The association between positive emotion (assessed via parent report), empathy (measured via observation), and second-by-second brain electrical activity (recorded during a pleasurable task) was investigated using a sample of one hundred twenty-eight 6- to 10-year-old children. Contentment related to increasing left frontopolar activation (p < .05). Empathic concern and positive empathy (...) related to increasing right frontopolar activation (ps < .05). A second form of positive empathy related to increasing left dorsolateral activation (p < .05). This suggests that positive affect and (negative and positive) empathy both relate to changes in prefrontal activity during a pleasurable task. (shrink)

According to the “paradox of knowability”, the moderate thesis that all truths are knowable – ... – implies the seemingly preposterous claim that all truths are actually known – ... –, i.e. that we are omniscient. If Fitch’s argument were successful, it would amount to a knockdown rebuttal of anti-realism by reductio. In the paper I defend the nowadays rather neglected strategy of intuitionistic revisionism. Employing only intuitionistically acceptable rules of inference, the conclusion of the argument is, firstly, not ..., (...) but .... Secondly, even if there were an intuitionistically acceptable proof of ..., i.e. an argument based on a different set of premises, the conclusion would have to be interpreted in accordance with Heyting semantics, and read in this way, the apparently preposterous conclusion would be true on conceptual grounds and acceptable even from a realist point of view. Fitch’s argument, understood as an immanent critique of verificationism, fails because in a debate dealing with the justification of deduction there can be no interpreted formal language on which realists and anti-realists could agree. Thus, the underlying problem is that a satisfactory solution to the “problem of shared content” is not available. I conclude with some remarks on the proposals by J. Salerno and N. Tennant to reconstruct certain arguments in the debate on anti-realism by establishing aporias. (shrink)

This article explores the norms that govern regular users’ acts of sharing content on social networking sites. Many debates on how to counteract misinformation on Social Networking Sites focus on the epistemic norms of testimony, implicitly assuming that the users’ acts of sharing should fall under the same norms as those for posting original content. I challenge this assumption by proposing a non-epistemic interpretation of (mis) information sharing on social networking sites which I construe as infrastructures for forms (...) of life found online. Misinformation sharing belongs more in the realm of rumour spreading and gossiping rather than in the information-giving language games. However, the norms for sharing cannot be fixed in advance, as these emerge at the interaction between the platforms’ explicit rules, local norms established by user practices, and a meta-norm of sociality. This unpredictability does not leave us with a normative void as an important user responsibility still remains, namely that of making the context of the sharing gesture explicit. If users will clarify how their gestures of sharing are meant to be interpreted by others, they will implicitly assume responsibility for possible misunderstandings based on omissions, and the harms of shared misinformation can be diminished. (shrink)

Two kinds of argument dominate anti-Simplicity literature: the Operator Argument and a cluster of related arguments based on saying, agreement, and retraction data. This chapter is devoted to disentangling and evaluating this second cluster of arguments. The chapter has two parts. Part One presents and evaluates two versions of a saying-based content diagnostic. Part Two is devoted to agreement-based diagnostics for shared content.

Benefit sharing has been a recurrent theme in international debates for the past two decades. However, despite its prominence in law, medical ethics and political philosophy, the concept has never been satisfactorily defined. In this conceptual paper, a definition that combines current legal guidelines with input from ethics debates is developed. Philosophers like boxes; protective casings into which they can put concisely-defined concepts. Autonomy is the human capacity for self-determination; beneficence denotes the virtue of good deeds, coercion is the intentional (...) threat of harm and so on. What about benefit sharing? Does the concept have a box and are the contents clearly defined? The answer to this question has to be no. The concept of benefit sharing is almost unique in that various disciplines use it regularly without precise definitions. In this article, a definition for benefit sharing is provided, to eliminate unnecessary ambiguity. (shrink)

This paper presents a single case-study of a longitudinal shared reading programme that took place in Dutch kindergartens with first language speakers of 4 to 6 years old. As will be shown, children participate both in a traditional instructional structure and in a participation framework characterised by a more or less free discussion. These structures establish an optimal learning environment both together and in relationship to each other. Our case study demonstrates how the teacher and the pupils participate in (...) these successive frameworks and how this supports the construction of conceptual knowledge. It will be shown that participation during shared reading of picture books at kindergarten is directly linked to interactional learning opportunities. (shrink)

This chapter offers a comprehensive road-map of contemporary philosophical issues pertaining to the intersubjectivity of thought and the role of thought in communication and coordination. It thus sheds light on an area of the philosophical research that has undergone a considerable boom in the last few decades. Along the way, it traces contemporary conceptions of thought sharing and intersubjectivity back to the works of Gottlob Frege and, more recently, Kit Fine; provides an introduction to the increasingly popular relational models of (...) thought individuation and their varied understandings of the key concept of coordination; draws a distinction between subjective-first and intersubjective-first approaches to the intersubjectivity of thought and connects it to fundamental debates such as that between internalism and externalism; examines recent disputes about whether successful communication requires thinkers to grasp the same thoughts; and summarizes and locates the contributions of _Sharing Thoughts_ in the road-map thus presented. (shrink)

