Relativism and Monadic Truth

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne (2009)
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Abstract

Cappelen and Hawthorne present a powerful critique of fashionable relativist accounts of truth, and the foundational ideas in semantics on which the new relativism draws. They argue compellingly that the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth and falsity.

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Author Profiles

Herman Cappelen
University of Hong Kong
John Hawthorne
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument.Herman Cappelen - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett, Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Mental Files.Francois Recanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Creative Interpreter: Content Relativism and Assertion.Herman Cappelen - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):23-46.
Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy.David Plunkett - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):828-874.

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References found in this work

Y.Bernd Moeller & Bruno Jahn - 2005 - In Bernd Moeller & Bruno Jahn, Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie der Theologie und der Kirchen (DBETh). Berlin, New York: De Gruyter Saur. pp. 1437-1438.
17.Mark Lance & Margaret Olivia Little - 2006 - In James Dreier, Defending Moral Particularism. Blackwell. pp. 305--321.

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