What is it to share the same concept? The question is an important one since sharing the same concept explains our ability to non-accidentally coordinate on the same topic over time and between individuals. Moreover, concept identity grounds key logical relations among thought contents such as samesaying, contradiction, validity, and entailment. Finally, an account of concept identity is crucial to explaining and justifying epistemic efforts to better understand the precise contents of our thoughts. The key question, then, is what psychological (...) and social facts could play these roles? Elsewhere, we have argued for a specific relational model of concept identity, the connectedness model (e.g. Schroeter 2012, Schroeter and Schroeter 2014, 2015). Our aim in this chapter is to further explain the motivations behind that account, to address worries about transitivity and vagueness, and to contrast our approach with closely related accounts of concept identity developed by François Recanati and Simon Prosser. -/- What’s distinctive of our approach is that we seek to vindicate the first-person epistemic perspective of concept users. Concepts, on our account, play a crucial normative role in setting regulative ideals for the representational practices in which individual subjects participate. This focus on the normative role of concepts – as opposed to a purely causal explanatory role – motivates our approach to concept identity and our toleration of vagueness and borderline cases. (shrink)

However broad or vague the notion of connexivity may be, it seems to be similar to the notion of relevance even when relevance and connexive logics have been shown to be incompatible to one another. Relevance logics can be examined by suggesting syntactic relevance principles and inspecting if the theorems of a logic abide to them. In this paper we want to suggest that a similar strategy can be employed with connexive logics. To do so, we will suggest some properties (...) that seem to be hinted at in Nelson’s work. Following this strategy will ideally shed some light over the notion of content and will also help make a clear comparison between relevance and connexive logics. (shrink)

If we were to connect two individuals’ brains together, how would this affect the individuals’ conscious experiences? In particular, it is possible for two people to share any of their conscious experiences; to simultaneously enjoy some token experiences while remaining distinct subjects? The case of the Hogan twins—craniopagus conjoined twins whose brains are connected at the thalamus—seems to show that this can happen. I argue that while practical empirical methods cannot tell us directly whether or not the twins share conscious (...) experiences, considerations about the locality of content processing in the brain entails that they most likely do so. (shrink)

As AI systems become increasingly competent language users, it is an apt moment to consider what it would take for machines to understand human languages. This paper considers whether either language models such as GPT-3 or chatbots might be able to understand language, focusing on the question of whether they could possess the relevant concepts. A significant obstacle is that systems of both kinds interact with the world only through text, and thus seem ill-suited to understanding utterances concerning the concrete (...) objects and properties which human language often describes. Language models cannot understand human languages because they perform only linguistic tasks, and therefore cannot represent such objects and properties. However, chatbots may perform tasks concerning the non-linguistic world, so they are better candidates for understanding. Chatbots can also possess the concepts necessary to understand human languages, despite their lack of perceptual contact with the world, due to the language-mediated concept-sharing described by social externalism about mental content. (shrink)

Despite the widespread popularity of the Creating Shared Value discourse, its ‘business case’ and ‘win–win’ rhetoric remain problematic. This paper adds an inclusive development perspective to the debate, arguing that analysing CSV strategies through an inclusivity lens contributes to a better operationalisation of societal value; makes tensions and contradictions between economic and societal value explicit and uncovers processes of inclusion, exclusion and adverse inclusion. We illustrate this by analysing Nestlé’s CSV strategy in its cocoa supply chains in Ghana based (...) on content analysis of company documents, interviews with value chain actors and stakeholders, and focus groups with farmers. We ask how Nestlé frames and implements its CSV discourse in practice and how this relates to the social, relational and environmental dimensions of inclusive development. Findings show how the company addresses inclusive development dimensions in its corporate discourse, practices and business operations, and what trade-offs it faces. We then unmask the inherent tension between business objectives and societal interests and explain why the scope, issues addressed and societal impacts of CSV remain constrained. We conclude that CSV can help reduce a company’s impact on some persistent societal issues, but that its contribution to transformational change remains limited because the need to uphold competitive advantages and short-term financial performance narrows its ability to address all inclusivity dimensions. Legislation mandating responsible business conduct and due diligence can reduce this inherent tension by levelling the playing field between companies addressing inclusivity issues vis-à-vis those who do not. (shrink)

With the popularity of social network platforms, users can easily build social connections with others, create content, and even forward or share content. While previous studies on content sharing shed light on either content creator or receiver, this paper is to investigate whether, when, and how the social connectedness of content creator and receiver jointly influence the sharing likelihood of receiver. We conducted a field study on the largest social media platform and two experiments in (...) China. Study 1 found that well-connected receivers prefer to share content from well-connected employee, and poorly connected receivers prefer to share content from poorly connected employee, but if the content contains promotional information, well-connected receivers are less likely to share it from the well-connected employee. Studies 2 and 3 confirmed these findings and verified that self-enhancement motivation acts as a mediator. The findings suggest that firm should choose the “right” employees who will send content to their “right” friends and caution about the crowd-out effect of promotional content. We provide new insights into the joint effects of creator and receiver, the moderating role of promotional content, and the mediating role of self-enhancement, which enriches both viral marketing and social media literature. (shrink)

This chapter explains the rationale behind the book. It provides basic definitions of the concept of the sharing economy as well as the primary meanings related to the subject of the analysis undertaken in the subsequent chapters. This Introduction also includes a description of the main benefits of the analysis of the sharing economy from a European perspective. It highlights that the idea of the book emerged from the collaboration of most co-authors in the COST Action CA16121 ‘From Sharing to (...) Caring: Examining Socio-Technical Aspects of the Collaborative Economy.’ Finally, the outline of the book is presented, providing a description of the content of each chapter within this academic collection. (shrink)

This chapter examines the worry that acknowledging cultural claims serves to emphasize how citizens differ from each other rather than what they share in common and therefore undermines the solidarity that is meant to bind together members of a diverse democratic community. According to this view, not only does a robust multiculturalist approach undermine solidarity, but any attempt to build solidarity violates the commitments that multiculturalism is to supposed hold. In response to these worries, this chapter argues that communal solidarity (...) is important to a well-functioning democracy _and_ that attempts to build solidarity both can and must be sensitive to the cultural diversity that characterizes democratic states. It offers an account of the content of a _shared public culture_ on which communities can build robust multicultural solidarity. (shrink)

Research projects sponsored by rich countries or companies and carried out in developing countries are often described as exploitative. One important debate about the prevention of exploitation in research centres on whether and how clinical research in developing countries should be responsive to local health problems. This paper analyses the responsiveness debate and draws out more general lessons for how policy makers can prevent exploitation in various research contexts. There are two independent ways to do this in the face of (...) entrenched power differences: to impose restrictions on the content of benefit-sharing arrangements, and to institute independent effective oversight. Which method should be chosen is highly dependent on context. (shrink)

The paper looks at the intersection of extended cognition and social cognition. The central claim is that the mechanisms of shared intentionality can equally be considered as coupling mechanisms of cognitive extension into the social domain. This claim will be demonstrated by investigating a detailed example of cooperative action, and it will be argued that such cases imply that socially extended cognition is not only about cognitive vehicles, but that content must additionally to be taken into account. It (...) is finally outlined how social content externalism can in principle be grounded in socially extended cognition. (shrink)

On the premise that people achieve knowledge of things by sharing mental resources, what are the scope and philosophical significance of acts of shared intentionality in social discourse? Some philosophers and scientists of social cognition, most notably Jane Heal and Michael Tomasello, have drawn upon insights about the capacity of individual people to share mental resources and contents to argue for the importance of sociality in shaping mental activity. In this paper, I synthetize these strands of research with the (...) aim of comparing different claims about shared intentionality, and facilitate an assessment in the debate on the social aspects of self and mentality. (shrink)

This study explored the lived experience of security and contentment, and their absence, for latency-aged children living in shared-time parenting arrangements following their parents’ separation. A descriptive phenomenological methodology was utilized. Sixteen children living in shared-time were interviewed about their experiences of two phenomena: “feeling secure and content living in shared-time” and “not feeling secure and content living in shared-time.” The eight richest protocols were selected for analysis. The two resultant general structures and their (...) core constituents are presented, and individual variations discussed. Central to each phenomenon is the parent/s’ capacity, or incapacity, to create and sustain a physical and emotional space in which the child feels secure and held in the mind, feels the arrangements are responsive to their needs, feels free to access the “absent” parent, and experiences integration between the two parental homes. Implications for phenomenological human science research are considered, including the use of descriptive phenomenology with children. (shrink)

When one communicates that they are in pain, it is often assumed that the speaker is providing an assertion or report. Call this the cognitivist stance of pain utterances. Nevertheless, many sentential pain utterances seem to have both assertive and imperatival communicative content in virtue of expressing both the speaker's pain belief and the pain experience, respectively. I call this view hybrid expressivism about pain. In this paper, I take the imperativist idea of pain seriously and show that, via (...) an expression relation, pain utterances inherit the imperative and motivational force of the pain. A hybrid expressivist stance better explains why pain utterances often have the perlocutionary effect of eliciting care from others, and it can provide a new understanding of what it means to silence one's pain. (shrink)

Living together is a joint activity. Joint activity involves shared intention. The basic problem in understanding shared intention is knowing what exactly it is that is shared in shared intention. Intention can be analyzed in terms of content, subject, and mode. Content-accounts of shared intention argue that sharedness is limited to content. Subject-accounts argue that shared intentions involve a shared intentional subject. Mode-accounts argue that shared intention involves a special (...) intentional mode. Each of the three alternative accounts struggles with serious objections. The strongest objection against subject-accounts, however, relies on a misconception of the intentional subject. (shrink)

This chapter is the second of three that sets out a metaphysics of linguistic representation, and here I turn to the key ingredient of linguistic convention. The focus is on a tension between the apparently individualistic character of the metaphysics of mental representation given by Radical Interpretation, and the presupposition of shared mental content apparently presupposed by appeals to linguistic convention. By considering the way in which beliefs about others’ beliefs influence the metaphysics of mental representation, the apparent (...) tension is resolved. Either belief-attributions characterize others’ mental states indirectly, as having content somehow related to the contents used to characterize them, or they don’t. In the first case, there is no presupposition of shared mental content in the characterization of conventions. In the second case, there is such a presupposition, but Radical Interpretation will predict that there is metasemantic pressure to attribute shared content. (shrink)

Strawson style counterexamples to Grice’s account of communication show that a communicative intention has to be overt. Saying what overtness consists in has proven to be difficult for Gricean accounts. In this paper, I show that a common explanation of overtness, one that construes it in terms of a network of shared beliefs or knowledge, is mistaken. I offer an alternative, collectivist, model of communication. This model takes the utterer’s communicative intention to be a we-intention, a kind of intention (...) with a distinctive content that cannot be reduced to an intention in favor of an individual action. I show that the collectivist model can explain overtness in terms of a general feature of we-intentions, namely the requirement that the participants in a shared activity are to intend to act in accordance with meshing subplans. (shrink)

In the majority of academic institutions nursing and medical students receive a traditional education, the content of which tends to be specific to their future roles as health care professionals. In essence, each curriculum design is independent of each course. Over the last decade, however, interest has been accumulating in relation to interprofessional and multiprofessional learning at student level. With the view that learning together during their student training would not only encourage and strengthen future collaboration in practice settings (...) but also enhance patient care, the University of Dundee decided to run a pilot study to explore shared teaching in ethics between medical and nursing students. This article presents a report on the reasons for selecting health care ethics as a precursor for shared teaching, the educational tool used for the sessions, and the results of student and facilitator evaluation of the short course. Overall, despite problems such as poor attendance by some students, and facilitation and timetable difficulties, most of the feedback from students and facilitators has been positive. In essence the ‘idea’ has gone from strength to strength and there are now three levels of shared teaching in ethics between nursing and medical students, with plans to include further sessions with students from other disciplines. Within the text, ‘health care ethics’ will be referred to as ‘ethics’; nursing students/nurses encompasses midwifery students/midwives. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, we will first give a historic overview of the concept of benefit sharing and its appearance in official agreements, particularly with respect to crop genetic resources. It will become clear that, at present, benefit sharing is primarily considered as an instrument of compensation or exchange, and thus refers to commutative justice. However, we believe that such a narrow interpretation of benefit sharing disregards, and even undermines, much of its (historical) content and potency, especially where crop (...) genetic resources are concerned. We argue that benefit sharing should not be based merely on commutative justice but rather on a broader model that is also grounded in the concept of distributive justice. This has repercussions for the application of benefit sharing, which we try to clarify by distinguishing between downstream and upstream benefit sharing. Upstream benefit sharing is not so much inspired by compensation for actions done, or the distribution downstream of benefits developed, but by the idea of shared decision‐making on the research and development of resources fundamental to human welfare. Going upstream in the research process of crop genetic resources, and determining research agendas and improving crops according to the needs of the poor, benefit sharing may well be a tool to contribute to world food security and global justice. We concretize our ideas on upstream benefit sharing by introducing a set of criteria that determine the success of consultations on agricultural research agenda setting. (shrink)

It is natural to think that successful communication takes place between two people when a single propositional content is expressed by the first and understood by the second. This ‘shared content’ or ‘shared thought’ view also provides a natural account of agreement and disagreement. In this chapter, I defend the shared thought view. Specifically, I argue in favour of an externalist shared thought view and against an internalist non-shared thought view, focusing on Pollock’s (...) claim that in cases of communication, agreement, and disagreement, ‘the possibility for shared thought is not a necessity … but, at best, an irrelevance’. In responding to Pollock, I show more generally why an externalist shared thought view is preferable to an internalist non-shared thought view. (shrink)

Assuming that social media is mainly composed of unsupervised and anonymous content, it is an important problem that the younger generation and students’ attitudes towards content related to various aspects of religious life such as belief, worship, community, morality and mind set. In this study, it has been examined the attitudes of active social media user theology faculty students towards social media sharing related with religious content. In addition, it has been analysed whether the social media religious (...) sharing attitudes of students differ according to gender, the term in which they are studying, the university where they are studying, daily internet usage time and daily social media usage time. Quantitative relational survey model was preferred in the research. The sample consists of 450 students studying in different 22 Theology Faculties located in various cities. In the research, data were collected by using survey technique and developed a social media religious sharing scale. According to the factor analysis results, it was seen that the scale items were divided under two factors named “religious content evaluation” and “religious content sharing”. The analysis of the data was performed with the SPSS package program. T test and variance analysis (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the differentiation between social media religious sharing attitude and independent variables. As a result, it was found that the sample had an investigate attitude towards religious content in social media and they generally behave investigating while evaluating the religious contents they encounter, and they are relatively less investigatory when they share religious contents. (shrink)

Understanding positive emotions' shared and differentiating features can yield valuable insight into the structure of positive emotion space and identify emotion states, or aspects of emotion states, that are most relevant for particular psychological processes and outcomes. We report two studies that examined core relational themes (Study 1) and expressive displays (Study 2) for eight positive emotion constructs—amusement, awe, contentment, gratitude, interest, joy, love, and pride. Across studies, all eight emotions shared one quality: high positive valence. Distinctive core (...) relational theme and expressive display patterns were found for four emotions—amusement, awe, interest, and pride. Gratitude was associated with a distinct core relational theme but not an expressive display. Joy and love were each associated with a distinct expressive display but their core relational themes also characterised pride and gratitude, respectively. Contentment was associated with a distinct expressive display but not a core relational theme. The implications of this work for the study of positive emotion are discussed. (shrink)

Most linguists think that there are infinitely many sentences, that languages are productive and systematic. Maybe the most remarkable achievement of our lives is that we learn this thing with infinite power. But the whole thing hangs on those sentences being built up out of their components, which are words. So it’s not even clear what one of the more striking theses in the development of linguistics over the last half century signifies or means without an account of the atoms, (...) so to speak, out of which we build these things. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Sharing BreathJody Sperling (bio)My work as choreographer dwells on the inseparability between breath and atmosphere. There are no firm boundaries between the air we breathe in, the air surrounding us, and the air enveloping the planet. This is as true for air as it is for water—there is only one global ocean, although by convention we divide the seas into named regions. When you move through the (...) ocean of air enveloping you, you displace it and create dynamic unseen wakes in your midst.Beginning with my dance, "Turbulence" (2011),1 I sought to visualize such patterns of air disturbance into kinetic sculptural forms. To do so, the six dancers deployed Loie Fuller-style costumes, disquieting the air and materializing its gyrations. An early innovator of performance technology, Fuller danced in robes fashioned from hundreds of yards of silk with embedded wands that extended her body's motion into space. Serendipitously introduced to Fuller's work in 1997, I became seduced by the genre for the way it imbues the doer with an expanded sense of self. Whirling in the Fuller-style garments, I felt, and still feel, integrated into the atmosphere as an eddy or gust.With "Wind Rose" (2019),2 a collaboration with composer Matthew Burtner, I focused on making the connections between breath and wind palpable. Wind is said to be the breath of the planet, a driver of earthly life. A windrose is a meteorological tool that graphically represents wind speed, direction and variability at a particular time and place. I thought, what if I designed choreography with the intention not to create human motion, but in order to create a windrose—an atmospheric snapshot—in the performing space? At the start of "Wind Rose," the five dancers stand shoulder to shoulder and circle the stage so as to forge a human turbine. As the dancers accelerate their cyclonic motion, they push a swelling air wave towards the audience.For another section, I choreographed eight motions, each of which was connected with a sound. The sounds were made either by the dancers whipping their Fuller-style costumes through the air or by the dancers' breathy vocalizations. Matthew took my eight sound-breath-moves and composed a fugue. The dancers perform this music-motion score so that [End Page 155] they stir up a breeze pattern—a fugue that can be felt, as well as seen and heard.Wind has been changing along with climate. Locally, winds are becoming more chaotic. Globally, the high winds are slowing down and the polar jet stream is becoming wonky. But we are not in the habit of listening to the changing winds. One of the root causes of climate inaction has been a deep disconnect between people and their atmosphere. Many among the privileged live out their lives in climate-controlled habitats. Recently, though, even wealthy nations and the elite are starting to feel the heat. These days, no matter how deeply you bury your head in the sand, your butt will still get scorched.As a way of grappling with life in the Anthropocene, I have been formulating an open inquiry called ecokinetics. I conceived ecokinetics as a choreographic corollary to ecoacoustics, an environmental mode of music composition pioneered by Matthew Burtner, my long-time musical collaborator. According to Matthew, "ecoacoustics embeds environmental systems into musical and performance structures using new technologies" (Burtner). Ecokinetics asks, how can we relate human movement to environmental systems? How can choreography (aesthetically patterned human motion) illuminate, echo, expand upon the movement vectors present at a site and help us better understand local ecologies? How can dance entwine with media technologies to embody the processes of natural systems? Ecokinetics is part personal movement practice, part pedagogical tool, and part performance methodology.In its essence, ecokinetics repudiates the separation of humans from nature, a pervasive Colonialist mindset that needs constant undoing. In order to make progress on climate change, we must feel—truly and deeply—that we are part of the planet and not apart from it. This is the opposite of what the billionaires' space club aims to accomplish. Bezos, Branson, and Musk, et al. view distance from Earth as a... (shrink)

Taking a Darwinian approach, we propose that people reason to detect free-riders on the Wason Selection task with the sharing-rule; If one receives the resource, one is an in-group member (standard), or If one is an in-group member, one receives the resource (switched). As predicted, taking the resource-provider's perspective, both undergraduates and children (11 to 12 years old) checked for the existence of out-group members taking undeserved resource. Changing the perspective to that of the resource-recipient did not alter the selection (...) pattern in undergraduates, although the prediction was that another type of free-riding -failure to share by resource-provider- would be checked as well. However, by removing confounding factors in the materials, both undergraduates and children checked for both types of free-riding, which fully supports the prediction. These results indicate that the sharing-rule elicits a thematic content effect that cannot be explained by preceding deontic reasoning theories. (shrink)

This book provides an account of discursive or reason-governed cognition, by synthesizing research in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and evolutionary anthropology. -/- Using the grasp of a natural language as a model for the autonomous or self-governed rationality of discursive cognition, the author uses a semantics for individual intentions, shared intentions, and normative attitudes as a framework for understanding what it is to be a rational animal. This semantics interprets claims about shared intentions and (...) claims about what people ought and may do as the expression of plans of action that involve taking the points of view of other people within a community. This has important consequences for our understanding of both the natural basis and the social relevance of intentional and normative mental states. In order to distinguish the strong and weak modal force, which characterizes normativity but not shared intentionality, the author argues that a notion of single-minded practical cognition is necessary. This account of single-mindedness is then used to shed light on the autonomy or self-government characteristic of discursive cognition, as manifest in a linguistic community whose members are able to adopt the standpoints of others. -/- Drawing together research in philosophy and the related sciences, the formal account of the semantic content of the claims we use to give expression to shared intentional and normative mental states integrates well with research in cognitive science, evolutionary anthropology, and social psychology concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of shared intentionality and norm psychology in human beings and other primates. The Single-Minded Animal will appeal to researchers and advanced students working on shared intentionality, normativity, rationality, cognitive science, social and developmental psychology, and evolutionary anthropology. (shrink)

The advent of the sharing/gig economy has created new forms of employment embedded in new labor practices. Advocates of the sharing economy frame it in salutary terms, lauding its sustainability, decentralization, and employment-generation capabilities. The workers of the gig economy are seen as independent contractors under law rather than employees, and the owners of the gig economy platforms celebrate this categorization as a form of entrepreneurship. In this paper, we use insights from the entrepreneurship literature to examine this claim critically. (...) Taking Uber as an exemplar, we look at the arguments behind the company’s contention that its drivers are actually “partners” who are engaged in entrepreneurship, and demonstrate why these claims are problematic. We utilize a stakeholders’ theory framework that initiates a dialogue between ethics and entrepreneurship in order to focus on the mechanisms that help ensure ethical practices in the sharing economy and to examine the efficacy of these mechanisms. We also discuss the role of the entrepreneurship literature in promoting entrepreneurial behaviors that lead to income inequality. We conclude by arguing that the sharing economy reflects the intensification of an ongoing neoliberal trend that misuses the concept of entrepreneurship in order to justify certain forms of employment practices, and make a case for regulatory oversight. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Sharing God’s Company: A Theology of the Communion of Saints by David Matzko McCarthyMark RyanSharing God’s Company: A Theology of the Communion of Saints By David Matzko McCarthy GRAND RAPIDS: WILLIAM B. EERDMANS, 2012. 182 PP. $28.00What is the meaning of “communion” as it occurs in Christian references to the “Communion of Saints”? It clearly implies a particular social bond, but of what sort? David Matzko McCarthy (...) observes that recent attempts to account [End Page 192] for the saints and Christians’ relations with them tend to thin out the meaning of communion. Modern approaches turn saints into exemplars intended to inspire us as we live within egalitarian, leveled societies, whereas postmodern approaches turn the lives of the saints into texts, subject to interpretive play. In both approaches the possibility of real relationship is left behind as the saints become subservient to our modern sensibilities. What McCarthy seeks to revive is substantial, real relationships with saints that can draw us out of ourselves.In chapters 1 and 2 McCarthy uses the family to indicate the strong bonds signified by the Communion of Saints (COS)—bonds that respond to our “social desire.” The COS extends such kinship across time and space, without banishing ordinary time and particular places. Yet the kind of social tie embodied in the COS has been rendered a problem by our modern biases with regard to knowledge, representation, and social life—in short, our sense of reality. If we are to enrich our participation in the COS, McCarthy implies, we must work the metaphysical ground to make it a little more hospitable to the lives of the saints. The remaining chapters consider how the reality embodied in the COS challenges modern sensibilities with regard to what is real. They do so by allowing literary and visual representations of the saints—in hagiography, scripture, statues, and painting—to interrogate modern forms of representation and the assumptions about reality and time that underlie these forms.McCarthy uses Beverly Donofrio’s Looking for Mary to exemplify the trajectory of his book. Donofrio weaves together her own life and her pilgrimage to Medjugorge with the story of Mary from the Annunciation to the present day. Of particular importance, she narrates a transformation whereby her personal stories are engrafted into the life of Mary, rather than the other way around. In this, her story illustrates how Mary becomes the key agent in de-centering the author’s life as an autonomous agent, and resituating it in the COS with Mary as her patron and route. It shows the difference between an approach to the saints that domesticates them for use in our world and one where we surrender and become part of theirs.McCarthy’s previous work is notable for its concern with family and neighborhood as the practical context, or “home,” for the Christian life. In this book, “the question of home goes deeper. Does our life together here and now have any connection to the course of things and to life as a whole?” (8) In his introduction to the inaugural issue of the Journal of Moral Theology, which he edits, he mapped out the terrain of moral theology between “hyper-enchantment,” which seeks a magic bullet for modern ills, and impersonal mechanism, which posits a “nature” abstracted from human meanings. In this book, he begins to present a fuller vision of this terrain in the form of a kinship that stretches across time and place. As he writes, “The saints and their lives embody an [End Page 193] incarnational reality; they populate the borderlands between the future and now, there and here, and heaven and earth. … They bring ordinary life and people into a real experience of communitas” (53).The book is relevant to Christian ethics, then, because of its account of what we want most, and the moral ecology in which such desire could be at home. It is tempting to treat the COS as an optional “extra” to be added to the “factory model” of moral goodness in the Christian life. McCarthy’s exceptional gift is displayed in showing us how ordinary and basic is our desire to be part... (shrink)

Benedikt von Liel provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the concept of Creating Shared Value (CSV). In the theoretical analysis, the author assesses the uniqueness of the theory of Creating Shared Value by comparing it to other relevant social responsibility concepts. The empirical analysis provides insights from over 60 industry case studies of Creating Shared Value. The assessment includes the influence of geography as well as a range of other relevant external and internal factors. As a (...) result, the author identifies critical success factors for the creation of shared value. Contents Theoretical introduction into Creating Shared Value Comparative analysis of CSV theory and related concepts Empirical study of CSV's unique elements < Impact of geography and other success factors for CSV Target Groups < Researchers and students in the field of business ethics and corporate social responsibility Businessmen interested and responsible for the social activities of companies The Author Benedikt von Liel studied Business and Mechanical Engineering at the Technical University of Karlsruhe before gaining industry experience at an international management consulting company. The practical experience triggered further interest in the combination of profit maximization and ethical driven business decisions. For this reason, the author researched the field of Creating Shared Value obtaining his PhD at the Technical University of Munich. (shrink)

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, (...) this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds. (shrink)

Contemporary semantics assumes two influential notions of context: one coming from Kaplan (1989), on which contexts are sets of predetermined parameters, and another originating in Stalnaker (1978), on which contexts are sets of propositions that are “common ground”. The latter is deservedly more popular, given its flexibility in accounting for context-dependent aspects of language beyond manifest indexicals, such as epistemic modals, predicates of taste, and so on and so forth; in fact, properly dealing with demonstratives (perhaps ultimately all indexicals) requires (...) that further flexibility. Even if we acknowledge Lewis (1980)’s point that, in a sense, Kaplanian contexts already include common ground contexts, it is better to be clear and explicit about what contexts constitutively are. Now, Stalnaker (1978, 2002, 2014) defines context-as-common-ground as a set of propositions, but recent work shows that this is not an accurate conception. The paper explains why, and provides an alternative. The main reason is that several phenomena (presuppositional treatments of pejoratives and predicates of taste, forces other than assertion) require that the common ground includes non-doxastic attitudes such as appraisals, emotions, etc. Hence the common ground should not be taken to include merely contents (propositions), but those together with attitudes concerning them: shared commitments, as I will defend. (shrink)

What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, (...) and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. My analysis states that we act together just in case our activities conform to a plan and that plan figures in an explanation of our activities’ joint conformity to it. To sloganize: shared activity is plan‐coordinated activity. Sometimes, plan‐coordination goes by way of shared intentions. However, besides shared intentions, there are at least two additional families of agency‐sharing mechanisms. The first features a central planner who determines the content of a plan and attributes the different parts of that plan to a collection of agents. The second does away with the planner and involves a roughly Darwinian selection of patterns of activity. Both families of mechanisms enable us to act together even in the absence of shared intentions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and PatientsDan W. Brock (bio)IntroductionShared treatment decision making, with its division of labor between physician and patient, is a common ideal in medical ethics for the physician-patient relationship.1 Most simply put, the physician's role is to use his or her training, knowledge, and experience to provide the patient with facts about the diagnosis and about the prognoses without treatment (...) and with alternative treatments. The patient's role in this division of labor is to provide the values—his or her own conception of the good—with which to evaluate these alternatives, and to select the one that is best for himself or herself. As a rough guide to practice, this is a reasonable conception; most of the time it is likely to produce sound treatment decisions. However, as an ideal it is too simplistic, and is subject to several challenges that I will explore in this paper.Some challenges relate to the physician's role. This facts/values division of labor seems to assume that the physician can and should provide the facts about treatment alternatives in a value-neutral form. But some have questioned whether the sciences on which medicine is based are, or can be, value free. Moreover, the concepts of health and disease, and of the normal and pathological, are held by many to be value laden. And even if it is possible for physicians to provide only value-neutral facts to the patient, should the physicians' role be restricted in this way?Other challenges that I will present in the paper are to the patient's role [End Page 28] as provider of the values for the evaluation of the different treatment alternatives. One defense of this role is based on the claim that physicians are not in a position to know reliably what is in a patient's best interests (Buchanan, forthcoming). I believe at least as influential—even if often not explicitly stated—is an extreme subjectivism about values that assumes that the patient's own ultimate values, which define his or her own conception of the good, are incorrigible. By incorrigible, I mean they cannot be mistaken. In the standard case in which treatment is pursued for the patient's benefit, this extreme subjectivism is thought to support the patient's values guiding treatment decision making and treatment. I will explore this incorrigibility claim and will argue that on each of the main philosophical conceptions of the good for persons it is indefensible and should not be the basis for shared treatment decision making.Underlying this view of the physician-patient division of labor are assumptions and beliefs about the nature and relation of facts and values, and science and ethics, that are largely the legacy of a logical positivism that has long since been rejected by most philosophers. It is time that these unstable foundations for our normative ideal of the physician-patient relation were finally removed and replaced with more defensible underpinnings.Two Models of the Physician-Patient RelationshipPositivists insisted on a relatively sharp distinction between descriptive or empirical claims and science, on the one hand, and evaluative claims and ethics, on the other.2 Descriptive statements and the claims of science were to be true or false according to whether they in fact correctly described and explained the world. By remaining properly descriptive or empirical, science could, at least in principle, be entirely value neutral or value free.In its more extreme versions, positivism held that ethical judgments lacked cognitive content, but were instead expressions of emotions or attitudes, and as such could be neither true nor false, correct or mistaken. Because no evaluative statements were held to be logically entailed by any descriptive or empirical statements, moral reasoning was thought to be properly understood not as reasoning but as attempts at nonrational persuasion.3 Many drew from this an extreme subjectivism in ethics along the lines of what I have called above the incorrigibility thesis—there is no meaningful sense in which an individual's ultimate values defining his or her own conception of the good life could be mistaken, false, or unfounded.These... (shrink)

Large-scale linkage of international clinical datasets could lead to unique insights into disease aetiology and facilitate treatment evaluation and drug development. Hereto, multi-stakeholder consortia are currently designing several disease-specific translational research platforms to enable international health data sharing. Despite the recent adoption of the EU General Data Protection Regulation, the procedures for how to govern responsible data sharing in such projects are not at all spelled out yet. In search of a first, basic outline of an ethical governance framework, we (...) set out to explore relevant ethical principles and norms. We performed a systematic review of literature and ethical guidelines for principles and norms pertaining to data sharing for international health research. We observed an abundance of principles and norms with considerable convergence at the aggregate level of four overarching themes: societal benefits and value; distribution of risks, benefits and burdens; respect for individuals and groups; and public trust and engagement. However, at the level of principles and norms we identified substantial variation in the phrasing and level of detail, the number and content of norms considered necessary to protect a principle, and the contextual approaches in which principles and norms are used. While providing some helpful leads for further work on a coherent governance framework for data sharing, the current collection of principles and norms prompts important questions about how to streamline terminology regarding de-identification and how to harmonise the identified principles and norms into a coherent governance framework that promotes data sharing while securing public trust. (shrink)

Funders (located primarily in high‐income countries) and high‐income country researchers have historically dominated decision‐making within global health research collaborations: from setting agendas and research design to determining how data are collected and analysed and what happens with findings and outputs. The ethical principle of shared decision‐making has been proposed as a way to help address these imbalances within collaborations and to reduce semicolonial and exploitative forms of global health research. It is important to be clear about what shared (...) decision‐making means in order to ensure that it is not done in a tokenistic, shallow way. Thus far, the principle’s content has not been examined and articulated in detail. This paper aims to start the process of delineating a concept of fair shared decision‐making as a minimum standard for global health research. Using two hypothetical case examples, the paper will demonstrate that global health research practice is often inconsistent with ideal shared decision‐making. In such instances, it can be difficult to decide whether shared decision‐making within collaborations is fair. The paper describes how the two cases do not meet criteria for unfair or non‐ideal shared decision‐making, despite having potentially morally troubling features. The nuances of these examples of research practice help to generate clearer ideas about how to judge fairness in shared decision‐making. The paper concludes by presenting ideas about when soft power can be fairly employed between high‐income‐country and low‐ and middle‐income‐country partners and what fair compromise agreements may look like in shared decision‐making. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Data from digital technologies are increasingly integrated in public health research. In April of 2020, we interviewed a subset of participants who completed a survey approximately one month earlier. Using the survey, we contacted and interviewed participants who had expressed their willingness or unwillingness to share digital data for use in public health. We followed a directed content analysis approach for the analysis of the interview data. Among participants who had reported being unwilling to share data, concerns about (...) privacy, confidentiality, and the purpose of the research were cited. During the interviews, 76.9% of the participants who had who had previously indicated that they were unwilling to share their data, expressed willingness to share data in order to assist with COVID-19 prevention. Our results contribute to our understanding of people’s perspectives on sharing personal data and of the way their perspectives can vary as a function of potential uses of their personal information. (shrink)